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RESUMO E PALAVRAS-CHAVE 
Resumo: A criação de redes transfronteiriças de Áreas Marinhas Protegidas (AMPs) pode 
contribuir para que os Estados cumpram os objectivos internacionais de protecção das 
zonas marinhas sob sua jurisdicção. No entanto, a complexidade deste tipo de iniciativas 
requer uma análise cuidada dos requisitos governativos da cooperação entre Estados para 
a conservação dos recursos marinhos partilhados, assim como uma abordagem 
interdisciplinar em face da natureza do problema. Para guiar este estudo de casos em 
áreas transfronteiriças na África Austral, foi desenvolvido um enquadramento teórico 
baseado na governança ambiental, entendida aqui como resultando da combinação da 
teoria dos bens comuns e da teoria dos regimes. A teoria dos bens comuns forneceu o 
enquadramento analítico para fazer uma caracterização da situação existente em cada um 
dos locais de estudo. Esta tese centrou-se em duas áreas de estudo – as fronteiras entre 
Moçambique e a Tanzânia e entre Moçambique e a África do Sul – e em dois recursos 
marinhos específicos – recifes de coral e golfinhos-corcunda do Indo-Pacífico (Sousa 
chinensis). A teoria dos regimes suportou a análise do potencial de cooperação entre os 
países na criação de redes transfronteiriças de AMPs. 
A tese é composta por três partes. Da Parte I constam a Introdução (Capítulo 1), o 
enquadramento teórico (Capítulo 2) e a Metodologia (Capítulo 3), acima resumidas. A 
Parte II é formada por sete capítulos. Cada um destes capítulos consiste num artigo 
publicado, em impressão, ou submetido, os quais respondem à questão geral definida no 
Capítulo 1 e às questões específicas definidas no Capítulo 3. A Parte III consiste num 
capítulo único, Capítulo 11, onde são apresentadas as conclusões. 
No Capítulo 4, procedeu-se à análise das características ecológicas, ameaças e 
arranjos institucionais relacionados com os recifes de coral e os golfinhos-corcunda em 
cada uma das áreas de estudo. Os resultados sugerem que as AMPs transfronteiriças não 
são sempre a ferramenta mais adequada à conservação de recifes de corais e de golfinhos-
corcunda do Indo-Pacífico nas áreas transfronteiriças costeiras Moçambique-Tanzânia e 
Moçambique-África do Sul.  
No Capítulo 5, foram comparados os enquadramentos nacionais de governança 
relacionados com as AMPs nos três países para identificar pontos em comum e diferenças 
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nos seus procedimentos institucionais, princípios e valores, assim como a medida em que 
estes afectam a criação e gestão de AMPs transfronteiriças. Conclui-se que, apesar da 
modernidade dos enquadramentos legais e de policy dos três países, subsistem 
importantes diferenças e insuficiências que os países precisam de ter em conta se 
decidirem criar AMPs transfronteiriças. 
No Capítulo 6, analisou-se em que medida o direito ambiental internacional pode 
contribuir para a criação e gestão de AMPs transfronteiriças na África Austral. Concluiu-
se que, globalmente, a Convenção das Nações Unidas para o Direito do Mar e a 
Convenção sobre a Diversidade Biológica são os instrumentos-chave para a criação de 
AMPS e redes de AMPs transfronteiriças. Regionalmente, a Convenção de Nairobi, e 
especificamente o seu Protocolo sobre Áreas Protegidas, e o Protocolo sobre Vida 
Selvagem da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral, oferecem a base legal 
para criar e gerir redes transfronteiriças de AMPs. Concluiu-se ainda que é ao nível 
regional, e mais provavelmente aos níveis bilateral e trilateral, que uma abordagem 
política e legal será mais efectiva. 
No Capítulo 7, estudaram-se as perspectivas de criação de AMPs transfronteiriças 
recorrendo à teoria dos regimes. Concluiu-se que há um regime plenamente desenvolvido 
entre Moçambique e a África do Sul, o qual existe independemente do facto de ambos os 
países já terem proclamado uma AMP transfronteiriça entre eles. Por outras palavras, o 
“núcleo” do regime – ou seja, os seus princípios e normas – já existiam antes de os dois 
países terem declarado a AMP transfronteiriça, a qual veio a materializar as regras e 
procedimentos decisórios que também definem o regime. No caso de Moçambique e 
Tanzânia, não há um regime entre os dois países para a criação de AMPs transfronteiriças 
devido a princípios divergentes. 
No Capítulo 8, analisaram-se vários casos de conservação transfronteiriça marinha 
para propor cinco opções diplomáticas e de gestão para a criação de AMPs 
transfronteiriças entre os três países. As cinco opções apresentadas são: i) AMPs criadas e 
geridas independentemente nos dois lados da fronteira; ii) AMPs criadas e geridas 
independentemente, com mecanismos de partilha transfronteiriça de informação; iii) 
criação e gestão coordenadas de AMPs nos dois lados da fronteira; iv) estabelecimento 
conjunto de duas AMPs transfronteiriças nos três países; v) acordos diplomáticos e de 
gestão trilaterais/subregionais. Estas opções podem ser encaradas como um fim em si 
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mesmas, ou como passos no sentido de um crescente compromisso político entre os três 
países. 
No Capítulo 9, as redes transfronteiriças de AMPs são de novo trazidas para o 
centro da análise. O seu aparente eclipse nos capítulos precedentes explica-se pela 
revelação durante o trabalho de campo de que a criação de redes transfronteiriças de 
AMPs é vista por múltiplos actores como um passo posterior à criação de AMPs 
transfronteiriças. Este capítulo revisita esta ferramenta ao explorar as interações 
institucionais em redes de AMPs com AMPs geridas pelas comunidades. Procedeu-se à 
análise de dez dessas redes de AMPs, o que levou à conclusão de que as interacções 
institucionais consistem geralmente em trocas de informação e em questões de controle e 
autoridade. Estas podem ter influência sobre o sucesso das AMPs, mas os seus custos de 
transacção elevados aconselham a que a sua aplicação seja cuidadosamente avaliada. 
Finalmente, no Capítulo 10, explora-se o impacto da (não) delimitação de 
fronteiras marítimas sobre a cooperação entre Estados na criação de AMPs 
transfronteiriças. Esta linha de investigação é importante para o caso Moçambique-África 
do Sul, pois estes dois países ainda não delimitaram a sua fronteira marítima comum. 
Analisando três AMPs transfronteiriças, concluiu-se que, ao contrário do que é 
comummente entendido, a criação e gestão de uma AMP transfronteiriça não carece de 
fronteira marítima delimitada entre os Estados envolvidos, se não houverem questões de 
relevo relacionadas com a potencial fronteira marítima. 
Na Parte III da tese, consistindo no Capítulo 11, é apresentado um resumo das 
principais conclusões de cada capítulo da Parte II, sempre com referência à subquestão 
respectiva a que cada capítulo responde. É explicitado o contributo que a adopção de uma 
abordagem interdisciplinar deu à elaboração da tese e às suas conclusões, nomeadamente 
pela integração que faz da teoria dos bens comuns e da teoria dos regimes para aplicação 
ao estudo da conservação marinha transfronteiriça. São ainda referidos os contributos 
específicos da tese para o conhecimento científico, concretamente: a avaliação da 
adequação das AMPs transfronteiriças propostas para a conservação de recifes de coral e 
de golfinhos-corcunda em cada uma das áreas de estudo; a identificação de um regime 
completamente desenvolvido entre Moçambique e a África do Sul para AMPs 
transfronteiriças; a ausência de um regime entre Moçambique e a Tanzânia para AMPs 
transfronteiriças; a definição do contributo que a adopção de uma abordagem sub-
regional/trilateral para a criação de AMPs transfronteiriças nos três países pode dar para 
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se observarem progressos neste domínio; a identificação de uma estratégia de 
conservação marinha transfronteiriça que comece com a criação de AMPs 
transfronteiriças como um primeiro passo para a criação de redes transfronteiriças de 
AMPs. A principal implicação destas descobertas para a policy consiste na necessidade de 
comparar a criação de AMPs com outros instrumentos de gestão marinha, de modo a 
avaliar adequadamente qual o instrumento que melhor se adequa às condições concretas e 
objectivas do contexto específico em que se planeia a sua implementação. Finalmente, 
são propostas novas linhas de investigação que não foram exploradas nesta tese por 
estarem fora do seu âmbito. 
Palavras-chave: áreas marinhas protegidas; conservação transfronteiriça; África Austral; 
teoria dos bens comuns; teoria dos regimes. 
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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS 
Abstract  
Transboundary networks of marine protected areas (MPAs) can assist states in meeting 
MPA coverage targets set internationally. However, their complexity requires a careful 
examination of the requirements of cooperation between states for the conservation of 
shared natural resources, as well as an interdisciplinary approach given the nature of the 
problem. A theoretical framework based on environmental governance was developed to 
guide this case study in two selected border regions of coastal East Africa. The findings 
suggest that transboundary MPAs are not always the most appropriate tool for marine 
conservation of coral reefs and Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins in the Mozambique-
Tanzania and Mozambique-South Africa transboundary coastal regions. The three states 
have modern MPA governance frameworks, but these have important insufficiencies that 
would need to be addressed in the creation of transboundary MPAs. International 
environmental law provides an important legal foundation for the creation and 
management of transboundary MPAs, but a sub-regional approach may be more 
appropriate for cooperation. A regime exists between Mozambique and South Africa for 
transboundary MPA-making, but one is lacking between Mozambique and Tanzania, 
given the former state’s interest in hydrocarbon production overriding marine 
conservation concerns. Nevertheless, five options for cooperation in marine conservation 
are suggested, depicting an increasing degree of political commitment between the three 
states. MPA networks may be created to include community-based MPAs, making 
institutional interplay a potentially critical determinant of MPA success. However, its 
costs need also to be considered. Finally, it was found that the lack of delimited maritime 
boundaries between states does not necessarily hinder the creation of a transboundary 
MPA, particularly if there are no salient boundary issues at stake. States considering 
engaging in the creation and management of transboundary networks of MPAs with their 
neighbors are advised to consider the multiple aspects of such endeavors, as well as their 
implications.  
Keywords: marine protected areas; transboundary conservation; East Africa; common 
pool resource theory; regime theory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The world has seen unprecedented changes in the last century. Technological advances 
and economic development are at the root of closer economic, political, social, cultural 
and environmental integration and interdependency that characterize our globalized world 
(Keohane & Nye 2000). Though progressive integration and interdependence are not new 
phenomena, the spatial and temporal rate at which they take place are unprecedented. 
Economically, the lessening of barriers to trade has widened markets and allowed 
services, goods and capital to reach new places with a new intensity. Economic 
development, resulting in the emergence of new economies, has reshaped international 
politics by shifting the balance of power away from traditionally hegemonic nations like 
the US (Keohane 1984). Political power has not only shifted between states, but also 
away from them (Stoker 1998). Supranational coordination of trade and financial policies 
is performed by different technocratic organizations characterized by forms of 
governance that do not rely heavily on the nation-state. Simultaneously, States are 
cooperating and fostering organizations at the regional level, and relying on local actors 
to perform some of their roles. This multiplication of actors and dispersion of authority 
has taken place not only in relation to states, but also independently of them. Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are now major players at both the global and 
national levels, accompanied by global social movements that try to influence decision-
making at various levels of authority. Culturally, the integration of societies and the low 
cost of technologies have widened the range of communication possibilities, facilitating 
the circulation of knowledge and ideas. Finally, globalization has brought also global 
environmental change that affects much of the world’s population and that has altered the 
relationships between people and the environment (Young et al. 2006). Climate change is 
the most paradigmatic example of such global environmental problems.  
Globalization has contributed both to changes in how societies are governed and 
to the expansion of human activities that are associated with an increased degradation of 
our physical environment. Places left until recently unexplored and unexploited, like the 
oceans, are now plundered in the quest for more natural resources (Berkes et al. 2006; 
Introduction 
4 
Jackson et al. 2001). At the same time, globalization is also at the root of the emergence 
of new forms of cooperation propelled by the need to resolve old and new environmental 
problems. 
1.1.1 The Rise of Marine Protected Areas 
Increased interconnectedness has been paralleled by a recognition and growing awareness 
of the effects of human actions on the marine environment (Allison et al. 1998; Norse 
1993; Ray 1976). The level and extent of human activities impacting the oceans has 
caused unprecedented changes in their health. The discharge of waste has contaminated 
coastal and marine waters and food webs, disrupting ecosystems and creating areas void 
of productivity, i.e., “dead zones” (Diaz & Rosenberg 2008; GESAMP 2001). Fishing, an 
activity with declining productivity since the mid-1980s, is responsible for the 
overexploitation of marine resources and physical alteration of the marine environment 
(Tegner & Dayton 1999; Watson & Pauly 2001). Alien species disturb local food webs 
and often reduce marine biodiversity (Carlton 1996). Greenhouse gas emissions cause 
climate change, and are expected to change the geographical distribution of species and 
habitats, and acidify the oceans (Cicerone et al. 2004; Norse 1993). As a result, marine 
biodiversity and the provision of vital ecosystem services are threatened (GESAMP 1990; 
Halpern et al. 2008; Worm et al. 2006).  
The deterioration of ocean health has led to a stronger reliance on marine 
protected areas (MPAs) to protect marine biodiversity and recover degraded ecosystems. 
MPAs are widely acknowledged as important area-based tools for tackling declining 
marine biodiversity (Agardy 1997; Belfiore et al. 2004; Kelleher 1999) and ensuring 
viable fisheries (FAO 2007a; Kelleher 1999). They are portions of the marine 
environment primarily delimited for marine biodiversity conservation, and often for 
fisheries enhancement too (Boersma & Parrish 1999). The International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) defines MPAs as: 
“Any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its 
overlying water and associated flora, fauna, historical and 
cultural features, which has been reserved by law or other 
effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed environment” 
(IUCN 1988). 
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MPAs have been relatively successful as tools for marine biodiversity 
conservation and for fisheries management (Alder 1996; Allison et al. 1998). MPAs 
provide protection to vulnerable habitats and allow degraded ones to recover (Agardy 
2000). They can also protect certain species, if they are designed to address their life 
history and ecological characteristics (Carr et al. 2003). MPAs usually determine the 
prohibition of damaging activities, and/or restrictions to levels of less harmful resource-
extraction activities. These restrictions make MPAs a safe haven for many species, where 
they can grow and reproduce, and maintain their genetic diversity. By protecting 
particularly attractive habitats and the species that depend on them, MPAs can also 
contribute to tourism, and create alternative sources of income for fishers and coastal 
collectors affected by restrictions on their activities (Russ & Alcala 1999; White et al. 
2002).  
MPAs have been reported to support fisheries through the spill-over effect. If a 
MPA is created, individuals within it are expected to live longer, and have a greater 
reproductive output; surplus adults and larvae may exit the MPA; and the resulting 
biomass export could contribute to increased catches and improved recruitment outside its 
limits (Crowder et al. 2000; Roberts et al. 2001), supporting local fisheries and thus 
providing “benefits beyond boundaries” (Gell & Roberts 2003; Russ et al. 2004). Where 
sedentary species are targeted and/or multi-species fisheries are involved, MPAs appear 
to be particularly effective fisheries management tools when compared with catch limits, 
particularly in places where there are multiple landing sites (Gell & Roberts 2003; 
Hilborn et al. 2004; Williams 1998). 
MPA fishery effects have been particularly studied in the tropics, more precisely 
in relation to coral reefs, where relatively sedentary species abound (Christie & White 
2007; Francis et al. 2002; Pollnac et al. 2001; Rogers & Beets 2001; Russ & Alcala 1996; 
White et al. 2002). There is some evidence that the density and biomass of large 
predatory coral reef fish increased in certain MPAs (Russ & Alcala 1996), and that 
catches increased by more than 46% in areas adjacent to protected coral reefs (Roberts et 
al. 2001). However, it is not always clear how adult exports are affected by fishing effort 
displacement (Halpern et al. 2004). 
Despite their widely publicized benefits, MPAs are not without contention and 
often face serious limitations (Agardy et al. 2011). First, MPAs have often been 
established opportunistically, without consideration for the ecological characteristics of 
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the habitats and species they purport to protect (Roberts et al. 2003). Second, there are 
also MPAs that have been created without sufficient involvement of stakeholders in the 
planning and management phases (Lundquist & Granek 2005), resulting in great 
frustration when benefits are observable only in the long term (Andrews 1998; Claudet et 
al. 2008), and lack of compliance and effectiveness (Suuronen et al. 2010). Third, MPA 
effectiveness can also be seriously affected if MPAs are not articulated within integrated 
coastal management (Cicin-Sain & Belfiore 2005) and pollution-control measures 
(Boersma & Parrish 1999). Forth, MPAs can also cause impacts on their surroundings, 
particularly when they are created without consideration for local contexts (Ferse et al. 
2010). For example, MPAs that impose restrictions on fisheries can displace fishing effort 
(Mascia & Claus 2009; Mascia et al. 2010), which can become more concentrated in 
previously unexploited areas. Fifth, there are also MPAs that are not actively managed, 
creating the impression of protection and suggesting that MPAs are generally ineffective 
because of the lack of positive effects (Agardy et al. 2011). A final, and often less 
mentioned, limitation of MPAs concerns their role in fisheries management in temperate 
waters. The influence of MPAs on fisheries have been mostly studied in tropical 
environments (Spalding et al. 2008), where most fish species have high site fidelity. In 
contrast, temperate fishes have low site fidelity, hence the apparent positive effect of 
MPAs in tropical fisheries cannot be directly transposed to temperate ones (Laurel & 
Bradbury 2006; Shipp 2003).  
1.1.2 Global Support for Marine Protected Areas 
Though MPAs are not the only management tool capable of addressing threats to marine 
biodiversity, and in view of the multiple benefits of MPAs, environmental fora1 and 
international conventions have strongly supported their creation. MPAs have been 
advocated as tools to address the declining health of marine and coastal ecosystems since 
the 1960’s: the 1st and 2nd World Conferences on National Parks (Seattle, USA, 1962; 
Grand Teton National Park, USA, 1972) called for the establishment of marine parks and 
reserves and the conservation of samples of marine ecosystems (IUCN 1975); in 1975, 
                                                 
1
 Environmental fora in this context is understood as intergovernmental and non-governmental conference 
circuits in which representatives of all the nations, researchers, and environmental organizations gather to 
address environmental issues  that have a significant impact worldwide. Some fora, like the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development, are also attended by special interest groups, such as business organizations. 
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the IUCN Conference on Marine Parks and Reserves called for the designation of MPAs; 
in 1988, IUCN’s General Assembly approved Recommendation 17.38 urging for a global 
representative system of MPAs to be created; the 1992 World Parks Congress in Caracas 
released Recommendation 11 calling for a global network of MPAs. This strong support 
from the scientific and NGO communities for MPA creation (Agardy 2005) was 
reinforced by further decisions of similar fora, such as the 2003 World Parks Congress 
(WPC). WPC’s Recommendation 22 called for global MPA networks encompassing 20-
30% of each habitat (WPC 2003). Recently, the 2008 World Conservation Congress 
(WCC) approved Resolution 4.045 urging states to strengthen their efforts in MPA 
establishment (WCC 2008). 
More important, though, are the supportive decisions of inter-governmental fora, 
as these are able to influence domestic policies. The 1995 Jakarta Mandate and the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) have been widely invoked to 
support an increase in MPA coverage  (Agardy 2005; Belfiore et al. 2004; Boersma & 
Parrish 1999; Grant 2005). The 1995 Jakarta Mandate (Decision II/10 on the conservation 
and sustainable use of marine and coastal biological diversity) of the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) encourages parties to use integrated coastal and marine 
management frameworks as a tool to promote marine and coastal biodiversity. WSSD 
pledged for the establishment of representative networks of marine protected areas by 
2012 (UN 2002). 
Various NGOs and scholars have also been quite active in supporting the 
designation of marine reserves.  Marine reserves are a type of MPA, also known as “no-
take areas” 2, in which no extractive activities are allowed (Allison et al. 1998). They are 
promoted as a priority management tool for marine conservation (Roberts & Hawkins 
2000) based on the understanding that multiple-use MPAs do not afford as many benefits 
as marine reserves “because they do not provide the same comprehensive level of 
protection” (PISCO 2007). A 20-30% marine reserve coverage of the oceans has also 
been proposed as a means to ensure adequate protection to the marine environment 
(Bohnsack et al. 2002).  
                                                 
2
 Marine reserves may be found as a stand-alone unit of protection or may be imbedded in the zoning 
scheme of larger multiple-use MPAs. Marine reserves provide protection against all threats, while MPAs 
exclude at least one threat (Norse et al. 2003). 
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The support from inter-governmental and scientific fora has put pressure on 
governments to increase MPA coverage (Gillespie 2007). There are currently 4435 MPAs 
covering 2.35 million km2, or 0.65%, of the world’s seas (MPANews 2008; Wood 2007). 
This is quite a timid record, and the marine environment is still lagging behind its 
terrestrial counterpart, where more than 17 million km2, more than 11%, are covered by 
about 70.000 protected areas. Furthermore, if current rates of MPA creation are not 
improved, the 2012 target will only be met in 2083 (Wood et al. 2008). Even though 
MPAs are not infallible, expansion of their coverage is thus expected to continue.  
1.1.3 Marine Protected Areas and Current Trends in Environmental Governance 
Globalization has had profound effects in various dimensions of human societies, 
including in how they relate to their physical environment. The two most notorious of 
these effects are the emergence of a multitude of non-state actors, and the relinquishing of 
state authority to actors at larger and smaller scales.  
At the environmental level, and in particular in what concerns protected areas, the 
forces of globalization have produced particular trends that depict changes in how 
protected areas are conceived, established and governed (Zimmerer 2006). These trends, 
while associated generally with terrestrial protected areas, also have their parallels in the 
marine realm. 
First, protected area coverage has grown significantly. Expansion of MPA 
coverage has occurred by multiplication of existing forms of management, but also 
through the creation of new types of arrangements to govern protected areas. A paradigm 
shift from strict nature protection to harmonization of multiple uses aiming at 
sustainability of conservation is mirrored in the creation of IUCN’s protected area 
categories3 V and VI in 1992 (Locke & Dearden 2005; Phillips 2003). The emphasis that 
                                                 
3
 IUCN’s protected area categories are: Ia – Strict Nature Reserve: protected area managed mainly for 
science; Ib - Wilderness Area: protected area managed mainly for wilderness protection; II – National Park: 
protected area managed mainly for ecosystem protection and recreation; III – National Monument: 
protected area managed mainly for conservation of specific natural features; IV – Habitat/Species 
Management Area: protected area managed mainly for conservation through management intervention; V – 
Protected Landscape/Seascape: protected area managed mainly for landscape/seascape conservation and 
recreation; VI – Managed Resource Protected Area: protected area managed mainly for sustainable use of 
natural ecosystems (IUCN 1994). 
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is put on the fisheries benefits of MPAs reflects the recognition of the interdependency 
between conservation and the activities that might take place within and around MPAs.  
Second, the integration of human activities into protected areas planning is taking 
place within larger geographical scales than ever before (Zimmerer 2006). The use of 
larger planning units in conservation planning contributes to global efforts towards 
ecosystem-based management that captures both wider environmental processes and 
environment-human interactions (Grumbine 1996; Haeuber 1996; Slocombe 1993). Large 
marine ecosystems (LMEs) and marine ecoregions provide a rationale for large-scale 
conservation planning in the marine environment, (Beck & Odaya 2001; Leslie 2005; 
Miclat et al. 2006; Sherman 1994; Sherman et al. 2005; Spalding et al. 2007). Another 
feature of scaling-up efforts in biodiversity conservation is the design of protected areas, 
in both terrestrial and marine environments, as networks constituted by individual 
conservation units linked by dispersal corridors (Francis 2008). The expansion of marine 
environmental protection is expected to be partially achieved through the creation of 
networks of MPAs (IUCN-WCPA 2008). While individual MPAs could be large enough 
to encompass the geographical scale of the processes that sustain marine ecosystems and 
thus contribute to marine ecosystem-based management (Leslie 2005), potential 
ecological benefits could easily be offset by the costs of managing and enforcing 
regulations in such a large area (UNEP-WCMC 2008). Alternatively, MPAs can be 
organized as networks of individual conservation units linked by larval dispersal and 
recruitment and by juvenile and adult migrations (Christie et al. 2010; Gerber & Heppell 
2004; Lubchenco et al. 2003). A network of MPAs4 is  
“a collection of individual MPAs or reserves operating 
cooperatively and synergistically, at various spatial scales, and 
with a range of protection levels designed to meet objectives that 
a single reserve cannot achieve” (IUCN-WCPA 2008).  
Protecting sites that export larvae and adults (sources) to other places (sinks) can 
increase the effectiveness of the network (Crowder et al. 2000). By optimizing marine 
conservation efforts, all the individual MPAs in a network will occupy a smaller area than 
                                                 
4
 MPA networks are sometimes referred to as MPA systems. The term network is here preferred as it is 
perceived to speak to the inherent interconnectedness of its individual MPAs. Others have argued in favor 
of the term systems, because of their understanding of networks as a form of social structure (UNEP-
WCMC 2008). 
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if a single MPA was to be established covering the same range. In addition to 
connectivity, which is not synonymous to continuity between MPA units, other criteria 
for network design are representativeness and replication. MPAs in the network ensure 
protection to samples of each habitat, species or relevant biophysical features found in a 
particular ecosystem. Also, each habitat is included in more than an individual MPA. This 
provides a safeguard against stochastic events and other threats that might affect an 
individual MPA but not the whole network. As a result, each MPA does not necessarily 
include the same habitats as the others, or covers the same area of each habitat. MPA 
networks tend to span a wider geographical area, thus protecting a larger number of 
habitats and species but also affecting a larger number of people who use marine 
resources and often depend on them for their livelihoods. Experience with establishing 
MPA networks is still developing (Gaines et al. 2010). While it is consensual that MPA 
network creation must attend to ecological criteria, as well as socio-economic and 
institutional aspects, there seem to be different practices in this regard (IUCN-WCPA 
2008; UNEP-WCMC 2008). For example, in the Philippines, an MPA network has been 
created based on existing MPAs that were not initially set to constitute a network. 
Therefore, attention is being paid not only to ecological criteria but also to the 
institutional challenges posed by community-based management of each MPA unit within 
the network, namely community heterogeneity, external influences, and the fit between 
MPA networks as institutions and the marine environment (Lowry et al. 2009). 
Third, while scaling-up conservation planning acknowledges the natural borders 
of ecosystems, other forms of ecosystem-based conservation are emerging across political 
boundaries. Transboundary protected areas (TBPAs) are: 
“an area of land and/or sea that straddles one or more 
boundaries between states, sub-national units such as provinces 
and regions, autonomous areas and/or areas beyond the limits of 
national sovereignty or jurisdiction, whose constituent parts are 
especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of 
biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural 
resources, and managed co-operatively through legal or other 
effective means” (Sandwith et al. 2001).  
TBPAs represent a new paradigm in nature conservation initiated in 1925 with the 
creation of the Albert National Park by the Belgian colonial administration of Congo and 
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Rwanda-Urundi (van der Linde et al. 2001). Since then, more TBPAs have been created, 
particularly in the last two decades: in 1988, 70 transboundary protected areas had been 
identified, with that number increasing to 136 TBPAs in 1997 and to 180 adjoining 
protected areas in 2007 (Lysenko et al. 2007; Thorsell & Harrison 1990; Zbicz & Green 
1997). In the marine environment, experience in transboundary protected areas is still 
confined to a very few – though successful – cases. Examples of transboundary MPAs 
include the Turtle Islands Heritage Protected Area between Malaysia and the Philippines; 
the Red Sea Marine Peace Park between Israel and Jordan; the Pelagos Sanctuary for 
Mediterranean Marine Mammals, established jointly by France, Italy and Monaco; and 
the Wadden Sea between Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (Crosby et al. 2002; 
Enemark et al. 1998; Notarbartolo di Sciara et al. 2008; WWF-Philippines 2005). 
Fourth, and in clear contrast with the shift towards scaled-up and transboundary 
conservation planning efforts, protected areas are observing a scaling-down, or 
decentralization, of management and decision-making through the proliferation of 
community-based management, whereby affected and interested actors take an active part 
in decision-making (Dearden et al. 2005; Locke & Dearden 2005; Phillips 2003; Pimbert 
2003; Zimmerer 2006). The situation in the marine realm is not different. Science-based 
MPAs were initially created in a top-down fashion, promoted essentially by governments, 
with few or no support from local communities and a focus on set-aside (Jones 2002). As 
experience grew around the globe, distinct management arrangements emerged to deal 
with rising conflicts (Balint 2006). Community-based MPAs have proliferated in the last 
two decades, particularly in developing countries where people are more dependent on 
the marine environment (Alcala 1998; Christie & White 1997; Gerhardinger et al. 2009). 
More MPAs have been created by local communities, frequently with some government 
intervention, and greater emphasis on multiple use (Jones 2002). Many community-based 
MPAs have also been created in reaction to the absence of governmental intervention to 
address marine environmental problems (Luttinger 1997). Decentralization of MPA 
management has therefore resulted from the devolution of power to local communities, in 
some cases, and from collective action where centralized governments lacked capacity or 
will to address marine issues. Calls for greater attention to the human dimensions of 
MPAs have surfaced too in reaction to MPA failures (Christie 2004; Christie et al. 2003; 
Mascia 2003). 
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1.1.4 Transboundary Networks of Marine Protected Areas 
General trends in nature conservation are reflected in recent changes in marine 
conservation strategies. The number of MPAs has increased and is expected to expand 
further to meet international set coverage targets, namely the 2012 target of protection of 
20-30% of the marine environment, which also contributes to Goal #7 (Ensure 
Environmental Sustainability) of the Millennium Development Goals (CBD 2005; UN 
2008; Wood et al. 2008). Larger spatial scales are being adopted in marine conservation 
planning efforts worldwide, both by NGOs and national governments. Networks of 
marine protected areas are likely to make substantial contributions to MPA expansion 
efforts, as they afford conservation to the marine environment in a more efficient fashion 
than single, large MPAs (IUCN-WCPA 2008; UNEP-WCMC 2008). Scaling up marine 
conservation will often necessitate cooperation between states over their maritime 
borders, as marine ecosystems do not abide to administrative divisions. Simultaneously 
and almost paradoxically, decentralization of management authority is associated with 
devolution of power to local communities, whose participation in managing the resources 
on which they depend is considered key to their sustainable use and conservation.  
These four aspects of marine conservation trends converge in the concept of 
transboundary networks of marine protected areas. These MPA networks straddle 
maritime boundaries of two or more states, are linked ecologically by larvae dispersal and 
juvenile and adult migration, and may also comprise community-based MPAs. 
Transboundary networks of marine protected areas are a particular strategy that states 
may adopt in face of their interdependency in relation to the marine environment. If an 
individual MPA within one of such transboundary networks overlaps with a maritime 
boundary, adjoining or opposite coastal states engaged in such cooperative arrangements 
will need to collaborate with each other by coordinating their actions. 
Such form of bilateral cooperation in marine conservation cannot ignore the 
conditions of the marine environment at the local level, namely how marine resources are 
used, how this use impacts on their sustainability, how successful existing institutional 
arrangements have been in managing marine resources locally and nationally, and how 
existing arrangements may be influenced by external factors. Additionally, when 
considering the implementation of transboundary networks of MPAs, it is essential to 
consider the international legal framework assisting in the implementation of such 
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solutions, assert the willingness of states to cooperate, and devise an institutional design 
for the governance of TBNMPAs that is most adequate to the specific context. Due to 
their large spatial scale, transboundary networks of MPAs will affect a wider range of 
actors at various levels, such as local residents, seasonal migrants, local NGOs, 
international NGOs, local branches of central government agencies, etc. As each actor 
contributes differently to the pool of values, interests and behaviors at stake in TBNMPA-
related decision-making, the potential for conflict regarding the creation of transboundary 
networks of MPAs will be higher (Paavola 2005). Finally, because global experience with 
MPA networks is still limited, and so far there is no knowledge of the existence of any 
TBNMPA, it is timely and appropriate to examine if cooperation in the creation of 
transboundary networks of MPAs is possible, and if yes, how can that be achieved 
(IUCN-WCPA 2008; Lowry et al. 2009; UNEP-WCMC 2008). 
1.2 Purpose 
This research is an interdisciplinary study of the governance requirements of 
transboundary networks of marine protected areas. Its purpose is to investigate the 
possibility of bilateral, and potentially trilateral, cooperation for the creation and 
management of transboundary networks of MPAs, and the requirements of such forms of 
cooperation.  
The thesis uses a case study approach (Yin 2003) and environmental governance 
as its analytical framework to examine how marine resources requiring conservation 
measures are governed at the local level, assess the potential for bilateral cooperation in 
the creation and management of transboundary networks of marine protected areas, and 
propose bilateral institutional designs for the management of transboundary networks of 
MPAs in face of local marine conservation challenges. 
1.3 Propositions and Research Questions 
This research will be guided by several theoretical propositions. A theoretical proposition 
is “a [hypothetical] story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur” (Sutton & 
Staw 1995; Yin 2003). The propositions now presented foreshadow the theories discussed 
later in Chapter 2 – common pool resource theory and regime theory – and recognize the 
prospective nature of this inquiry: 
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• Shared natural resources create interdependencies among states; 
• Threats to shared natural resources are better addressed through international 
cooperation by making a state’s actions contingent on other states’ actions; 
• International cooperation is more likely to emerge when states’ power, interests and 
knowledge converge; 
• International cooperation is more likely to be maintained by reflecting states’ power, 
interests and knowledge in the regime’s institutional design. 
These propositions inform the research question of this inquiry, which will be 
applied to the potential establishment of transboundary networks of MPAs in selected 
geographical areas:  
What are the governance requirements that may 
facilitate cooperation in the conservation of 
shared natural resources? 
This research question will be answered in relation to the potential establishment 
of transboundary networks of MPAs in East Africa (Fig. 1). Two geographically distinct 
cases are examined: the possible creation of a transboundary network of MPAs between 
Mozambique and Tanzania; and the possible creation of a transboundary network of 
MPAs between Mozambique and South Africa. 
1.4 Interdisciplinarity 
Answering this research question requires an interdisciplinary approach because of the 
nature of the problem posed. Interdisciplinarity can be defined as “bringing together 
distinctive components of two or more disciplines” (Nissani 1997). The problem of 
cooperation between states for the conservation of the marine environment through the 
creation of TBNMPAs is both an environmental problem and a legal-political problem. 
As an environmental problem, it concerns how marine resources (i.e., specific 
species and habitats) are appropriated and used, how this affects their conservation, and 
how interdependencies between states are created through appropriation and use of 
marine resources. Given the complexity of the marine environment that can be expected 
in areas to where TBNMPAs have been proposed, natural sciences will be essential to 
understand its biophysical characteristics and how these influence selected species and 
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habitats. The environment, however, be it terrestrial or marine, cannot be seen exclusively 
from an ecological perspective. Except for extremely remote and/or inhabited areas, most 
environments will have human population that depends, directly or indirectly, on coastal 
and marine resources. Their needs and interests cannot be ignored and need to be taken 
into consideration as well. Natural sciences are not capable of dealing with the human 
dimensions of transboundary marine conservation, and hence the need for their 
integration with social sciences. 
As a legal-political problem, this research concerns the type of threats posed to 
marine biodiversity, how these threats are addressed, how MPAs are established in each 
state to deal with specific threats, how these threats and other contextual regional issues 
affect each state’s willingness to cooperate, and how this cooperation can be 
institutionalized. The investigation of these aspects requires the use of disciplines such as 
law, environmental management, environmental policy and political science. 
In addition to the general nature of the problem at hand, it should also be noted 
that research associated with MPAs is increasingly of an interdisciplinary nature, and no 
longer the exclusive realm of natural sciences. MPAs pose environmental problems that 
require solutions to be drawn from the natural and the social sciences (Buanes & Jentoft 
2009). Though MPAs are generally seen as tools for marine conservation, they achieve 
this through the regulation of human activities that impact on the marine environment. 
Hence, MPAs are not only a tool for biodiversity conservation but essentially a tool for 
the regulation of human behavior. Consequently, the study of MPAs increasingly 
necessitates insights from the social sciences, and greatly benefits from their use in 
addition to that of the natural sciences. 
Yet, using natural sciences and social sciences is not sufficient for an 
interdisciplinary approach if their use is limited to independent applications of their 
multiple disciplines. Interdisciplinary research benefits from the interaction between 
several disciplines in a cross-cutting way. This cross-cutting nature of the production of 
interdisciplinarity is reflected in the research papers that constitute this thesis. The seven 
research papers constitute autonomous but inter-related chapters, each providing different 
snapshots of the problem at hand. 
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Figure 1 – Location of case study areas in East Africa 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. In addition to this introductory chapter, Part I of the 
thesis includes two other chapters. Chapter 2 presents governance as an analytical and 
theoretical framework through the utilization of two distinct theories – common pool 
resource theory and regime theory. Chapter 3 describes the research scope, approach and 
design, presents the research subquestions, and outlines the methods used to answer them.  
Part II of the thesis is formed by seven research papers that answer the general 
research question, as well as the subquestions detailed in section 3.3.2. In Chapter 4, 
Grilo (Submitted) explores the characteristics of marine resources necessitating 
conservation efforts, how these characteristics may influence states’ preferences 
regarding international cooperation for their conservation, and how adequate 
transboundary MPAs are for their protection. In Chapter 5, Chircop et al. (2010) compare 
the domestic governance frameworks of East African states in relation to MPA creation 
and management, signaling gaps and mismatches. In Chapter 6, Guerreiro et al. (2011) 
examine the extent to which international environmental law can assist the creation and 
management of transboundary MPAs in this region. In Chapter 7, Grilo et al. (In prep.) 
analyze what may drive, facilitate or complicate cooperation in the creation and 
management of transboundary marine protected areas. In Chapter 8, Guerreiro et al. 
(2010) explore diplomatic and political options that states in East Africa may consider for 
their cooperation in the protection of their shared marine environment. In Chapter 9, Grilo 
(2011) explores the role of institutional interplay in bridging top-down and bottom-up 
marine conservation approaches by focusing on the specific case of MPA networks that 
include community-based MPAs, a potential approach to MPA-making in East Africa. In 
Chapter 10, Grilo (2010) assesses how maritime boundary-making affects cooperation in 
the creation of transboundary MPAs.  
In Part III, Chapter 11 synthesizes the findings of these papers by revisiting their 
logic relationship and limitations, and provides conclusive remarks while suggesting 
theoretical generalizations. Recommendations regarding transboundary marine 
conservation and further research are given.  
 
 
  
Chapter 2 
   19 
2. GOVERNANCE AND MARINE PROTECTED AREAS  
2.1 Governance 
Governance is a rather recent concept that is subjected to various interpretations. This 
section introduces the concept by outlining its short life and its meaning for the purpose 
of this thesis. It then focuses on the particular field of environmental governance, which 
broadly concerns how actors interact to regulate access and use of natural resources. In 
this chapter, I resort to common pool resource theory and regime theory to build the 
theoretical underpinnings that will assist in the examination of the governance 
requirements of transboundary networks of MPAs. 
2.1.1 The Emergence of Governance 
A top-down, centralized form of government resulting from representative political 
systems has been dominant for many decades. Based on a rigid idea of sovereignty, this 
traditional form of government that operated through “command and control” of society 
and markets has been greatly impacted by the increased complexities in societal and 
economic organization arising from the globalization process (Finger 1999). New 
economic powers have emerged, challenging the post-war hegemony of the United States 
and increasing the integration of markets; states have become more interdependent, 
engaging in new forms of global cooperation; and new social movements have erupted, 
questioning traditional forms of government and claiming rights to less visible 
constituencies (Jessop 1995).  
As a consequence, the boundaries defining the state-market-civil society trinity 
have blurred, and new actors multiplied at various scales. In this more complex setting, 
governments are now confronted with public problems that often straddle disciplinary and 
jurisdictional boundaries, making the limitations of government action more apparent 
(Frederickson 1999).  
These changes have motivated shifts demands for how societies should be 
governed. Governments have acknowledged the relevance of other actors in governing 
society (Stoker 1998) by strengthening their linkages to them. Actors as diverse as the 
private sector, non-governmental organizations and individual citizens have been 
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progressively included in decision-making processes at multiple levels, ranging from 
global, through regional, to the local level. The inclusion of actors in decision-making 
processes has been further expanded by shifting the loci from where authority for 
command, administration, management and control emanates (Kersbergen & van 
Waarden 2004). Through decentralization, the establishment of partnerships with non-
governmental actors, and privatization, central governments have been “hollowed out” by 
flows of power that move upwards to supra-national organizations, and downwards and 
sideways to decentralized organizations (Rhodes 1994). It comes then without surprise 
that centralized power has been challenged, reflecting the interdependence that 
characterizes our time (Schrijver 1995). States do not directly control the global 
organization that regulates global trade (Finger 1999); domestic policies and legislation 
may be dictated by regional integration organizations like the European Union (Alter 
2000); and solutions to environmental problems may be discussed at the global level, by 
fora of NGOs, and state and business representatives, for local implementation (Clark et 
al. 1998). 
These shifts towards an enlarged citizenry in the exercise of government and the 
blurring of boundaries between the state and other actors are the most common 
interpretation of governance. The concept of governance was primarily promoted by the 
World Bank at the end of the Cold War as “the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's economic and social resources for development” (World Bank 
1992). This change in the World Bank’s apolitical position resulted of its concerns with 
the lack of effectiveness of many programs and projects it supported (Doornbos 2003; 
World Bank 1992). The concept soon permeated the discourse of many aid donors, 
development agencies and intergovernmental organizations, undertaking a transformation 
into “good governance” (Asian Development Bank 1995; CEC 2001; UNDP 1997a). It 
has also been the focus of a major undertaking by the United Nations at increasing 
multilateralism in international relations between states. In sponsoring the work of the 
Commission on Global Governance, the United Nations tried to capitalize on the growing 
interdependency of states by promoting cooperation in dealing with issues like security, 
sustainable development, democratization, equity, human rights, and humanitarian action 
(Commission on Global Governance 1995).  
The discussions at the global level have been reinforced by empirical evidence 
supporting the significant role of good governance in attaining better development 
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(Kaufmann et al. 1999), which supported earlier arguments favoring governance as an 
essential condition to sustainable development (Ginther 1995).  
Tracing the origins of governance does not provide a measure of its impact on 
scholarship, and how it has been used in theory development. The next section deals with 
the multiple meanings of governance, its fields of application, and its analytical role. 
2.1.2 Understanding Governance 
The previously mentioned World Bank’s definition of governance is narrowly concerned 
with the behavior of states and their governments, attributing them the lead role in 
decision-making. Other definitions of governance reflect a greater diversity of actors, 
highlighting the importance of their roles.  
Rhodes (1996), Finger (1999) and Kersbergen & van Waarden (2004) have 
identified at least eight different meanings to governance, pointing to the lack of 
unanimity in the usage of the concept.5 Governance can refer to different scales (local or 
global), sectors of activity (private or public) or how actors are organized (hierarchies, 
markets or networks). Some uses are very specific (i.e. minimal state), while others may 
reflect more mature bodies of theory. That is the case of common pool resources theory 
and regime theory. These two theories operate at very distinct scales, and have preceded 
the emergence of the governance concept. Common pool resources theory studies the 
conditions that enable local responses to the frequent lack of capacity of central political 
authorities to create, implement, and sustain regimes, while regime theory assumes that 
global actors overcome an otherwise anarchical arena by cooperating to achieve shared 
goals that will bring them greater net benefits than the status quo (Keohane & Ostrom 
1995; Young 1994). Despite these differences, both theories share a primary concern with 
                                                 
5
 Rhodes (1996) associates the use of governance with good governance, corporate governance, new public 
management, self-organizing networks, the minimal state, and socio-cybernetic system. Finger defines 
governance as comprising the following concepts and theories: structural or “good governance”, regime 
theory, common pool resources theory, and global governance. Kersbergen & van Waarden (2004) name as 
many as eight different applications of governance: good governance; governing without government as in 
international relations; governing without government, as in self-organization; economic governance (with 
or without the state), through markets and their institutions; “good governance” in the private sector, 
through corporate governance; "good governance" in the public sector, through new public management; 
governance in and by networks; network governance, as in multilevel governance; and network governance 
in the private sector, depicting a shift from hierarchies to networks. 
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the behavior of actors in establishing and adopting rules governing a resource or an issue 
of common concern for the collective good. 
Governance congregates several theories on cooperation, but it is not in itself a 
theory. Instead, its value lies in constituting a “bridge between disciplines” that provides 
an organizational framework to examine changes in governance processes, and thus 
combine the essential of the various uses of the concept (Kersbergen & van Waarden 
2004; Löffler 2003; Stoker 1998). Five propositions define governance as a framework of 
analysis (Stoker 1998):  
• Actors and institutions involved in government include and go beyond the 
government, increasing the complexity of institutional arrangements and raising 
issues of legitimacy of non-State actors (Swyngedouw 2005). 
• There is a blurring of the boundaries and responsibilities for government between 
the various actors and institutions. This obscures the allocation of responsibility 
for unexpected consequences of decisions, and complicates accountability (Jessop 
2005). 
• Governance acknowledges the power interdependence between actors and 
institutions involved in collective action (Paavola 2007). Partnerships between 
different actors are likely to emerge, evoking the collaborative nature of 
governance processes (e.g., Wallington et al. 2008). 
• Governance is enabled by the emergence of self-organized networks of actors, 
which not only can influence government but also take over its role (Rhodes 
1996). This decentralization of governmental responsibilities to outside the sphere 
of government introduces difficulties in keeping decision-makers accountable 
(e.g., Batterbury & Fernando 2006). 
• Consequently, governance recognizes that government is not the only source of 
authoritative power for decision-making (Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004). This 
demands coordination efforts from the government, as well as the capacity to 
adapt to changing conditions (Duit & Galaz 2008). The uncertainty associated 
with a permanently changing environment may complicate governability by 
increasing the likelihood of governance failure. Finally, governance reminds us 
that electoral processes, though necessary, are not sufficient to establish 
legitimacy in decision-making (Huang et al. 2008). 
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These propositions implicitly deny the state any privileged role in governance 
processes, though they do not neglect its importance. They suggest that governance is 
more than inputs and outputs, being instead concerned with the quality of decision-
making processes whereby different actors interact to advance their own interests (Löffler 
2003). The propositions suggest too that the examination of governance raises questions 
about governability, accountability and legitimacy (Kersbergen & van Waarden 2004). 
Nine principles have been proposed to achieve good governance for sustainable 
development: participation of all through legitimate institutions representing their 
interests; rule of law ensuring respect for human rights; transparency of decision-making 
processes; responsiveness to a changing socio-economic environment; consensus 
orientation for a common position that reflects various interests; equity in opportunities to 
improve and maintain well-being; effectiveness and efficiency of institutions in producing 
results meeting societal needs; accountability of decision-makers; and strategic vision for 
good governance and human development (UNDP 1997a, b). 
In this thesis, governance provides an analytical framework that considers 
multiple scales and presumes the incorporation of all relevant actors, independent of their 
organizational structure or sector of activity. Governance is therefore essentially 
concerned with the potential cooperative behavior of actors at various levels and in 
relation to decisions that affect or interest them collectively.  
The following section elaborates briefly on environmental governance and 
describes in greater detail its two main constitutive theories.  
2.1.3 Environmental Governance 
The global changes observed in the last few decades have lead to an increased 
interdependency at the economic, political, social and cultural levels, affecting how 
human societies relate to their natural environment. The different scales at which natural 
resources originate conflicts have rendered distinct analysis about how individuals may 
cooperate to regulate access and use of natural resources. Until recently, environmental 
governance literature has been divided into two streams of analysis in what concerns the 
role of formal and informal institutions in governing natural resources. On the one hand, 
common pool resource theory concentrates on the conditions that enable self-organized, 
localized and sustained institutional arrangements that have emerged as an alternative to 
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centralized political authority, markets and private property in avoiding or at least 
reducing the effects of the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). On 
the other hand, regime theory (a field of international relations) is more generally 
preoccupied with the conditions that foster cooperation in an otherwise anarchical global 
society to overcome distinct situations that include, but are not limited to, the collective 
action problems posed by common pool resources (CPRs) (Young 1995). Both these 
theories are instrumental to the objectives of this study. Common pool resource theory is 
adequate to examine the conditions facing potential transboundary networks of MPAs in 
each of the study sites. Moreover, it will contribute to evaluate the potential for collective 
action, a necessary condition for the success of increasingly important community-based 
MPAs. Finally, common pool resource theory is appropriate to the study of MPAs given 
their property-right nature, which is closely linked to their capacity to regulate human 
behavior. In contrast, regime theory provides a comprehensive framework to evaluate the 
potentially facilitating and constraining factors in the emergence of cooperation for the 
creation of transboundary networks of MPAs. The combination of common pool resource 
theory and regime theory will then inform the construction of possible institutional 
designs that may be better equipped to deal with the specificities of each study area. The 
motivations for the choice of both theories are elaborated in greater detail in sections 
2.2.6 and 2.3.6, respectively. 
In the following sections the general underpinnings of both common pool resource 
theory and regime theory are examined. Their strengths and limitations are presented, as 
well as the relevance of both theories for the study of the governance requirements of 
transboundary networks of MPAs examined. 
2.2 Common Pool Resource Theory 
2.2.1 Common Pool Resources 
Typically, goods have been classified in private, public, club or common-pool goods 
according to their subtractability and excludability (Table 1). A good is subtractable, or 
generates rivalry, when extraction by one user reduces the amount of good available to 
others. It is excludable when its removal can be limited to some users, and others 
excluded from harvesting it, and not too costly. Common pool resources (CPRs) can be 
defined as “a class of resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use involves 
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subtractability” (Berkes et al. 1989). Common examples of CPRs include groundwater, 
fisheries, and forests. In the case of migratory fisheries, exclusion is particularly difficult 
to attain given the sizeable area the resource may span.  
Table 1 – Types of goods 
 Subtractable 
Non-
subtractable 
Excludable Private goods Club goods6 
Non-
excludable 
Common pool 
goods/resources 
Public goods 
 
Because of their non-excludability, public and common pool goods pose 
collective action problems. Collective action problems are situations in which individual 
actors have more to benefit from coordinating their actions with others than from 
pursuing their own self-interest. Such problems can usually be divided into problems of 
allocation (i.e., how much of the good can be extracted, how, where, when, and by whom) 
and provision of the good (i.e., how is the good going to be supplied so that users can 
continue enjoying it). A common collective action problem is that of free-riding, where 
users enjoying the benefits of the good refuse to contribute to its provision. Standard 
solutions to collective action problems have included, among others, technology that 
fences off non-contributors, or the creation of property rights (Ostrom 2003). Any of 
these two solutions to exclude non-contributors may entail significant costs. However, 
these costs can be overcome, with common pool goods being quite frequently owned 
jointly by an identifiable group of users that are able to exclude others and regulate their 
own use.7 That common pool goods can sometimes be governed by successfully 
excluding non-contributors is not a characteristic of these goods, but instead a social 
consequence of the creation of property entitlements.  
2.2.2 Property Regimes 
                                                 
6
 Club goods are considered a special case of public goods that are evident when a public good is 
excludable. The electromagnetic spectrum for satellite television is an example of a club good. 
7
 In the case of public goods, restriction to a reduced number of users is not so desirable as they would be 
the sole providers of a good that everybody would be able to enjoy, as individual use does not impede the 
use by others (Ostrom 2003). 
Governance and Marine Protected Areas 
26 
Property is a social construction that defines the relationship between individuals in 
relation to a certain entity. As such, property can only exist if it is recognized by not only 
the individual or group that claims it, but also by the rest of society that is excluded from 
benefiting from such property (Bromley 1992). Property rights, or claims of ownership 
over something, are not a direct derivation of the resource characteristics bridged in the 
previous section, but are instead negotiated and determined by individuals (Gibbs & 
Bromley 1989). This means that a single property regime may apply to different types of 
goods, and that a type of good may be held under different property regimes. 
Three different property regimes can be defined: private property, public property 
(res publica), and common property (res communes) (Bromley 1992; Feeny et al. 1990). 
For each regime, clear property rights define who may use a resource, when, and how. 
Property regimes arise out of a societal perception of what is scarce enough and valuable 
enough to be regulated (Bromley 1992). A public property is owned by the citizens and 
controlled by the state that represents them, while with private property those functions 
are ensured by an individual. In contrast, common property regimes are characterized by 
ownership and control over use of a resource being secured by a group of users. Common 
property regimes can be defined as: 
“structured ownership arrangements within which management 
rules are developed, group size is known and enforced, incentives 
exist for co-owners to follow the accepted institutional 
arrangements, and sanctions work to insure compliance” 
(Bromley & Cernea 1989). 
Though the distinction between property regimes is theoretically useful, it is 
seldom clear in reality. Any given good may not be permanently subject to a single form 
of property (Ostrom 2002). It may shift from common property to public property, as in 
the case of appropriation by the State of once communal grounds. A good may also be 
simultaneously held under more than one form of property. For example, coastal fisheries 
are often de jure public property but de facto common property, with coastal communities 
negotiating and implementing their own rules for harvesting fish resources (Schlager & 
Ostrom 1992). These overlaps and shifts in property rights highlight their independency 
from the physical characteristics of the resource, demonstrating instead that they are 
socially constructed, though the choice of one property regime over other is informed by 
the nature of the resource, among other factors (Bromley 1992).  
Chapter 2 
   27 
In some situations, though, property rights may not be defined or enforced and the 
resource is then considered to be open access, or under a non-property regime (res 
nullius) (Gibbs & Bromley 1989). Resources that are open access are often confused with 
resources under a common property regime. This misunderstanding may be explained by 
the frequent conversion of common property regimes into de jure public property that is 
not enforced, leaving the resource to be used on a first-come-first-served basis (Bromley 
1992). However, they are quite different, as property rights in the latter are present and 
enforced.  
2.2.3 The Rise of Common Pool Resource Theory 
Common property regimes have been portrayed as problematic at least since William 
Forster Lloyd’s work in 1833 (Baden & Noonan 1998). More than one hundred years 
later, in his “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Hardin (1968) picked up on Lloyd’s analogy 
of the problems faced by herdsmen sharing a grazing land, highlighting the problems 
associated with resource scarcity and their relationship with property rights regimes: 
“Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each 
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the 
commons. (...) As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to 
maximize his gain. (...) the rational herdsman concludes that the 
only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to 
his herd. And another; and another.... But this is the conclusion 
reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a 
world that is limited. (...) Freedom in a commons brings ruin to 
all.” (Hardin 1968) 
Hardin (1968) argued in this way that scarce resources that are held in common 
are deemed to be overexploited or even exhausted. As the benefits of use are concentrated 
on each individual and the costs are divided by all, individual interests prevail over 
community ones originating the “tragedy of the commons”. According to Hardin, the 
collective action dilemmas arisen could only be avoided by converting them into private 
or public property, an idea that had been advanced a few years before (Gordon 1954; 
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Scott 1955). The possibility of individuals communicating with each other and organizing 
for the common good was not even considered as an alternative solution. Instead, an 
external enforcement authority was offered as the solution. 
Hardin’s claim is supported by some empirical evidence. Common property 
regimes have rather frequently not been successful in sustaining their existence and 
avoiding congestion or even resource depletion, to which responsibilities communities 
cannot be alienated from (McCay & Jentoft 1998). Users may be too individualistic, 
jeopardizing the survival and effectiveness of such regimes. When common property 
regimes are not adequate to deal with resource scarcity, public or private property regimes 
may be more appropriate (Lino Grima & Berkes 1989; Symes & Crean 1995). 
Yet, there is also evidence showing that common property regimes have played a 
fundamental role through time and place. Communities have organized to regulate the use 
of resources and managed to escape “tragedy” without external intervention of markets or 
central authorities (Berkes et al. 1989). Many of these regimes have evolved and existed 
over decades, sometimes even centuries, and have allowed communities to sustain their 
livelihoods, and in some cases to contribute to environmental conservation (Berkes 2004; 
Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975). 
The awareness that common property regimes can be quite successful has fuelled 
scholarship efforts into understanding how they have overcome the “tragedy of the 
commons”. A first step has been to refute Hardin’s conclusion that commonly held 
resources are doomed to be depleted. One of the main criticisms that have been conveyed 
towards Hardin’s argument (1968) is that he posits the grazing land in his analogy to be 
held under a common property regime (Bromley & Cernea 1989; Feeny et al. 1990; 
Ostrom 1990). Duly enforced common property rights do not match the description of 
Hardin’s “commons”. In fact, Hardin’s conceptualization of commons resembles that of 
resources under an open access regime (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975).  
Moreover, the arguments advanced to reach the final policy prescription – that the 
problems of common property regimes can only be solved by changing the nature of the 
property rights – ignored three important aspects related to individual behavior, local 
practices, and property rights. Firstly, Hardin assumed that individual behavior is driven 
solely by rational maximization of one’s utility. In doing so, he failed to recognize other 
factors that may influence behavior, such as norms and values. Individual actions may be 
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guided by a person’s concerns with the impacts her actions may have on the rest of the 
community to which she belongs and within which most of her social interactions reside. 
Moral norms may influence a person’s behavior either by refraining their rent-seeking 
behavior from overriding the maximization of collective utility, or by reinforcing the 
sense of community, where mutual trust is developed (Baland & Platteau 1996). 
Secondly, public property and private property are not always the norm in many societies. 
For example, while private property may be more economically efficient than common 
property, it is often so at the expenses of equity as it usually generates asymmetries in the 
concentration of wealth (Baland & Platteau 1996; Berkes 1989a). Communities in several 
parts of the world have thus pooled their abilities and designed more appropriate 
institutional responses to the local resource conditions they face, namely common 
property regimes (Gibbs & Bromley 1989). Thirdly, while property rights systems may 
succumb because of community factors such as the pursuit of self-interest, they can also 
be crippled by external factors, such as the emergence of markets or state intervention. 
These are powerful enough to alter an existing property regime and have sometimes been 
responsible for the collapse of functional common property regimes.  
Exposing the fragilities of Hardin’s argument has therefore led to the recognition 
that the theory of the state and the theory of the firm, proposing respectively public 
property and private property as solutions to independent action in situations of 
interdependency, are not capable of explaining the emergence of institutional 
arrangements for self-organization and self-government of common pool resources 
(Ostrom 1990). Several authors have thus showed how local collective action problems 
associated with a large variety of common pool resources have been solved through 
cooperative behavior that has avoided the collapse or at least reduced the deterioration of 
the commons through the provision of new institutions, the creation of credible 
commitments and mutual monitoring (Baland & Platteau 1996; Berkes 1989a; Bromley & 
Cernea 1989; NRC 1986; Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988). These and other studies highlight 
the importance of community involvement in the management of natural resources. 
Notwithstanding, their most significant contribution is an evolving body of knowledge - 
common pool resource theory – that has empirically and theoretically explained how 
individuals can and do organize themselves to overcome collective problems (Ostrom 
2000a). Additionally, scholars have attempted quite successfully to elicit the conditions 
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under which common property regimes can emerge and be successful in regulating 
common pool resources. 
Before proceeding with the description of these conditions and of their effects on 
collective action, the discussion continues on the particulars of common property regimes 
governing common pool resources. 
2.2.4 Common Pool Resources Governed by Common Property Regimes 
The subtractability of common pool resources generates interdependency among users, 
and is further complicated by the high costs of excluding other users (Paavola 2005). 
These two characteristics hinder collective action in the management of CPRs, as 
individual short-term interests diverge from collective long-term interests (Cox 2008; 
Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom et al. 1999). If users conclude that collective action can bring 
them more benefits that exceed short- and long-term costs, then they will cooperate to 
bring institutional change (Ostrom 2000a). Cooperation is a necessary condition for 
common property regimes governing common pool resources. The benefits of 
cooperation in the use of common pool resources are two-folded. It enables users to 
restrain their rent seeking-behavior from negatively impacting on the wealth of others, 
and it yields greater total net benefits than independent action (Ostrom 1990, 2003). By 
prioritizing long-term community benefits over individual immediate ones, CPR users 
can facilitate the emergence of successful common property regimes.  
To better understand the role of common property in governing CPRs, as well as 
the related collective problems, it is necessary to make a distinction between the resource 
system and its resource units. A resource system can be considered a stock variable that 
has the ability of generating a flow of resource units without jeopardizing itself , while a 
resource unit is what appropriators extract from resource systems (Ostrom 1990). If 
different resource units are available from a given CPR system, users may be interested in 
extracting more than one type of resource unit. In a resource system such as a forest, users 
may extract timber and harvest medicinal plants, two types of resource units. Moreover, 
each resource unit may be held under different property regimes. For example, medicinal 
plants may be extracted exclusively by a single user, while timber may be under a 
common property regime. The distinction between resource system as a stock variable 
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and resource unit as a flow variable is also useful in the case of renewable resources, as it 
allows the definition of a replenishment rate (Ostrom 1990). 
Common property regimes try to overcome the collective action problems posed 
by CPRs when appropriators acting independently face suboptimal outcomes, and when 
there are institutional alternatives to regulate use that are more efficient than current 
arrangements (Gardner et al. 1990). Such problems can be divided into situations 
associated with the appropriation of the resource and with its provision (Figure 2) 
(Gardner et al. 1990). Appropriation problems concern the flow aspect of CPR systems, 
and emerge when the quantity of resource units appropriated is sufficiently large for users 
to adopt an individual behavior conducive to suboptimal outcomes. Appropriation 
problems concern essentially the problem of allocation of resource units among users, 
that is, the total amount of resource units that can be extracted. After the allocation 
problem has been solved, distribution becomes a concern. While allocation is in respect 
of common property regime membership, distribution relates to defining the share of 
resources each member will be entitled to (Libecap 1995). Both allocation and 
distribution have time, spatial and technological dimensions, which are respectively 
related to when, where and how can resource units be appropriated (Gardner et al. 1990).  
 
 
In turn, provision problems are related to the stock aspect of CPR systems, more 
concretely with ensuring that there are enough resource units to be allocated fairly among 
users. Provision problems are associated with the behavioral incentives to ensure 
adequate provision of resource units (the supply side of the problem), on the one hand, 
Figure 2 – Collective action problems posed by common pool resources 
Collective action problems posed by 
common pool resources 
Appropriation 
(flow-related) 
Provision 
(stock-related) 
Allocation 
Distribution 
Supply Demand 
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and to maintain extraction sustainable patterns of resource extraction that avoid 
exhaustion of the resource (the demand side of the problem) (Gardner et al. 1990). 
Securing solutions to these collective action problems within the realm of 
common property regimes does not ensure that these will be stable over time. Most 
common property regimes are instead the result of evolution over long periods of time. 
Common property regimes have developed through substantial trial and error in adapting 
to initial and changing conditions in resource use and abundance (Berkes 1989b; Ostrom 
1990). Current knowledge of common property regimes is then mostly restricted to a 
snapshot of their recent history. Tracing back their emergence and evolution is a rather 
difficult task. Despite these difficulties, CPR theory has been able to generate relatively 
strong hypotheses regarding the conditions that enable successful common property 
regimes governing common pool resources. The following section describes and analyses 
these conditions. 
2.2.5 Conditions Enabling Successful Common Property Regimes 
The success of common property regimes is the product of a complex set of factors. More 
than forty variables have been shown to enable cooperation for the formation and 
maintenance of common property regimes (Agrawal 2002, 2003; Pagdee et al. 2006). 
Each variable, or design principle for successful common property regimes, is  
“an essential element or condition that helps to account for the 
success of these institutions in sustaining CPRs and gaining the 
compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the 
rules in use” (Ostrom 1990). 
Initial studies of CPRs have thoroughly examined the property rights governing 
CPRs, at the expenses of the characteristics of the resource system, some aspects of user 
group membership and the external social, physical, and institutional environment 
affecting the sustainability of CPR institutions (Agrawal 2002). In a thorough review of 
three studies of CPR institutions, Agrawal (2002) groups their enabling conditions into 
four categories (Table 2):  
• characteristics of the resource system; 
• characteristics of the users group; 
• institutional arrangements regulating resource appropriation and provision; 
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• and external influences arising from state intervention, market integration and the 
introduction of new technologies. 
The following section elaborates on these four conditions enabling successful 
regulation of renewable8 CPRs, linking these with experiences in marine commons.  
2.2.5.1 Resource System Characteristics 
The resource system characteristic most often associated with local and successful 
management of the commons is its small size. Smaller CPRs are more likely to be 
successfully managed than larger ones because users can better control access and 
appropriation by enforcing rules among themselves and excluding outsiders when a 
resource system is small than when it is larger (Wade 1988). The boundaries of a small 
CPR are also easier to identify, and its dynamics easier to be understood by the CPR 
appropriator (Ostrom 2000a). For example, a small MPA is easier to manage, as it 
constitutes a smaller area to monitor and to enforce regulations. 
A resource characteristic closely related to CPR size is its boundaries. Having 
clear boundaries yields the CPR easier to manage, as it can be clearly identified. Defining 
the boundaries of the CPR system is then the first step in organizing collective action 
(Ostrom 1990). By clearly defining what constitutes the CPR to be collectively managed, 
users can devise rules to address allocation and provision problems. Most importantly, 
clear boundaries are unavoidable if non-users are to be excluded. In the case of MPAs, 
clearly identifiable signs marking their boundaries are perceived to contribute towards 
compliance with MPA regulations by both locals and outsiders (White & Vogt 2000). 
The boundaries of the CPR resource under common management are in part 
determined by its mobility. Defined as “the spatial movement of the [CPR] units, apart 
from any harvesting activity by resource users” (Schlager et al. 1994), mobility increases 
the complexity of the resource itself, leading to higher information costs related to the 
knowledge appropriators can have of the resource. Appropriators may also not be able to 
detect whether changes in the resource flow are caused by their own appropriation level 
and pattern, or from appropriators not associated with their common property system that 
                                                 
8
 Collective action regarding renewable resources may be more difficult than with non-renewable resources, 
as production may bounce back due to exogenous factors (Libecap 1995). 
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are able to harvest the resource beyond the resource system boundaries. For example, in 
the case of fisheries, if a fish stock spans a geographic area larger than the one fishers are 
capable of covering efficiently, information about the fishery will be harder to get, 
namely its size, population dynamics, how many resource units are being harvested, and 
the effect the harvest of a fisher may have on that of another fisher (Schlager et al. 1994). 
Unless the size of the user pool can match the distribution of the resource, mobile 
resources also hinder CPR users’ capability to enforce rules, thus clouding their 
understanding. In the case of marine turtles, conservation efforts, including the creation of 
MPAs, have been directed at reducing land-based threats, even though the biggest threat 
to these migratory animals is fisheries bycatch (Donlan et al. 2010). In other words, 
coastal MPAs established for marine turtle protection fall short of dealing with their main 
user pool. 
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Table 2 – Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons 
I – Resource System 
Characteristics II – Group Characteristics III – Institutional Arrangements IV – External Environment 
• Small size (RW) 
• Well-defined 
boundaries (RW, EO) 
• Low levels of mobility 
• Possibilities of storage 
of benefits from the 
resource 
• Predictability 
• Small size (RW, B&P) 
• Clearly defined 
boundaries (RW, EO) 
• Shared norms (B&P) 
• Past successful 
experiences – social 
capital (RW, B&P) 
• Appropriate leadership 
– young, familiar with 
changing external 
environments, 
connected to local 
traditional elite (B&P) 
• Interdependence among 
group members (RW, 
B&P) 
• Heterogeneity of 
endowments, 
homogeneity of 
identities and interests 
(B&P) 
• Low levels of poverty 
• Rules are simple and 
easy to understand 
(B&P) 
• Locally devised access 
and management rules 
(RW, EO, B&P) 
• Ease in enforcement of 
rules (RW, EO, B&P) 
• Graduated sanctions 
(RW, EO) 
• Availability of low-cost 
adjudication (EO) 
• Accountability of 
monitors and other 
officials to users (EO, 
B&P) 
• Technology: 
o Low-cost exclusion technology 
(RW) 
o Time for adaptation to new 
technologies related to the 
commons 
• Low levels of articulation with 
external markets 
• Gradual change in articulation with 
external markets 
• State: 
o Central governments should not 
undermine local authority (RW, 
EO) 
o Supportive external sanctioning 
institutions (B&P) 
o Appropriate levels of external aid 
to compensate local users for 
conservation activities (B&P) 
o Nested levels of appropriation, 
provision, enforcement, 
governance (EO) 
I and II - Relationship between Resource System Characteristics and Group Characteristics 
• Overlap between user group residential location and resource location (RW, B&P) 
• High levels of dependence by group members on resource system (RW) 
• Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources (B&P) 
• Low levels of user demand 
• Gradual changes in levels of demand 
I and III - Relationship between Resource System and Institutional Arrangements 
• Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources (RW, EO) 
Reproduced from Agrawal (2002), p. 62-63; sources: RW (Wade 1988), EO (Ostrom 1990) and B&P (Baland & Platteau 1996).
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In the case of marine fishery resources, examples abound of such CPRs that are 
mobile to the point of straddling multiple jurisdictions. Thus, the user pool associated 
with marine fishery resources can have either a multinational, national, regional, localized 
or traditional character,9 depending on the mobility of the resource in relation to 
administrative boundaries (Table 3). The higher the mobility of the resource units, the 
more complex will its management be, as different jurisdictional regimes may apply. For 
example, an unshared stock confined to a single jurisdiction is subject to a single set of 
management rules, while a stock shared by two distinct jurisdictions necessitates 
coordination and collaboration between the respective management authorities. 
Difficulties in the management of migratory fish stocks are further complicated if they 
straddle not only national jurisdictions but also areas outside national jurisdictions (the 
high seas). Coordination at higher levels entails higher transaction and information costs, 
lending both the problems of exclusion and subtractability much harder solutions (Berkes 
2006). 
Table 3 – A typology of mobile fishery resources 
Scale of User Pool Migratory Pattern 
Traditional 
 
Localized 
 
Regional 
 
National  
 
Multinational 
• Unshared stock exists in a single jurisdiction 
• Shared stock exists in the jurisdiction of two or more adjacent or 
opposite coastal nations 
• Highly migratory stock is within the jurisdiction of two or more 
nations and exists outside any national jurisdiction 
• Anadromous stock lives in the fresh or estuarine waters of a single 
nation and outside the nation’s jurisdiction on the high seas 
• High Seas stock exists outside national jurisdictions 
(adapted from Buck, 1989) 
Mobility has a direct impact on the success of MPAs. If a CPR, like a fishery that 
is overexploited, is present, the MPA may not be large enough to encompass its entire 
range and provide adequate protection. On the other hand, if one considers stationary 
resources like sea cucumbers and sessile mollusks such as limpets and oysters (at least at 
the stage of their life cycle in which they are harvestable), and even habitats such as coral 
reefs and mangroves, then the lack of mobility facilitates the enforcement of MPA 
regulations. Of course, such considerations depend on whether the conservation 
                                                 
9
 Traditional (internal control, little external control), localized (external political control), regional 
(external political control), national (internal political control), and multinational (little internal or external 
control). 
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objectives of any given MPA are oriented towards species conservation, habitat 
conservation, or both. 
Another important resource characteristic that can enable successful CPR regimes 
is whether appropriated resource units can or not be stored.  Storage refers to “whether 
the resource has storage capacity that enables users to capture and retain unharvested 
units” (Schlager et al. 1994). Storage of resource units allows appropriators to maintain 
the resource flow even in times of scarcity of production. Appropriators are then able to 
overcome seasonal cycles that are commonly associated with many common pool 
resources, such as irrigation water and migratory fisheries, and incentives to continue 
harvesting resource units beyond sustainable levels are thus absent (Schlager et al. 1994). 
Storage thus contributes to sustain a predictable flow of resource units to users. 
Predictability of a resource can be defined as the ability of indicating in advance 
the flow of resource units in the system. A CPR system with a predictable production 
demands less information from the user pool, and renders the assessment of the impact 
management rules have on the production of the resource easier (Wilson 2002). In 
opposition, an unpredictable resource introduces serious difficulties in the allocation of 
resource units among users (Agrawal 2002). Predictability of a resource system has 
consequences for marine conservation too. For example, the outcomes of protection 
measures such as marine reserves are more difficult to predict and harder to detect in the 
short term, a situation that is associated with the non-linearity and unpredictability of the 
flow of many marine resources, and that complicates their social acceptance (Carr et al. 
2003). 
2.2.5.2 Group Characteristics 
CPR theory has collected its empirical insights from situations that are understood to be 
particularly conducive to successful CPR institutions (Ostrom 1990). The most prominent 
feature of such institutions is the small size of the user group, a characteristic that is often 
associated with the already mentioned small size of the CPR system. A small group of 
users tends to be more capable of engaging in self-management, as members are more 
likely to have closer relationships, an incentive to consider the long-term outcomes of 
their choices instead of their individual costs and benefits (Baland & Platteau 1996). 
Large groups, on the contrary, are faced with much higher costs of monitoring to keep a 
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reasonable level of excludability in relation to outsiders (Agrawal & Goyal 2001). The 
small size of a user group has been associated with successful community-based MPAs 
(Pollnac et al. 2001). The close ties between group members also contribute to each user’s 
knowledge of other member’s preferences and interests (Baland & Platteau 1996).  
Drawing a parallel with the previous discussion of resource system characteristics, 
closely associated with the size of the group are the boundaries delimiting the resource 
users, that is, determining which individuals have rights of access and appropriation of 
the resource, and which do not. A clear definition of the boundaries of the users group 
should unambiguously show who is entitled to enjoy the benefits of the resource and to 
share the costs of providing for it, and who is not (Ostrom 1990). The same is to be said 
of MPAs, where regulations stating unambiguously what activities are allowed, and 
where, generate in practice the user groups that are allowed to exert their activities within 
the MPA. 
Another characteristic of user groups that has been found to be associated with 
successful common property regimes is the sharing of norms among all users. Shared 
norms, like the pursuit of utility maximization, can influence behavior of appropriators in 
two different ways. They may limit one’s options to achieve utility maximization, or they 
may actually shape individual preferences (Baland & Platteau 1996). In the first case, 
shared norms are reflected in reciprocity (e.g., Stoffle & Minnis 2007), whereby one 
cooperates to the point where others cooperate too. In the second perspective, group 
identity arising from shared norms contributes to define individual preferences. Such 
group identity can facilitate the creation of an MPA, but also hinder it if the MPA is 
perceived to threaten that same identity (Stoffle & Minnis 2007). 
The existence of shared norms among a group of users contributes to its social 
capital. Social capital refers to “structures of social organization such as networks, norms 
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 
1995). Then, social capital is not formed by resources held by individuals or groups of 
individuals, such as physical capital, but instead consists in social interactions that 
generate mutually beneficial outcomes for those involved (Bankston III & Zhou 2002). In 
fact, four differences between social capital and physical capital have been suggested 
(Ostrom 2000b): 
• Social capital does not wear out with use, but rather with disuse; 
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• Social capital is not easy to observe and measure; 
• Social capital is hard to construct through external interventions; 
• National and regional governmental institutions strongly affect the level and 
type of social capital available to individuals to pursue long-term development 
efforts. 
Past experiences that build into social capital can provide a fertile ground for the 
emergence of cooperative behavior among resource users, as they lower the costs of 
collective action (Pretty 2003). As pointed out by Ostrom (2000b), social interactions that 
are a constitutive part of social capital need to be sustained over time, at the danger of 
being eroded and not warranting the trust and social norms on which common property 
systems can be based on. In the case of MPAs, social capital is an important condition for 
their success because it enables social sanctions that deter individual opportunism (Rudd 
et al. 2003). 
Social ties as imbedded in the concept of social capital, when combined with 
leadership, can dissipate the group size effect on the sustainability of common property 
regimes. Even when the user group is large, it has been found that leadership in the form 
of an authority structure to which users relate to can overcome the incentive dilution 
effect associated with large groups (Olson 1982; Wade 1988). Community leaders usually 
have the authority to resolve conflicts, support collective decisions and apply penalties to 
users that fail to comply with established rules. They can also exercise their authority in 
mobilizing a significant part of a community or resource users to participate in a CPR 
institution (Baland & Platteau 1996). In the case of MPAs, leadership within communities 
has been identified as essential to ensure the success of MPAs in general and community-
based MPAs in particular (Oracion et al. 2005; Pollnac et al. 2001). 
Interdependence among resource users is usually perceived as a source of conflict 
(Paavola 2005). However, interdependence can also enable collaboration among users, 
particularly when there is a significant stock of social capital. For example, 
interdependence among group members may give rise to preoccupations about individual 
reputation (Baland & Platteau 1996). Users may then be less likely to infringe resource 
management rules out of concern with the impact that may have on their social 
integration in the community. Interdependence can thus enable them to create an 
institutional environment that manages the effects of the natural environment to their 
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benefit (Astley & Van de Hen 1983). The ability of interdependence to ensure compliance 
with MPA rules is an important condition for MPA success (Rudd et al. 2003). 
Interdependence among group members is perceived as more capable of 
generating cooperative behavior when users share the same interests and similar cultural 
identities but have different capabilities (Baland & Platteau 1996). Homogeneity in 
interests is often associated with small user groups, as these are more likely to share 
similar interests. Homogeneity of interests increases the likelihood of users cooperating in 
the management of a CPR, because it facilitates the definition of common objectives, and 
reduces the cost of negotiation and bargaining associated with the crafting of institutions 
(Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson 2002). Disparities in users’ interests can easily derail any 
attempts to promote collective action. A typical example is that of marine fisheries and 
the conflicting interests of small-scale fishers and industrial fleets. Local fishers have 
usually limited mobility and therefore restrict their activity to certain fishing grounds. 
Industrial fleets, on the other hand, can move to distant fishing grounds when those 
shared with small-scale fishers are not as profitable as before, often leaving locals with a 
significantly less productive resource system (Baland & Platteau 1996). Homogeneity of 
cultural identities has an influence over the possibility of collective action similar to that 
of homogeneity of interests. Culturally homogeneous users share values and have a 
similar understanding of social problems affecting them (Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson 
2002). Consequently, in creating MPAs, it is crucial to understand the interests and 
cultural traits of different user groups (Davos et al. 2007).  
However, the link between homogeneity of interests and collective action is not 
linear. It has been argued that heterogeneity in users’ interests may lead to collective 
action, though through a risky path (Libecap 1995). Heterogeneity may delay collective 
action, as users appropriate resource units according to their own individual interests. As 
resource availability is reduced, users become more homogeneous in their lower 
individual net benefits, a situation that may conduct to collective action, also as a 
consequence of some appropriators leaving the resource area in result of harvest declines. 
The effect of homogeneity of identities and interests over the prospects of 
collective action may be reinforced by users having different endowments. Heterogeneity 
of endowments generates different interest intensities that enable collective action. Such 
situation, known as the “Olson effect”, can be summarized as follows:  
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“the greater the interest in the collective good of any single 
member, the greater the likelihood that that member will get such 
a significant proportion of the total benefit of the collective good 
that he will gain from seeing that the good is provided, even if he 
has to pay for all the cost himself” (Olson 1965). 
The Olson effect makes sense when users can expect benefits proportional to their 
effort in producing the resource (Bardhan & Dayton-Johnson 2002). However, 
heterogeneous endowments may have the opposite effect. For example, fishers using 
gears with different harvesting efficiencies may be less likely to cooperate even if they 
recognize that resource conservation is a necessity (Scott 1993), thus potentially 
jeopardizing the success of an MPA.  
The last of the group characteristics that positively affect the likelihood of 
common property regimes to emerge is low levels of poverty. Poor users are more likely 
to experience greater dependence on resources, and therefore to be less likely to prioritize 
communal objectives over their own benefits. In other words, consumption in the present 
is so fundamental that the future does not play a role in individual appropriation 
decisions. Poverty can hinder the pursuit of conservation goals in MPAs as poorer users 
are more likely to break regulations (Cinner 2009; Tobey & Torell 2006). As for other 
factors, the effect of poverty levels on collective action is dubious. For example, wealthier 
fishers may have more efficient gears and thus endure higher levels of appropriation that 
may jeopardize the sustainability of the resource (Agrawal 2002). 
2.2.5.3 Relationship between Resource System Characteristics and Group Characteristics 
The previous sections examined separately how resource and group characteristics 
influence collective action. These two sets of characteristics act independently, but they 
also interact to enable cooperative behavior. These interactions are here addressed. 
The first aspect of the relationship between a resource system and the group that 
appropriates it is the overlap between the location of the user group and that of the 
resource. Users that are closer to the resource they appropriate are more capable of 
understanding the production dynamics of the resource and thus to better devise 
institutions for its collective management (Baland & Platteau 1996), as is the case of 
customary closure systems (Cinner et al. 2005). Users under these conditions are also 
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more capable of monitoring each other’s activities, which may result in more efficient 
enforcement (King & Faasili 1998). 
Secondly, resource users that are highly dependent on the resource system are 
more likely to engage in collective arrangements for its appropriation. This potential for 
collective action stems from the increased users’ knowledge of how supply and demand 
of the resource system varies and is affected by users’ behavior over time and space. 
However, beyond a certain level of dependence, users may just consider their own 
individual utility, instead of that of the community. In the case of MPAs, resource 
dependency appears to be inversely correlated with pro-conservation attitudes (Marshall 
et al. 2010). 
Thirdly, rules devised to allocate resource units among users are more likely to be 
complied with if they reflect some collective notion of fairness (Baland & Platteau 1996). 
This implies that rules for self-governance of common pool resources are not devised 
only out of concerns with the sustainability of the resource flow, but also take into 
account the distributional consequences of allocation among users. In the case of MPAs, 
if rules are perceived to be unfair and not legitimate, users will be less likely to comply 
with them (Christie 2004; Oracion et al. 2005).  
Fourth, low levels of user demand have a greater potential to facilitate the 
emergence of common property regimes, as this is less likely to impact on the scarcity of 
the resource. Demand may increase due to the influence of external factors, such as 
demographic changes, market integration or technological development of appropriation 
tools (Agrawal 2002). Market integration has been found to be inversely correlated with 
the conservation effectiveness of MPAs (McClanahan et al. 2006). 
Fifth, when changes in demand levels do take place, they are less likely to affect 
the prospects of collective action if they are gradual. Slow-paced changes in resource 
demand facilitate an understanding of its causes and outcomes, allowing collective action 
to account for this knowledge in crafting appropriate institutions. Resource demand may 
increase due to immigration. For example, migrant fishers in northern Mozambique are 
considered a threat to the protection of the marine environment of a local MPA (Rosendo 
et al. 2011). 
2.2.5.4 Institutional Arrangements 
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Another set of enabling conditions that have a significant effect on CPR regimes pertain 
the institutional arrangements regulating CPRs. Here, institutional arrangements concern 
formal and/or informal rules prescribing the following types of rights (Ostrom 2003; 
Schlager & Ostrom 1992): 
• Access: the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-subtractable 
benefits; 
• Withdrawal: the right to extract a resource; 
• Management: the right to regulate withdrawal rights; 
• Exclusion: the right to regulate access rights, including their transference; 
• Alienation: the right to sell or lease either or both management and exclusions 
rights. 
These rights are negotiated by resource users and determined by the rules they 
choose to create, and not by the characteristics of the resource (Gibbs & Bromley 1989). 
This distinction between rights and rules is clarified by considering that “rights are the 
product of rules”, in which “rights refer to particular actions that are authorized” and 
“rules refer to the prescriptions that create authorizations” (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). 
The rights of access and of withdrawal are essentially operational, not affecting the nature 
of the CPR regime. This is because individuals holding either of these rights are not 
entitled to participate in decision-making associated with the three other collective-action 
rights. 
CPR regimes, like other property regimes, often present different bundles of these 
property rights. Some actors may have the right to access a property but not to withdraw 
resources from it; others may access and withdraw resource units but may not have the 
right to manage it; some may have the right to decide on access rights, but cannot transfer 
their own rights; and finally some may have alienation rights, which imply enjoyment of 
all the other rights (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). By organizing these rights in different 
bundles, different types of property-rights holders can be differentiated10: 
                                                 
10
 These rights do not relate directly to the type of property regime. In other words, CPRs can be subjected 
to open access, private property, communal property or state property but they are not necessarily 
associated with any of these property regimes. While in an open access regime property rights are not well-
defined, in the other three types they lie respectively with an individual (or an organized group of 
individuals, like a corporation), with a recognizable group of individuals, or with the state (Feeny et al. 
1990). 
Governance and Marine Protected Areas 
44 
Table 4 – Types of property-rights holders 
 Authorized 
entrant 
Authorized 
user 
Claimant Proprietor Owner 
Access X X X X X 
Withdrawal  X X X X 
Management   X X X 
Exclusion    X X 
Alienation     X 
(Adapted from Schlager & Ostrom, 1992) 
Actors with different entitlements need not all be individuals from local 
communities. Individuals and companies may have full access and withdrawal rights, and 
limited management rights, while the State may hold the rights of exclusion and 
alienation, as owner of the resource (Sandberg 2007). 
The success of the allocation of rights depends on the characteristics of the rules 
that generate them. Rules that are simple and easy to understand by resource users, and 
that require an almost effortless apprehension by outsiders, are more likely to be complied 
with. This implies that rules require recognition not only by the users allowed to 
appropriate the resource, but also by individuals and communities that are not a part of 
the common property regime. Because rules governing CPRs are often informal, 
recognition by government authority may be necessary to legitimize their existence and 
sustain their success (Lino Grima & Berkes 1989). Rules governing MPAs are considered 
simpler in the case of marine reserves (i.e., no-take areas) than in multiple use MPAs, and 
consequently easier to enforce. 
The rules devised to govern a given CPR situation are more likely to match the 
characteristics of the resource if they are defined at the local level. In particular, rules 
should reflect the characteristics of the resource at stake, as these prescriptions try to deal 
with the different problems a resource system poses to its users (Ostrom 1990). This 
speaks to the necessity of involving local users in the management of the resources upon 
which they depend. It also implies that external intervention in the management of CPRs 
cannot ignore local knowledge and informal rules already in place, especially as these can 
contribute both to resource management and environmental conservation (Cinner & 
Aswani 2007). 
Besides being simple and devised at the local level, rules that have lower costs of 
enforcement are more likely to contribute to the success of the CPR regimes. 
Enforcement is needed to discourage those inclined to violate rules and to ensure 
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compliers that they are not easily deceived, that is, that they are not the only ones 
complying (Ostrom 1990). Low enforcement costs result directly from the rules devised 
to regulate the use of the resource. For example, during appropriation of the resource, 
individuals that have the greatest incentive to cheat may be placed close to those who will 
enjoy greater benefits if free-riding is deterred. A related contribution to reduce 
enforcement costs is the noticeability of free-riders, which is determined partially by the 
small size of the resource and of the user group, as well as by the overlap between the 
location of the two (Baland & Platteau 1996). As enforcement in common property 
regimes is not externally provided, the role of monitors should not be underestimated. 
These may be users that are assigned this particular role, or may be just an implicit 
responsibility of all users, which is quite common in community-based MPAs (Christie et 
al. 2002; Cinner et al. 2009). Importantly, monitors do have incentives to ensure 
compliance among their peers, such as prestige and even side benefits (Ostrom 1990).  
When enforcement results in the identification of illicit activities, perpetrators will 
face sanctions. Sanctions that are gradual are more effective than sanctions that are not 
proportional to the gravity of the offense and that do not take into account special 
circumstances (Ostrom 1990). The importance of gradual sanctions is illustrated by 
situations where information is imperfect, where penalties can be wrongly imposed on 
someone who has not broken any rule; when information is perfect, and there is certainty 
about the offense, graduated sanctions are nevertheless adequate as these imply greater 
penalties to serious and repetitive offenders, and smaller penalties to one-time and minor 
offenders (Baland & Platteau 1996). Penalties may involve apprehension of illicitly 
harvested resource units, payment of fines, suspension of rights of use of the resource, 
and in more serious cases even expulsion from the community (McKean 1992). In 
addition to sanctions, compliance with MPA rules can be promoted with the appropriate 
incentives, such as skills training, alternative employment opportunities and 
environmental education (Mascia 1999). 
Violations of the rules agreed by all can lead to conflicts. These may result from 
divergent interpretations of how the rules are to be implemented, leading to different 
understandings of each user’s rights and duties and ultimately to some users perceiving 
other user’s actions as free-riding (Ostrom 1990). Compounding this with the 
evolutionary and adaptive nature of common property regimes, a low-cost conflict 
resolution mechanism is therefore essential to ensure the continuation of the regime. 
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Conflict resolution mechanisms may be supplemented with warnings being issued to 
avoid rule-breaking and conflict situations (Baland & Platteau 1996). In a coastal 
management context, conflict resolution mechanisms are essential to the maintenance of 
governance arrangements, as potentially conflicting uses and interests are paramount to 
coastal zones (Ehler 2003; Lane 2006). In the particular case of MPAs, lack of impartial 
and representative conflict resolution mechanisms has been identified as the most 
disturbing aspect contributing to their social failure (Christie 2004). 
As mentioned above, compliance with institutional arrangements of a common 
property regime can be monitored and enforced by some or all users. Because monitors 
are simultaneously resource users, ensuring that there is no foul play in monitoring 
activities necessitates mechanisms that ensure monitors are held accountable for their 
monitoring and enforcement actions. For example, records can be kept by monitors 
detailing the circumstances and reasons for applying penalties to users, and such form of 
bookkeeping should be available to the group members (Baland & Platteau 1996). Even 
when monitors are not resource users, if they act according to their own interests and not 
those of the MPA where they work, they can easily jeopardize its marine conservation 
role (Dalby & Sorensen 2002). 
2.2.5.5 Relationship between Resource System and Institutional Arrangements 
Having examined different institutional arrangements contributing to the emergence of 
common property regimes for the governance of common pool resources, it is appropriate 
now to address the relationship between rules governing resource appropriation and 
provision, and the resource system characteristics. Appropriation rules include those 
determining restrictions on time, place, resource units and technologies employed in the 
harvest of the resource, while provision rules pertain the supply of material, labor and 
money to maintain resource production (Ostrom 1990). Both sets of rules contribute to 
the sustainable management of the resource system if they strike a balance between the 
provision and extraction of the resource, and do not ignore natural replacement rates. For 
example, fishermen that have been successful in crafting and maintaining common 
property regimes to govern their activities have usually done so by creating rules that do 
not impose catch limits, but instead create restrictions on gears and on the duration and 
location of harvest. This seems to be a result of the high enforcement costs associated 
with monitoring catches, when compared with those of enforcing the use of gear (Sutinen 
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& Andersen 1985). High information costs associated with knowing the size of the 
resource system and with determining the optimal harvesting level may also explain such 
collective choice. Though the match between such rules and resource characteristics is 
hard to observe, it has been found to have the strongest association with the success of 
community forest management (Pagdee et al. 2006). MPA regulations are essentially 
intended to match resource use to the regeneration of resources, particularly in multiple 
use MPAs. However, such knowledge is not easy to obtain, and consequently MPA 
management should be adaptive, that is, “periodically reviewed and revised as dictated by 
the results of monitoring” (Kelleher 1999). 
2.2.5.6 External Environment 
The focus of CPR theory on internal factors, such as community, has contributed to the 
absence of analyses of the role of markets and the state in changing common property 
regimes (McCay & Jentoft 1998). The studies of Wade (1989), Ostrom (1990) and 
Balland and Platteau (1996) do not escape this criticism (Agrawal 2002). While they 
provide limited elaborations on how market integration and state intervention may 
jeopardize resource sustainability, none of these three studies considers the impact of 
demography (Agrawal 2001). Other scholars have increased the scope of CPR theory by 
considering contextual factors – market, State and technology – in their analysis of the 
conditions enabling successful common property regimes (Agrawal 2002; Husain & 
Bhattacharya 2004; Klooster 2000; McCay & Jentoft 1998; Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002; 
Singleton 1999). Such studies have shown that Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” often 
results from external influences and not necessarily from flaws in the common property 
system itself or the community governing it (Berkes 1989b). 
Technology determines our ability to influence and adapt to environmental 
conditions. In the case of common property arrangements for the management of 
common pool resources, as in other situations in general, technology can have both 
positive and negative effects, depending on how it changes the ration between costs and 
benefits associated with a CPR institution. Low-cost technology that permits the users 
group to exclude non-users will reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, increasing the 
group’s utility (Kerr 2007; Wade 1987). For example, fencing a field under a common 
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property regime allows the group to exclude non-users from using it to feed their cattle.11 
In other situations, technological developments may pose a threat to the sustainability of 
the resource. When technologies improve appropriation efficiency, they may contribute to 
the adoption of extraction levels that go beyond natural replacement rates. A modal 
example is that of fisheries. This sector has observed dramatic changes in technological 
capacity that are in part responsible for more than 75% of world fish stocks, for which 
information is available, being fully exploited or overexploited and for the collapse of 
local common property institutions that regulated coastal fishing activities in small 
communities (Baland & Platteau 1996; Berkes 1985; FAO 2007b; Maguire et al. 2006; 
Pauly et al. 2002). 
Deleterious technological developments such as those abundantly described in the 
fisheries sector have taken place rather quickly. Local common property institutions 
regulating inshore fisheries have often not been able to adapt their rules and rights 
structures to conform to changes in their environment. Thus, adaptation of the CPR 
regime to new technological developments may not be possible within a short period of 
time. Users require time to determine the consequences of technology on their 
institutions, and to adjust their allocation and distribution. Yet, and in the case of MPAs, 
technological change can be beneficial. For example, vessel monitoring systems are 
crucial in monitoring fishing activities in MPAs that protect deep-sea habitats (Davies et 
al. 2007). 
Markets, like technologies, may also have a negative impact on existing common 
property regimes. For example, road construction may give access to trade markets for 
harvested resource units. This may provide a strong incentive to increase resource 
appropriation beyond natural replacement levels, and lead to congestion and even 
depletion of the resource (Agrawal 2002). By altering the drivers behind individual 
subsistence resource appropriation, namely by raising the monetary value of resource 
units, market integration can diminish the compliance pull of local traditional authorities 
(Ruddle 1993). Markets can also undermine common property regimes through the 
promotion of specialization of its members. Common property regimes associated with 
inshore fisheries often rely on rotation schemes. Rotation schemes are aimed at ensuring a 
                                                 
11
 Contrasting effects of fencing with barbed wire have been widely reported. Barbed wire has played a 
significant role in enclosing the commons in different parts of the world, leading effectively to their 
privatization (Ostrom 2000a; Tucker 2008). 
Chapter 2 
   49 
fair distribution of costs and benefits among all users, as different fishing locations have 
different levels of resource units at different periods in time. A non-intended but useful 
consequence of rotation schemes is preventing specialization of users. Market articulation 
contributes to specialization, sparing resource users the need to travel to the different 
locations made available to them through the common property regime (Agrawal 2002). 
As with the introduction of new technologies, market articulation may be less harmful on 
common property regimes if it happens at a pace that allows for adaptations in rules and 
rights to take place. 
Before proceeding to examine the consequences of State action on commons 
institutions, it is appropriate to consider the joint action of technologies and markets on 
common property regimes. For analytical purposes, these two aspects were considered 
separately, but in reality they often operate jointly. Consider the case of sequential 
exploitation of fisheries (Lino Grima & Berkes 1989): a valuable species under a 
common property regime is appropriated from easily accessible areas; high market prices 
induce the entry of non-owners, usually with more efficient fishing gears and no 
restrictions on their activities; the common property institution is thus challenged, with 
exploitation levels leading to congestion and maybe even depletion of the resource; 
outsiders eventually shift to less valuable species in less accessible areas, with locals 
being left with depleted stocks and often unable to explore farther locations.  
The third form of external influences on common property regimes arises from 
state actions. State intervention has been frequently harmful to local management 
institutions governing the commons. Often lacking the knowledge about, or even 
purposely ignoring, informal management systems, many states and donor agencies have 
advanced policies reclaiming the commons they perceived to be unmanaged (Bromley & 
Cernea 1989). Many of such interventions have been part of a broader strategy to build 
young states, traditionally after long periods of colonization (Bromley & Chapagain 
1984). However, they have regularly undermined traditional communal controls, being 
often unable to replace these controls with an effective alternative system, be it public or 
private property (Berkes 1989a). An example of how undermining local authority can 
result in the deterioration of the marine environment is the decline of customary marine 
tenure in the Pacific (Johannes 1978). 
Yet, state intervention is not always detrimental to commons institutions. On the 
contrary, it is often necessary to deal with resource degradation and to enable recovery of 
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irrigation systems from extreme environmental events, such as earthquakes and landslides 
(Baker 2001). The conditions under which states may intervene can dictate the success or 
failure of common property regimes. Common property regimes are rarely formalized and 
recognized by official authorities, as they tend to parallel existing official regulations or 
even replace them when these are either absent or not enforced. While formal recognition 
by local and central governmental authorities may not be an essential condition for their 
success, it can shield commons institutions and legitimize enforcement. Lack of formal 
recognition may in some cases prevent them from participating into regional management 
initiatives, or even jeopardize their existence (Berkes 2006). That is the case of some 
fisheries in India under community-based arrangements, which appear to have emerged as 
a consequence of recent changes in markets and legislation, and that have not been able to 
ensure exclusion of outsiders due to lack of state recognition (Lobe & Berkes 2004). 
While this shows that active state intervention is sometimes necessary to maintain local 
institutions, a passive but benign attitude may also bring a positive contribution to their 
survival. Thus, when central authorities refrain from undermining local authorities 
associated with the governance of the commons, they are indeed contributing to their 
success (Ostrom 1990). In the case of community-based MPAs, legal recognition may be 
an essential step for their wider societal acceptance (Aswani et al. 2005). 
Central authorities may also supply some functions to local institutions governing 
the commons, such as sanctioning. Sanctioning by external institutions may be necessary 
when the group of users is too large to ensure proper enforcement (Baland & Platteau 
1996). In larger groups, users tend not to know all the users, reducing the compliance pull 
of moral norms that arise from persistent personal interactions. For example, in mangrove 
community-based protected areas in Ecuador, enforcement is a task of local authorities, 
while involved communities are responsible for the implementation of a management 
plan. 
In some situations, where agreement on the initial distribution of resource units 
cannot be reached, the State may take the responsibility for side payments. Such 
situations are often associated with the need to not only manage the resource but to secure 
its conservation. Side payments are adequate when an equal distribution of appropriation 
rights may lead the users that were previously more productive to free-ride; they may also 
benefit resource sustainability by providing alternative sources of income during periods 
when resources cannot be harvested, thus linking resource management to environmental 
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conservation (Baland & Platteau 1996). Indeed, successful alternative income generating 
activities are an important predictor of community-based MPAs’ success (Pollnac et al. 
2001). 
Considering the influence of the central authorities on local common property 
regimes evokes issues of scale. Complex common property regimes may be organized at 
various levels, with nested layers of enterprises (Ostrom 1990). This means they can be 
intertwined with other organizations, like professional associations, local government or 
central government institutions, being linked to these both horizontally (linked to another 
organization at the same scale) and vertically (linked to another organization at a different 
scale). For example, Beach Management Units – i.e., local organizations mandated to co-
manage coastal fisheries resources in Kenya – are created and operate through the 
intervention of distinct organizations such as the Ministry of Fisheries Development, 
provincial administration, non-governmental organizations, and courts (Cinner et al. 
2009). Each organization has a different role at different steps and scales of the BMU 
framework, implying that changes in rules of one organization affecting the BMU 
framework require adjustments by all the other organizations. Nestedness thus invokes 
organizational interdependence in the management of CPRs, possibly reducing 
transaction and information costs at all levels. This decentralized governance of the 
commons, in which local institutions benefit from linkages with higher-level entities, can 
be hypothetically formalized by networks of community-based MPAs that depend on a 
centralized authority to perform some functions such as sanctioning. Independently of the 
types of linkages pursued by MPAs, it is widely recognized that they should be linked and 
integrated within larger management frameworks (Cicin-Sain & Belfiore 2005). 
The previous discussion of the conditions that may enable successful common 
property regimes was occasionally punctuated with brief comments on the implications to 
MPAs. The following section concentrates in greater detail on the relevance of common 
pool resource theory not only to MPAs, but also to the study sites in East Africa. 
2.2.6 Common Pool Resource Theory and Marine Protected Areas in East Africa 
The choice of common pool resource theory to investigate the governance requirements 
of transboundary networks of MPAs is not accidental. CPR theory and the characteristics 
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of this study overlap in three different ways that yield the theoretical framework of CPR 
theory essential to the analysis. 
First, the physical conditions that transboundary networks of MPAs will face in 
each of the two case studies are adequate to the application of CPR theory. In each case 
study the two states involved share marine resources and habitats across their maritime 
borders. The coasts of Mozambique and Tanzania are divided by the mouth of the 
Ruvuma River. This geographical feature may set a physical separation between the 
coastlines of the two countries. Yet, they still share live marine resources that straddle 
their common maritime boundary, such as shrimp (FAO 2000). Also, fishers from 
Mozambique often cross the border to Tanzania to sell their catch in Mtwara, while 
Tanzanian fishers are known to fish in Mozambican waters, returning to their country to 
sell their catch (TRANSMAP 2008d). In the southern transboundary site, there is no 
geographical feature marking the border that divides the coastlines of Mozambique and 
South Africa, with coastal habitats being shared between the two states. Several fish 
species and marine mammals are known to straddle the maritime border between the two 
states. Also, the transboundary coastal zone of both states provides habitat to five 
different species of sea turtles, among other charismatic species (TRANSMAP 2008a, b). 
Shared resources and habitats create interdependencies between each set of states. These 
are further reinforced by cross-border movements of people that appropriate resources on 
one side of the border and move them to the other side.  
The second motivation for the use of common pool resource theory stems from 
the object of this research – marine protected areas. Marine protected areas are tools for 
the protection of marine biodiversity. MPAs are characterized by the difficulty of 
excluding non-users from accessing it and extracting its resources from it, which is 
generally inherent to the marine environment. MPAs and their networks can then be 
considered common pool resources, as they are subjected to “bundles of collective 
entitlement for their constituents which require protection through controls on their use” 
(Murphree 2002). Another aspect of MPAs reinforces approaching their creation from the 
angle of common pool resource theory. Though MPAs are essentially ecologically-
oriented in their goals, there is abundant evidence showing their creation and 
management cannot ignore the human dimensions associated with conservation efforts 
(Christie et al. 2003; Mascia 2003). MPAs can be considered regulators of human 
behavior as they prescribe behaviors through their rules (FAO 2007a; Jentoft et al. 2007). 
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One of the human dimensions of MPAs is property, whose rights stem directly from the 
MPA rules (Mascia & Claus 2009; Naughton-Treves & Sanderson 1995). Given the 
geographical scope of many MPAs, as well as that of their networks, it is unavoidable 
that the creation of either of them will interfere with existing property claims, potentially 
generating conflicts between competing claims. The creation of MPAs introduces new 
claims through their regulations, leading to a reallocation of rights whereby some users 
will lose entitlements and others will benefit from new ones (Mascia & Claus 2009). For 
example, the creation of MPAs can lead to the conversion of a marine area previously 
subjected to a common property regime into open access or public property, depending on 
the capacity of the State to enforce regulations (Moeliono 2006). In contrast, a marine 
area could also be open access and the creation of a MPA could bring it under a common, 
public or even private property regime. Within this context, the usefulness of CPR theory 
lies in its typology of pre-MPA bundles of property rights and how these may be affected 
by MPA creation. CPR theory can also assist in identifying the characteristics of marine 
resources of conservation significance, and how these are appropriated. For example, 
(i)mobility of resources to be targeted by conservation measures within MPAs are of 
particular interest, as they have a strong influence on the governance arrangements aimed 
at their conservation (Naughton-Treves & Sanderson 1995). 
Finally, CPR theory is fundamental to the examination of the governance 
requirements of transboundary networks of MPAs because it underscores the importance 
of collective action and cooperative behavior at the local level in managing collectively 
owned resources. This community-based aspect of common property regimes makes CPR 
theory appropriate to the study of MPAs in  because community-based MPAs are an 
emerging trend in the region (Francis et al. 2002). This trend is a regional expression of 
the global shift in protected area governance from “nature fortresses” to sustainable use, 
in which regulation of use has replaced use exclusion (Murphree 2002). It will be hard for 
future creation of MPAs to ignore this trend. Common pool resource theory can provide 
insights into the potential of future MPAs for community-based arrangements, as it stems 
from an insightful, though not complete, understanding of how common property regimes 
emerge and are sustained in time. For example, CPR theory postulates that common 
property regimes tend to be more successful when users have a strong dependence on the 
resource system. This condition is observable in most coastal communities in the two 
selected case study areas. CPR theory also proposes that collective action for the 
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management of common pool resources is likely to be more successful in situations 
where state control is weak or even absent. Some study areas are generally characterized 
by weak control of marine resources by the state, of which fisheries are the modal 
example. CPR theory can thus provide a basis for the evaluation of the possibility of 
creating community-based MPAs in the two study areas.  
In sum, common pool resource theory is adequate to the examination of the 
governance requirements of transboundary networks of marine protected areas because 
the marine resources and habitats at stake in the two case studies resemble common pool 
resources, as they are shared between each set of states. Additionally, the characteristics 
of MPAs enable their treatment as common pool resources. Finally, common pool 
resource theory can assist in the assessment of the potential of the two planned 
transboundary networks of MPAs to encompass community-based MPAs. 
2.2.7 Limitations of Common Pool Resource Theory 
The application of any theory to investigate a given topic is bounded by the limitations of 
that same theory. Theories are as good as their explanations of the real world fit empirical 
observations (Popper 1963). Like most theories, CPR theory has its limitations. Its use 
necessitates an understanding of such constraints, as conclusions drawn from this study, 
as well as their policy implications, will be bounded by them. 
The most prominent contribution of CPR theory is its explaining of the existence 
and maintenance of local cooperative arrangements for the governance of common pool 
resources. The conventional theory of the commons had not been able to explain how 
users overcome over-appropriation dilemmas, nor when private and public property 
regimes may be more adequate than communal regimes (Ostrom 2001). The alternative 
CPR theory described in section 2.2.5 has furthered the understanding of how 
communities organize to overcome appropriation problems associated with scarce, 
subtractable and hardly excludable resources. Most importantly, CPR scholars have 
contributed to a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, list of conditions that facilitate 
successful communal governance of common pool resources.  
However, how these conditions were investigated imposes some limitations on 
their predictability. Common property regimes are naturally evolving institutions that 
emerge as a result of a joint need to regulate the appropriation of scarce and valuable 
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CPRs. They are therefore a product of social adaptation to socio-natural environment, 
often constituting quite stable institutions that result from processes of trial and error. 
Their persistence can be considered a measure of their capacity to overcome new 
collective dilemmas. Unsurprisingly, empirical observations of common property regimes 
have centered on those institutions that have persisted with varying degrees of success, 
and sporadically on some that have failed to maintain themselves or even to emerge at all 
(Lobe & Berkes 2004; Ostrom 1990). As such, the conditions advanced by many 
researchers thus explain the maintenance of such institutions but do not necessarily 
explicate their emergence. The evolutionary and adaptive nature of common property 
regimes thus limits researchers’ ability to elicit their origins, adaptation and evolution into 
their present form (Snidal 1995). 
The empirical observation of innumerous such regimes has centered essentially on 
local CPR systems managed by a small group of users, that is, under conditions 
particularly favorable to the emergence of successful collective action (Ostrom 1990). 
More recent studies on CPR theory have tried to explain how larger user groups may 
actually be a contributing factor to successful CPR regimes. The size of the user group 
has been generally perceived as a crucial factor in the emergence of successful CPR 
regimes. Yet, many other variables can affect collective action for the governance of the 
commons. The large number of variables, though valuable for expanding the explanatory 
power of CPR theory, poses some obstacles to comprehensive studies of CPR regimes 
(Agrawal 2002). Firstly, the factors that explain the maintenance of common property 
regimes are general propositions that have been collected from a variety of studies. A 
variable that may be important for a fisheries regime may not be so for an irrigation 
regime. Secondly, if a study is to consider all the 27 variables posited by Agrawal (2002), 
as well as others referred to in the literature that were not considered, the associated 
research effort may hardly meet research capacities. This leads to a third difficulty of 
relying on many factors: relevant variables for a given study may be ignored, while others 
that in fact do not explain accurately collective action may be erroneously integrated into 
causal rationales. Fourthly, the various variables, though independent in relation to the 
outcomes associated with CPR regimes, may be causally connected. In other words, the 
influence of one given variable over institutional outcomes may be mediated by another 
variable. Logically, this complicates enormously the detection of causal relationships. 
Fifthly, complexity in the role of these variables is further increased because some do not 
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have a linear behavior, producing instead one similar result at high and low values and 
another at medium values. Therefore, general statements about a few variables cannot be 
analyzed independently from each other, but instead their effects need to be seen as 
interactive. In other words, the effect of a variable on the success of CPR regimes may be 
contingent with other variables, but there is no exact way of knowing how the various 
variables at play correlate to each other (Agrawal 2002). These complex 
interdependencies between variables complicate the establishment of causality, reducing 
their predictability and hindering theoretical generalizations about their effects (Cox 
2008). 
2.3 Regime Theory 
This section introduces the foundations of regime theory. First, the concept of 
international regimes is explained and its relevance for the study of international 
cooperation discussed. Then, it follows a depiction of the evolution of regime theory from 
its initial assumptions to more recent advances. Given their importance to this research, 
environmental regimes are briefly examined. Taking into account that there are not in 
place any regimes to regulate cooperation in the creation and management of 
transboundary networks of MPAs, the factors enabling regime formation are described 
and explained. Assuming the creation of such regimes, it is very likely that states will 
create institutions to promote and maintain cooperation in that regard, as decentralized 
cooperation is difficult to achieve (Koremenos et al. 2001a). The literature on institutional 
design will then end the theoretical presentation of regime theory, giving place to the 
examination of its limitations and relevance for the study of transboundary marine 
conservation.  
2.3.1 International Regimes 
Historically, the field of international relations has been dedicated to explaining the 
behavior of States at the international level in relation to affairs of their common interest. 
Until the 1970s, most studies of international relations had done so by relying on the 
examination of international law. This legalistic approach to the study of international 
relations was eventually criticized for ignoring that rules and norms, codified in 
international law and purporting to be abstract and universal, are in fact a rationalization 
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or even a mere reflection of the power and interests of states (Hurrell 1993). Reactions in 
scholarship to this excessive formalism of international law have been responsible for a 
partial shift in the research focus of international relations to international regimes 
(Rittberger & Mayer 1993). International regimes are defined as: 
“a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge 
in a given area of international relations.” (Krasner 1982). 
Principles are beliefs of facts, causal links and moral; norms are standards of 
behavior reflected in rights and duties; rules instruct specific actions; and decision-
making procedures are related to implementation. Principles and norms constitute the 
defining core of regimes. Changes in a regime’s principles and norms imply changes in 
the regime itself. In contrast, rules and decision-making procedures do not alter the nature 
of the regime as long as they do not reflect changes in the principles and norms of a 
regime (Krasner 1982). 
This definition goes beyond the formalism of international law by considering 
also informal rules. Yet, it is troubled by the question of showing how rules and norms 
have a “compliance pull” of their own.12 The compliance pull of regimes would have to 
be at least partially independent of the power and interests that usually generate them, and 
would have to be effective even when contrary to states’ interests (Hurrell 1993). In other 
words, regimes strike a balance between reflecting power and interests of states in the 
absence of a world government and having a restraining effect on states’ behavior even 
when their individual self-interest would lead them to act otherwise (Hurrell 1993). By 
positing states as self-interested entities seeking to maximize their individual utility, it 
follows that states will adhere to a particular regime when the liquid benefits accrued by 
their membership exceed those enjoyed in the status quo (Oye 1985). To this 
consideration may contribute the impact of their new position in relation to other states, 
whether the discussion of the issue at stake can include other issues, and the shadow of 
the future, among other aspects (Axelrod & Keohane 1985; Haas 1980). If joining a 
                                                 
12
 International regimes codified in legal agreements have the advantage of increasing the credibility of the 
commitments between states (Abbott & Smidal 2000). However, they appear to be less abundant than 
informal regimes. Informal regimes have therefore some advantages over formal ones, such as allowing for 
greater ambiguity and consequently having a greater potential to facilitate agreements than formal regimes 
(Lipson 1991). 
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regime, a state can expect it (i) to provide a framework for liability, (ii) to reduce 
transaction costs associated with reaching agreements among its members, facilitating 
future cooperation, and (iii) to improve the quality and quantity of information available 
on the behavior of states, reducing uncertainty (Keohane 1982). A regime will then 
facilitate the coordination of actions among states in issues of common interest. 
Regimes have been termed “pervasive characteristics of the international system” 
(Krasner 1982). Yet, this classification is not without criticism. The validity of the regime 
concept has been argued to be a “fad” obscuring the power relations that produce the 
rules governing relationships between states (Strange 1982). This and similar criticisms 
have been refuted by demonstrating that regimes do make a difference in bringing 
cooperation into the international arena (Boczek 1987; Puchala & Hopkins 1982). A 
regime matters if its members’ behavior differs from the one they would have in the 
absence of the regime (Krasner 1982). Thus, members of a regime will expectedly align 
their actions with the regime’s principles and norms, generating predictability of behavior 
around a common issue. Regimes are beneficial to their members also by facilitating 
information exchanges among them. However, while regimes may contribute to reduce 
information asymmetries among members, they are still faced with information-related 
problems that can affect interactions between states, namely: moral hazard, occurring 
when agreements introduce incentives not to cooperate; and deception and 
irresponsibility, when members ignore that another member has entered into agreements 
that it does not intend or knowingly cannot fulfill (Keohane 1982). In any of these 
information-challenged situations regime participants can endure less benefits than they 
originally expected, and reductions in individual net utility are observed exclusively by 
regime participants. However, regimes may also impose costs on non-participants, while 
providing net benefits to their members than costs. Consequently, global utility may 
actually be decreased if the benefits enjoyed by regime participants do not outweigh the 
costs imposed on non-members (Keohane 1982). 
Regimes provide an environment that facilitates interactions between members 
that are conducive to reach agreements on jointly desired outcomes, that is, when actors 
share similar interests. Regimes can also facilitate reaching agreements on jointly 
unwanted results, or common aversions (Stein 1982). These distinct situations necessitate 
different solutions: a dilemma of common interests is solved through cooperation, and 
one of common aversions requires only coordination among actors (Stein 1982). 
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Cooperation occurs when joint outcomes yield more benefits to the involved actors than 
decisions that take only self-interest into consideration. This means that a cooperative 
outcome of the decision-making process is contingent on other actors’ decisions 
(Kratochwil 1993). In contrast, coordination only entails that actors avoid the collectively 
most undesirable outcome, imposing less restrictions on their individual pursuit of self-
interest. The behavior of actors engaged in the avoidance of common aversions needs 
only to be mutually consistent, or coordinated, and not mutually restrained. Another 
difference between regimes created to solve cooperation dilemmas and to solve 
coordination dilemmas is that the former require enforcement and the latter do not (Stein 
1982). Enforcement is more easily ensured by an organization assisting in this and other 
functions, than by the regime members’ themselves. Hence, cooperation regimes are more 
likely to be implemented through organizations than coordination regimes (Stein 1982).  
This leads to the importance of distinguishing regimes from organizations. 
Organizations refer to the bureaucratic and logistic aspects of an institution, such as 
office, administrative procedures and budget (Young 1982b). A regime may exist without 
an organization, while organizations are created to serve regimes and other institutions.13 
When regimes require formal organizations for their implementation, their establishment 
is feasible usually only with a common understanding of the purpose of such 
organizations (Kratochwil 1993). 
As Krasner (1983)’s definition indicated, the emergence of an international 
regime is generally sparked by a common concern of two or more states in a given issue 
area. Hence, it is implied that regimes are restricted to a single issue. However, it is often 
the case that international regimes emerge in connection with two or more related issues. 
The international regime on the law of the sea is paramount to the congregation of several 
issues in one single regime, or issue-linkage. Codified in the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), it covers issues concerning the use of the seabed, 
freedom of navigation, natural resource conservation and management, marine scientific 
research, among others. It is also an evolving regime, spawning related regimes in 
connected issues such as shipping and regionalism in ocean management (Joyner 2000). 
                                                 
13
 This necessitates a second distinction, that between regimes and institutions. Regimes do not need to be 
institutionalized, being then considered quasi-regimes. Conversely, institutions need not be a regime. An 
example of such institutions is the United Nations, where being a member of the institution does not prevent 
independent decision-making (Stein 1982). 
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But what is the benefit of creating a regime covering more than one issue-area? And what 
conditions are more susceptible to issue-linkage? Issue-linkage can facilitate the 
negotiation of agreements in situations where actors’ interests are asymmetric (Haas 
1980). In contrast, when actors have very strong preferences and the power to maintain 
them, they are not willing to associate other issues with the one at stake. Issue-linkage 
therefore provides opportunities to advance negotiations in an original issue-area by 
integrating its negotiation game with other games related to other issue areas. There are 
three ways through which issue-linkage can be introduced in negotiations (Haas 1980). 
Substantive linkage may occur as a result of increased and agreed knowledge that justifies 
linking related issues together. Actors often will perceive issues to be linked through 
common causes or common effects, which explains for example all-encompassing 
environmental policies in the European Union (Liefferink 1996). In tactical linkage, 
issues need not be connected in any way as the objective for the actor introducing the new 
issue is simply to gain leverage in negotiations on the original issue. Tactical linkage is 
typically used by the weaker actors, as in the UNCLOS III negotiations where developing 
states introduced the issue of strait navigation to ensure the agreement of developed states 
to the international status of the deep seabed (Haas 1990). Finally, fragmented linkage 
occurs when actors in a coalition share a common overall goal, but are uncertain about the 
interconnectedness of the issues at hand and how to achieve the overriding goal. The 
negotiations of the New International Economic Order depict well this case, with some 
coherence among the states but lack of agreement on the knowledge base supporting 
negotiations (Haas 1980). Issue-linkage is a prevalent strategy dependent on knowledge 
that creates more opportunities for cooperation where many actors interact in different 
arenas associated with different issues (Haas 1980; McGinnis 1986). 
In sum, regimes can be considered as mechanisms that enable both 
communication and cooperation. Communication among members of a regime allows 
each participant to increase its understanding of the consequences of an agreement, while 
cooperation enables members to jointly select a particular agreement from a variety of 
possibilities (Kydd & Snidal 1993). From this, it is clear that regimes are distinct from 
agreements. Regimes are thus more than occasional glimpses of cooperation, denoting 
long-term calculations of interest. Regimes work as “intervening variables standing 
between basic causal variables (most prominently, power and interests) and outcomes and 
behavior”, facilitating coordination between actors in the international sphere in relation 
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to a given issue-area (Krasner 1982). However, regimes do not ensure that cooperation 
will emerge. 
When regimes emerge, their characteristics will depend both on specific factors, 
such as the distribution of power among participating actors, and on context. However, a 
classification of regimes is more useful if allows the comprehension of their 
consequences, instead of restricting the study of regimes to their causal factors (Levy et 
al. 1995). Regimes can be characterized according to their scope, their strength, and the 
compliance effect they have on participating states (Haas 1993). The scope of a regime 
concerns the issues it regulates, which may range from the uses and applications of a 
single substance to all the uses of a shared resource; the strength of the regime is related 
to how stringent are demands on states to comply with the regime’s prescribed behavior 
(Haas 1993). In terms of compliance, there are usually differences among regime 
members, usually associated with their individual capacities and the ranking of the issue 
on their domestic agenda.  
The preceding discussion attempted to provide a brief introduction to the concept 
of international regimes. The following section will complement it by elaborating on the 
development of regime theory and its consequences to the study of international relations. 
In particular, it will address particular contributions to scholarship that have increased the 
comprehensiveness of regime theory. 
2.3.2 The Evolution of Regime Theory 
2.3.2.1 Basic Assumptions 
As mentioned at the outset of the previous discussion, regime theory developed in 
reaction to legal descriptions of international relations. These were deemed insufficient to 
explain existing cooperative behavior between states in the absence of strong centralized 
institutions (Snidal 1996). The concept of international regimes has been found to fit 
empirical observations of formal and informal cooperative behavior among states (Snidal 
1996). Empirical analyses of regimes are informed by three different but complementary 
assumptions. 
The first is that there is not a world government to regulate interactions between 
interdependent states, and none is likely to emerge (Mayer et al. 1993). Without such an 
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authority, the relationships between states occur in a state of “anarchy”, or, as others have 
proposed, governance at the international level is exercised without government (Rosenau 
& Czempiel 1992). It is important to make a distinction between cooperation, “anarchy” 
and harmony. Cooperation is not the same as harmony: cooperation exists when actors 
with different interests converge in their actions for their mutual benefit, while harmony 
implies a perfect alignment of interests among actors (Axelrod & Keohane 1985). 
Anarchy, on the other hand, should not be understood as chaos or permanent conflict, but 
instead as the absence of a world government. This however does not preclude the 
availability of the functions a central authority would perform, such as conflict prevention 
and unity preservation (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992). Regime theory therefore attempts to 
explain how states claiming sovereignty but competing for power and influence can 
cooperate in an anarchic international arena from where a central government, purported 
to make and enforce rules of behavior, is absent (Hurrell 1993). Cooperation is then a 
possible situation “beyond anarchy and short of supranational government in a given 
issue area (Mayer et al. 1993).  
The second assumption underlying regime theory is that states are self-interest 
actors that seek to maximize their individual utility (Hurrell 1993). A corollary of this 
assumption is that actors in international relations are predominantly, if not exclusively, 
states. The consequence is the already mentioned suggestion that states will only join a 
regime if it brings it more liquid benefits than the status quo (Oye 1985). The concept of 
self-interested states also highlights the role of norms and rules in overcoming the 
assurance problem and in affecting the pay-off structure (Hurrell 1993). In the first case, 
norms and rules ensure that all participants put a minimum effort into cooperation if they 
are to enjoy the benefits of their own actions. In the second case, norms and rules impose 
some limitations on a participant’s behavior, limiting their behavioral possibilities, and 
altering costs and benefits of other participants. In other words, norms and rules make one 
actor’s behavior contingent on other actors’ behaviors. This is possible because 
uncertainty is reduced, communication is facilitated, learning is promoted and knowledge 
and information are transmitted (Hurrell 1993). Interestingly, and despite being associated 
with egoistic behavior, self-interest has been suggested to play a role in ocean ethics 
given the common benefits that all may enjoy from a clean and healthy ocean (Auster et 
al. 2009). 
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Finally, the third assumption of regime theory is related to the role of reciprocity 
(Hurrell 1993). Reciprocity can be defined as: 
“exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of 
each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in 
such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad” 
(Keohane 1986). 
Reciprocity can be interpreted in two distinct senses. Specific reciprocity occurs 
when actors engage in exchanges of the exact same value in pre-determined terms, while 
in diffuse reciprocity the equivalence between the exchanged items is not as clear, those 
participating in the exchange may be seen as a group instead of individual actors, and 
there may not be an agreed sequence for the exchange (Keohane 1986). Despite these 
differences, both definitions enable trust among actors, and entail two similar ideas, those 
of contingency and equivalence. One actor’s actions are contingent when they are 
conditioned by other actors’ actions; equivalence needs not be absolute correspondence, 
being this aspect that distinguishes absolute from diffuse reciprocity (Keohane 1986).  
2.3.2.2. Advances in Regime Theory 
Those three assumptions of regime theory, though essential to its development, do not 
however explain its evolution. Regime theory has evolved in different directions to be 
able to better explain the emergence, maintenance and collapse of cooperation at the 
international level (Levy et al. 1995). Advances in regime theory have been possible by 
enlarging its scope beyond the state-centered perspective that dominated much of the 
initial regime studies. Consequently, students of international relations have come to 
focus their attention on the role of non-state actors in shaping the interests of a state in 
international negotiations, in particular the role of NGOs (Bas 2000; Haufler 1993). 
Additionally, the focus of regime theory has been increased by relaxing the assumption of 
the state as a unitary actor. In particular, regime theory has come to address the influence 
of domestic politics in regime formation and operation (Zurn 1993). 
The issue of domestic politics and its influence on regime formation is not a lesser 
one, as it had been suggested in the early 1980s (Strange 1982). Domestic politics can 
alter the utility function that states try to maximize in the international sphere (Kydd & 
Snidal 1993). Particularly when international regimes require legislative ratification, the 
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importance and interests of those able to influence a state’s position in the regime 
negotiations cannot be ignored (Kydd & Snidal 1993). This does not mean that domestic 
politics are capable on their own of determining the outcomes of international 
negotiations. Instead, it is the interaction between, on one hand, negotiations among states 
in the international sphere and, on the other hand, each individual state’s negotiations 
within their own domestic arena, which influences the formation of regimes. In other 
words, the study of regimes cannot ignore “how the domestic politics of several countries 
became entangled via an international negotiation” (Putnam 1988). 
The importance of domestic politics to the formation of regimes is closely linked 
to the role of non-state actors. Found either at the domestic or the international levels, 
when not in both, non-state actors have slowly gained prominence in regime scholarship. 
International regimes are typically created by states, but the domestic implementation of 
many of the regime rules can easily affect non-state actors, such as corporations operating 
inside states’ jurisdictions and whose behavior the regime seeks to regulate, or NGOs that 
can contribute towards regime implementation. Non-state actors potentially affected by 
international regimes will then most likely seek to influence the outcomes of international 
negotiations by pressuring national officials. These are in turn subjected to the two-level 
game of international relations, whereby a state negotiates regimes with other states, and 
then will implement its provisions within their jurisdictions (Young 1995).   
Non-state actors can try to influence regimes that may affect their activities or to 
which they are attentive. They can also create their own regimes, resembling in these 
activities the performance of states when forming an international regime (Haufler 1993). 
Non-state actors and state actors are thus related in two different ways when considering 
the formation and maintenance of international regimes (Haufler 1993). On the one hand, 
states can create regimes that are partially implemented by non-state actors such as 
corporations and NGOs. That is the case of the regime to control pollution in the North 
Sea. Created by the North Sea coastal states, the success of this regime success has 
depended greatly on the collaboration of industry, agriculture and wastewater treatment 
companies (Skaerseth 2003). On the other hand, non-state actors can create their own 
regimes or participate with state actors in similar terms in the formation of new regimes. 
An example of the latter is the formation of the regime embodied in the Code of Conduct 
for private companies dedicated to sell pesticides to developing states, which was 
significantly influenced by both environmental NGOs and industry representatives 
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(Paarlberg 1993). Of particular importance here is the role of many NGOs who have tried 
to influence regime formation both domestically and internationally (Princen & Finger 
1994). That is the case of NGOs such as Greenpeace, present simultaneously at the 
national level in a significant number of states, but that are also able to influence 
international negotiations (Parmentier 1999). The influence of non-state actors can go as 
far as to be the source of principles and norms upon which new regimes are based. The 
principle of prior informed consent (PIC) imbedded in the regime regulating trade in 
hazardous chemicals and pesticides was proposed by NGOs (Paarlberg 1993). Even when 
not participating directly in the formation of a regime, NGOs can also perform some of its 
functions, such as monitoring, information collection, and enforcement (Haufler 1993). 
For example, implementation of PIC within the hazardous chemicals regime and 
associated Code of Conduct has been ensured by environmental NGOs, which have at 
times provided the only independent review of implementation success (Victor 1998). 
Additionally, they may form coalitions within the domestic political system or in the 
international arena to try to influence regime formation (Haufler 1993). That is the case of 
NGOs that were very active in promoting the global ban on ivory trade as a solution to 
the poaching of elephants, which was considered the biggest threat to their survival 
(Nadelmann 1990). Some caution is needed however in the use of the catch-all term non-
governmental organization, as it includes a diversity of organizations that only have in 
common their existence outside of the sphere of the state (Götz 2008). Non-state actors 
can also create their own regimes without participation of state actors in the definition of 
its principles, norms, rules and procedures (Haufler 1993). Private regimes governing the 
financial and insurance markets are quite common. Similarly, NGOs have created a 
regime for transboundary conservation between Bolivia and Paraguay, and have also 
engaged in partnerships with the business actors to provide standards for certification of 
sustainable fisheries (Budowski et al. 2003; Pattberg 2005). Private regimes established 
by the private sector contrast with public regimes in that the former emerge in connection 
with a particular industry sector and the latter are created around specific issue-areas 
(Haufler 1999). 
Regime theory therefore explains not only the international system where a state’s 
actions are often contingent on other states’ actions, but also the existence of an 
international society where states “have established by dialogue and consent common 
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rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common 
interest in maintaining these arrangements” (Buzan 1993).  
2.3.3 Environmental Regimes 
One particular area of development of regime theory has been in connection with 
environmental issues (Boczek 1987; Lejano 2006a; Young 1982b, 1994, 2001). In this 
field, regime theory is concerned with the design of “institutions that serve to order the 
actions of those interested in the use of various natural resources” (Young 1982b). This is 
a natural area of development of regimes, given the global interdependencies that many 
natural resources create among states. However, there are no substantial differences 
between regimes oriented toward natural resources or environmental governance, and 
those intended to govern any other aspect of international relations (Young & Osherenko 
1993b). 
Global interdependencies differ according to the type of resource considered 
which in turn determines in part the institutional solutions designed to regulate it. 
International commons may lie entirely or in part outside of national jurisdiction, and 
governance options to this type of resource may include a world government, national 
jurisdiction or restricted common property; natural resources may be shared by multiple 
jurisdictions, requiring cooperation between State actors to negotiate joint arrangements; 
transboundary externalities may occur when activities in one jurisdiction affect the 
wellbeing of those in other jurisdictions, and their resolution raises questions about 
sovereignty in face of external intervention and liability of the jurisdiction from where the 
effects originate; issues may be linked when environmental decisions or regimes affect 
other decisions or regimes, and vice-versa (Young 1994). 
A case in point of an international environmental regime is that created to control 
marine pollution in the Mediterranean Sea (Haas 1989). Given that the main source of 
pollution was found to be terrestrial activities, this regime’s scope was enlarged to include 
integrated coastal zone management as a cornerstone of the environmental policies of 
Mediterranean states (Frantzi & Lovett 2008). Other prominent regimes include the 
regulation of whaling, codified in the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling (1946), and the regime established for the conservation of Antarctica, codified in 
the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980) 
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(Young 1989). These and most other environmental regimes are characterized by 
interactions within the different jurisdictions located in distinct levels of organization at 
which they operate, or interactions with other regimes (Young 2006). 
Despite the abundance of literature on environmental regimes and the growing 
number of transboundary conservation initiatives, the application of regime theory to the 
study of transboundary conservation is still very limited. To date, only on a few occasions 
has regime theory explicitly informed studies of transboundary conservation (Chester 
1999; Lejano 2006a; Lejano 2006b; Prideaux 2003). Game theory has also been applied 
to contrast transboundary protected areas with non-transboundary protected areas (Busch 
2008). Besides these few cases, transboundary conservation initiatives have in general 
been examined from a sometimes wishful perspective that concentrates essentially on the 
peace building role of transboundary protected areas (Budowski 2003). Much of this 
literature is also oriented towards providing guidance into transboundary protected area 
creation and management (Hanks 1997; Mittermeier et al. 2005; Sandwith et al. 2001; 
van der Linde et al. 2001). In contrast, more critical perspectives have emerged recently, 
often supported by a political ecology theoretical framework (Duffy 2001, 2005, 2006; 
Dzingirai 2004; Singh & van Houtum 2002; Spierenburg et al. 2008). In conclusion, the 
emergence and operation of regimes governing transboundary conservation has yet 
received limited attention from regime theory scholars. 
2.3.4 Factors Enabling Regime Formation 
There are three different schools of thought in regime theory, each attributing different 
importance to the influence of distinct sets of factors over the emergence of regimes 
(Haas 1993; Young & Osherenko 1993b). 
Realists, or structuralists, explain regime formation as a result of power and 
capabilities, while denying the influence of interests in determining state behavior (Haas 
1982). Their basic premise is that regimes are structured by power and reflect its 
distribution in international society (Young & Osherenko 1993b). Definitions of power in 
the realist tradition are associated with the material capacity of a state to force other states 
to do something contrary to their interests (Barnett & Duvall 2005). In the case of 
environmental issues, power resources include (i) enough control over a resource 
allowing a state to dominate collective decision-making affecting it, (ii) sufficient 
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capacity to change the quality of the shared resource, (iii) enough trade control allowing 
environmental restrictions to seriously affect trading partners, and (iv) a reputation for 
diplomatic behavior and scientific knowledge (Haas 1993). 
In their treatment of power, realists adopt a collective choice model and posit 
states to be distinct sovereign and rational units seeking to maximize their own individual 
benefits and minimize their costs in a self-help system (Bas 2000; Young 2001). The role 
of power in shaping the prospects of cooperation has been explained in terms of a balance 
of power for more than five centuries (Little 2007). As independent actors aiming at self-
preservation, a state aims to prevent other states or coalitions of states from exceeding its 
individual capabilities. It will then seek to match other states’ capabilities by either 
expanding its own (internal balancing) or by forming alliances (external balancing) 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2009). Hence, the formation of a balance of power can enable 
international cooperation. 
While the goal of a state trying to balance power in its relations is to avoid the 
emergence of a hegemon, the presence of a hegemonic actor does not necessarily 
preclude cooperation. The theory of hegemonic stability posits that cooperation in the 
international arena necessitates a dominant state that determines and enforces rules 
regulating the interactions between states, thus avoiding “anarchy”. This theory has been 
fueled by historical examinations of the dominant importance of certain states in both 
trade and military capacity, and its explanatory power is associated with very particular 
conditions that are not always observable (Snidal 1985b). Yet, international cooperation 
does not necessarily decrease when there is a decrease or even an absence of hegemony 
(Keohane 1984). This is in part attributable to the nature of hegemony, which can be 
associated with the power base of the hegemon, or with its control over outcomes 
(Russett 1985). 
In addition to the impact of a balance of power and a hegemon, there are other 
mechanisms through which power may affect cooperation. Asymmetry of power has for 
long been understood as a particularly strong constrain to international cooperation. A 
case in point is that of the North-South relations (Zartman 1985). In other situations, a 
group of actors with significant power in the issue-area at stake can be particularly active 
in promoting a regime. 
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Various hypotheses have been proposed and analyzed regarding the role of power 
in regime formation (Table 5).  
Table 5 – Power-based hypotheses for regime formation 
Power-based hypotheses 
Regime formation necessitates or is enabled by: 
• Bipolar distribution of power (balance of power) 
• Symmetry in distribution of power 
• The existence of a small group of great powers in the issue area 
 
Regime formation may not necessitate or be enabled by: 
• The presence of a hegemon in the issue-area at stake 
Adapted from Young & Osherenko (1993b). 
 
While power cannot be ignored as shaping regime emergence, configurations of 
power associated with the presence of a hegemon appear to be disconfirmed (Young & 
Osherenko 1993b). However, this hypothesis shall not be discarded completely. For 
example, the US has been able to maintain their hegemony in the negotiations of 
international environmental regimes. Yet, the US has not acted as a hegemon to promote 
regime formation, but instead to stall it (Giegerich 2006). 
Besides their elaborations on the influence of power configurations over regime 
formation, realists neglect the influence of non-state actors and domestic politics. An 
important consequence of their assumption of states as unitary and rational actors is that, 
while regime membership may reshape the incentives that influence their decision-
making, it will not affect their identity or alter their goals (Young 2001).  
In contrast with realists, institutionalists, or neoliberals, see the interests of the 
state as more influential in explaining regime formation, and posit regimes to enable 
states to realize their common interests (Hasenclever et al. 1996). Institutionalism is 
motivated by the conceptualization of regimes as resulting from the interaction of self-
interest actors that seek joint gains by coordinating their behavior (Young & Osherenko 
1993b). Institutionalists have significantly used game theory to advance their 
explanations of cooperation, instead of previous realist uses that were more concerned 
with conflict (Snidal 1985a). In particular, the use of game theory has been instrumental 
in linking the situational structure facing actors with the institutional design enabling 
cooperation among them (Mitchell & Keilbach 2001). Different situation structures are 
posited to have different levels of regime-conduciveness. Generally, there are two types 
of situations, each with different implications for regime formation: dilemmas of common 
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interests occur when actors share similar interests but disagree on how to pursue them; 
dilemmas of common aversions occur when actors do not agree on a desirable outcome 
but share their desire to avoid a certain outcome (Stein 1982). In a dilemma of common 
interests, one actor behaving independently will enjoy a better pay-off than if it makes his 
actions contingent on other actor’s. In other words, a situation of equilibrium between 
two actors is suboptimal for both of them (suboptimal equilibrium) (Martin 1995). Such 
type of dilemmas is solved by actors collaborating with each other to ensure mutual 
enforcement. An example of a dilemma of common interests is the “tragedy of the 
commons”, mentioned in section 2.2.3 (Hardin 1968). In the case of dilemmas of 
common aversions, enforcement is less problematic. An actor will have an incentive to 
avoid the common aversion because it may improve his payoff, and actors can only have 
mutual gains if they make mutually consistent decisions. In other words, “states recognize 
that failure to agree will hurt all, but they frequently have strongly divergent preferences 
about which cooperative equilibrium to choose” (Martin 1995). Therefore, actors need 
only to coordinate their actions. It is then not surprising that coordination games are more 
regime-conducive than collaboration games (Rittberger & Zurn 1991). 
Institutionalists refuse the idea of atomist states, arguing instead that they are 
integrated in the international system and their positions are therefore relational (Bas 
2000). Institutionalists thus adopt a social-practice model by conceiving states as 
multifaceted entities embodying different and often contradictory interests (Young 2001). 
This multiple character of state actors is also associated with their presence in various 
bargaining processes concerning distinct issue-areas. In situations of heterogeneity of 
interests among actors, cooperation may be facilitated in one issue-area by linking it with 
other issue-areas. Issue-linkage then comes to facilitate integrative bargaining, that is, 
bargaining that aims at developing mutually beneficial outcomes (Young 1989), or 
making the pie bigger. Integrative bargaining is often contrasted with distributive 
bargaining, a negotiation process to distribute limited benefits, or split the pie. However, 
in real-world situations the differences between the two are often not clear as both 
processes are highly intertwined (Spangler 2003), as the pie that has been made bigger 
will eventually be split up. 
Another factor affecting the emergence of regimes is the existence of uncertainty 
regarding the distributional effects of various institutional options on the actor’s relative 
position in the international sphere (Young 1998). Under this “veil of uncertainty”, an 
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actor does not know the consequences of a certain regime to his relative position, and 
would then prefer institutional arrangements that perceives to be fair (Young 1989). 
Contrary to general negative perceptions of uncertainty, this “veil of uncertainty” can 
then be a good thing, in so far as it may, for example, provide an incentive for actors to 
increase their knowledge base, promoting learning processes in regime formation (Haas 
& Haas 1995). While this type of institutional uncertainty can promote regime formation, 
other institutional uncertainties are rather prejudicial to the operation of regimes. Internal 
uncertainties, behavioral uncertainties and linkage uncertainties often emerge in 
connection respectively to the internal characteristics of regimes, the behavior of actors in 
relation to those regimes, and the relation of a regime with other regimes (Young 1998). 
That uncertainty can produce benign outcomes is hardly surprising. Collective 
action is spurred in part by the need to reduce uncertainty and increase predictability of 
behaviors. Yet, it is interesting that uncertainty can be dealt with by prioritizing fair or 
equitable outcomes over efficient ones. In other words, regime formation will be 
successful if agreed outcomes are equitable, even if at the loss of some efficiency (Young 
& Osherenko 1993b). 
Proposing salient solutions to specific problems can also facilitate regime 
formation. Salient solutions are simple prescriptions that often help to break through 
stalled negotiations, and that should be conveyed by their proponents in a straightforward 
manner to policy-makers (Young & Osherenko 1993b).   
Solutions to specific problems that regimes propose to solve can also be 
accelerated by perceived or real external crisis or shocks (Young & Osherenko 1993b). 
For example, reclassification of the African elephant as “no trade allowed” was propelled 
by an evident crisis in its supposedly controlled trade, which was clearly out of control 
and leading to drastic reductions in populations (Sand 2001).  
The study of possible determinants of regime formation has also allowed 
understanding which factors may not be necessary for regime formation, or that appear 
not to influence it at all (Table 6).  
Table 6 – Interest-based hypotheses for regime formation 
Interest-based hypotheses 
Regime formation necessitates or is enabled by: 
• Individual leadership: structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership (Young 1991) 
• Equitable, and not merely efficient, institutional options 
• Salient solutions 
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• Compliance mechanisms that are regarded as clear-cut and effective 
• Integrative bargaining 
• A veil of uncertainty 
• Exogenous shocks or crises 
 
Regime formation may not necessitate or be enabled by: 
• Policy priority status of the issue 
• Willingness to set aside narrow national interests in favor of the common good 
• Concentrating on scientific and technical considerations, as opposed to political issues 
• Greater role of negotiators with scientific or technical competence 
• Highly technical character of the issues at stake 
• Participation of all relevant parties 
Adapted from Young & Osherenko (1993b). 
The factors that appear to contribute to the emergence of regimes elicit another 
feature of institutionalism. Institutionalists recognize that regime implementation is often 
mediated by states, which seek to regulate the behavior of non-state actors in a defined 
issue-area. Conversely, state interests are susceptible to the influence of non-state actors 
(Haufler 1993). This bridging role of the state highlights that regime implementation is a 
two-step process, requiring first membership from the state and then implementation at 
the national level. Implicit is then the role of domestic politics, which institutionalists 
have integrated in game theory by constructing two-level games: “domestic groups 
pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies” and “at 
the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures” (Putnam 1988). However, explaining regime formation on the basis 
of domestic sources creates two problems. On the one hand, the independent (domestic 
politics) and dependent (state behavior) variables are located on different levels of 
analysis, and on the other hand investigating the domestic sources of state behavior 
impose severe information costs on the researcher (Zurn 1993). This latter problem can be 
solved by concentrating exclusively on those states in the issue area who play a prominent 
role in the process of institution-building (prominent states), and also on the domestic 
actors that are most active in influencing state’s interests (prominent domestic actors). 
Cognitivism criticizes realism and institutionalism for ignoring the “pervasive 
ambiguity of reality” (Mayer et al. 1993). Cognitivists go beyond power structures and 
interests to focus on factors such as perception and knowledge, which they propose to 
also explain regime formation (Young & Osherenko 1993b). They posit that knowledge, 
values and perception of the importance and consequences of the issues at stake, as well 
as the options available to solve them, contribute to shape states’ interests (Haas 1992). 
Of course, knowledge can also be considered a form of power, indirectly influencing 
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regime formation (Young & Osherenko 1993b). Still, cognitive explanations of regime 
formation are concerned with how states’ interests are generated by highlighting the role 
of knowledge (Hasenclever et al. 1996).  
While knowledge is determinant for states to have a basis for their decisions on 
how to act on a certain issue, states will first need to have some consensus of the nature 
and scope of the problem at hand before they can proceed to consider possible solutions 
(Hasenclever et al. 1996; Hopkins 1992; Jönsson 1993). Such a convergence of ideas 
would concern the causes of the problem and a range of potential responses to it. The 
need for a scientific consensus is especially visible in environmental and natural resource 
regimes, which are very dependent on science and on changing values regarding human-
environment interactions (Young & Osherenko 1993b). For example, the recognition that 
existing management approaches and institutions were not dealing adequately with 
transboundary wildlife problems was the main driver for the emergence of transboundary 
natural resources management, influencing the emergence of regimes for transboundary 
conservation such as the one governing transboundary wildlife management between 
Canada and the US (Grant & Quinn 2007). 
The importance of such a scientific consensus is highlighted by the 
interdependence states are constantly faced with. This increases the uncertainty of their 
causal relationships in their interactions. Knowledge therefore assumes a function of 
reducing uncertainty. This notion of uncertainty as precluding a full understanding of the 
origins and consequences of an issue, as well as its linkages to other issues, is distinct 
from institutionalists’ notions of uncertainty. In the latter case, uncertainty is associated 
with the lack of information about other actors’ behavior and interests (Hasenclever et al. 
1996). 
A scientific consensus about the problem, causal relations, and possible solutions 
can emerge through the existence of an epistemic community, that is, “a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 
1992). Members of this professional network share a common understanding of the 
problem and possible solutions, and are able to communicate it efficiently to policy-
makers (Young & Osherenko 1993a). Because it is often the case that government 
officials belong to epistemic communities, this form of organization bridges the divide 
between international and domestic politics. Such networks are capable not only of 
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promoting their views but also of precluding other views from gaining prominence (Adler 
& Haas 1992).  
While scientific consensus and epistemic communities may facilitate regime 
emergence, they can also contribute to overcome conflicts that may arise in the 
negotiation process. Dissensual conflicts arise when actors disagree on what is 
individually and collectively desirable, while consensual conflicts occur when values and 
means are agreed upon but actors disagree on how to divide a scarce good (Rittberger & 
Zurn 1991). Dissensual conflicts can be further divided into value conflicts and conflicts 
about means. In the former, actors purport to achieve irreconcilable goals, and in the latter 
they seek to achieve common goals but disagree on the means to reach them. Consensual 
conflicts can concern absolutely valued goods, such as food, and relatively valued goods, 
such as military capacity.  Each of these conflicts vary in their capacity to stall regime 
formation (Rittberger & Zurn 1991):   
Table 7 – Typology of conflicts 
Type of conflict Object of contention Regime conduciveness 
Dissensual conflict Values Very low Means Medium 
Consensual conflict Absolutely valued goods High Relatively valued goods Low 
Adapted from Rittberger & Zurn (1991) 
The influence of values and knowledge in regime formation is indisputable. 
However, scientific convergence and epistemic communities appear not to be always 
necessary or even determinant for regime emergence (Table 8) (Young & Osherenko 
1993b). 
Table 8 – Knowledge-based hypotheses for regime formation 
Knowledge-based hypotheses 
Regime formation necessitates or is enabled by: 
• Values/ideas that matter 
• Scientific convergence on the causal relations and appropriate responses to the issue at stake 
• Presence of epistemic communities (Haas 1992) 
Adapted from Young & Osherenko (1993b). 
A finally set of factors that contribute to regime formation can be grouped under 
the general heading of contextual factors. These pertain “national and world 
circumstances and events seemingly unrelated to the issue area under consideration [that] 
play a major role in determining if and when international cooperation to address a 
particular problem or issue area occurs and in shaping the content of any regime that 
Chapter 2 
   75 
forms” by providing windows of opportunity for regime formation (Young & Osherenko 
1993b). These contextual factors may include shifts in values and ideas, new political 
trends, or simply specific events such as changes in political appointees. For example, 
transboundary marine conservation currently represents a paradigm shift, which has been 
motivated by the physical continuity of the marine environment, the global impact of 
human activities, and the recognition that borderless ecosystems require borderless 
protection. 
The three schools of thought in regime theory advocate the primacy of a specific set 
of factors in explaining the emergence of international regimes. While these are often 
approached separately by scholars, they are not necessarily incompatible. In fact, 
considering the three sets of factors simultaneously may yield greater predictability to the 
analysis (Efinger et al. 1993; Young & Osherenko 1993b). Regime formation can then be 
explained by analyzing four sets of factors surrounding possible cooperation between 
states in a given issue area (Figure 3).  
 
Each factor does not operate in isolation from the rest and interactions are likely to 
occur. These can adopt two forms: substitution effects and interaction effects (Young & 
Osherenko 1993b). A substitution effect exists when the confirmation of one hypothesis 
disconfirms others. For example, if the presence of a hegemon is confirmed to influence 
regime formation, a symmetrical distribution of power is immediately discarded as a 
Figure 3 – Regime formation 
Adapted from Young & Osherenko (1993b) 
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viable explanation. This implies that there would be “tracks” fro regime formation, with 
specific variables playing a determinant role in each of them. Interaction effects, in 
contrast, do not preclude the confirmation of one hypothesis at the expenses of another.  
An interaction may occur when one factor can only be observed after a previous one is 
confirmed. This causal link interaction is exemplified by the possibility of integrative 
bargaining being only possible after actors’ interests have been shaped by an epistemic 
community (Mayer et al. 1993). An interaction effect may not always depict a causal 
relationship between factors. Instead, these may operate simultaneously to produce a 
synergistic effect. For example, the interplay between structural and entrepreneurial 
leadership has contributed to the agreement codified in the Montreal Protocol (Young & 
Osherenko 1993b). 
Multivariate models of regime analysis have caught the attention of various 
students of regime theory (Efinger et al. 1993; Young & Osherenko 1993a, b; Zurn 1998). 
Multivariate analysis holds the promise of a greater explanatory power of the 
determinants of regime formation by considering the influence of a larger set of factors, 
instead of narrowly focusing on a single factor. This approach may help eliciting 
significant conditions under which regimes are more likely to emerge. However, because 
it is applied only ex post, using its findings ex ante may reduce its predictability, but 
necessarily its explanatory power. For example, one may be able to explain how observed 
conditions may affect the likelihood of a state to present a proposal for regulating 
activities in an issue area (regime initiation), to behave unilaterally in refusing the need 
for international management of the issue at stake (i.e., regime prevention), or even to 
show opposition to the most version of the regime without trying to change it or 
withdrawing from the discussions (Zurn 1993). However, while it would be possible to 
pinpoint which of these behaviors are more likely, no certainty can be attached to these 
options. Therefore, and while the behavior of states and other actors in regime negotiation 
cannot be predicted by this approach, its explanatory power is still significant to allow an 
analysis of the potential consequences of current conditions on the future emergence of a 
regime, providing an input into the design of institutions for the regulation of an agreed 
regime. 
2.3.5 Institutional Design 
Chapter 2 
   77 
Earlier scholarship in regime theory was concerned with showing under which conditions 
do regimes matter. Later, it proceeded to analyze how regimes are formed, and what 
factors determine their persistence, change, and decay. More recently, scholars of 
international relations have taken a step forward by assuming that regimes are needed, 
and have focused instead in studying their institutional features and how they should be 
designed to produce desired outcomes (Koremenos et al. 2001a; Wendt 2001). 
Institutions such as regimes are important features of international relations. Their 
importance derives from their ability to facilitate cooperation by embodying principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making processes (Axelrod & Keohane 1985). Moving from 
studying the determinants of regime formation to focus on their adequacy raises concerns 
about how their design can best tackle the problem they were meant to solve. 
There is a great variation in how regimes are organized. Different regimes bring 
together different actors with different interests in the resolution of different problems. In 
other words, states vary in their willingness to produce and adhere to a regime and in their 
incentives to defect from it (Mitchell & Keilbach 2001). It is thus not surprising that a 
regime’s components vary with the nature of the problem at hand. Regimes as institutions 
will then vary along five dimensions (Koremenos et al. 2001b): (i) membership rules, 
concerning who is included and excluded; (ii) scope of issue(s) covered; (iii) 
centralization of tasks, or how are tasks such as information dissemination, bargaining 
reduction and minimization of transaction costs divided between the institution and its 
members; (iv) control, or rules for controlling the institution, such as decision-making 
processes and the loci of institutional authority; and (v) flexibility of arrangements, so 
that changing circumstances can be accommodated.  
Membership of a regime defines who benefits from an institution and pays its 
costs (Koremenos et al. 2001a). Regime membership can be global or can be more 
restricted, depending on the scope of the issue in question and on the uncertainty of 
states’ preferences. For example, NATO membership has generated heated discussions 
that try to find a balance between its enlargement and Russia’s sensitivity (Kydd 2001). A 
regime’s membership can be expanded not only to ensure all states associated with an 
issue participate in dealing with it, but also to accommodate states that otherwise would 
undermine regime functionality. Additionally, a regime may not be restricted to states, 
and can include non-state actors such as NGOs. 
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A regime may tackle one or more issues that may deal with very specific 
problems, such as the control of a substance, or may be more general, such as the control 
of all the activities associated with a shared resource. Regime scope will then vary 
between these two extremes. The number of issues covered by a regime may depend too 
on how these are linked, or on the need to link them despite the absence of a cognitive 
relationship between them. 
Regimes may have different functions, reflected in how its tasks are centralized. A 
regime may operate only as a consultation forum, or functions such as enforcement, 
reduction of transaction costs and bargaining may be centralized in a focal authority. 
Centralization in international cooperation may be contentious as it interferes with state 
sovereignty. Regime members may not be willing to relinquish power in some regime 
functions, generating a more decentralized regime. Centralizing information exchange 
may be the least contested form of centralization. Other functions, such as enforcement, 
bargaining and dispute resolution, are also prone to centralization, as exemplified by the 
EU. Centralization encompasses not only which tasks are centralized but also how they 
are centralized (Duffield 2003). The focal authority of a regime may then be a supra-
national body such as the EU, a body where all regime members are represented as the 
Conference of the Parties of the generality of international treaties, or be restricted to just 
a few regime members such as the UN Security Council.  
Centralization is distinguished from regime control, in that both are usually 
independent. Still, centralization can imply some reduction in control over certain tasks 
such as enforcement. Nevertheless, control over a regime’s decision-making procedures is 
dependent on decision-making rules that determine voting weight, financial sustainability 
of the institution, transparency, etc. Greater control can also be used to deal with 
uncertainty. For example, states involved in the aviation market have retained significant 
control over highly uncertain aspects of the market, such as traffic flows and pricing 
(Richards 2001).  
Finally, flexibility of a regime refers to its capacity to adapt to changing 
conditions. Flexibility may take two forms: adaptive flexibility allows regime members to 
maintain their institutional arrangements while dealing with external shocks through, for 
example, escape clauses (Rosendorff & Milner 2001); transformative flexibility allows 
change in and from within the regime, through clauses determining renegotiation of a 
regime after a certain period of time (Koremenos et al. 2001a). Flexibility is then a 
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regime feature that allows actors to deal with uncertainty, and is therefore dependent on 
the knowledge base on which a regime is built. 
These five institutional dimensions of regimes are not completely independent 
from each other, as institutions are more the result of their interaction than from simple 
grouping them (Koremenos et al. 2001a). As discussed before in relation to the 
determinants of regime formation, institutional dimensions will interact with each other 
and produce different effects than those each dimension would produce on its own. For 
example, it is likely that a regime covering a larger number of issues with a wide scope 
will have a larger membership than a regime dealing only with a very specific issue.  
But how can variation in regimes be explained? Rational approaches have had 
merit in their ability to explain the emergence and maintenance of international 
institutions. However, because regimes are the product of power, interests, knowledge 
and context (Young & Osherenko 1993b), institutional design should be examined within 
a framework that reflects the factors that explain cooperation (Koremenos et al. 2001a). It 
is then in power, interests, knowledge and context that clues for regime design should be 
sought (Figure 4), given the limitations of a purely rational approach (Duffield 2003). 
 
 In setting this causal link between the factors affecting regime formation and 
institutional design of regimes, it is not implied that regimes are merely epiphenomenal 
and inconsequent events (Martin & Simmons 1998). On the contrary, the focus of this 
research, while mainly preoccupied with the potential for regime formation and 
institutional design, does not exclude the interest in the consequences of institutions. 
Membership 
Scope 
Centralization 
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Flexibility 
Power-based factors 
Interest-based factors 
Knowledge-based factors 
Context 
Regime formation Institutional design 
Figure 4 – Regime formation and institutional design 
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After all, it is because institutions have consequences that regimes are studied in the first 
place. 
2.3.6 Regime Theory and Transboundary Networks of Marine Protected Areas 
The exposition of regime theory that preceded this section already sheds some light on the 
choice of regime theory to study the potential establishment of transboundary networks of 
marine protected areas. Yet, a more precise clarification of its role in this study seems 
appropriate. This explanation revolves around the match between regime theory and the 
potentially observable social phenomena that are posited to precede the 
institutionalization of transboundary marine conservation initiatives. 
In the two transboundary regions here considered, there is yet not a complete 
regime that can prescribe behavior for the creation, establishment, and management of 
transboundary networks of marine protected areas. The 1985 Convention for the 
Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the 
Eastern African Region (UNEP 1985a)14 was created under the Regional Seas Program to 
enable cooperation and coordination of actions, as well as to facilitate information 
exchange concerning the marine and coastal environment of East African states. While it 
includes a Protocol concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern 
African Region that addresses also the creation and management of marine protected 
areas, the framework provided by this convention does not provide for the establishment 
of networks of MPAs, transboundary MPAs or transboundary networks of MPAs (UNEP 
1985b). . However, most states in the region do have a duty to protect and conserve the 
marine environment, and to cooperate for that same end, which emanates from their 
commitments made through the Nairobi Convention,15 the Convention on Biological 
                                                 
14
 The Amended Nairobi Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the Western Indian Ocean and a new Protocol for the Protection of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the Western Indian Ocean from Land-Based Sources and Activities were adopted 
on 31 March 2010. None of these instruments has yet been ratified. 
15
 In accordance with Article 10, “The Contracting Parties shall, individually or jointly, take all appropriate 
measures to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as rare, depleted, threatened or 
endangered species of wild fauna and flora and their habitats in the Convention area. To this end the 
Contracting Parties shall, in areas under their jurisdiction, establish protected areas, such as parks and 
reserves, and shall regulate and, where required and subject to the rules of international law, prohibit an 
activity likely to have adverse effects on the species, ecosystems or biological processes that such areas are 
established to protect. The establishment of such areas shall not affect the rights of other Contracting Parties 
and third States and in particular other legitimate uses of the sea.” (emphasis added) 
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Diversity16 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.17 Hence, there are 
principles and norms constituting the core of a regime for cooperation in marine 
conservation. This cooperation can be implemented through sets of rules such as 
transboundary MPAs and transboundary networks of MPAs. However, decision-making 
procedures for this end are lacking, and consequently the regime is insufficient. At least 
in part, it is possible to examine the motivations for cooperation between states on the 
basis of international agreements between them on the topic of transboundary marine 
conservation. However, international legal commitments do not inform sufficiently of the 
motivations, nor at all of the deterrents, to cooperate. Alternatively, regime theory can 
complement international legal commitments in illuminating how the existing conditions 
in each study area may affect the emergence of such a regime. 
As it was shown in the previous sections, regime theory provides a framework to 
examine how cooperation emerges at the international level, and what factors contribute 
to cooperative behavior. Given that in two case studies selected there are still no 
transboundary networks of MPAs, regime theory will be used as a prospective tool. It 
appears that regime theory has not been used to analyze the potential for regime creation 
before even states engage in a negotiation process. It has, however, been used to explain 
why regimes were not formed despite states entering into negotiations. Still, regime 
theory does provide a framework that can elicit the differences and similarities between 
states and how this may affect their cooperative behavior for governing such MPA 
networks. Analyzing states’ capabilities, interests, knowledge and values, will contribute 
to the identification of the governance requirements of transboundary networks of MPAs 
at the international level. Finally, recent developments in regime theory oriented towards 
institutional design provide a framework for the institutional design of governance 
arrangements for transboundary networks of MPAs. 
                                                 
16
 In accordance with Article 5, “Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, 
cooperate with other Contracting Parties, directly or, where appropriate, through competent international 
organizations, in respect of areas beyond national jurisdiction and on other matters of mutual interest, for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.” 
17
 In accordance with Article 192, “States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment”, while Article 197 stipulates that “States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, 
on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and 
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this 
Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account 
characteristic regional features.” 
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Referring specifically to the potential development of transboundary networks of 
MPAs, the absence of a regime entails that any discussion on the implications of different 
network configurations for inter-state cooperation are merely conjectural. However, two 
general situations are envisaged (Figure 5). In the first situation (a), the MPA network 
straddles the maritime boundary dividing the two states’ waters, but none of the 
individual MPAs is shared by the two states. In the second situation (b), at least one of the 
individual MPAs is shared between the two states.  
Each of these situations has different implications for the type of regime to be 
accorded by the involved states, if they actually agree on the need to create transboundary 
networks of MPAs. In scenario (a), the two states would only need to coordinate their 
actions to ensure that the regime is effective. In scenario (b), however, coordination 
would not be enough and the two states are to undertake joint actions if the regime is to 
be effective. These two scenarios could be further divided to accommodate particular 
arrangements. For example, if scenario (b) materializes, the two states may decide to still 
just coordinate their actions by attributing to each other the sole management of the 
section of the MPA on their side of the maritime boundary. They may also perceive their 
interdependence to be so strong that such a situation would require them to work together 
and share material, financial and human resources for the management of that particular 
MPA. These possibilities may be further expanded when specific resources are analyzed 
and considered in the creation of transboundary networks of MPAs in each transboundary 
study site. 
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Figure 5 – Scenarios for transboundary networks of marine protected areas 
2.3.7 Limitations of Regime Theory 
The adoption of any theoretical orientation should not be taken lightly. No matter 
how well a theory explains world phenomena, it always has its weaknesses. Far from 
being a complete theory, regime theory has of course its own limitations. These 
limitations are here discussed, so that they may later inform the data analysis and allow 
the recognition of the applicability and boundaries of the conclusions. 
From its inception, the main criticism of regime theory has targeted the concept of 
regime. Initially labeled as a “fad” and “woolly” (Strange 1982), the most widely adopted 
concept of regimes has not made much progress in clarifying its boundaries, leaving open 
the question of “Where does one regime end and another begin?” (Kratochwil & Ruggie 
1986). Of course, several variations of the concept have emerged through the years 
(Young 1982a, 1998). Though these definitions do not answer the question posed before, 
this should not be surprising giving that regimes are social constructions and not concrete 
entities (Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986). One of such definitions has generated another 
source of criticism. Regimes can also been defined as “patterns of behavior around which 
expectations converge” (Young 1982b). The essence of this definition – convergent 
expectations – is very subjective in nature, and in contradiction with the rational and 
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positivist separation of regimes and the forces that create them (Kratochwil & Ruggie 
1986). Though these criticisms have not hindered the development of regime theory, they 
do raise some concerns about the validity of the concept. There is no simple answer or 
definition that would overcome all these criticisms. Yet, these definitional difficulties can 
be reduced by ensuring consistency in the application of the regime concept to the study 
of cooperation in international relations. 
As mentioned before, regimes were conceptualized as single-issued for a long 
time. Issue-linkage has in the meantime become one of the prominent developments in 
regime theory, pointing to the need to, under certain conditions, link issues under a single 
regime to ensure that an agreement is reached on the primary issue. While this innovation 
allows for an enlarged perspective of regime formation, by also considering parallel 
developments in other regimes, regime theory neglects other phenomena in international 
society beyond those of regimes (Buzan 1993). For example, the focus of international 
relations on regimes shifts attention from aspects of international society, such as mutual 
recognition of sovereignty, which provide an environment for regimes to flourish. Issue-
linkage may partially inform scholars of international relations about how regimes relate 
to each other. Yet, such analysis is always in relation to a specific regime, and ignores the 
“big picture” of how regimes related to each other, how states associated with each other, 
etc. One case in point was that of Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, reciprocated 
by the EU’s support of Russia’s adhesion to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both 
regimes were not linked under a single regulatory framework, but they were strategically 
linked in the international society, and Russia played carefully that linkage in its own 
favor (Douma 2006). 
Studies of international relations have neglected other aspects of international 
society by considering instead more generally institutionalized behavior (Kratochwil & 
Ruggie 1986). International organizations have hardly been studied in regime theory, 
despite their capacity to facilitate international cooperation (Snidal 1992). This is in part 
attributable to the application of game theory to the study of regimes. Game theory 
facilitates the study of regimes by analyzing a diversity of situational models that capture 
many of the possible interactions between actors in the international arena. Indeed, game 
theory has proven to be an effective tool to analyze the use of shared natural resources 
such as land, water, fisheries and pollution (Sumaila et al. 2009). Game theory owns its 
success to its overly simplified portrait of real-world situations. By taking rules as 
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regimes to define the “rules of the game”, regime theory overlooks rules as institutions 
and its role in cooperation (Snidal 1992). Another international phenomenon that has not 
caught much attention from regime theory is strategic interactions. Strategic interactions 
are quite pervasive in the international arena, and exist when actors unilaterally make 
their actions dependent on others’ actions (Lake & Powell 1999). These interactions 
depend largely on what each actor believes others will do. Considering strategic 
interactions places emphasis on the “connection between what actors want, the 
environment in which they strive to further their interests, and the outcomes of this 
interaction” (Lake & Powell 1999). 
Rationalists have been principally responsible for the use of game theory in the 
study of international regimes. Game theory treats actors’ behavior to be guided by 
rational motivations, and to be oriented toward maximization of individual utility. 
However, behavior is the result of more than just rational considerations. Other factors 
include shared values and a common culture that can enable cooperation between states 
by facilitating joint recognition of the need to address issues of their common interest, 
and by facilitating communication in that regard (Hurrell 1995). Also, states’ decisions 
are not just contingent on costs and benefits but depend on notions of justice and fairness. 
Consequently, states may refuse to enter into a regime that, despite improving their 
individual utility, they perceive to be unfair (Hurrell 1995). 
Finally, rational conceptualizations of state actors presume these to be unitary 
entities. However, a state is in fact the result of the interplay between the various 
domestic forces, its political leadership, and the international environment in which they 
are located. The domestic dimension in particular contributes to the definition of a state’s 
interests, and affects also regime implementation. The domestic context operates in this 
regard in three distinct ways: (i) the the international rules emanating from a regime 
require transposition into the domestic legal framework, often through adaptation to the 
national context; (ii) domestic law and international law are mutually dependent, as the 
former ensures implementation of the latter, and this influences the content of the former; 
and (iii) the compliance pull of international law is partially a result of the domestic 
context, where many of the political costs of defecting from international rules are 
observed (Hurrell 1995). 
Importantly enough, regime analysis acknowledges that its field of inquiry does 
not cover the whole realm of today’s international relations, even if we take into account 
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both international and transnational regimes (Mayer et al. 1993). As it evolved, regime 
theory has been able to slowly expand its coverage of international relations, though it is 
hardly a theory that fully explains the nature and consequences of international relations. 
Regime theory has more recently been preoccupied with institutional design. In 
taking institutions as influential in enabling international cooperation, the task of 
explaining how they are formed has been partially replaced with how to design them. The 
rational design framework proposed by Koremenos et al. (2001a) posits institutions to be 
rational responses negotiated to address the problems faced by international actors. 
However, institutions such as regimes do not merely conform to rational rules. Other 
notions, such as fairness and justice, also contribute to shape the institutional design of a 
regime (Wendt 2001). The rational design framework, while useful, is therefore limited in 
its explanation of how institutions are designed (Pierson 2000; Wendt 2001). These 
limitations do not preclude extracting some useful aspects of the rational design 
framework. Chiefly, the rational design framework offers a decomposition of the 
dimensions of international institutions that should not be neglected, but that does not 
account for all possible relevant dimensions of institutions with impact on their outcomes. 
In particular, it has been pointed that it does not pay sufficient attention to variation in 
norms, which, together with principles, are the core components of regimes (Duffield 
2003; Krasner 1982). Variation in norms can be observed regarding their specificity, 
durability and concordance (Legro 1997). Specificity of a norm denotes its simplicity and 
precision, reflected in actors’ understanding of their content and implications. Durable 
norms are those that are maintained over the course of time, and that resist deviations. 
Norm concordance refers to its acceptance in international relations. 
 One general caution is appropriate regarding institutional design as a whole. 
Institutional design as a framework to devise institutions and predict their consequences is 
still in its infancy. Adopting a framework that includes more than just rational factors and 
explanations for institutional variation represents a step forward in the collective effort to 
improve existing institutions and create new ones. To ignore this is to assume that 
“institutional designers” have the necessary knowledge to fully understand the problem in 
question, know how to design an institution to better tackle that problem, and the 
institutional outcomes are those initially expected (Pierson 2000). On the contrary, more 
often than not institutions will have unpredicted and even undesirable outcomes. For 
example, a limited comprehension of the problem to be tackled by a regime is 
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unfortunately a persistent source of institutional ineffectiveness (Wendt 2001). The 
uncertainty associated with institutional design is further compounded by the possible 
interactions between the various factors, resulting in institutional arrangements that are 
not easy to predict. 
2.4 Linking Common Pool Resource Theory and Regime Theory 
As it was shown in the previous sections, these two theories have the potential to 
contribute differently to the analysis of the governance requirements of transboundary 
networks of MPAs. Mozambique and Tanzania, and Mozambique and South Africa share 
different marine resources of conservationist interest that can be considered common pool 
resources. The multi-jurisdictional nature of resources requires solutions at the state level. 
CPR theory can provide a framework to identify the current governance arrangements in 
place to govern the extraction and use of shared resources. CPR theory will then be 
instrumental in providing information on how appropriation of marine resources is 
currently regulated by each state and by local communities. This will constitute an 
important input to define exactly what type of problems these resources face, and how 
they can be best addressed at the bilateral level. 
The joint management and conservation of such resources through transboundary 
networks of MPAs necessitates some degree of bilateral cooperation between states. 
Regime theory provides an analytical framework that can support the identification of 
conditions enabling and restraining cooperation between each set of two states. 
Additionally, regime theory can inform the creation of institutional designs for the 
governance of transboundary networks of MPAs that are best tailored to the specific 
problems faced in each case study.   
CPR theory and regime theory coincide in their focus on collective action for the 
purpose of achieving joint gains or avoiding joint losses (Mayer et al. 1993). They differ 
however in their basic concepts, methodological approaches and research practices 
(Young 2002). CPR theory is more concerned with the factors that explain the emergence 
of CPR regimes, and not with institutional design of those same regimes. Also, property 
rights as conceived in CPR theory do not translate directly into the global level. The 
global commons, in opposition to local commons, are differentiated on the basis of 
jurisdiction, instead of property (Young 1995). While CPR theory examines the 
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conditions that enable cooperation between resource users in sustaining management 
regimes that avoid central authority and markets, regime theory tries to unveil the 
conditions that would facilitate cooperative behavior between states in the absence of an 
enforcement authority (Martin 1995). These differences highlight the difficulties of trying 
to transpose (scale-up) local cooperative behavior to the international arena, and vice-
versa (scale-down). 
Despite these differences, these two theories are not irreconcilable and are 
particularly useful in exploring cooperation options in the context of global commons 
(Martin 1995). CPR theory can inform regime theory of the descriptive characteristics of 
the resources at stake, the people that use them, and what institutional arrangements are in 
place. These characteristics will contribute to elicit the power-based, interests-based, 
knowledge-based and contextual factors that influence international cooperation and 
institutional design. Linking CPR theory and regime theory generates a framework to 
examine multi-level governance issues like those posed by transboundary networks of 
MPAs (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6 – Linking common pool resource theory and regime theory 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapters presented the need for transboundary networks of marine protected 
areas given current trends in protected area development and marine conservation. The 
theoretical underpinnings of common pool resource theory and regime theory were 
explained, as well as how this theoretical framework can elicit the potential for 
cooperation in the creation and management of transboundary networks of marine 
protected areas. This chapter presents the methodology, consisting of a research approach, 
research design, and methodological techniques. 
3.1 Research Scope 
The overall goal of this research was to identify the governance requirements for 
cooperation in the creation and management of transboundary networks of marine 
protected areas, an emergent tool for transboundary marine conservation. Governance 
requirements are here defined as the courses of action that states can undertake to achieve 
a proposed objective, the institutional arrangements that serve that objective, and the 
decision-making procedures adopted in that regard (Hanna 1999; Symes 2007). In other 
words, governance requirements concern how states and other actors can cooperate for 
the successful creation and management of transboundary networks of MPAs. The goal of 
this research was pursued by focusing on what is needed to facilitate bilateral cooperation 
that can ensure the governance of transboundary networks of marine protected areas in 
two transboundary areas in East Africa (Kooiman 2008). First, the governance 
requirements of transboundary networks of marine protected areas are determined by the 
physical characteristics of shared natural resources, the dependent users and interests, the 
modes according to which they are utilized, and the institutional arrangements currently 
governing their utilization. Second, the influence of these local conditions over 
cooperation is further compounded by the interplay between power, interests and 
knowledge, influencing the behaviour of international actors. 
This research aims to improve the comprehension of the limitations and potentials 
of transboundary networks of marine protected areas. Such knowledge is essential for the 
success of this marine conservation tool that is still incipient, but likely to gain 
momentum given current trends in marine conservation. 
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This research addressed two transboundary marine areas where the creation of 
transboundary networks of marine protected areas has been explored, namely (1) the 
border region between Mozambique and Tanzania, and (2) the border region between 
Mozambique and South Africa.  The research project TRANSMAP (Transboundary 
networks of marine protected areas for integrated conservation and sustainable 
development – biophysical, socio-economic and governance assessment in East Africa) 
has developed a scientific basis for the creation of TBNMPAs in the two study areas. 
However, it has not addressed the question this research attempts to answer. In other 
words, the project provided a substantial amount of information that supports the creation 
of transboundary networks of marine protected areas, but the question of how states can 
cooperate in their creation and management remains unanswered. 
3.2 Research Approach 
This thesis sought to establish causal relationships between the existing situations in the 
two transboundary areas, the behaviour of domestic and international actors, and 
governance requirements for the creation and establishment of transboundary networks of 
MPAs in this region of Africa.  
A case study approach was selected to investigate the potential for cooperation in 
the creation and management of transboundary networks of marine protected areas, 
because it is preferred when the studied phenomenon is hard to control and when the 
current phenomenon cannot be easily distinguished from the context (Yin 2003). Its 
advantage over historical analysis is the ability to process a wide variety of evidence, 
such as interviews, documents and observation, this being  its main strength. Case studies 
are preferred over experimentation due to their ability to deal with phenomena that cannot 
be controlled. Investigating causal relationships in a small number of cases enables 
research on (Mitchell & Bernauer 1998): 
• important variables that are difficult to quantify (e.g., power, interests, or 
knowledge); 
• theoretically important, empirically rare, or previously ignored cases; 
• innovative (but, by their nature, rare) international environmental policy 
strategies; 
• causal, rather than merely correlational, relationships. 
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The case study approach does not preclude the use of other research approaches. 
For example, surveys and ethnographies can be integrated in case studies. While case 
study approaches are often criticized for their lack of “hard” quantitative analysis, the 
latter is not excluded and is often used. In sum, a case study is: 
“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (Yin 2003). 
The research approach followed here results from an adaptation of the case study 
approach, and it is depicted in Figure 7. 
3.3 Research Design 
A research design is the logical connection between theory, research questions, data 
collection and ultimately the conclusions to be drawn (Yin 2003). Establishing a research 
design requires (i) using existing theories to define the research questions that will orient 
the research, (ii) building hypotheses to be tested, (iii) selecting the case studies, (iv) 
defining what data is collected and how it is collected, (v) and analysing the data. A 
research design is not complete without a brief examination of ethical issues concerning 
data collection and analysis, and the creation of mechanisms to ensure construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability (Mitchell & Bernauer 1998; Yin 2003). 
3.3.1 Insights from Existing Theories 
The theoretical framework presented in section 2.2 provides an analytical framework to 
examine the characteristics of common pool resources, their users, and those of their 
institutional arrangements that are conducive to the establishment of common property 
regimes. While defining the type of property regime for transboundary networks of MPAs 
is not the main purpose of this research, the analytical framework provided by CPR 
theory defines the issues confronting the creation of transboundary networks of MPAs.
Methodology 
94 
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In turn, these issues provide the basis to examine the potential for cooperation. 
The theoretical framework presented in section 2.3 discussed the importance of power-
based, interest-based, knowledge-based and contextual factors in the emergence of 
cooperation. Each set of factors will have a distinct influence over cooperation, depending 
on contextual aspects and the interactions between factors, within the same set or 
otherwise. The manner in which each factor influences cooperation is likely help shape a 
regime’s institutional design in terms of its membership, scope, centralization, control and 
flexibility. 
3.3.2 Detailed Research Questions 
The propositions and main research question of this inquiry were presented in section 1.3. 
The research question guiding the elaboration of this thesis is: 
What are the governance requirements that may 
facilitate cooperation in the conservation of 
shared natural resources? 
The inquiry set by this research question is of a predictive nature, and guided by 
the following assumptions: 
• The actors capable of significantly shaping a state’s interests can be identified, 
characterized and their potential influence measured; 
• A state’s capacities, interests and knowledge can be defined and characterized; 
• The capacities, interests and knowledge of two potentially cooperating states can 
be examined interdependently to identify aspects enabling and restricting  
cooperation; 
• The institutional design of a regime governing international cooperation in an 
issue can be informed by the participating states’ power, interests and knowledge 
and the context within which it will emerge. 
• Existing international obligations and commitments concerning marine 
conservation are, to a certain extent, conducive to international cooperation. 
Taking these assumptions in consideration, the main research question is 
answered by providing further answers to the following subquestions, which were used to 
guide data collection and analysis: 
Methodology 
96 
1. What are the physical, resource user and institutional characteristics of the resources 
that are the object of the international cooperation for their conservation? 
2. How do the different characteristics of the resources influence state actors’ 
preferences? 
3. What are the capacities, interests and knowledge of states concerning the 
transboundary conservation of these resources? 
4. What are the capacities, interests and knowledge of actors potentially influential in 
shaping a state’s position? 
5. How may potentially influential actors affect states’ preferences? 
6. How do the power, interest and knowledge-based characteristics of interdependent 
states interact to limit and enable cooperation? 
7. What international principles, rules and procedures to which the states subscribe 
facilitate/guide international cooperation in the case study areas? 
8. How can a regime be designed to address possible constraints to cooperation? 
3.3.3 Selection of Case Studies 
The selection of case studies conforms to replication logic rather than of  sampling  (Yin 
2003). Borrowing language from experimental science, this method entails that each case 
study is an experiment in itself and therefore does not constitute a sample within an 
experiment. The cases were selected on the basis of the following criteria: 
• Each case study must have potential for neighboring states to cooperate in creating 
and managing transboundary networks of marine protected areas. The potential 
for cooperation is here defined by: the absence or lack of success of domestic or 
bilateral exchanges in this regard; the political commitment to transboundary 
conservation and marine conservation of each state, reflected respectively in the 
existence of transboundary protected areas on land and of marine protected areas 
in each transboundary region, or  in public statements; the availability of scientific 
and technical knowledge and skills related to the conservation and management of 
marine biodiversity, and associated economic and subsistence activities; the 
availability of internal financial resources to sustain cooperation or, in the 
alternative, the availability of external assistance. 
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• There is no management regime of a transboundary character in operation in the 
geographical area of the case study at the time the research was undertaken. 
• The case study must correspond to a geographical area of particular marine 
ecological importance.  
• The case study or, more precisely, its geographical area, should be sufficiently 
familiar to the researcher and enable access to and retrieval of potential data. 
• The case studies should have at least one state in common to serve to a limited 
extent as a control variable. By having one state involved in the two case studies, 
it should be possible to contrast the effects of that state’s preferences and their 
interactions in one case with the other case. 
The two cases selected concern the transboundary marine regions shared by 
Mozambique and Tanzania and by Mozambique and South Africa. Both transboundary 
regions have been the object of a research project that provided knowledge to the three 
states to assist with the creation of bilateral transboundary networks of MPAs 
(TRANSMAP 2008e). TRANSMAP produced biophysical, socio-economic and 
governance assessments of both transboundary regions. The project did not investigate 
the potential for cooperation between each pair of states, as the project was developed 
under the assumption that its results would be used by the three states. While there is one 
MPA on both sides of the boundary in each of the two transboundary regions, there was 
no functional transboundary management regime in place in either at the time this 
research was undertaken. At the time of writing, it was questionable whether the 
respective management authorities even communicated their MPA management practices 
and results among them. However, the three states possess significant experience in 
transboundary terrestrial conservation. 
Together with Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa are  responsible for the 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. They have also been cooperating, along with 
Swaziland, for the creation of transboundary protected areas through the General Trans-
Frontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol (TFCRA Protocol 2000). This General 
Protocol supersedes five others that specify transboundary protected areas to be created, 
one of which consists in a transboundary MPA between Mozambique and South Africa: 
the Lubombo Ponta do Ouro–Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier Conservation 
and Resource Area (Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Protocol 2000). This protocol codifies 
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Mozambique’s intention to create transboundary MPAs with its neighbors (Wells et al. 
2007). 
Mozambique and Tanzania are in the process of establishing an elephant corridor 
connecting the Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania with the Nyasa Reserve in 
Mozambique. In the past few years, they have also engaged in exchanges – so far 
unsuccessful – regarding the creation of an MPA that would fill the void in marine 
protection between the Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP), in 
Tanzania, and the marine section of the Quirimbas National Park (QNP) in northern 
Mozambique. In addition to Mozambique’s commitment toward its coastal neighbors, 
Tanzania has also recognized the need to share with Mozambique a similar environmental 
regime for this transboundary marine region (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
2006). 
Both case studies are an integral part of the Eastern African Marine Ecoregion, 
which has been considered a priority area for marine conservation by WWF (WWF & 
EAME 2007). WWF has provided financial and technical assistance to the Quirimbas 
National Park. The Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) played a relevant role in the Great 
Limpopo Transfrontier Park. Additionally, the researcher participated in the research 
efforts of TRANSMAP during its four years by participating in the fieldwork of the 
socio-economic stream and by providing significant input into the governance stream of 
the project. These geographical areas offer a very good opportunity to use one state as a 
control variable across the two cases. This is particularly important to contrast the effects 
of the “control” state’s preferences and their interactions in one case with the other case. 
Considering these aspects in aggregate, it is reasonable to assume the existence of a 
strong potential for cooperation in the conservation of shared marine resources in the two 
transboundary regions. 
Given limitations in research resources, the whole range of species and habitats 
that underlie interdependence between states in each case area was not considered. 
Instead, one habitat – coral reefs – and one species – Indo-Pacific humpback dolphin 
(Sousa chinensis) – were selected for the following reasons: 
• The selection of both a habitat and a species attempts to substantiate the widely 
recognized need to protect both ecologically significant habitats and charismatic 
species through MPA networks. 
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• Both coral reefs and Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins can be considered common 
pool resources, given that exclusion of other users from extracting them is costly 
and removal of resource units by one user diminishes the availability to other 
users. 
• These CPRs differ most prominently in their mobility. Coral reefs can be 
considered stationary not only because of their sessile nature, but also because the 
fish populations that use them as habitat are relatively residential. Indo-Pacific 
humpback dolphins, on the other hand, are mobile and can introduce different 
institutional challenges.  
• Both coral reefs and Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins have high conservation 
needs in both study areas and require conservation measures to ensure their 
preservation (TRANSMAP 2008c). 
• They have socio-economic importance: coral reefs are typically important fishing 
grounds for coastal communities, while Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins, along 
with other cetaceans, can be targeted by dolphin watching operators and are 
targeted by fishers that use them for shark bait. This makes them quite prone to 
conservation through bilateral cooperation between states. 
3.3.4 Data Collection 
Data collection aimed at gathering good information that answers the research questions 
(Creswell 1998). Two forms of data collection were considered necessary given the 
nature of the research inquiry. Archival and documental data contribute to set the scene 
that precedes fieldwork, giving the researcher a better grasp of the existing conditions. 
This form of data collection enabled triangulation through the use of multiple sources of 
evidence, particularly after the fieldwork, substantiating claims that evidence collected in 
the fieldwork may not be strong enough to make, and disconfirming others. Ethnographic 
methods were adopted in the fieldwork. Ethnography was used as the methodological 
basis for data collection because of its capacity to explore the behaviour of social groups, 
including institutions and their organizations (Creswell 1998). Three ethnographic 
methods were used: participant observation, questionnaires, and interviews.  
3.3.4.1 Archival Research 
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Archival research is particularly important to provide contextual information concerning 
the two study areas. Specifically, peer-reviewed scientific literature and scientific 
information produced by the TRANSMAP project were used to select the common pool 
resources targeted by the research, and to identify their characteristics. The reports 
produced by the TRANSMAP socio-economic and governance teams were instrumental 
in setting the scene in which the fieldwork is to be carried out, and in identifying the 
relevant actors in face of the research objectives. These actors are here considered as 
stakeholders, that is, individuals, groups and organizations who are affected by or can 
affect the outcomes of a decision or action (Reed et al. 2009). Yet, stakeholder 
identification was not limited to a review of the literature on the two regions. During the 
fieldwork  the researcher gained a deeper understanding of the scene of the research 
inquiry so that  more stakeholders were identified. 
These two main sources of information were also complemented with 
governmental reports concerning the marine environment in the three states and abundant 
information produced by several NGOs operating the three states. The analysis of these 
documents allowed the identification of possible grounds for cooperation by highlighting 
similar threats to shared resources on both sides of a border and interdependencies in the 
use of those resources. 
3.3.4.2 Ethnographic Methods 
Three ethnographic methods were adopted: semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation, and questionnaires. These methods generated different types of data in 
distinct field conditions. For each transboundary area, two sites were selected, one on 
each side of the border and within the existing marine protected areas. This preference 
aimed at assessing how the selected resources are managed within MPAs in the three 
states. 
3.3.4.2.1 QUESTIONNAIRES 
Questionnaires were used to collect information on the selected common pool resources, 
namely their uses and the importance users attribute to them, the institutional 
arrangements in place to govern their use, and the relation between these aspects and the 
characteristics of each resource. These questionnaires assisted in the systematized 
collection of information, and their administration and data processing were less time 
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demanding than interviews. Though careful consideration was given to issues of 
representativeness of the data collected, the use of questionnaires did not aim at achieving 
statistical significance. Two questionnaires were produced: one directed at those involved 
in fisheries, and another one directed at tourism operators (Appendix I). 
3.3.4.2.2 PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
Participant observation contributed to a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the 
resources. While there is abundant literature on the uses of coral reefs in the region, the 
knowledge on humpback dolphins is less developed. More detail on this cetacean can be 
obtained from observing and interacting with individuals or groups of individuals that 
may know more about humpback dolphins than what has been reported in the literature 
until now. Participant observation was planned to last two weeks at each site to ensure a 
more complete understanding of the characteristics of the resources.. However, it lasted 
on average 2-3 days. This was because fieldwork logistics consumed more time than it 
was initially predicted, and significant time was also spent in obtaining answers to 
questionnaires from respondents. Despite the very short duration, participant observation 
was important for the researcher to embed in the study sites. Participant observation 
assisted an understanding of how resources were being used, complementing the use of 
questionnaires, and identifying stakeholders that may have been absent from the 
literature.  
For the purpose of this research, a stakeholder was defined as: (i) individuals, 
groups of individuals or organizations that engage in consumptive or non-consumptive 
use of coral reefs and/or of humpback dolphins in the two transboundary regions; (ii) 
individuals, groups of individuals or organizations that may affect the outcome of 
measures aiming at the conservation of these resources in the two transboundary regions; 
and (iii) individuals, groups of individuals or organizations that may be affected by 
measures aiming at the conservation of these resources (Reed et al. 2009). Participant 
observation informed, to a limited extent, the application of questionnaires and of 
interviews. 
3.3.4.2.3 INTERVIEWS18 
                                                 
18
 While questionnaires are more appropriate to produce knowledge on a certain phenomenon in face of a 
potentially large number of informants and little time to engage with them all, interviews are more adequate 
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 The aim of the interviews was to understand how different actors see cooperation 
in the conservation of specific marine resources shared between two states. Three 
interview scripts were designed, following an identification of the actors having 
knowledge that can answer the research questions (Appendix II). While this “data 
mining” orientation of the interview design process was dominant in its initial phases, 
such position was relaxed during the interviews by adopting a more “interviewer as 
traveller” attitude (Kvale 2007). The first interview script was oriented to elicit the 
motivation and ability of each state to cooperate in the conservation of shared marine 
resources. For this purpose, the state institution that would lead the negotiation process 
with a neighbouring state for the purpose of cooperation in the conservation of shared 
marine natural resources was identified. A second, but more limited, set of interviews  
targeted actors previously involved in transboundary conservation initiatives in each state. 
The purpose of these interviews was to understand the potential successes and failures of 
transboundary cooperation between each pair of states. Finally, a third set of interviews 
was conducted with representatives of institutions and organizations potentially 
influential in shaping a state's motivation to cooperate in the conservation of shared 
resources. This included governmental departments with a mandate pertaining activities 
in each transboundary region (e.g., fisheries and oil drilling), and non-state organizations 
that may have an interest in marine conservation in any of the two transboundary regions 
(e.g., environmental NGOs and scientific community).  
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
Data analysis was undertaken after all questionnaires were processed,  results converted 
to electronic format,  interview reports were verified by the interviewees, and field notes 
from participant observation transcribed to an electronic file. Data that names 
interviewees and questionnaire respondents was omitted from the electronic files to 
ensure anonymity and enable the researcher to concentrate on the information provided. 
The analysis was initiated by thoroughly studying all the data collected and 
annotating them. For each case study, a description was written giving a detailed view of 
the factual context of the research inquiry. This was followed by the creation of a small 
                                                                                                                                                  
when the number of informants is smaller, and their insights, more than factual knowledge, is sought (Kvale 
2007).  
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number of codes to reflect various informative dimensions of the data. The categorical 
aggregation sought preliminary general answers to the central question and subquestions 
of the research. Data analysis continued with a focus on single aspects that were 
examined independently from other aspects. Direct interpretation was framed by the 
theoretical framework provided in Figure 6 in Chapter 2. An iterative interpretation 
process was then initiated by moving back and forth from single aspects to more general 
and substantiated explanations. This interpretation process sought to identify patterns in 
the data and to establish links between them. Finally, generalizations were sought from 
the interpretations provided.. 
3.3.6 Ethical Issues 
Any research study of this nature deals unavoidably with ethical issues concerning the use 
of human participants. Data collection depends in this case almost exclusively on the 
willingness of various persons to reveal not only facts, but also their thoughts, opinions 
and ideas regarding the matter in question. The researcher benefiting from this realm of 
information and knowledge has essentially four obligations toward the research 
participants: 
1) Non-maleficence, or the duty not to harm in any way the research participants; 
2) Beneficence, or the duty to ensure that research involving human participants 
yields some benefit, rather than just being carried for its own sake; 
3) Autonomy or self-determination, or the duty to respect the values and decisions of 
the research participants; 
4) Justice, or the duty to treat research participants equally (Murphy & Dingwall 
2001). 
The potential to cause unintended harm to research participants was reduced by 
ensuring both their confidentiality and anonymity. This was and will continue to be 
achieved by decoupling participants’ identification information from research reports, and 
by handling and storing research data until five years after the publication of relevant 
research results in peer-review publications. Research data storage is password-protected, 
and accessible only to the author of this thesis. Five years after publication of relevant 
results, physical and electronic research data will be destroyed. To avoid the misuse of a 
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participant’s knowledge and perceptions19, participants were included in the interview 
review process. Interviewees were given the opportunity to review the report of their 
inputs to the inquiry tentatively within 48 hours of the interview, and thus correct any 
misstatements that may have been made by the researcher. Participants responding to 
questionnaires are expected not to be the subject of biased reporting on the side of the 
researcher, given the very straight and direct nature of the questions posed in a 
questionnaire, when compared with the more open nature of an interview.  
In terms of the benefits it may generate, this inquiry is expected to not only 
advance knowledge on how transboundary networks of MPAs may be created, but also on 
how obstacles to this endeavour may be overcome. Moreover, fieldwork with local 
communities elicited a greater understanding of how they in general, and the subgroups 
within them in particular, relate to the CPRs at stake. Lastly, it is expectable that research 
results can be generalized to situations where a potential for transboundary cooperation 
may exist but that it is yet to be realized. 
All research participants contributing to the research were given the opportunity to 
clearly decline or accept to participate in this research. Interviewees were informed of the 
consequences of their participation in the research through a consent form (Appendix 
III).20. Participants targeted by questionnaires and participant observation were informed 
in a more general manner. Given that many local communities are illiterate, verbal 
consent was sought following a brief explanation of the nature and purpose of the 
research. 
 
                                                 
19
 This commonly results from a lack of accuracy in the researcher’s reporting of the interactions with the 
participants. 
20
 The research form details (i) the main purpose of the study, (ii) the study design, (iii) the criteria to define 
who can be a research participant, (iv) details about who is conducting the research, (v) what research 
participants need to do to contribute to the inquiry (Dalhousie University 2007) 
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4. PROTECTING CORAL REEFS AND HUMPBACK DOLPHINS 
GRILO, C. (Submitted). "Transboundary Marine Protected Areas in the Western Indian 
Ocean: How Adequate Are They?" Marine Policy. 
 
Abstract: Many threatened marine species and habitats straddle more than a single 
national jurisdiction, making transboundary marine protected areas (MPAs) one possible 
tool for their conservation. However, such area-based tools are not appropriate for all 
levels of resource mobility, are not capable of tackling all threats, and pose various 
governance challenges arising from multiple jurisdictions and interests. Transboundary 
MPAs have been proposed to protect marine habitats and species in the Western Indian 
Ocean. To assess their adequacy, the ecological characteristics, threats, and institutions 
associated with a static resource (coral reefs) and a mobile resource (Indo-Pacific 
humpback dolphin) in two coastal border regions were examined. This assessment 
revealed some limitations of transboundary MPAs in the Mozambique-Tanzania and 
Mozambique-South Africa border regions, such as significant knowledge gaps, inability 
to tackle land-based pollution, and difficulties in law enforcement in remote areas. It also 
showed that transboundary MPAs can protect continuous ecosystems divided by political 
borders, though existing fisheries co-management institutions on both sides of a border 
may be a better option. Most importantly, this assessment illustrates the importance of 
conducting similar reviews before countries commit to establish transboundary MPAs, 
and highlights the need to tailor conservation regimes to on-the-ground contexts. 
Keywords: transboundary conservation; marine protected areas; Western Indian Ocean; 
coral reefs; Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are widely advocated as one of the best tools available 
for the protection and conservation of marine species and habitats [1, 2], as well as for the 
enhancement of fish stocks [3, 4]. Often, threatened marine species and habitats straddle 
multiple national jurisdictions (e.g., through migrations or geographical extent, 
respectively), or are exposed to multijurisdictional threats (e.g. fishers from neighbouring 
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country). In such cases, it is wise to consider the creation of transboundary MPAs, i.e. 
MPAs that straddle one or more borders between states [5].   
Transboundary MPAs have the potential to protect marine species and habitats by 
joining conservation efforts of different countries, their institutions and peoples. Yet, just 
like subnational MPAs, transboundary MPAs need to be tailored to their specific 
contexts. The ecological characteristics of threatened habitats and species are determinant 
to the size and shape of an MPA [6, 7]. For example, a well-defined habitat will be easier 
to protect through an MPA, due to its lack of mobility, while a species with low site 
fidelity and high dispersal movements, exceeding the size of an MPA will receive only 
limited protection [8, 9]. It is also essential to know the threats affecting vulnerable 
resources, as these should determine directly the objectives of MPAs and the measures to 
be adopted so that these same threats are minimized. Many MPAs have been created with 
the broad goals of “protecting biodiversity” and “fisheries enhancement” [8], often 
lacking detailed objectives for the specific ecological features they purport to protect [10]. 
Finally, MPAs cannot be created without consideration for the institutional and social 
contexts in which those resources are used [11-13]. 
This paper complements previous research on transboundary MPAs proposed for 
the Mozambique-Tanzania and Mozambique-South Africa border regions [14-16], by 
assessing their adequacy in the protection of coral reefs and Indo-Pacific humpback 
dolphins. Specifically, it investigates (i) the ecological characteristics of those two marine 
resources, namely mobility and connectivity [17, 18]; (ii) the threats currently affecting 
them [13, 19]; and (iii) the institutional arrangements that already govern these threats 
[20, 21], including those of the existing MPAs that have been proposed to be linked 
through larger transboundary MPAs. The overall goal of the paper is to elicit the added 
value of creating transboundary MPAs in these two transboundary marine regions, in face 
of their particular contexts. The paper is not an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
existing MPAs; instead, it tries to show the adequacy of transboundary MPAs to protect 
certain resources that are under concrete threats and are governed by particular 
institutional arrangements. 
The following section describes the selected study sites and resources, as well as 
the methodology. In sections 3 and 4, the ecological characteristics, threats and 
institutional arrangements related to each resource in the Mozambique-Tanzania and 
Mozambique-South Africa border regions, respectively, are presented. These are 
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discussed in a comparative manner in Section 5 to highlight the benefits and limitations of 
creating transboundary MPAs in these two particular contexts. Section 6 concludes the 
paper, suggesting that similar assessments be conducted before transboundary MPAs are 
created, and that these should compare MPAs to other marine management tools. 
2. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Several countries bordering the Western Indian Ocean have been making significant 
progress in the creation of MPAs to protect marine biodiversity [22]. As part of these 
efforts, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania are also working toward the creation 
and joint management of transboundary MPAs around their maritime borders to protect 
their marine biodiversity, support the sustainable use of marine resources, promote 
tourism and contribute to poverty reduction [23-25].  
2.1 Study areas 
The border regions between Mozambique and Tanzania (Fig. 1) and between 
Mozambique and South Africa (Fig. 2) are quite remarkable in terms of their marine 
biodiversity, and have been classified as priority seascapes of the Eastern African Marine 
Ecoregion by WWF [26]. Important marine and coastal habitats include coral reefs, 
mangroves, seagrass beds, rocky shores, sandy beaches, and deepwater canyons, which 
support a variety of species that includes marine invertebrates, reef fish, pelagic fishes 
and highly migratory fishes, and charismatic megafauna (whales, dolphins and dugongs). 
The border region between Mozambique and Tanzania is considered to have 
Outstanding Universal Value, and has been recommended for inclusion into the World 
Heritage Site list [27]. The two countries have engaged in the past few years in occasional 
conversations toward the creation of a transboundary MPA that would connect the MPAs 
that already exist on both sides of the border. The Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine 
Park (MBREMP) was created by Tanzania in 2000 in its southernmost coastal region, 
Mtwara. It is adjacent to the border with Mozambique, has about 30.000 inhabitants, and 
covers an area of 650 km2. The Quirimbas National Park (QNP), established in 2002 in 
Mozambique, is inhabited by approximately 130.000 people living within its 7.500 km2, a 
fifth of which covers coastal and marine habitats and species in the southern and central 
sections of the Quirimbas Archipelago. QNP is located 200 km from the border with 
Tanzania, and it is this geographical gap in protection – the northern section of the 
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Quirimbas archipelago – that both countries have been trying to address. Tanzania has 
publicly recognized the need to share with Mozambique a similar environmental regime 
applicable to their common marine environment [28]; in Mozambique, a proposal was 
prepared in 2006 to create a protected area adjacent to MBREMP, covering marine and 
terrestrial habitats, but it is yet to be implemented.  
Mozambique has also engaged in conversations with South Africa regarding the 
creation of a transboundary MPA between the two countries. Like Tanzania, South Africa 
also has an MPA bordering with Mozambique. The Saint Lucia and Maputaland Marine 
Reserves constitute the marine component of the iSimangaliso Wetland Park (IWP). IWP 
results from the amalgamation of several pre-existing terrestrial and marine protected 
areas, and was declared a World Heritage Site in 1999. It covers an area of 3585 km2 that 
is inhabited by 2.000 people, and has 600.000 people living near its borders [29]. In 
August 2009, Mozambique created the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve (POPMR) 
with 678 km2, which is contiguous with the border with South Africa. This MPA results 
from the seaward extension of the Maputo Special Reserve. Both Mozambican protected 
areas are inhabited by a total of 12.000 people [30], and have been in the tentative list of 
World Heritage Sites since August 2008.  The creation of POPMR fulfils the agreement 
Mozambique had signed with South Africa in 2000 for the creation of the Lubombo Ponta 
do Ouro–Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area. 
2.2 Conservation surrogates 
For the purpose of this paper, one habitat and one species were used as surrogates 
for assessing the adequacy of the proposed transboundary MPAs. Two aspects explain 
this choice: (i) current practices for MPA design are based on the selection of both critical 
habitats [31, 32] and individual species, especially when the latter have particular 
conservation importance and/or are popular among the general public [33, 34]; (ii) 
habitats and species have distinct levels of mobility, which may create diverse 
interdependencies among countries trying to protect them. The habitat coral reef and the 
species Indo-Pacific humpback dolphin (Sousa chinensis) were chosen because they both 
occur in the two study areas and because of their conservation importance and needs. 
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Figure 1 – Border region between Mozambique and Tanzania (Source: World Database on Marine Protected Areas). 
Description: shaded areas indicate the two MPAs in the region, MBREMP – Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park 
and QNP – Quirimbas National Park, and single straight lines indicate the location of each MPA’s study site. 
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Figure 2 – Border region between Mozambique and South Africa (Source: Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve). 
Description: shaded areas indicate the two MPAs in the region, POPMR – Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve and 
IWP – iSimangaliso Wetland Park, and single straight lines indicate each MPA’s study site. 
  
Chapter 4 
113 
Coral reefs are crucial hotspots of marine biodiversity [35], and consequently are 
commonly used as surrogates for marine biodiversity conservation in tropical marine 
environments [36], such as the coastal waters of the Western Indian Ocean. Coral reefs 
are threatened by overfishing [37], the use of destructive fishing gear [38], land-based 
pollution [39], climate change [40], and tourism [41]. Despite being particularly 
vulnerable [42], coral reefs usually react positively to increased and prolonged protection 
through the creation of MPAs [43].  
Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins are one of the best studied cetaceans in the 
Western Indian Ocean [44], but knowledge of this species is restricted to very few local 
populations. They are protected internationally by the Convention on Migratory Species 
(CMS, Appendix II)  and by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES, Appendix I)  [45], and considered Near 
Threatened by IUCN [46]. Humpback dolphins have a discontinuous distribution 
throughout their range, and their preference for shallow waters – coral reefs, mangroves, 
and the murky waters of estuaries – exposes them to intense coastal activities and 
degraded habitats [47]. They may be protected through the creation of MPAs but, as with 
other marine mammal species, their adequacy depends on the behavior of local 
populations and threats posed to them [48]. 
2.3 Methodology 
Information about the ecological aspects, threats and institutional arrangements in place 
for coral reefs and humpback dolphins in the two study areas was initially obtained 
through literature review. Ecological aspects concern information such as the area 
covered by or where the resource is found, biophysical factors affecting their occurrence, 
and their condition. Threats to the resources are those activities which inherently 
deteriorate the resource condition, or that are conducted at such levels as to result in 
serious damage. Institutional arrangements refer to both informal and formal rules 
governing resources and the activities that threaten them.  
Fieldwork was then conducted inside the existing MPAs, consisting in participant 
observation and questionnaires with resource users and tourism operators, and in semi-
structured interviews and informal conversations with key informants (fisheries officials, 
MPA managers, researchers, environmental NGOs). One community in each MPA was 
visited, except in IWP.  Consequentially, studying how marine resources are currently 
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managed inside each MPA was crucial to gain a better understanding of (i) the 
consequences for underprotected areas of a future increase in marine environmental 
protection, and, to some extent, (ii) how existing MPAs may be impacted by linking them 
through transboundary cooperation. The former was particularly relevant for the 
Mozambique-Tanzania case study, where there is a significant area without protection 
between MBREMP in Tanzania and QNP in Mozambique. The multitude of sources 
allowed the triangulation of information and strengthened its consistency and reliability. 
Yet, there are still important gaps in knowledge that will also be addressed in the 
following sections. 
3. MOZAMBIQUE-TANZANIA TRANSBOUNDARY REGION 
3.1 Coral reefs 
3.1.1 Ecological aspects 
Coral reefs form an almost continuous fringing reef along the 425 km of coast of 
Mozambique’s northern coastal province,  and have an area of about 20 km2 along the 
coast of southern Tanzania [49, 50]. They are subjected to the influence of the westward 
South Equatorial Current. After crossing the Indian Ocean, this current meets the land 
around the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, splitting into the northwards 
Southwest Monsoon drift and the southwards Mozambique current [51]. The exact point 
where the South Equatorial Current splits into those two opposing currents is variable, 
making it impossible to know whether coral reefs on the Tanzanian side are sinks and 
those in Mozambique sources, and vice-versa. Though research on coral reefs in this 
transboundary region is limited, it has been suggested that coral diversity in the Western 
Indian Ocean is at its highest here [52]. However, coral reefs and associated fish 
populations show signs of deterioration from intensive fishing activity and from the use 
of destructive fishing methods [49]. 
3.1.2 Threats 
Coral reefs in this region experienced very high levels of mortality during the 1998 El 
Niño event [53, 54]. However, they are among the most resistant to warming events in the 
Western Indian Ocean [55], and have been making a good recovery [56, 57]. Coral reefs 
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in this region are used for various purposes, some of which pose serious threats to their 
condition and existence.  
Population growth is believed to be the main factor behind overfishing on both 
sides of the border, which in the case of Mozambique may be further compounded by the 
permanent settlement on the coast of inland people that were displaced by independence 
and civil wars. The coastal population in this region faces extreme poverty, and generally 
has in marine resources its main source of animal protein, thus less accessible reefs have 
less signs of fishing activity [58].  
In addition, authorities and coastal communities in Mozambique suggest that 
overfishing on the Mozambican side is also caused by migrant fishers coming from 
Nampula, further south, and from Tanzania [59]. The presence of Tanzanian fishers in the 
Quirimbas archipelago has also been attributed to the creation of MBREMP, through 
displacement of fishing effort [59, 60].  
It is general belief in the region that the use of destructive fishing gears in 
northern Mozambique has resulted from the presence of migrant fishers. Of particular 
concern is the use of dynamite for fishing, which has been common in Tanzania since the 
1960s and prohibited since 1970. A nation-wide campaign during 1998 was able to 
almost eliminate it [61], but discontinuation of enforcement efforts is believed to have 
eased its resurgence, including recently inside MBREMP. There are anecdotal reports of 
dynamite fishing being now used too in northern Mozambique. Other drivers of 
degradation of coral reefs and associated communities are the use of beach seines and 
intertidal gleaning in reefs with low coral growth [62], and the use of Euphoria and cattle 
insecticide to stun reef fish, both practices posing public health problems. In addition to 
being important fishing grounds, coral reefs are also mined for building material and raw 
material for lime production. Regrettably, coastal communities do not usually see this 
traditional practice as harmful. 
There are expectations that tourism will contribute to the financial sustainability 
of the MPAs in this region and provide employment opportunities for locals. Yet, tourism 
is nearly inexistent inside MBREMP. In northern Mozambique, both inside and outside 
QNP, tourism activities target higher market segments, remain low intensity, and provide 
few job opportunities mostly limited to unskilled labour. Consequently, and at its current 
levels, tourism is hardly a threat to coral reefs, and future rampant growth is unlikely 
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given the difficulties in accessing the region and its inability to compete with similar 
destinations that are more accessible and less expensive (e.g., Zanzibar in Tanzania, 
Bazaruto in Mozambique). 
In contrast with tourism, oil and natural gas exists in this transboundary region, 
and prospecting and exploitation is likely to seriously affect coral reefs. In northern 
Mozambique, and as of August 2010, deposits had been found at great depths, but their 
commercial viability remains unknown.  In Tanzania, there is a natural gas field currently 
exploited inside MBREMP. The pipeline connecting the gas field to a processing facility 
40 km away avoids coral reefs, but future expansion of exploration is likely and 
commercially promising [63].  
3.1.3 Institutional arrangements 
Coral reef-related marine uses in the two countries are subjected to various regulations, 
but this habitat remains open access. In Mozambique, coral reefs are considered “fragile 
ecosystems” and therefore any activity that damages them is prohibited (2006 Regulation 
for Pollution Prevention and Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment), while in 
Tanzania regulations concern activities in general (e.g., 2003 Fisheries Act) and do not 
address coral reefs in particular.  
In both MBREMP and QNP, coral reefs are protected through gear restrictions 
and zoning schemes regulating marine and coastal activities. The zoning scheme in 
MBREMP does not appear to be adequately complied with or enforced [pers. obs., 62]. In 
QNP, several sanctuaries (i.e., no-take areas) have been created, most in areas with coral 
reefs. The use of prohibited gears is somewhat tolerated in both MPAs due to lack of 
alternatives. 
Besides MPAs, coral reefs in both countries are also targeted by fisheries co-
management arrangements promoted by their respective state administrations. In 
Tanzania, Beach Management Units (BMUs) are being created along the Indian Ocean 
coast, except inside MPAs. BMUs are promoted by the central government in 
collaboration with local authorities. Fishers have a strong incentive to join a local BMU, 
as otherwise they cannot be issued fishing licenses. BMUs provide a useful platform for 
localized and participatory fisheries management, but they have limitations. BMUs 
appear to be more an extension of government than a true partnership between 
government and fishers, as input from fishers is hardly ever sought [64]. Furthermore, 
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other stakeholders besides fishers (e.g., fish processors, traders, gear repairers and 
suppliers, boat builders) can also join a BMU. This can be counter-productive, as BMUs 
are often dominated by traders [65], replicating some of the power relations that impede 
fishers from improving their livelihoods [66].   
In Mozambique, Community Fisheries Councils (locally known as CCPs, from the 
Portuguese designation Conselho Comunitário de Pesca) are being created throughout the 
entire coast, including inside MPAs such as the marine section of QNP. Similarly to 
BMUs, CCPs are jointly promoted by central and local authorities, at times with support 
from other organizations. For example, some CCPs inside QNP are promoted and 
facilitated by a local NGO, and others by QNP itself. CCP members, like BMU members, 
are responsible for managing access and resource extraction from a designated marine 
area, and this includes regulating access by outsiders, particularly migrant fishermen. 
However, BMUs and CCPs, like other marine resource-related policies in the region, do 
not adequately address the issue of migrant fishermen [67]. 
Other regulatory measures affecting coral reefs, both inside and outside MPAs in 
the two countries, include the duty to conduct environmental impact assessments for 
potentially damaging activities, such as seismic surveys, drills, and pipelines. In what 
concerns tourism activities, both MPAs have recently increased their fees for tourism 
operators without notice. This has resulted in MBREMP’s only tourism operator ending 
its activities, while in QNP it is generally perceived as discouraging by investors. 
3.2 Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins 
3.2.1 Ecological aspects 
To date, humpback dolphins in this region have been poorly studied. The only official 
sightings in this part of Mozambique have been reported in the Environmental Impact 
Assessments of seismic surveys conducted for the concession block bordering Tanzania 
[68, 69], and by an international research project recently conducted in the region [70]. 
These sightings confirmed previous perceptions that, in northern Mozambique, humpback 
dolphins prefer the shallow and calm waters between the Quirimbas islands and the 
mainland [23]. Personal observations of humpback dolphins near Ibo Island within QNP 
further add to the scarce information available. 
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Humpback dolphins are also found in southern Tanzania, but their numbers appear 
to be smaller than in northern Mozambique where most fishers easily recognised the 
species, in contrast with fishers in southern Tanzania. There is no information available 
regarding transboundary movements of the species, but given the continuity in habitat 
(i.e., calm, shallow waters including those of the Ruvuma estuary), it is very likely that 
individuals straddle the border between Mozambique and Tanzania. 
3.2.2 Threats 
Humpback dolphins can easily be caught in fishing nets as bycatch, particularly shark 
nets, as they are slow simmers. It is not clear how many individuals may be caught over a 
certain period of time, but some of them are not released so they can be used as bait for 
shark fishing in Tanzania. As one fisher explained, this preference for humpback dolphins 
is justified by their flesh being bloody, hence good to attract sharks. This preference for 
humpback dolphins for shark bait in Tanzania is a reason for concern. Artisanal fisheries, 
in contrast with commercial fisheries, are responsible for most shark catches, and 
southern Tanzania is one of the mainland regions where shark fishing is more intense 
[71]. There is anecdotal evidence of humpback dolphins being used for human 
consumption outside QNP and close to the border with Tanzania. There are no tourism 
activities associated with marine mammals in this region, except for the occasional 
sighting by the few tourists that scuba dive or snorkel in northern Mozambique. 
3.2.3 Institutional arrangements 
Like coral reefs, humpback dolphins are also open access in Mozambique and Tanzania. 
The entire Indian Ocean was declared a marine mammal sanctuary by the International 
Whaling Commission in 1979, hence prohibiting commercial whaling in areas less than 
55°S. Mozambique prohibits the catch of all dolphin species by sport and recreational 
fishers (Sport and Recreational Fishing Regulation, Decree 51/99 of 31 August 1999). 
According to fisheries and marine conservation officials and specialists in Mozambique, 
this is implied to be applicable to any kind of fishery. Inside QNP, there is no specific 
concern with dolphins, besides the one expressed in the Management Plan that determines 
that marine mammals are not to be approached within 100 meters [72]. In Tanzania, there 
are no regulations that protect humpback dolphins, directly or indirectly. 
4. MOZAMBIQUE-SOUTH AFRICA TRANSBOUNDARY REGION 
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4.1 Coral reefs 
4.1.1 Ecological aspects 
Coral reefs in this border region are the southernmost corals in Africa, cover an area of 5 
km2 [73] in southern Mozambique and less than 50 km2 in South Africa [74], and are 
considered to be in very good condition [75, 76]. Coral reefs on both sides of the border 
lack most characteristics of true coral reefs [76, 77]. They are located very close to the 
coast, as a result of the narrow continental shelf, and under the influence of the Agulhas 
current [73]. Its highly stable southward trajectory implies that coral reefs in South Africa 
are seeded by those in southern Mozambique. Reef fish tagging studies have been 
conducted on both sides of the border, and suggest MPA size ranges of 1.9-91.2 km for 
resident and semi-resident species [78]. This transboundary region’s purported upstream 
importance for some of South Africa’s fisheries [79], its high levels of coral reef 
endemism and the threats posed to them make this region a top marine biodiversity 
hotspot that should receive priority conservation measures [80]. 
4.1.2 Threats 
Coral communities in the Mozambique-South Africa transboundary region were the least 
affected by the 1998 bleaching event in the Western Indian Ocean [55]. Because of their 
high-latitude location, they are expected to experience minimum bleaching in further 
warming events [81, 82]. Hence, direct human activities, such as scuba diving and 
fishing, are a more likely source of harmful disturbance.  
Recreational scuba diving is a very popular activity on both sides of the border. 
The general perception among tourism operators and MPA managers is that diving is 
more intense on the South African side, than on the Mozambican side. In 2009, there 
were at least seventeen scuba diving companies in IWP,  with up to 35 probably operating 
there in the near future,  while in POPMR there were at least nine operators. Diving 
pressure is concentrated on the near shore shallow reefs on both sides of the border [83, 
84]. Coral communities in Sodwana Bay, the most popular diving spot in IWP and South 
Africa, received 80.000 dives in 1999 [85], and 67.900 dives in 2009 [86], a decline 
attributed to the growing popularity of southern Mozambique as a diving destination and, 
more recently, to the economic downturn. In POPMR, coral communities received an 
estimated 62.000 dives in 2002 [83], but less than 25.000 in 2010 (M. Pereira, pers. obs), 
a decline that is attributed not only to the economic downturn but also to competition 
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from other domestic tourism destinations (e.g., Inhambane). In agreement with a general 
perception of diving pressure being higher in IWP than in POPMR, key informants in 
both countries agree that coral communities in POPMR are in better condition than in 
IWP. Damage by new divers in both MPAs and by underwater photography competitions  
in IWP are particular reasons for concern [85]. Damage from boat anchoring is not an 
issue as it is prohibited and very difficult due to the prevalent large swells.  
Fishing in this region is essentially a sport/recreational and commercial activity, as 
subsistence fishing is limited to shore angling due to rough sea conditions that impede the 
use of non-motorized boats. Sport/recreational fishing in or near coral communities in 
POPMR and IWP consists in spear fishing, jet ski angling, shore angling, and more 
recently also involves deep-water sport fishing from motor boats, with all modalities 
targeting both reef and non-reef fish species [30, 87]. In POPMR, spear fishing is done 
opportunistically by a small proportion of divers [83], and by local employees of diving 
companies while their clients are diving (pers. obs.). Shore anglers are both tourists and 
locals. The impacts of recreational fishing here are unknown, though the diving 
community complains of damage to coral communities and reef fish populations from 
fishing lines and hooks. A commercial reef line fishery exists on the Mozambican side, 
though boats are only licensed to fish to the north of Ponta Dobela.  Illegal fishing to the 
south of Ponta Dobela occurs – but reports on its intensity and location are contradictory 
– and extend into South African waters.  Coral communities seem not to be affected, 
though there are concerns that reef fish may be impacted [87].  
In IWP, recreational fishing, notably shore angling, has decreased as a result of 
the 2001 beach driving ban [88]. It is still a very popular activity in IWP, essentially 
restricted to two public boat launching sites, and with regular fishing competitions [89]. 
Estuarine and shore anglers do not pose a threat to reef fish as almost the entire catch is 
released. The situation is very different for jetski anglers and spear fishers, as the former 
release a rather small proportion of their catch, and the latter catch non-pelagic, 
residential species with great effectiveness [89]. This places spear fishing as the main 
source of concern, similarly to coral reefs elsewhere [90, 91], for its removal of reef’s top 
predators. Fishing lines from other recreational fishing activities also damage corals, and 
though it is a rather small source of damage, it can have serious consequences [84]. 
4.1.3 Institutional arrangements 
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Coral reef-related marine uses in this border region are very similar, but they are subject 
to significantly different regulations that are imposed either at the MPA or national and 
provincial levels.  
In Mozambique, the scuba diving regulatory regime does not seem to be fully 
adhered to by both operators and authorities. There are no limits to the number of scuba 
diving operators on the Mozambican side. POPMR’s management plan proposes a zoning 
scheme similar to IWP’s whereby scuba diving is allowed in the restricted and multiple 
use areas, but not in the sanctuary area [30]. Current diving areas may be closed and/or 
new ones created to spread diving pressure [30]. Most scuba diving operators purport to 
adhere to standard environmental guidelines (“no touching, no teasing, no taking”). Their 
concerns with the need for healthy coral communities as a pre-condition for business 
success, and the establishment of POPMR, lead to the creation of the Ponta do Ouro 
business association. Their membership and scope is expected to increase with growing 
local tourism supply, and the approval of POPMR’s management plan. Similarly to scuba 
diving, fishing of pelagic species only is allowed in the restricted and multiple use areas 
for permit holders [30]. The use of jet skis, which disturbed and endangered bathers, is 
restricted to fishing permit holders. 
On South Africa’s side, uses associated with coral reefs are under a clear 
regulatory regime that is adequately enforced, a direct consequence of all coral reefs 
being found in MPAs [92]. Formally, coral reefs have been protected since 1986 through 
national and provincial legislation [93]. At the IWP level, the joint management plan of 
Saint Lucia and Maputaland Marine Reserves, which cover the northern and central 
sections of IWP’s marine environment, are applied in the absence of the Integrated 
Management Plan required by World Heritage sites [94]. The management plan of the 
two MPAs is not legally binding [95], but the zoning scheme is widely recognized, 
complied with, and enforced. It consists of sanctuary zones, restricted zones, and 
controlled access zones. Scuba diving is allowed in restricted (advanced divers only) and 
in controlled access zones, and subjected to diving permits. A sandy area surrounding one 
of the small “reefs” is used for buoyancy training of novice divers, leaving the “reef” in 
better condition than others [84]. Besides this informal arrangement, there is no specific 
zoning of “reefs” for scuba diving [74] nor limits to number of dives. Like in POPMR, 
scuba diving operators in Sodwana Bay (the main scuba diving launching site in IWP) 
have also constituted a local business association that promotes training of staff (pers. 
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obs.). Operators claim to adhere to standard environmental practices in their activity. 
Fishing is also permitted in restricted and controlled access zones, as long as the catch 
consists of pelagic species only. It should be noted that the sanctuary zone in the northern 
section of IWP borders with the controlled access zone in the southern section of 
POPMR, and that there is no maritime boundary delimited between the two countries. 
4.2 Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins 
4.2.1 Ecological aspects 
This transboundary region lies between two of the areas where humpback dolphins have 
been most studied in Africa: Maputo Bay to the north of POPMR, and most of South 
Africa’s coast. In Maputo Bay, the population is estimated at 105 individuals [96]. The 
eastern section of the Bay – constituting the northern section of POPMR – appears to be a 
preferred area for foraging and nursing, besides receiving transient individuals seasonally 
[96]. In Ponta do Ouro, a few individuals are regularly seen, often associated with a pod 
of bottlenose dolphins. 
In KwaZulu-Natal, there an estimated 165-215 individuals [97], which prefer 
large estuaries and enclosed bays [47, 98], such as Saint Lucia estuary and Kosi Bay 
inside IWP. This preference may be because of these estuaries’ calm waters providing 
some shelter from the big swells found along South Africa’s coast, or could be a dietary 
preference for estuary fish [98]. Humpback dolphins in Richard’s Bay – located less than 
50 km to the south of iSimangaliso Wetland Park – are the best studied in the country. 
Resident humpback dolphins travel up to 150 km from here [99]. It has also been 
suggested that humpback dolphin densities are higher to the north of Richard’s Bay, and 
that the local population may receive individuals migrating from further north [100]. 
Populations in both locations experience seasonal changes in composition [96] 
that suggest transboundary movements to occur. 
4.2.2 Threats 
Humpback dolphins in this transboundary region are subjected to several threats, most 
notably land-based pollution. They have the highest concentration of organochlorines 
among marine mammals in South Africa [101], probably a direct consequence of intense 
pesticide use in sugar cane plantations affecting estuaries [102]. The use of DDT to 
eradicate malaria in the northern part of KwaZulu-Natal may have also contributed to 
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contamination of humpback dolphins [101]. The most direct consequence of 
contamination is females transferring 72-85% of pollutants to their calves [103], which 
explains the very high mortality rates among first-born calves [104]. Reductions in the 
input of these contaminants in the marine environment may take many years to be 
reflected in the level of contaminants of small marine mammals [105]. In KwaZulu-Natal, 
pollution levels may take even longer to decrease because of its level of industrialization 
and agriculture production [101]. Another threat to humpback dolphins on the South 
African side of the border comes from antishark nets deployed to protect bathers from 
shark attacks [100]. Antishark nets are found along the main beaches in KwaZulu-Natal, 
but not inside IWP. The nearest location is in Richard’s Bay [99], where in the 1980s they 
caught the highest share of all humpback dolphins captured in this way in South Africa 
[100]. Antishark nets are a very serious threat to humpback dolphins because the 
mortality levels inflicted (4%/year or 7,4 individuals/year) is similar to the theoretical 
annual population growth rate (4-6%) [100]. In an effort to reduce bycatch, antishark nets 
have been being replaced by drumlines, while others have been equipped with pingers. 
Drumlines have significantly less bycatch than antishark nets. Pingers set on these nets 
have not produced any reduction in humpback dolphin mortality [106]. Against the 
backdrop of these threats, incidental sightings of humpback dolphins by the KwaZulu-
Natal Sharks Board declined 50% between 1984 and 1992, suggesting a reduction in the 
population size in the province [97]. 
In southern Mozambique, the main threats to humpback dolphins result from 
fishing activity, both commercial and artisanal, in Maputo Bay. There is no indication of 
this species being subject to any threat in the Indian Ocean section of POPMR, probably a 
result of their near shore and shy behaviour resulting in boat avoidance of both fishing 
vessels and dolphin-watching boats operating from Ponta do Ouro. The two dolphin-
watching operators in POPMR follow strict codes of conduct in their interactions with 
dolphins, and are an unlikely source of significant disturbance. Scuba diving operators 
that allow their clients in the water when dolphins are spotted on the way back to shore 
are more concerning. 
4.2.3 Institutional arrangements 
Humpback dolphins are an open access resource in both Mozambique and South Africa. 
Inside POPMR, humpback dolphins are not a conservation priority, given their small 
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numbers, the absence of a perceived, strong threat, and lack of tourism appeal. Dolphin-
watching activity will be strongly regulated through the POPMR management plan, 
which allows only one dolphin-watching license for every 20 km of coast. Commercial 
fishing is not allowed inside POPMR, so interactions with fishing vessels will likely be 
reduced. In IWP, the only whale-watching operator may soon be joined by two others, 
following the national government’s request for applications. The regulatory regime for 
whale-watching defined in the 2008 Regulations for the Management of Boat-Based 
Whale Watching and Protection of Turtles sets out very clear guidelines for the behaviour 
to be adopted by tourism operators. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The previous section showed how the ecological characteristics of coral reefs and 
humpback dolphins, as well as the threats and institutional arrangements to which they 
are subjected to, can vary from one region to another. These cross-site differences have 
important implications for the proposed transboundary MPAs. 
Firstly, and in what concerns the ecological characteristics of marine resources, 
the lack of mobility of coral reefs implies that area-based tools such as MPAs are 
appropriate for their conservation. The influence of currents on larval connectivity 
between coral reefs needs however to be taken into account [107], and connectivity 
studies are needed to provide important information for sitting no-take areas within the 
proposed transboundary MPAs [108]. In the case of humpback dolphins, the continuity in 
habitat and depth preferences [109] suggests that humpback dolphins can be protected 
through an MPA in the Mozambique-Tanzania border. The same does not apply to the 
Mozambique-South Africa border where that continuity is lacking. However, and even 
for the Mozambique-Tanzania border region, the lack of knowledge on the ecology and 
population dynamics of this species deters any further elaborations on the adequacy of 
MPAs for its protection or even on how it compares with other conservation tools.  
Secondly, the threats to the two resources pose particular challenges to the 
proposed transboundary MPAs. Coral reefs in the Mozambique-Tanzania border region 
are particularly threatened by subsistence fisheries, through overfishing and destructive 
fishing methods, and by oil and gas prospection and exploration. The dietary needs of 
coastal communities in the region, which are significantly met through fishing, strongly 
support the need for a sustainable use approach to coral reef conservation (in contrast 
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with a purely conservationist one). The difficulties in managing fishing effort by migrant 
fishers strongly suggests that the empowerment of local communities that fisheries co-
management institutions are promoting may be a more adequate vehicle to deal with 
outsiders’ fishing effort. Also, oil and gas prospecting and exploration activities in this 
region can inflict physical damage to coral reefs and associated species from seismic 
surveys and drilling, and chemical contamination from spills. In the Mozambique-South 
Africa region, threats to coral reefs arise essentially from reef-based tourism, that is, they 
result directly from reef-based activities and not from activities somewhere else. 
Consequently, MPAs can provide an adequate framework for their protection. In the case 
of humpback dolphins, non-disturbance in preferred habitats in the Mozambique-
Tanzania border can be achieved with area-based tools such as MPAs, as has been done 
with sea turtle conservation efforts focused on their nesting sites [110]. Still, the bycatch 
of humpback dolphins can only be reduced through fisheries management tools that are 
not area-specific, which has also been recognized for sea turtles where bycatch reduction 
is crucial for their protection [111, 112]. In the Mozambique-South Africa region, MPAs 
are inadequate to deal with land-based pollution [20] and to reduce impact by anti-shark 
nets, essential for bather safety. They could however entail measures to reduce boat 
traffic and noise [109] that results from water-based tourism activities. 
Thirdly, existing institutional arrangements need to be taken into account, and 
harmonized with the regulations of future MPAs. In the case of coral reefs, environmental 
impact assessment procedures related to oil and gas prospecting and exploration can 
complement MPA regulations, and even present stricter environmental standards inside 
MPAs. Yet, higher environmental standards will not avoid damage, in the same way that 
oil and gas prospecting and exploration are very unlikely to be halted altogether. As an 
alternative to the harmonization of existing regulations with future transboundary MPA 
regulations, existing institutional arrangements may be considered as a viable tool for 
coral reef conservation instead of MPA creation. In the Mozambique-Tanzania region, 
and despite their weaknesses, fisheries co-management institutions may provide a more 
adequate arrangement to deal with threats to coral reefs arising from fishing practices, for 
four reasons. First, CCPs in Mozambique and BMUs in Tanzania are co-management 
approaches that can empower local communities to address their problems. Second, CCPs 
and BMUs have a focus on sustainable use in a context where marine protein is essential 
for local communities, increased fishing pressure resulting from fishing effort 
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displacement is believed to occur, and protection from outsiders is more important than 
conservation per se. Third, CCPs and BMUs rely greatly on local capacity in very 
populated region of the two countries, hence potentially making the administrative and 
management structure of new MPAs redundant, and enforcement difficult in face of the 
region’s remoteness. Finally, local communities have shown great ambivalence regarding 
MPAs [59]. Taken altogether, these reasons are at least supportive of the need to consider 
alternatives to MPAs for the conservation of coral reefs in the Mozambique-Tanzania 
border region. In the Mozambique-South Africa region, the regulations of South African 
MPAs appear to be sufficient to deal with the existing threats from tourism activities. 
Further improvements may be necessary to better control the impacts of spearfishing and 
underwater photography, and to address the issue of the undelimited maritime boundary. 
The latter hinders the fight against illegal commercial fishing because authorities cannot 
clearly identify their jurisdiction. It also makes it impossible to discern where POPMR’s 
controlled access zone ends and the IWP’s sanctuary zone begins. In relation to 
humpback dolphins, Mozambique and Tanzania lack rules to protect them inside and 
outside MPAs, so a new transboundary MPA would need to fill this vacuum. In South 
Africa, very concrete and targeted actions have been taken, namely on the need to reduce 
bycatch by anti-shark nets. In the Mozambique-South Africa border region, the existing 
MPAs have at best a negligible effect on humpback dolphin protection, as they cannot 
control land-based pollution. Consequently, these MPAs should be placed within larger 
ocean management governance frameworks that account for the impact of land activities 
on marine biodiversity [20]. 
Finally, and in relation to the existing MPAs, it is clear that in the Mozambique-South 
Africa region the joint management of the existing MPAs is a logical consequence of 
their contiguity. This contrasts greatly with the Mozambique-Tanzania case, where 200 
km separate the two existing MPAs. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This research has shown that ecological characteristics, threats and institutional 
arrangements of vulnerable marine resources provide a framework against which the 
adequacy of proposed MPAs to protect those resources can be assessed before MPAs are 
actually created. The examination of these aspects brings into question the adequacy of 
transboundary MPAs to protect coral reefs in the Mozambique-Tanzania border and 
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humpback dolphins in the Mozambique-South Africa border. It also points gaps in the 
proposed transboundary MPAs regarding the protection of humpback dolphins in the 
Mozambique-Tanzania border region and of coral reefs in the Mozambique-South Africa 
region. In particular, this research has highlighted the multiple use contexts in which 
transboundary MPAs are being proposed in the border regions between Mozambique and 
Tanzania, and between Mozambique and South Africa, as well as the institutional 
arrangements that already exist. 
Most importantly, though, this research has demonstrated that social and 
institutional context is crucial to the planning of MPAs, transboundary or subnational, in 
the Western Indian Ocean and elsewhere. It seems appropriate then to suggest that marine 
management interventions for conservation purposes, such as MPAs, require not only an 
evaluation of their adequacy in face of particular contexts, but also against other 
management interventions, such as existing fisheries co-management institutions [113]. 
Finally, we should keep in mind that there are no perfect marine conservation tools and 
that us all – MPA researchers, policy-makers and managers – should be aware of their 
limitations and advantages. 
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5. MPA GOVERNANCE: A COMPARISON 
Chircop, A., Francis, J., Van Der Elst, R., Pacule, H., Guerreiro, J., GRILO, C. & 
Carneiro, G. (2010). Governance of Marine Protected Areas in East Africa: A 
Comparative Study of Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania. Ocean Development & 
International Law, 41(1), 1 - 33. 
 
Abstract: Marine protected areas (MPAs), including MPA networks, have become an 
indispensable tool for marine conservation. This article undertakes a comparative 
discussion of the domestic governance frameworks of Mozambique, South Africa, and 
Tanzania in view of the efforts of these three states to scale up their MPA cooperation in 
the East African Marine Ecoregion (EAME) to include MPA networks, including 
transboundary MPAs. Although on many issues there appears to be regional solidarity 
and convergence on principles, including participatory processes and decision making to 
guide MPA making, there are significant differences on lead roles, institutional structures, 
access to public information, and conflict management, among others, which would need 
to be factored in MPA cooperation. Other important factors for regional MPA 
cooperation include policy directions on shared concerns such as conservation and 
development values with emphasis on equitable resource use and poverty alleviation. 
Keywords: East Africa, marine protected area, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania 
1. INTRODUCTION 
States parties to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)i committed through 
a 2004 decision of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to achieve effective protection of 
10% of marine ecoregions by 2012.ii Wells, Burgess, and Ngusaru (2007) recently 
reviewed the status of marine protected areas (MPAs) in East Africa and reported 
considerable progress concerning protection of the continental shelf. They suggested that 
Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania could reach their target commitments by 2012. South 
Africa has also been reported as achieving significant progress, with designations of as 
many as 20 MPAs (South Africa 2008). However, as Wells, Burgess, and Ngusaru (2007) 
noted: “There is a risk that focusing on increasing the area under protection could have a 
negative impact in terms of reducing management effectiveness of existing MPAs” (at 
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80). In other words, there is a danger that, while pressure to meet the CBD target 
percentage mounts, states might not meet the corequirement of effective management. 
In addition to domestic MPA initiatives, regional initiatives to establish MPA 
networks are needed in response to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development’s call for a global system of MPA networksiii and also to further assist 
meeting the CBD target for marine ecoregions (Fifth World Parks Congress 2003; World 
Conservation Congress 2008; World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002). There 
is growing attention on the need for greater transboundary marine conservation efforts in 
the East African Marine Ecoregion (EAME). The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Regional Seas Programme for East Africa has a 1985 Protocol 
Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African Region,iv 
the implementation of which is overseen by a Group of Experts on Marine Protected 
Areas in Eastern Africa (GEMPA-EA). The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) established the 
EAME program that aims at 10% of each state’s marine area to be under MPA cover and 
to which South Africa and Tanzania have made commitments (WWF 2004). There is 
growing awareness among East African states of the need to adopt a systemic approach to 
MPA designation and management in the interests of conservation of the EAME which 
they all share (UNEP/WCMC 2008, at 57). There is already interest in transboundary 
MPAs.v A systemic approach to protecting the EAME necessarily involves the use of 
tools such as MPA networks and transboundary MPAs covering substantial areas of the 
coastal and maritime zones of regional states.  
Clearly, regionalism of this type requires a high degree of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in undertaking, coordinating, and implementing MPA-making 
commitments. An essential aspect of MPA making at the national level (and at any level 
for that matter) is the governance framework; especially, a solid domestic legal 
foundation to support MPA establishment and management (Kelleher 1999; Pomeroy, 
Parks, and Watson 2004; Sanders and Cochrane 2006). Where MPA cooperation has an 
international dimension, such as in the case of a transboundary MPA, the governance 
framework needs to include a bilateral or coordinated legal arrangement (Kelleher 1999). 
A proper domestic and bilateral governance framework provides legitimacy and is the 
springboard for planning, implementation, management, and enforcement—all essential 
elements of effectiveness.  
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This article undertakes a comparative discussion of the domestic governance 
frameworks of Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania in view of the efforts of these 
three states to scale up their MPA cooperation in the EAME to include MPA networks, 
including transboundary MPAs. The geographical focus is on two areas in the border 
regions between Mozambique and Tanzania and Mozambique and South Africa (see 
Figure 1). More specifically, the discussion is guided by two critical questions: (1) Given 
the prospect of international MPA cooperation in their border regions, are their respective 
governance frameworks coherent and sufficiently in harmony to facilitate cooperation? 
and (2) Are there gaps in those frameworks and, if so, what are they and could they 
constrain transboundary MPA cooperation? 
2. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
Although the needs of governance of MPAs are well understood, there is less of a clear 
understanding of the governance demands of MPA networks, including transboundary 
MPAs. On the one hand, as long as the MPAs concerned work together to achieve 
common goals, “the sites do not necessarily have to be managed in the same way” 
(UNEP/WCMC 2008, at 8). However, principles of good governance for MPA networks 
have yet to be identified and there are no indicators to measure network success in 
reducing biodiversity loss (UNEP/WCMC 2008). Clearly, whatever the governance 
framework of a transboundary MPA, such a framework would be influenced by the 
respective national governance structures in the cooperating states because of the 
sovereignty issues involved (UNEP/WCMC 2008). 
While being cognizant of the lack of guidance on governance principles, 
structures, and processes for the establishment of international MPA networks and 
transboundary MPAs, we assembled a composite analytical framework drawing from the 
literature on integrated coastal and ocean management (ICOM) and MPAs. MPAs are 
increasingly considered important tools for ICOM (Cicin-Sain and Belfiore 2006; Ehler 
2006). Literature on international relations theory (in particular, regime theory) was also 
used to consider aspects of the international bilateral relations between the three states. 
The resulting composite framework includes 12 criteria considered useful for a discussion 
of comparative governance, and which are used as the basis for comparative analysis.  
2.1 Common International Legal Commitments 
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Determination of the extent to which the three states are parties to the same instruments 
and members of the same international organizations is important. Prima facie this 
indicates the presence of convergent and mutual expectations on the accepted 
international principles, norms, rules, and procedures of the international regimes to 
which they subscribe (Keohane 1984). Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania are 
parties to important international environmental law instruments relevant or useful for 
MPA making, but not necessarily to all of them. These instruments can be considered in 
two categories: (1) instruments that specifically provide for protected areas, and (2) 
instruments that provide tools that can be used for the management of protected areas.  
Under the first category, the three states are parties to the following conventions, 
which are all in force: the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 
especially as waterfowl habitats relevant for the establishment of Ramsar sites;vi the 1992 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,vii 
relevant for the establishment of World Heritage sites; the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),viii which provides for the adoption of 
special mandatory measures addressing vessel source pollution in special areas in 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs); and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 
relevant for in situ conservation.ix There are other instruments belonging to this category 
where the pattern of adherence by these three states is checkered at best. Mozambique is 
not a party to the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals,x nor the 1995 Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory 
Waterbirds,xi unlike South Africa and Tanzania. None of the three states is a party to the 
2001 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, which recently entered 
into force.xii  
Under the second category, the practice of the three states varies even more. The 
three states are all parties to only two instruments, the 1973 Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),xiii and the 1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as modified by the 
1978 Protocol to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 1973/78)xiv relating thereto. 
MARPOL sets out global standards for the discharge of a wide range of 
operational pollution from ships. More significantly for the protection of sensitive marine 
Chapter 5 
143 
ecosystems, MARPOL provides for the designation of special areas within which higher 
standards can apply for discharges from international shipping of oily residues (Annex I), 
noxious liquid substances (Annex II), and garbage (Annex V). MARPOL also regulates 
the discharge of sewage from the nearest land (Annex IV) and emission control areas for 
certain pollutants released atmospherically (Annex VI). High vessel source pollution 
standards are beneficial for MPAs located in the midst or in the vicinity of international 
maritime trade routes, as is the case of East African MPAs. Although all three states are 
parties to MARPOL, their subscription to the optional Annexes III–VI is disparate. 
Whereas all three are bound by mandatory Annexes I and II, subscription to the 
other annexes is inconsistent. Mozambique and Tanzania are parties to Annexes III to V; 
although a party to Annexes III and V, South Africa is not a party to Annex IV; none of 
the three states is yet a party to Annex VI. The consequence is that, although the three 
states are in a position to secure higher standards for certain types of vessel source 
pollution, they are not in a position to do so in relation to all vessel source pollution and 
to implement such standards. Moreover, the three states have not taken steps to secure 
from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) the designation of EAME marine 
areas (especially candidates for MPAs) as special areas under those MARPOL annexes to 
which all three states are parties (in particular, Annexes I, II, and V providing for special 
area designation). This is unfortunate because the designation of EAME marine areas as 
zero discharge zones (e.g., for oily wastes and garbage) would provide additional 
protection for marine species and marine avifauna vulnerable to these types of pollution. 
Unlike South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania are not parties to several other 
international instruments that are important for ocean management and MPAs. 
Considering the presence of a variety of cetaceans in the EAME region, the 
nonsubscription to the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whalingxv 
stands out. They are also not parties to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (as amended) (the London 
Convention).xvi The London Convention is potentially useful in controlling various 
discharges into the marine environment that could have deleterious impact on MPAs. 
Similarly, only South Africa is party to the International Law Commission (ILC)’s 1997 
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,xvii 
which is a useful instrument for the control of upstream discharges in international 
watercourses that could have downstream coastal zone impact. Inexplicably, South Africa 
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is not a party to the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation,xviii which provides a framework for cooperation in oil spill 
contingency planning and response, a shared concern of all three states given the location 
of one of the world’s major navigation routes just off their coasts. 
 
 
         
Figure 1 - Transboundary Networks of Marine Protected Areas for Integrated Conservation and Sustainable 
Development: Biophysical, Socio-Economic and Governance Assessment in East Africa (TRANSMAP) study areas: 
Mozambique/Tanzania and Mozambique/South Africa border areas. 
(Source: TRANSMAP, available at http://www.transmap.fc.ul.pt.) 
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Although there appears to be uniform adherence to key regional political and 
economic and some environmental agreements, the three states’ patterns of ratification of 
other relevant regional instruments are inconsistent. All three states are parties to the 1985 
UNEP Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Regionxix and the 1985 Nairobi Wildlife 
Protocol.xx The three states are parties to the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African 
Union,xxi the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community,xxii and the 
1992 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community,xxiii including the latter’s 
Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement,xxiv and the Protocol on 
Fisheries.xxv Support for other important regional environmental and conservation 
agreements is not as consistent. For example, Mozambique and Tanzania are parties to 
the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and NaturalResources;xxvi 
South Africa is not a party. This instrument was revised in 2003,xxvii is not yet in force, 
and none of the three states is yet a party to the revised convention. While South Africa 
and Tanzania are parties to the 1994 Lusaka Agreement on Co-Operative Enforcement 
Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora,xxviii Mozambique is not. 
At the subregional and bilateral level, all three states have significant experience 
with domestic marine and transboundary protected areas and resource conservation 
cooperation with neighbors, albeit mostly in relation to terrestrial parks.xxix There are 
several recent agreements between Mozambique and South Africa (including Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe) concerning Limpopo transfrontier conservation and resources that 
indicate experience with the diplomatic and management processes to enable the 
establishment of this close form of cooperation.xxx In 2000 Mozambique, South Africa, 
and Swaziland adopted the Protocol on the Establishment of the Lubombo Transfrontier 
Conservation and Resource Area.xxxi Five transfrontier conservation and resource 
conservation areas (TFCAs) have been established, one of which overlaps with the future 
transboundary MPA area between Mozambique and South Africa. This project 
establishes the Lubombo Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier 
Conservation and Resource Area. Although there are in effect five TFCAs focusing on 
different geographical areas under the 2000 Protocol, they are jointly planned and 
managed by the Trilateral Lubombo Commission. Mozambique has also cooperated with 
Tanzania in relation to the Niassa-Selous wildlife corridor and with Zimbabwe and 
Zambia in other transfrontier reserves. The World Bank-funded projects for Mnazi Bay-
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Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park and Quirimbas National Park provide further experience 
more directly related to the transboundary MPA candidate area between Mozambique and 
Tanzania. South Africa has transboundary park agreements with Botswana concerning the 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Parkxxxii and Namibia on the |Ai-|Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier 
Park.xxxiii 
The three states have other bilateral agreements with neighboring states 
addressing resources and environmental concerns shared across boundaries. There are 
several commissions that are tasked with the joint management of international 
watercourses and river basins to which the three states are party, including: the Incomati-
Maputo Agreement between South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland;xxxiv the Orange-
Senqu Commission concerning South Africa Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia; the 
Pungwe River Basin water commission between Mozambique and Zimbabwe; the 
cooperative arrangements between Tanzania and its neighbors in relation to Lakes 
Malawi/Nyasa, Tanganyika, and Victoria; and the ongoing work on the establishment of 
the Zambezi River Basin commission involving eight countries, among which are 
Tanzania and Mozambique. All three states are signatories to the 2000 South African 
Development Community Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses.xxxv 
The relevance of subregional or bilateral transboundary cooperation agreements 
lies in the experience that the three states have accumulated from the establishment and 
management of permanent transboundary resource conservation arrangements with their 
neighbors. Although the transboundary conservation cooperation experience is 
fundamentally terrestrial, there is some similarity in the political, diplomatic, legal, 
institutional, and management challenges to be encountered in the establishment of 
transboundary MPAs. Most importantly, the extensive diplomatic experience outlined 
above is evidence of political commitment by the three states to further cooperate on 
transboundary conservation.  
2.2 Implementation of International Legal Commitments 
Where the three states are parties to the same international instruments, each state is 
expected to exercise its rights and duties within those regimes by implementing its 
protection and conservation-related commitments at the national level. Implementation is 
expected to occur through a range of measures, including policy change, institutional 
development, legislation, allocation of resources, and so forth (Mann Borgese, Chircop, 
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and Pereira 1990). In particular, attention needs to be paid to the application of important 
generally accepted principles governing sustainable development, ecosystem-based 
management, participatory approaches, and precaution, among others, that may be 
considered useful for MPA making. A question to consider is the extent to which the 
three states adopted a “principled” approach. All three states have formal stated policy, 
legislated commitments, or both concerning the implementation of international 
environmental legal obligations and have tended to follow up on those commitments to 
different extents and in various ways.  
Tanzania’s National Environmental Policy objectives specifically include the 
promotion of international cooperation, including bilateral, and implementation of 
international conventions (TZNEP 1997). Its Environmental Management Act is an 
important instrument implementing international environmental instruments to which 
Tanzania is a party (TZ EMA 2004). Similarly, in South Africa, international 
environmental law not only informs the state’s environmental law, but also obligates the 
state to conform to its international legal obligations (SAMLRA, 1998; SA NEMA 2003, 
Chapter VI; SA NEMA/ICMA 2008). South Africa has used a range of policy and 
legislative instruments in implementing its international environmental commitments. For 
example, the 1972 World Heritage Conventionxxxvi was incorporated as an annex to the 
World Heritage Convention Act and iSimangaliso Wetland Park (formerly known as 
Greater St. Lucia Wetland Park) was designated as a World Heritage site under this 
instrument (SAWHCA 1999). Mozambique’s Environmental Law, though not referring 
explicitly to international obligations, assumes international cooperation as one of its 
fundamental principles, recognizing its role in producing solutions to transboundary and 
global environmental problems (MZ EL 1997). Mozambique’s Environmental Law 
implemented the legal instruments produced by the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) within 5 years of their adoption. 
International environmental law principles, norms, and rules that help guide 
transboundary MPA making appear in the legislation of the three states. In this respect, 
the three states appear to be pursuing a principled approach to marine conservation, 
although their implementation efforts vary. South Africa’s National Environmental 
Management Act is founded on key modern and comprehensive principles that include: 
sustainable development, a human right to a decent environment, a citizen’s legal 
standing to challenge environmental issues, intergenerational equity, environment as a 
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public trust, integration, precaution, pollution prevention, the polluter pays principle, 
local-level governance, ecosystem-based management, and common but differentiated 
responsibilities (SA NEMA 2003, Chapter I). All of these principles stem from UNCED 
and other international arenas. The common but differentiated responsibilities principle 
should be of particular interest to neighboring Mozambique, which is significantly less 
developed than South Africa, in its joint marine conservation efforts. South Africa’s 
Integrated Coastal Management Act “interests of the whole community” include: “a long-
term perspective that takes into account the interests of future generations in inheriting 
coastal public property and a coastal environment characterised by healthy and productive 
ecosystems and economic activities that are ecologically and socially sustainable” (SA 
NEMA/ICMA 2008, section 1). Precaution has a place in the Marine Living Resources 
Act (SA MLRA 1998). The Biodiversity Act, which implements South Africa’s 
international obligations concerning conservation, provides for ecosystem protection and 
management and defines bioregions to include the marine environment (SA NEMA/BA 
2004, sections 1 and 5). Biodiversity management plans must be aimed to ensure long-
term survival of ecosystems and species (SA NEMA/BA 2004, section 45). 
Given the recent socioeconomic history of South African fisheries and coastal 
communities, a balance has had to be struck between development and redistribution of 
access to resources on the one hand and conservation on the other. South Africa’s 
environmental and fisheries legislation recognizes that poverty alleviation and improving 
living standards are prioritized goals. Hence, rather than taking a rigid approach to the 
implementation of international principles, the fisheries legislation attempts to achieve a 
balance between the need to conserve ecosystems and species, and the need to provide 
access to fishery resources to poor coastal communities. The reality of post-apartheid 
South Africa is that there is an urgent requirement to provide greater equity of access to 
the nation’s natural and economic wealth as much as to conserve and use resources on a 
sustainable basis (Van der Elst et al. 1997). Other important statutes implementing South 
Africa’s international commitments include the Environment Conservation Act, the 
National Parks Act, and the World Heritage Convention Act (SA ECA 1989; SA 
NEMA/BA 2004; SA NPA 1976; SA WHCA 1999). 
Tanzania similarly invokes international principles in its legislation and policy 
documents. The National Environmental Policy draws heavily on sustainable 
development thinking and intergenerational equity (TZ NEP 1997). The National Forest 
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Policy is inspired by the CBD in providing for biodiversity conservation at the genetic, 
species, and ecosystem levels (TZ NFP 1998). However, it appears that Tanzania has not 
always legislated important treaty provisions where one would expect this to occur. For 
example, it can be noted that CITESxxxvii provisions have not been incorporated in the 
Marine Parks and Reserves Act, even though marine parks and reserves under the act are 
no-take zones (TZ MPRA 1994). 
Mozambique has likewise implemented several global international conventions 
in its legislation, including ones on biodiversity, desertification, and wetlands. Some of 
these conventions provide a basis for the development of specific legislation or policies 
such as the Nairobi Convention,xxxviii which provides a foundation for the national 
strategy for the protection and development of the coastal zone. Similarly to Tanzania and 
South Africa, Mozambique’s constitution and environmental law incorporate rights and 
duties of its people in relation to the environment (MZ Constitution 2004; MZ EL 1997). 
However, it is clear that Mozambique’s implementation efforts have been hampered by a 
lack of technical and research capacity, insufficient interinstitutional coordination, 
bureaucratic obstacles, language constraints, lack of access to usable public 
environmental information, illiteracy, insufficient public understanding and support, lack 
of financial resources, and vulnerability to natural hazards. A direct consequence of these 
constraints is the delay in the national implementation of its international commitments. 
The three states have a variable record in the designation of protected sites with an 
international status pursuant to their conventional obligations (Ramsar Secretariat 2007; 
UNESCO/WHC 2007). South Africa has 17 Ramsar sites (498,721 hectares) (including 6 
in KwaZulu-Natal, which is the provincial neighbor of Mozambique) and 7 World 
Heritage sites (Ramsar Secretariat 2007). iSimangaliso Wetland Park is both a Ramsar 
and a World Heritage site. Tanzania has four Ramsar sites (4,868,424 hectares), one of 
which is the Rufiji-Mafia-Kilwa Marine Site. Tanzania has seven World Heritage 
Sites.xxxix Although Mozambique has one World Heritage site and one Ramsar site, the 
area covered is a sizable 688,000 hectares. 
Most importantly, all three states signed on to the 2004 CBD COP decision to 
achieve effective protection of 10% of marine ecoregions by 2012.xl As noted at the 
outset of this article, Mozambique and Tanzania are reported to be making good progress 
toward reaching those targets (at least until recently up to 8.1% for Tanzania’s and 4.0% 
for Mozambique’s continental shelf areas) (Wells, Burgess, and Ngusaru 2007). South 
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Africa’s record is also significant, as mentioned at the beginning of this article. Clearly, 
the CBD commitment provides a strong incentive for all three states to establish more 
MPAs, including MPA networks and transboundary MPAs.  
2.3 Settled Jurisdictional Boundaries 
Reference to the degree of jurisdictional certainty of each state is pertinent because each 
of the three states will have internal MPA responsibilities up to the limits of its maritime 
zones, and will need to coordinate the exercise of pertinent legislative and enforcement 
jurisdictions on its side of the border in cooperation with the neighboring state concerned. 
Arguably, settled boundaries are more likely to facilitate clarity, certainty, and 
predictability in the exercise of national jurisdiction and thereby avoid or minimize 
conflict with a neighboring state over varying interpretations of legitimacy of national 
action (Johnston 1988). By and large, the three states have claimed most of the maritime 
zone and jurisdictional entitlements permissible under UNCLOS;xli namely, the territorial 
sea, contiguous zone, and 200-nautical-mile EEZ (MZ LM 1996; SA MZA 1994; TZ 
TSEEZA 1989). This is important for the purpose of determining the type and full extent 
of maritime legislative and enforcement jurisdiction that the three states may exercise 
with reference to MPAs. There are some differences, however, in their respective claims. 
Mozambique and South Africa claim all the above-ocean zones. At the time of writing, 
only South Africa had made a submission concerning the outer limits of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles for consideration by the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf established under UNCLOS. Mozambique was expected to make a 
submission, but has not, while Tanzania does not appear to have taken steps with respect 
to its continental shelf. However, these submissions will not likely be material any time 
soon for MPA networks and transboundary MPAs in the EAME region, which are likely 
to be located well within the territorial sea and EEZ. Also, Mozambique and South Africa 
have incorporated most of the UNCLOS provisions concerning baseline delineationxlii 
(MZ LM 1996; SA MZA 1994). Tanzania has not fully incorporated the baseline 
provisions; in particular, in relation to the straight baseline and bay closing line methods 
(TZ TSEEZA 1989). Tanzania may not have fully maximized the internal waters it can 
claim, although this is unlikely to affect transboundary MPA management with 
Mozambique. 
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With their maritime boundary settled by agreement in 1988, there are no 
outstanding boundary issues between Mozambique and Tanzania.xliii The maritime 
boundary between Mozambique and South Africa has not been settled. Both states appear 
to observe the median line rule for undelimited territorial sea boundaries in UNCLOS,xliv 
which is the maritime zone and boundary segment of greatest relevance for the most 
likely transboundary MPA scenario between the two states. Whatever the provisional 
arrangement might be, there is no legal boundary and it is conceivable that issues may 
arise in the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction along the putative territorial sea 
boundary.  
2.4 MPA Policy Objectives 
The ocean policy literature provides useful pointers for MPA policymaking. Miles 
defined policy as a “purposive course of action in response to some set of perceived 
problems” (Miles 1989, at 214).Writing on national ocean policy, Levy described policy 
at this level as “global in scope and intent, formulated at the highest decision-making 
level” (Levy 1993, p. 77). A national policy for MPAs similarly implies that it ought to be 
formulated at a high level of decision making, even though its scope will be narrower 
than that of national ocean policy. For the purposes of comparative assessment, it is 
necessary to consider the existence of policies, commitments, or both in support of the 
establishment of national MPAs. The seniority of a decision is a prima facie indicator of 
the degree of political commitment.xlv Analogously with ocean policy and guided by CBD 
principles, a national MPA policy should: 
• Express the national political will on conservation aspirations including a willingness 
to cooperate with neighboring states; 
• Identify marine conservation objectives at the ecosystem, species, and genetic levels, 
and the pursuit of these in situ and ex situ; 
• Respond to or anticipate problems and issues arising from the establishment and 
implementation of MPAs; 
• Provide direction and purpose for governmental efforts while rationalizing 
intergovernmental and multiagency efforts; 
• Provide a basis for the allocation of financial and administrative resources; and 
• Establish a framework for inclusive participation by stakeholders. 
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It does not appear that Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania have adopted 
standalone MPA policies. Rather, their policy frameworks for MPA making are 
embedded in larger policy documents such as environment (and biodiversity), fisheries, 
and coastal zone management. Each of the three states draws policy guidance from 
various instruments. The effect of some of these instruments is to legislate policy. It is 
arguable that, as long as there are clear directions for MPA making in the various 
instruments, there is not a need for an MPA policy confined to one instrument. In their 
overall approaches, all three are influenced by contemporary thinking in terms of 
balancing conservation and socioeconomic objectives and, in particular, with due regard 
to poverty alleviation needs.  
In South Africa, the leading instrument for MPA making has historically been the 
Marine Living Resources Act and, to a lesser extent, the National Parks Act. Today, the 
South Africa National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act provides for a 
more coordinated approach to creating protected areas, including MPAs, and sets out the 
objectives and framework for the declaration and management of protected areas 
generally (SA NEMA/PAA 2003). The 2003 act sets out the objectives and framework 
for the declaration and management of protected areas generally. The act also places 
emphasis on cooperative governance and establishment of systems of protected areas, 
including representative networks, while providing for sustainable utilization and 
inclusive participation. This is particularly relevant for South Africa’s efforts in 
establishing MPA networks with its neighbors. The act sets out precise and detailed 
reasons for the establishment of protected areas, including MPAs. Complementary to the 
act is the White Paper on Marine Fisheries Policy for South Africa, which provides a 
framework for resource management directions including equity issues in fisheries (SA 
WPFP 1997). The Marine Living Resources Act further sets out principles and policy 
objectives for fisheries based on ecosystem and biodiversity protection, equity, 
precaution, and a participatory approach to decision making (SA MLRA 1998). 
Recently, South Africa adopted comprehensive framework legislation, which now 
serves as the larger context for MPA making. Prepared in 2008, the National 
Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act was assented to on 11 
February 2009 (SA NEMA/ICMA 2008). The act comes on the heels of a prolonged 
consultative process that included a Green Paper (SA GPCP 1998), a White Paper on 
Coastal Policy (SA WPCP 2000), and a publicly circulated draft Integrated Coastal 
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Management Bill (SA ICM Bill 2006). The definition of the coastal zone is one of the 
most comprehensive for such legislation in that it covers not only the land-sea interface 
area, but also the full extent of the EEZ and includes functions normally reserved for 
other environmental protection legislation such as release of effluents, incineration, and 
dumping of wastes. The coastal zone is looked at as management space for the protection 
of the marine environment, use regulation, and within which management intervention 
may be necessary. The act provides for coastal protection zones and coastal protected 
areas. The former enable “. . . the use of land that is adjacent to coastal public property or 
that plays a significant role in a coastal ecosystem . . .,” a useful tool providing the 
management and conservation authority to support the terrestrial portion of protected 
areas that are both coastal and marine (SA NEMA/ICMA 2008, section 17). Coastal 
protected areas may be designated for management by a state organ and, in this respect, 
could potentially overlap with other legislation by virtue of which MPAs may be 
established in South Africa. The act appears to have anticipated the potential overlap by 
providing that, by notice in the Gazette, “the whole or any part of a protected area that is 
not coastal public property, will not form part of the coastal protection zone” after 
consultation with the management authority of the protected area (SA NEMA/ICMA 
2008, section 22). The overlap will likely not be totally avoided where MPAs (and 
protected cultural heritage sites) established under other legislation also include coastal 
public property. 
Tanzania’s most significant document in support of MPA making is the National 
Environmental Policy, a framework instrument that has conservation and enhancement of 
natural and man-made heritage, including biological diversity and unique ecosystems, as 
one of the overall objectives (TZ NEP 1997). Policy-makers in Tanzania appear to be 
particularly conscious of past problems of conflicting and uncoordinated policies. There 
is an expectation that biodiversity conservation be integrated into all relevant government 
initiatives. This thinking permeates the National Forest Policy, the National Land Policy, 
and the National Fisheries Sector Policy and Strategy Management (TZ NFP 1998; TZ 
NFSP 1997; TZ NLP 1995). In forestry, which is relevant to the conservation of 
mangroves as habitats for many coastal and marine species, the protection of unique 
ecosystems and biological diversity is pursued with regard to the needs of the local 
population. For MPAs with a coastal component, the land policy is relevant because one 
of the objectives is to protect sensitive areas. The fisheries policy is even more direct in 
MPA Governance: A Comparison 
154 
promoting the protection of fragile ecosystems, vulnerable and endangered species and 
their habitats, and areas of special ecological significance. This policy promotes the 
establishment of marine parks, reserves, and closed breeding areas on the basis of 
collaborative management with user communities. According to the National Integrated 
Coastal Environment Management Strategy, the protection of areas of high biodiversity 
should be achieved inter alia through incorporation of these areas into existing MPAs and 
the creation of new MPAs “where local communities support the concept of a park” (TZ 
NICEMS 2003, at 25). This instrument proposes the implementation of Special Area 
Management Plans in transboundary areas where “significant coastal management issues 
exist” (TZ NICEMS 2003, at 26), enabling the central government, together with local 
authorities and stakeholders, to plan and manage coastal areas of special importance. In 
general in Tanzania, conservation policy and practice appear to support the establishment 
of transboundary MPAs, as is further evidenced by the National Fisheries Sector Policy, 
the Fisheries Act, and the Marine Parks and Reserves Unit Strategic Plan for 2005/2009 
(TZ FA 2003; TZ MPRU 2005; TZ NFSP 1997). 
Mozambique has a range of policies that support biological diversity conservation 
and MPAs. In particular, the 1995 Environmental Policy addresses, among other issues, 
coastal zone management and the creation of marine parks as a tool for the development 
of marine and coastal resources (MZ EP 1995). The Strategy and Action Plan for 
Biodiversity Conservation in Mozambique was produced by a unit within the Ministry for 
the Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA) and is the country’s plan to 
implement and meet the targets of the Convention on Biological Diversity (MZ SAPBC 
2003), including marine resources and in situ conservation. The National Tourism Policy 
and Implementation Strategy promotes protected areas by blending development and 
conservation objectives, and facilitating private investments and benefits for local 
communities (MZ TPIS 2003). This policy, as well as the national Fisheries Policy and 
Strategy for its Implementation, targets distribution of benefits and poverty alleviation 
(MZ FPSI 1996; MZ TPIS 2003). The National Land Policy similarly provides for 
protection zones, but also guarantees land use access by the people (a major issue) and 
protects customary rights of access to rural communities (MZ NLP 1995). In 
Mozambique, land is vested in the state and, accordingly, government has a fundamental 
responsibility for its conservation and for providing access to its benefits for the people 
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(MZ Constitution 2004). Several other sectoral policies include environmental concerns 
in their goals. 
2.5 Existence of a National and Subnational Legal Framework for MPA Making 
In examining governance indicators for the purpose of evaluating MPAs, Pomeroy, Parks, 
and Watson (2004) advised that consideration of the  
existence and adequacy of legislation to enable the MPA to accomplish its 
goals and objectives is a measure of formal legislation in place to provide 
the MPA with a sound legal foundation so that the goals and objectives of 
the MPA can be recognised, explained, respected, accomplished and 
enforced. In some areas, traditional law may also serve as a foundation for 
the MPA. (at 175) 
Accordingly, the existence and degree of MPA-related legal development–
whether formal (i.e., legislation) or informal (i.e., customary; Pomeroy, Parks, and 
Watson’s “traditional”) – is essential for a comparative assessment. MPAs may be 
established under dedicated legislation (i.e., statutes and rules specifically developed for 
MPA purposes), but other sectoral legislation may be important to further MPA 
objectives (e.g., the establishment of no-take zones in fisheries legislation or areas to be 
avoided in navigation under shipping legislation). 
Pomeroy, Parks, and Watson (2004) justified “enabling legislation” (as an 
evaluation indicator) as being necessary for successful implementation of the MPA 
management plan (at 175). Further, and perhaps even more fundamentally, a proper 
national and subnational legal basis provides legitimacy for MPA making and the 
consequent measures that may have to be taken such as restrictions on or closure of 
access to resources. In addition to examining the recognition of MPAs in the national 
legal system, a comparative assessment also needs to consider the extent to which there is 
legal basis to support the “network” approach to MPA making in national law as a 
systematic approach to protected areas based on representativeness of natural systems in 
the state, in relation to neighboring states, and, ideally, also in the region (Kelleher 1999). 
Citing Christie and White, Sanders and Cochrane (2006) noted that networks should also 
function to accomplish social as well as ecological goals. This is important in East Africa 
because MPAs have the potential of contributing to poverty alleviation, a major regional 
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concern.xlvi Ascertaining the extent to which national law promotes social as well as 
conservation objectives is relevant. 
Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania have highly developed legislative 
frameworks to support the designation, implementation, and management of national 
MPAs. There are few legislative and policy provisions that direct efforts at regional MPA 
networks or transboundary MPAs. However, the well-developed national legal 
frameworks appear to support national MPA commitments that may be undertaken in 
coordination with similar MPA initiatives of neighboring states. All three states have 
modern legislation, mostly post-1992. Also, all three states have local customary law that 
may play a role in MPA making and management. 
The constitutions of the three states address environmental protection. In 
Mozambique, the national government and local authorities are required to legislate for 
environmental protection and rational utilization of resources, in cooperation with other 
environmental associations (MZ Constitution 2004, Article 90). Clearly, the national 
government has conservation duties (MZ Constitution 2004, Article 102). South Africa’s 
constitution provides a citizens’ and intergenerational right to an environment not harmful 
to human health (SA Constitution 1996, section 24) and conservation and sustainable 
development, including ecological integrity, are also addressed. There is a right of access 
to natural resources rather than a right to the resources themselves (SA Constitution 
1996). Tanzania places a duty on every citizen to protect the country’s natural resources 
(TZ Constitution 1977). The Tanzanian constitution is sensitive to the need to consider 
natural resource development with reference to human development, especially the 
eradication of poverty. As seen elsewhere in this article, the latter is also a salient policy 
concern in Mozambique and South Africa.  
Protected areas in South Africa can be designated under several statutes 
depending on the particular purpose of the designation. There are roles to be played by 
national and provincial governments. Jurisdiction over marine areas is a national 
government responsibility but, in some cases, the provinces are allocated roles in the 
implementation of nationally designated protected areas. As noted earlier, the lead 
legislation is the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act, which 
replaced prior legislation on protection and conservation of South Africa’s biodiversity, 
landscapes, seascapes, and environmental goods and services (SA NEMA/PAA 2003). 
The act adopted a common international practice of generally following the six categories 
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of MPAs set out by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
(Kelleher 1999). Closely related is the Biodiversity Act, which empowers the minister to 
enter into agreements with neighboring states to secure the effective implementation of a 
bioregional plan containing measures for effective management and monitoring of 
biodiversity (SA NEMA/BA 2004, sections 40–41). Other statutes also empower the 
minister to declare MPAs. In a fisheries context, the Marine Living Resources Act 
empowers the minister with this prerogative (SA MLRA 1998, section 43). The 
Environment Conservation Act empowers the minister to declare Special Nature 
Reserves, including in the territorial waters of South Africa, to protect the environment or 
special characteristics and features (SA ECA 1989, section 18). The National Parks Act 
permits the establishment and management of national parks (SA NPA 1976). The World 
Heritage Convention Act is the basis for the designation of World Heritage sites (SA 
WHCA 1999). The Integrated Coastal Management Act is state-of-the-art legislation that 
has reorganized marine environmental protection and conservation with a unique 
integrated approach that includes provision for coastal protected areas, coastal wetlands, 
specially protected areas, and special management areas. The definition of coastal waters 
includes “marine waters that form part of the territorial waters or the internal waters” and 
estuaries, and the “coastal zone” includes the EEZ (SA NEMA/ICMA 2008, section 1).  
The significant number of instruments providing a ministerial power to designate 
a protected area may, at first blush, suggest unnecessary complexity and inefficiency. 
However, only one national government department has, until recently, dealt with MPAs: 
the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT). New government 
structures introduced after the 2009 elections have seen DEAT split into three ministries: 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Water and Environmental Affairs; and Tourism. Each 
is likely to have a stake in MPA development, but the exact details and implications 
remain to be finalized and clarified.  
There may be an issue respecting hierarchy of legislation for a specific MPA; for 
example, in terms of what statute takes priority over the same area should there be 
conflict between legislative provisions. This could have a bearing on management and 
reporting. The Integrated Coastal Management Act attempts to address this concern and 
provides that the act prevails over other legislation in relation to coastal zone 
management concerns (SA NEMA/ICMA 2008, section 6). 
MPA Governance: A Comparison 
158 
In Tanzania, the Environment Management Act lays out a broad legal framework 
for the enhancement, protection, conservation, and management of the environment with 
a strong emphasis on integration and sustainability (TZ EMA 2004). The statute most 
directly related to the establishment of MPAs is the Marine Parks and Reserves Act, 
which was specifically adopted to provide for the establishment, management, and 
monitoring of marine parks and reserves with the purpose of conserving, protecting, and 
restoring species, habitats, and ecosystemic processes (TZ MPRA 1994).xlvii Mafia Island 
Marine Park and Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park were established as marine 
parks under this statute. MPAs in Tanzania can also be established under other statutes 
that serve a more general purpose. For example, the Saadani National Park was 
established under the National Parks Ordinance, although this statute does not specifically 
provide for MPAs per se (TZ NPO 1959). The Dar es Salaam and the Maziwe Island 
Marine Reserves were both declared under the Fisheries Act (TZ FA 1970). According to 
the Marine Parks and Reserve Act, the minister responsible for national parks may, after 
consultation with the relevant local government authorities, declare any marine park or 
any part of a marine park to be a national park. Under the Fisheries Act, the minister may 
take protective measures, but not all fisheries legislation appears to support MPA making. 
Previously, the Deep Sea Fishing Authority Act provided no conservation mandate or 
provision for the establishment of MPAs in the EEZ (TZ DSFA 1998), but this changed 
with amendments to the act in 2007. According to the amended Deep Sea Fishing 
Authority Act, the Deep Sea Fishing Authority has additional functions to safeguard the 
EEZ environment and to implement any agreement reached at regional and other 
international levels to which Tanzania is a party (TZ DSFA 2007). Finally, under the 
more general Environmental Management Act, the minister may, on the recommendation 
of the National Environmental Advisory Committee, declare as an Environment Protected 
Area an area of land considered ecologically fragile or sensitive for various reasons, 
including international commitments, ecological and landscape values, local community 
interests, and so on (TZ EMA 2004). 
As in the cases of South Africa and Tanzania, the general environmental law of 
Mozambique incorporates modern international environmental law principles (e.g., 
precaution, traditional knowledge, ecosystem protection, inclusive participation, gender 
equity, polluter pays, environment impact assessment (EIA)), providing an important 
overarching principled framework for environmental management and conservation 
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efforts. The Environment Law provides for environmental protection zones over 
terrestrial and marine areas in order to facilitate protection of ecosystems that have 
ecological, socioeconomic, aesthetic, cultural, scientific, and other values (MZ EL 1997). 
Similar provision for protection zones exists in the Land Law and the Forestry and 
Wildlife Law (MZ FWL 1999; MZ LL 1997). The latter provides for the establishment of 
various types of conservation and protected areas. Other statutes provide for the taking of 
management and conservation measures. The Fisheries Law provides for the adoption of 
conservation and management measures, including: minimal size or weight of species, 
closed seasons, limited or no-access areas, minimum mesh size, permissible fishing gear 
methods, catch quotas per boat or person, schemes for limiting access or effort, and fish 
sanctuaries (MZ FL 1995, Article 35a). The Tourism Law plays a role in the conservation 
of terrestrial and marine biodiversity (MZ TL 2004) and the Local Organs Law enables 
district authorities to propose protected areas, designate ecological zones and other 
protected areas, and establish reserves using their land use planning powers (MZ LOL 
2003). Mozambique is considered to have a good system of representative protected 
areas, accounting for some 12.6% of the land surface of the country and 4% of the 
continental shelf (Wells, Burgess, and Ngusaru 2007). With the designation of Inhaca 
Island as a protected area in 1965, it also has one of the oldest MPAs in the region.xlviii 
2.6 Regulatory Tools for Land Use Planning, Marine Spatial Planning, and 
Resource Use 
Legal recognition may be sufficient for designating and establishing MPAs but, for 
management purposes, an MPA manager will be concerned with human and ecological 
uses of the area concerned. Thus an MPA manager, as a type of marine manager, needs to 
be equipped with or have access to a range of tools appropriate for the regulation of 
marine resource and nonresource uses. Where an MPA includes a terrestrial component, 
the marine manager may also perform coastal management functions. Tools for MPA 
managers may be specifically provided in MPA-dedicated legislation or in other existing 
legal instruments. For example, regulatory tools for fishery management purposes may 
include zoning, licensing, permissible fishing gear, habitat protection, closed seasons, no 
take zones, and so forth, which may be useful for MPAs that include fishing interests. 
Shipping legislation frequently includes regulatory powers consisting of standard-based 
safety and environmental regulation, including vessel waste discharges into the marine 
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environment and routing schemes that include navigation routes, traffic lanes and 
separation schemes, areas to be avoided, mandatory and voluntary reporting, and so forth. 
Environmental and wildlife legislation may address discharges and dumping in the 
marine environment, species-specific protection, habitat protection, EIA, and so forth. 
Similarly, in land use law, zoning and related planning tools can be useful for the MPA 
manager. More recently, in some jurisdictions, marine spatial planning is being promoted 
as an essential ocean management tool complementary to integrated coastal zone 
management (European Union 2008). 
Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania’s suite of environmental and sectoral 
statutes provide a wide range of tools to support conservation and the regulation of 
resource and nonresource uses within MPAs. In Tanzania, any area declared as an 
Environment Protected Area under the Environmental Management Act can be managed 
by the tools provided under the act. These tools include zoning, access restrictions, fees, 
and so forth, and a broad power for “any other measure deemed appropriate for proper 
and sound use of the area” (TZ EMA 2004). The limitation is that the legislation applies 
to terrestrial, inland waters and shoreline areas, but not to marine areas which are covered 
under other legislation. These powers are, however, valuable for the coastal and estuarine 
parts of an MPA. The Marine Parks and Reserves Act requires general management plans 
for a park or reserve and provides an EIA requirement for certain activities within a park. 
Parks and reserves are generally considered no-take zones (TZ MPRA 1994). Guided by 
the National Forest Policy, the Forests Act also provides for EIAs as a management tool 
and for the establishment of forest reserves and buffer zones around them (TZ FA 2002; 
TZ NFP 1998). The Fisheries Act has various resource access, management, surveillance, 
and enforcement tools. The minister has a regulatory mandate for the protection of critical 
habitats, closed periods, and conservation (biodiversity, habitat, and endangered species) 
(TZ FA 2003). 
South Africa’s statutory management tools are similar to Tanzania’s. The Marine 
Living Resources Act empowers the minister to declare protected areas, and this 
provision has been used to renew protected area status for South Africa’s marine parks 
(SA MLRA 1998, section 43). Further, the Minister of Fisheries may declare certain areas 
to be under special management control as fisheries management areas. Similarly, the 
Environment Conservation Act enables the designation of Limited Development Areas 
within which strict control is imposed on certain developments (SA ECA 1989, section 
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23). EIAs are also an important tool that can be used for MPA purposes under the 
National Environmental Management Act, and this includes public participation (SA 
NEMA 1998).  
Mozambique law similarly provides for a wide range of regulatory authority to 
adopt management and conservation measures, including EIA and environmental audits 
(MZ EAR 2003; MZ EIAR 2004), fishery management zoning, species-specific 
protection (e.g., turtles), licensing and effort control (MZ REPMAR 2003), environmental 
quality standards (MZ RSEQ 2004), marine pollution prevention (MZ PPO 1973), 
strategic environmental assessment,xlix and so forth. Regulations tend to provide more 
detailed powers for the establishment of marine parks, reserves, and other protected areas 
(e.g., MZ REPMAR 2003).  
2.7 Institutional Mandates 
A corollary to the requirement for a solid legal foundation for MPAs is the need for an 
institutional framework, which includes a clear allocation of a legal mandate for MPA 
purposes. This mandate needs to set out the lead role to be played by an identified 
institution, its functions and powers, and its relationship to other interested institutions. 
The lead institution will normally be expected to perform its functions in cooperation 
with other national agencies, other levels of government and local authorities, and interest 
groups, including communities and stakeholders. Vertical (intergovernmental in a 
domestic setting) and horizontal (interagency) coordination, especially where institutional 
mandates overlap, is important to enable effective MPA management. The reality of 
sectoralization of government functions requires the lead institution to collaborate with 
other government agencies. This may be a requirement set out in parent legislation 
(Vallejo 1992). Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania have significantly different 
institutional frameworks for MPA making. Each of the three states has multiple 
institutions at various levels of decision making, and the degree of vertical and horizontal 
coordination among the multiple institutions involved is variable. 
Environmental policy in South Africa is set at the national level, with provinces 
carrying considerable responsibilities for its implementation; especially, in the coastal and 
marine environment. Responsibility for the administration and coordination of the 
national policy and legal framework concerning MPAs has been the responsibility of the 
DEAT, with provincial departments of environment having a role in implementation. 
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Changes introduced after the 2009 reshuffle50 are likely to split the responsibility for 
MPAs between fisheries and environment ministries. The past centralization of this 
responsibility in the DEAT allowed for a common strategic approach, even when MPAs 
were proposed by different agencies under different instruments. It also meant that 
contributions to national, regional, and international responsibilities could be better 
evaluated and the meeting of MPA targets by 2012 better coordinated. It remains to be 
seen if the new government structures will retain this efficient “one-stop-shopping” 
approach.  
In Mozambique, although the lead agency is MICOA, there are overlapping 
mandates among ministries. MICOA is the national government’s lead agency for 
developing and implementing environmental policy, and for the coordination for the 
proper planning and utilization of natural resources (MZ MICOA 1995, Article 1). There 
are at least three national government institutions with responsibilities for the 
establishment and management of wildlife resources, including the Ministry of 
Agriculture (overall responsibility for wildlife management in free areas and reserves), 
the Ministry of Tourism (national parks and reserves including “Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas” and hunting areas), and the Ministry of Fisheries (in regulating 
fishing). Related functions are also performed by the MICOA and the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (social-cultural heritage matters). 
Under Tanzania’s Marine Parks and Reserves Act, the Marine Parks and Reserves 
Unit (MPRU) is responsible for management of those protected areas. Under the National 
Parks Act, the Tanzania National Park Authority advises the minister on the 
establishment of reserves and parks, including marine parks. The president proceeds with 
designation only after a resolution is submitted by the minister to parliament and is 
passed. However, there appears to be confusion on the structure, functions, and 
responsibilities of the MPRU, including its relationship to the director of fisheries. 
Difficulties are experienced by the MPRU, as a centralized institution, in the 
establishment and management of MPAs. Further, there are as many as 10 ministries that 
have mandates touching on coastal and marine resource and environmental issues. Of 
particular interest in Tanzania’s institutional framework for MPAs is the role of lower 
levels of government. Local management by communities is more viable if those 
communities are persuaded of the value and benefits to be reaped from taking on this 
responsibility. Under the Town and Country Planning Ordinance, local authorities are 
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empowered to declare and regulate planning areas (TZ TCPO 1956). There is a 
potentially important role for local urban government authorities in the taking of 
measures or making bylaws in support MPAs under the Local Government (Urban 
Authorities) Act (TZ LGUAA 1982). For example, measures for the conservation of 
natural resources may be taken at this level of government (e.g., prevention of soil 
erosion, food inspection). Local government authorities are empowered with fisheries 
licensing and enforcement and are normally involved in the management of marine parks 
and reserves in an advisory capacity under the Local Government (District) Authorities 
Act (TZ LGDAA 1982). Under the Village Land Act, villages have land management 
responsibilities that require them to consult and be consulted (TZ VLA 1999).  
2.8 Process for MPA Decision Making as Established in Law 
Attention needs to be given to the designation, establishment, implementation, and 
ongoing management of MPAs. Differences can be expected as to how decision making 
is set out in relevant national legislation, whether decisions are dirigiste, that is top down 
by the mandated government institution, or bottom up (community or stakeholder driven), 
or somewhere in between such as in comanagement (shared between the government or 
community and stakeholders), or perhaps even a mixture of the above depending on the 
situation (Hildebrand 1997). The degree of similarity or differences in legal processes 
(and cultures) of decision making between Tanzania and Mozambique, and Mozambique 
and South Africa will be important to understand as these will be relevant considerations 
for cooperative MPA networks and transboundary MPAs.  
Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania have different procedures for MPA 
establishment. In South Africa, the procedure depends on the statute used to designate a 
protected area but, as noted earlier, the decision for establishing an MPA has to date 
remained the responsibility of DEAT. The MPA designation process in South Africa (see 
Figure 2) may be initiated by any person or the government itself. The process tends to 
invite stakeholder, public, and governmental comment, after which a proposal is revised 
and submitted to the minister for approval. The MPA is then declared and published in 
the government Gazette. National parks and World Heritage sites need parliamentary 
approval before proclamation and, likewise, the termination of park status requires 
parliamentary assent. An integrated management plan is not necessarily adopted at the 
outset, but would normally be completed within 6 months of the designation of an MPA 
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under the National Environment Management Protected Areas Act (SA NEMA/PAA 
2003, section 39(2)). This is a responsibility that the minister delegates to a provincial or 
park authority and is undertaken with public participation. However, MPAs declared 
solely under the Marine Living Resources Act have no obligation to produce such 
management plans. There have been problems of transparency and decision making in 
some MPAs.  
 
Figure 2 - MPA designation process in South Africa. Abbreviations: DEAT, Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism; MPA, marine protected area. 
In Tanzania, marine parks and reserves are similarly established by the minister 
after consulting local authorities. A local authority or other nongovernmental institution 
or person may also advise the minister to establish an MPA (see Figure 3). The 
governmental legwork is undertaken by the MPRU. The Board of Trustees of the MPRU 
appoints the warden for an MPA and, in turn, the warden may appoint park officers in 
consultation with the board. Once established, an MPA plan will be developed by the 
board, the advisory committee of the MPA, and village councils. As in the case of South 
Africa, this is to occur within 6 months of declaration of an MPA. The minister has to 
approve the plan (TZ MPRA 1994, section 14); however, the actual management is the 
responsibility of the park management team. 
 
Figure 3 - MPA designation process in Tanzania. Abbreviations: MPRU, Marine Parks and Reserves Unit; MPA, 
marine protected area. 
In Mozambique, the establishment of protected areas follows different processes 
(see Figure  4), top down or bottom up, depending on the institution from which a 
proposal arises. At the provincial or local level, a proposal arising from the decentralized 
ministry services (either as the proponent or on behalf of an individual or entity from 
which the proposal was originally created) is subject to the approval of the Council of 
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Ministers, after being channelled by the central services. If the proposal was initiated by 
the local government, the relevant ministries will contribute to the process, after which 
the proposal is sent to the Council of Ministers, following scrutiny from the Inter-
institutional Technical Committee for Coastal Management and by the National Council 
for Sustainable Development. In both of these processes, community consultation is 
mandatory only at the establishment phase and as a contribution to the management plan. 
Yet another process for the establishment of protected areas commences with 
communities and other relevant stakeholders, and its results as well as other technically 
relevant documentation (including the management plan) are subjected to the approval of 
the relevant entities.  
The major difference between the top-down and the bottom-up approaches is that 
the former is based on the potential of an area to be proclaimed and the latter relies on 
technical information with supporting evidence that there are biophysical and social 
conditions to establish a conservation area. In the particular case of MPAs, only the 
Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Tourism can initiate a proclamation process. 
 
Figure 4 - MPA designation process in Mozambique. Abbreviation: MPA, marine protected area. 
2.9 Participatory Rights and Processes 
This criterion is closely related to the previous one. Whereas the previous criterion 
considered decision making from the perspective of the mandated institution, 
participatory rights and processes relate to the expectations of communities and 
stakeholders to be included in decision making processes. This expectation can be legal 
(in terms of a legislated or customary right, i.e., enforceable), as much as political, social, 
and ethical. Pomeroy, Parks, and Watson (2004) wrote that  
the level of stakeholder participation in the management of the MPA is a 
measure of the amount of active involvement of people in making MPA 
management decisions or involvement in management activities and of 
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their satisfaction with their level of participation, including if their views 
and concerns are being heard and considered by MPA managers. (at 193)  
The significance of this, Pomeroy, Parks, and Watson (2004) continued, is that if 
there is inclusive participation of stakeholders, they are more likely to develop a sense of 
ownership and more likely to be compliant with management measures (at 193). Others 
have similarly noted that top-down approaches to decision making have frequently led to 
failure in fisheries management and MPAs (Christie and White 2006; Cochrane 2007; 
Salm, Clark, and Siirla 2000; Sanders and Cochrane 2006; World Resources Institute 
2004). Accordingly, for the purposes of the comparative assessment, it is useful to 
determine how the policy and legal framework in each of the three states provides for 
inclusive participation. In particular, community and stakeholder compliance on either 
side of the borders between Mozambique and Tanzania and Mozambique and South 
Africa (KwaZulu-Natal Province) can be expected to be critical for the success of 
prospective transboundary MPAs in the border regions. 
Consistent with modern governance practices, the legislation of Mozambique, 
South Africa, and Tanzania provides for public participatory rights and processes in 
developmental and environmental decision making. As part of the general process of 
democratization in post-apartheid South Africa, there has been a consistent trend toward 
promotion of inclusive participation in policy development in support of environmental 
legislation. Legal standing to enforce environmental law through public and private 
prosecution, including public interest actions, is provided in the National Environmental 
Management Act (SA NEMA 1998, sections 32–33). In particular, the act provides that 
any person can seek appropriate relief with respect to any breach or threatened breach of 
any of the principles of the act (SANEMA 1999, section 2). Consultative processes are 
also built into conservation decision making.  
This is also the case in Tanzania. Tanzania’s Fisheries Act provides for Beach 
Management Units, a type of comanagement mechanism, to enable local community 
stakeholders to cooperate with the government in the management, conservation, and 
protection of local fishery resources (TZ FA 2003). Also, under Tanzania’s Marine Parks 
and Reserves Act, the park warden has a duty to involve affected villages in the 
establishment, governance, and management of the park or reserve, and village 
representatives have a right to advise officials on management and conservation matters 
and, thereby, also benefit from the park (TZ MPRA 1994). Village representatives are 
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part of an MPA’s advisory committee and, together with this committee, they are 
responsible for proposing a general management plan for an MPA to the respective board. 
Public participation in environmental decision making is also fostered by the 
Environmental Management Act (TZ EMA 2004). 
Similarly in Mozambique, various policies and legal instruments promote public 
participation, especially, local communities, on issues of development and conservation 
of biological diversity (e.g., MZ SAPBC 2003). Environmental legislation requires 
community participation and the utilization of their knowledge (MZ EL 1997, Article 30). 
The law requires decentralized implementation to enable local participation, initiative, 
and benefit (MZ EL 1997, Article 7). Decentralization envisages participative 
administration and management, including public-private partnerships. In the 
establishment of conservation areas, the “timing” of the consultation process depends on 
how the proclamation is initiated: if top down, consultation takes place during the 
elaboration of the management plan; if bottom up, consultation is part of the proposal 
presented to the authorities.  
There is an uneven practice in the public dissemination of information, especially, 
of the regulatory type, and access to public information. In South Africa, on the one hand, 
public access to information is elevated to the status of a basic principle in the National 
Environmental Management Act (SA NEMA 1998, section 2). On the other hand, 
communications from an MPA itself are generally weak and there is little public access to 
that information. In Mozambique, there appears to be a lack of awareness at all levels of 
society about environmental legislation with respect to the coastal zone. With lack of 
freedom of information legislation, poor communication infrastructures, and high 
illiteracy rates, especially, in rural areas, public access to information is an issue in 
Mozambique. Since 2000, Mozambique has had an Information and Communication 
Technology Policy (ICT) that aims at enhancing the infrastructure to enable provision of 
a wide range of information important for national development, including natural 
resources management (MZ ICT Policy 2000). In comparison, in Tanzania, the 
dissemination of knowledge on parks and reserves is an important legislated objective 
(TZ MPRA 1994). It is conceivable that effective participatory processes could be 
hampered if there is insufficient dissemination of knowledge to enable informed 
participation by communities and other stakeholders and this, in turn, could hamper buy-
in into existing and future MPAs. There has been criticism in Tanzania that there are legal 
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and institutional barriers to effective access to information by the public. For example, 
“there is no single government source of environmental and natural resource information 
for the public. With no central repository for environmental information, the public must 
make requests to multiple sources to get all relevant information” (LEAT 1999, p. 8).  
2.10 Enforcement and Incentives for Compliance 
Ideally, an MPA should create an atmosphere of stakeholder compliance as a 
consequence of management efficiency and effectiveness, without the need to divert 
resources into compelling behavioral outcomes. In addition to the likely benefits of 
inclusive participation, the policy and legal framework may anticipate the provision of 
benefits for compliance such as fiscal, economic, or social and cultural benefits for 
stakeholders. But the reality is that compliance cannot always be relied on and 
enforcement of the law may be necessary. Enforcement gives fiat to the legal protection 
of MPAs and avoids the risk of having paper MPAs. It is necessary that there be proper 
authorization of MPA managers and related officials to undertake enforcement (Pomeroy, 
Parks, and Watson 2004, at 198). A comparative assessment would need to ascertain the 
experience in each of the three countries with respect to the enforcement of legal and 
management measures for MPA violations.  
Having determined the existence of an MPA policy and legal framework, 
knowledge of its existence and functions among communities and stakeholders is an 
important indicator of MPA success (Pomeroy, Parks, and Watson 2004, at 202). A 
comparative assessment would need to consider whether mechanisms for the 
dissemination of this information are in existence in the three states. Knowledge is an 
indispensable element to facilitate inclusive participation in decision making, 
understanding of the reasons for management measures, and compliance with those 
measures. 
As noted above in relation to South Africa, the provinces are largely delegated 
responsibilities for implementation and compliance (SA MLRA 1998, Chapter 6). For 
example, the Ezemvelo KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife is the conservation manager of the 
iSimangaliso Wetland Park and performs the enforcement functions. There is a high level 
of voluntary compliance in MPAs off KwaZulu-Natal, possibly due to public buy-in as a 
result of participatory processes in MPA making, but also because of effective zoning that 
enables many users to operate under tight controls (with outright prohibition limited to 
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sanctuary areas). This is particularly relevant for the transboundary area between 
Mozambique and South Africa. Where compliance issues arise, they tend to be more in 
relation to land ownership and terrestrial resources than to MPAs where the waters are 
subject to surveillance. Compliance is more of an issue elsewhere where there are higher 
subsistence needs or valuable resources (e.g., abalone), and where fish poaching is 
common. More of a problem along much of the East African coast is compliance by 
international shipping with basic MARPOL discharge requirements in the proximity of 
MPAs, but this is a problem common with many marine regions around the world. 
In Tanzania, there may be an issue of meeting the statutory time requirements to 
put in place regulations and management plans and, thereby, facilitate compliance. 
Ministerial delay in enacting regulations implementing primary legislation, among others, 
was responsible for the late establishment of the general management plans for Mnazi 
Bay and Mafia Island parks. However, there are practical matters to consider. For 
example, the development of a General Management Plan (GMP) involves a long and 
intensive consultative and approval process; particularly, in relation to the identification 
of zones, their demarcation, and the process for securing approval of the plan. The 
document first has to be approved by all villages in the park, then by district authorities, 
followed by the Park Board and finally the minister. The process requires a considerably 
longer period than the 6-month period stipulated in the legislation. 
In Mozambique, responsibility for enforcement within a conservation area lies 
with park staff and ultimately its manager. Because existing protected areas are all under 
the Ministry of Tourism, the park manager is expected to liaise with the local 
decentralized services of that ministry. However, it does not appear that local tourism 
services participate in law enforcement activities within conservation areas. Protected 
areas in Mozambique often lack sufficient staff and other resources to make enforcement 
effective. Compliance with the management plan is often dependent on the views and 
feelings of local communities on the conservation area and the impact regulations have on 
their daily life and subsistence. It is not unusual for conflicts to arise. For example, in the 
context of terrestrial protected areas, conflicts between elephant movements and human 
settlements often occur, including in the Maputo Elephant Reserve near Ponta de Ouro on 
the south coast of Mozambique.  
2.11 Conflict Management Processes 
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Although the MPA-making process should be guided by conflict avoidance, it can be 
expected that the designation and implementation of an MPA may juxtapose divergent or 
irreconcilable interests, possibly leading to conflict. Conflicts may arise in several 
situations such as interagency within the government, between levels of government (e.g., 
national government and local authority), between government (whether national or 
subnational) and a community or group of stakeholders, between communities, within 
communities, between communities and other stakeholders, and between the respective 
cooperating governments themselves. Competitive behavior may concern resource access 
(allocation), multiple uses of the same space (“elbowing”), adverse impact of one use on 
others (e.g., pollution), actor (intra- and interuse) conflicts, actor-regulator conflicts, and 
process-related differences (participation) (Chircop 1994). The determination of 
mechanisms and processes for conflict management and the similarities or differences 
between the three states is necessary in a comparative assessment. There is a wide range 
of formal and informal conflict avoidance and management processes that may be 
adopted in whole or in part, including fact finding, negotiation, mediation, and 
conciliation, among others (Harness 1996; Wall and Lynn 1993). 
In South Africa, the National Environmental Management Act provides structures 
for conciliation, arbitration, investigation, and compensation for environmental conflicts, 
which presumably would include MPA-related conflicts (SA NEMA 1998, Part IV). 
Indeed, the “Director-General shall designate an officer to provide information to the 
public on appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms for referral of disputes and 
complaints” (SA NEMA 1998, section 22). The picture is different in Mozambique’s and 
Tanzania’s legislation, where the process for managing conflicts concerning MPAs is 
unclear. The designation and implementation of protected areas in Mozambique has not 
been without difficulty. For instance, although human settlements are not permitted in 
conservation areas given full protection (e.g., national parks and reserves), in reality there 
are many communities that had been living in the protected areas before these were 
created (MZ FWL 1999; MZ LL 1997). This situation has generated significant conflicts 
between the human settlements and wildlife, and the degradation or destruction of habitat 
and animals. It has also led to conflicts with park authorities. For example, in the Maputo 
Elephant’s Reserve, one or two communities take the view that they do not belong to the 
reserve and, thus, dispute the authority of park managers. Tanzania has also experienced 
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conflicts between sectoral administrative responsibilities, including in terms of licensing 
for resource use, monitoring, control, and surveillance. 
2.12 MPA Review 
Several authors in the ICOM and MPA fields have highlighted the importance of ongoing 
and periodic review, not only of management operations and their effectiveness, but also 
of the framework (including legal) for management (Chircop and Hildebrand, 2006; 
Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998; Pomeroy, Parks, and Watson 2004). In essence, an MPA 
governance framework review is advocated as a systemic requirement in the interests of 
quality assurance and continued relevance. Regular monitoring and periodic review are 
essential to enable measurement of progress toward conservation targets and outcomes. 
Inclusion of review in the governance framework enables an assessment of its efficiency 
in helping achieve targets. Governance reviews can also be useful to ensure that equity 
issues (e.g., inclusive participation) are not overlooked. The assessment should consider 
whether review requirements are legislated in each of the three states to enable the taking 
stock of MPA making and cooperation on marine conservation matters on a periodic 
basis.  
Insofar as the effectiveness of MPAs is concerned, all three states tend to monitor 
some aspects of the MPAs as a matter of practice. South Africa’s legislation demands 
evaluation of MPA effectiveness against a set of performance indicators specific to each 
MPA but, in most cases, this is either not achieved or the indicators are inadequate to 
properly evaluate effectiveness. In most cases, the monitoring relates more to tourist visits 
and transgressions than to biodiversity issues. In the case of Mozambique, an MPA law 
review process would likely encounter issues of lack of capacity and the fact that MPA-
related legislation is not limited to a single instrument. Therefore, any review would have 
to deal with many other issues that the various laws address and their original raison 
d’être. Insofar as park-specific reviews are concerned, the Limpopo National Park, as part 
of the wider Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, is subject to review. MPA management 
plans have to be reviewed every 5 years. Bazaruto National Park was reviewed and the 
park’s boundaries were extended to cover other sea areas and islands not included within 
the original boundaries. Similarly, the Maputo Elephant Reserve’s boundary was 
extended to include 3 to 5 nautical miles of ocean space. In Tanzania, although the 
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Marine Parks and Reserves Act does not provide for periodic review, the GMPs do have 
provisions in them for conducting review park-specific reviews. 
3. ASSESSMENT 
This article set out with the objective of identifying and comparing the national 
governance frameworks for MPAs between Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania, 
and to identify issues that could facilitate or constrain MPA cooperation between them. In 
particular, this article has attempted to assess the degree of similarity between those 
national governance frameworks and identify gaps that could constrain bilateral or 
multilateral MPA network and transboundary MPA cooperation.  
In responding to these tasks, a noticeable aspect of the environmental policy and 
legal infrastructure of the three countries is the recent vintage of several of the main 
instruments. These laws tend to be novel, modern, mostly post-Rio, and, thus, imbued 
with the sustainable development ethic, but possibly also insufficiently “weathered” as 
they may have yet to generate experience, review, and adaptive amendment. In 
Mozambique’s and South Africa’s cases, the new legislation followed the end of 
traumatic periods. In Mozambique’s case, there has been a period of societal, legislative, 
and infrastructural reconstruction in the wake of the devastations of the civil war in the 
1980s and until 1992. The war took a heavy toll not only on human life and 
socioeconomic well-being, but also on the environment and many individual species. 
South Africa has experienced a rethinking of basic governance structures, including 
environmental, since the end of apartheid and launching of democracy in 1994, but has 
not suffered the environmental losses of Mozambique.  
Despite their modernity, the policy and legal frameworks for MPA making in 
Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania are products of established conservation 
experience in and outside of the three states and are certainly not paper phenomena. The 
three states have adopted principled approaches in their main conservation policies and 
legislation. All have established and managed different types of terrestrial protected areas 
and MPAs for many years. Admittedly, the capacity and effectiveness have been variable 
and these can be explained in several ways. But, there are sound practices in place such as 
the involvement of different levels of government, use of diverse regulatory tools, and 
promotion of participatory rights and processes. There are diverse, but comparable, 
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decision-making processes for MPA designation. Each state has different processes for 
MPA designation that include multiple ways on how protected areas may be established.  
Despite the obvious strengths of the governance frameworks of the three states, 
not everything is rosy. There are significant gaps in adherence to pertinent international 
environmental law conventions that would support neighborly marine environmental and 
MPA cooperation. The institutional framework for MPAs suffers from inefficiencies. 
Delineation between institutional mandates is an issue in Mozambique and Tanzania 
where parallel mandates for MPA making are in place, contributing to overlaps and 
ambiguity of management roles and responsibilities. The legal definition of MPAs is also 
an issue in Tanzania where there is a need to more clearly define the legal and 
management parameters of the different MPAs permitted, notably the distinction between 
parks and reserves and better cross-sectoral regulation in support of MPAs. The problem 
may be explained, in part, by the absence of legislated duties for government agencies to 
coordinate the performance of their functions. 
Lack of capacity is yet another issue. Mozambique has a far-reaching need for 
capacity building on several fronts, including better access and exchange of information 
on international conventions; the capacity of government to employ true integrated 
approaches and better interinstitutional coordination; further strengthening of 
environmental law (in particular, to support MPA management and enforcement); and 
simplification of legal documentation for public information and dissemination among 
communities, taking into consideration illiteracy and poverty constraints. Conflicts 
between legal institutions can be a problem. The experience of Tanzania also shows that 
customary rights are not always recognized in legislation. This is important in order to 
bestow legitimacy to them in the eyes of administrators. South Africa too has issues, but 
may not be as technically and financially constrained as the other two states. All three 
states evidence a weak system for review of MPA governance and evaluating 
management effectiveness. Mozambique and Tanzania also have weaknesses relating to 
access and dissemination of information to the public, uneven enforcement capabilities, 
and insufficiently clear conflict management processes. The consultative processes that 
the three states have in place suggest that a consultation process for the purpose of 
establishing a regional MPA network or transboundary MPAs will be a long one. 
To further reinforce the national governance frameworks surveyed in this article 
as legal infrastructure for a transboundary MPA network and transboundary MPAs in 
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their border regions, the three states should consider developing legal provisions to 
properly mandate the respective authorities with responsibilities for the establishment and 
management of such transboundary arrangements. Although the legislation on domestic 
MPA making is clear, there is less clarity with reference to cooperative MPA making. 
This would be innovative legislation, which would, inter alia, further facilitate cross-
border scientific exchanges, stakeholder participation, and surveillance and enforcement. 
In particular, the designation of transboundary MPAs is likely to benefit from better 
definition of domestic lead roles for initiating the dialogue leading to a transboundary 
MPA designation and eventually for continued management. Even in the event that the 
three states agree to establish joint commissions or similar unified structures for the 
management of transboundary MPAs in the two border regions, it will be important to 
have provisions for the definition of the roles of domestic institutions whose cooperation 
will be needed in what essentially will be international initiatives. 
Beyond the domestic governance infrastructure, cooperation on MPAs will require 
a diplomatic process that was not studied in this article. The three states boast substantial 
international experience in transboundary resource conservation and cooperation 
(Guerreiro et al. 2009). Although this relates primarily to terrestrial contexts, there is 
likely much that is transferable to marine environmental cooperation such as the 
diplomatic processes involved, the consequential interbureaucratic cooperation required 
on an ongoing basis, and the range of options in achieving acceptable joint outcomes. The 
practice on regional MPA networks elsewhere shows that international legal agreements 
and a strong coordinating framework are likely to facilitate progress (UNEP/WCMC 
2008). Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania have the capacities and aptitudes 
necessary to enter into bilateral, and possibly subregional arrangements, a good augur for 
an East African regional transboundary MPA network. 
4. CONCLUSION 
As Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania further engage in dialogue on marine 
conservation cooperation, to the point of scaling up their cooperation to a regional MPA 
network and transboundary MPAs in their border regions, they will need to consider how 
their domestic governance frameworks facilitate or constrain their cooperation. Although 
on many issues, there appears to be regional solidarity and a convergence on principles, 
there are significant differences concerning lead roles and institutional structures, access 
Chapter 5 
175 
to public information, and conflict management, among others, which would need to be 
factored in MPA cooperation. Other important factors for regional MPA cooperation 
include policy directions on shared concerns such as conservation and development 
values, with an emphasis on equitable resource use and poverty alleviation. The three 
states have the political will to address the difficult balance they need to strike between 
poverty and conservation at the domestic level. Their added challenge will be to address 
that balance at a regional level. 
POSTSCRIPT 
In October 2009 the transboundary MPA between Mozambique and South Africa 
discussed in this article came into existence with Mozambique’s announcement of the 
Ponta de Ouro Marine Reserve. The MPA on the Mozambique side includes Ponta de 
Ouro, Inhaca, Portuguese Islands and Maputo Special Reserve to a seaward extent of 
three nautical miles and collectively covering an area of 678 km2. The area has been 
placed on the tentative list for eventual proposal for World Heritage Site status. This 
MPA now links with the iSimangaliso Wetland Park on the South African side of the 
maritime boundary and the two MPAs together extend for 300 km. The transboundary 
MPA is one of five areas under the Lubombo Transfrontier Conservation Area Protocol 
and is considered to be the first in the African region. (iSimangaliso News & Info, online: 
http://isimangalisonews.wordpress.com/2009/10/29/mozambique-and-sa-link-
handsacross-sea-creating-africa%e2%80%99s-largest-marine-protec-ted-area/). 
REFERENCES 
Legislation 
Mozambique 
MZ Constitution, Constitutição da República, Aprovada pela Assembleia da 
República, 16 de Novembro de 2004, available at 
www.mozambique.mz/pdf/constituicao.pdf. 
MZ EAR, Environmental Audit Regulations, Decreto no. 32/2003 de 12 de 
Agosto, Boletim da República No. 34 (1st Series), 20 August 2003, 379–381. 
MPA Governance: A Comparison 
176 
MZ EIAR, Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations, Decreto no. 45/2004 
de 29 de Setembro, Boletim da República No. 39 (1st Series), 29 August 2004, 406 (1–
17). 
MZ EL, Lei do Ambiente, Lei no. 20/97 de 31 de Julho, Boletim da República No. 
40 (1st Series), 3rd Supplement, 7 October 1997, 200 (19–24), available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/moz15370.doc. 
MZ EP, Environmental Policy Resolution, Resolução no. 5/95 de 3 de Agosto, 
Boletim da República No. 49 (1st Series), Supplement, 6 December 1995, 232 (1–13). 
MZ FL, Lei das Pescas, Lei no. 3/90 de 26 de Setembro, Boletim da República 
No. 39, 26 September 1990, 250 (5–14), available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/moz3459.pdf. 
MZ FPSI, Fisheries Policy and Strategy for Its Implementation, Decree No. 17/96 
of 28 May, 1996, available at www.govnet.gov.mz/docs gov/fold 
politicas/outrasPol/politica pesqueira.pdf. 
MZ FWL, Lei de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Lei no. 10/99 de 7 de Julho, Boletim 
da República No. 27 (1st Series), 4th Supplement, 7 July 1999, 126 (31–39), available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/moz20106.pdf. 
MZ ICT Policy, Information and Communication Technology Policy, approved 
by the Council of Ministers on 12 December 2000, available at 
www.comminit.com/en/node/148334/306. 
MZ LL, Lei de Terras, Lei no. 19/97 de 1 de Outubro, Boletim da República No. 
40, 3rd Supplement, 7 October 1997, 200 (15–19), available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/moz15369.pdf. 
MZ LM, Lei do Mar, Lei no. 4/96 de 4 de Janeiro, Boletim da República No. 1 
(1st Series), 4 January 1996, 4 (10–15), available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/moz22054.pdf. 
MZ LOL, Local, Provincial, District and Administrative Posts Law, Lei no. 
8/2003 de 19 de Maio, 2003, available at 
www.govnet.gov.mz/Legisla/legisSectores/adminEst/. 
Chapter 5 
177 
MZ MICOA, Objectives and Functions of the Ministry for the Coordination of 
Environmental Action Presidential Order, Decreto Presidencial no. 6/95 de 10 de 
Novembro, 1995, available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/. 
MZ NLP, National Land Policy Resolution, Resolução no. 10/95 de 17 de 
Outubro, 1995, available at http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/. 
MZ PPO, Sea and Coastal Waters Pollution Prevention Order, Decreto no. 495/73 
de 6 de Outubro, Boletim Oficial No. 123 (1st Series), 20 October 1973, 1179–1180. 
MZ REPMAR, General Regulations on Marine Fisheries, Decreto no. 43/2003 de 
10 de Dezembro, Boletim da República No. 50 (1st Series), 10 December 2003, 550–583. 
MZ RSEQ, Regulation on Environmental Quality Patterns and the Emission of 
Effluents, Decree No. 18/2004, available at 
www.legisambiente.gov.mz/index.php?option=com docman&taskdocdetails&gid=32. 
MZ SAPBC, Strategy and Action Plan for Biodiversity Conservation, 2003, 
available at www.cbd.int/countries/default.shtml?country=mz. 
MZ TL, Lei do Turismo, Lei no. 4/2004 de Abril, 2004, available at 
www.govnet.gov.mz/Legisla/legisSectores/turismo leg/lei%20do%20turismo.pdf. 
MZ TPIS, Tourism Policy and Implementation Strategy Resolution, Resolução no. 
14/2003 de 4 de Abril, 2003, available at www.govnet.gov.mz/docs gov/fold 
politicas/turismo/politica turismo.pdf. 
 
South Africa 
SA Constitution, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 
1996, available at www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm. 
SA ECA, Environment Conservation Act, Act No. 73 of 1989, available at 
www.elaw.org/resources/text.asp?id=2339. 
SA GPCP, ”Green Paper: Towards Sustainable CoastalDevelopment in 
SouthAfrica,” 1998, available at www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1998/coastalpolicy.htm. 
MPA Governance: A Comparison 
178 
SA ICM Bill, National Environmental Management Act: Draft Integrated Coastal 
Management Bill, Legal Notice 1829 of 2006, available at 
www.info.gov.za/gazette/bills/2006/29476.pdf. 
SA MLRA, Marine Living Resources Act, Act No. 18 of 1998, available at 
www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a18–98.pdf. 
SA MZA, Maritime Zones Act, Act No. 15 of 1994, available at 
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ZAF 1994 Act.pdf. 
SA NEMA, National Environment Management Act, Act No. 107 of 1998, as 
amended by Act 46 of 2003, available at www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a107–98.pdf 
and at www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68023. 
SANEMA/BA, National Environmental Management:Biodiversity Act, Act No. 
10 of 2004, available at www.info.gov.za/acts/2004/a10–04/index.html. 
SA NEMA/ICMA, National Environment Management Act: Integrated Coastal 
Management Act, Act No. 24 of 2008, Government Gazette Vol. 524, No. 31884, 11 
February 2009. 
SA NEMA/PAA, National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act, Act 
No. 57 of 2003, available at www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2003/a57–03.pdf. 
SA NPA, National Parks Act, Act No. 57 of 1976, as amended, available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/. 
SA WHCA, World Heritage Convention Act, Act No. 49 of 1999, available at 
www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1999/a49–99.pdf. 
SA WPCP, “White Paper: Sustainable Coastal Development in South Africa,” 
2000, available at www.info.gov.za/documents/whitepapers/index.htm#2000. 
SA WPFP, “White Paper: Marine Fisheries Policy for South Africa,” 1997, 
available at www.info.gov.za/whitepapers/1997/marine.htm. 
 
Tanzania 
TZ Constitution, Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Act No. 
1 of 1977, available at www.parliament.go.tz/bunge/katiba/constitution.pdf. 
Chapter 5 
179 
TZ DSFA, Deep Sea Fishing Authority, 1998, Act No. 1 of 1998, available at 
www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/1-. 
TZ DSFA, Deep Sea Fishing Authority (Amendment) Act, 2007, Act No. 17 of 
2007, available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan78171.pdf. 
TZ EMA, Environmental Management Act, 2004, Act No. 20 of 2004, available 
at www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/20-2004.pdf. 
TZ FA, Forests Act, 2002, Act No. 14 of 2002, available at 
www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/14-2002.pdf. 
TZ FA 1970, Fisheries Act, Act No. 6 of 1970, available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan53037.pdf. 
TZ FA, Fisheries Act, 2003, Act No. 22 of 2003, available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan53024.pdf. 
TZ LGDAA, Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982, Act No. 7 of 
1982, available at www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/7-1982.pdf. 
TZ LGUAA, Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, 1982, Act No. 8 of 
1982, available at www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/8-1982.pdf. 
TZ MPRA, Marine Parks and Reserves Act, 1994, Act No. 29 of 1994, available 
at www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/29-1994.pdf. 
TZ MPRU, MPRU Strategic Plan for 2005–2009, 2005, available at 
www.marineparktz.com/pdf/strategic%20plan.pdf. 
TZ NICEMS, National Integrated Coastal Environment Management Strategy, 
2003, available at http://www.crc.uri.edu/download/TanzNatlStrategy.pdf. 
TZ NEP, National Environmental Policy, 1997, available at 
www.tanzania.go.tz/sectoralpol.htm#Environmental%20Policy. 
TZ NFP, National Forest Policy, 1998, available at 
www.tanzania.go.tz/sectoralpol.htm#Environmental%20Policy. 
TZ NFSP, National Fisheries Sector Policy and Strategy Statement, 1997, 
available at www.tanzania.go.tz/sectoralpol.htm#Environmental%20Policy. 
MPA Governance: A Comparison 
180 
TZ NLP, National Land Policy, 1995, available at 
www.tanzania.go.tz/sectoralpol.htm#Environmental%20Policy. 
TZ NPO, National Parks Ordinance, 1959, Ordinance No. 12 of 1959, available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/tan5350.pdf. 
TZ TCPO, Town and Country Planning Ordinance, 1956, Cap. 378, available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/. 
TZ TSEEZA, Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 1989, Act No. 3 
of 1989, available at 
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TZA1989Act.pdf. 
TZ VLA, Village Land Act, 1999, Act No. 5 of 1999, available at 
www.parliament.go.tz/Polis/PAMS/Docs/5–1999.pdf. 
Literature 
A. Chircop, “Competing Demands for Ocean Use,” in Maritime Security and 
Conflict Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. P. Haydon and A. Griffiths 
(Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada: 
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1994), 19–25. 
A. Chircop, A., and L. Hildebrand, “Beyond the Buzzwords: A Perspective on 
Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada,” in Towards Principled Oceans 
Governance: Australian and Canadian Approaches and Challenges, ed. Donald R. 
Rothwell and David L. VanderZwaag (London: Routledge, 2006), 19–71. 
P. Christie, and A. T. White, “Best Practices in Governance and Enforcement of 
Marine Protected Areas: an Overview,” in Report of the Workshop on the Role of MPAs 
in Fisheries Management, Rome, 12–14 June 2006, FAO Fisheries Report No. 825 
(Rome: FAO, 2006). 
B. Cicin-Sain, and S. Belfiore, “Linking Marine Protected Areas to Integrated 
Coastal and Ocean Management: A Review of Theory and Practice,” Ocean and Coastal 
Management 48 (2006): 847–868. 
B. Cicin-Sain, and R. Knecht, Integrated Coastal and Ocean Management: 
Concepts and Practices (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1998). 
Chapter 5 
181 
K. L. Cochrane, “Marine Protected Areas as Management Measures: Tools or 
Toys?” in Law, Science and Ocean Management, ed. M. H. Nordquist, R. Long, T. H. 
Heidar, and J. N. Moore (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 701–737. 
C. E. Ehler, special issue ed., “Integrating Management of Marine Protected Areas 
with Coastal and Ocean Governance: Principles and Practices,” Ocean and Coastal 
Management 48 (2006): 843–846. 
E. L. Miles, “Concepts, Approaches, and Applications in Sea Use Planning and 
Management,” Ocean Development and International Law 20 (1989): 213–238. 
European Union, Communication from the Commission. Roadmap for Maritime 
Spatial Planning: Achieving Common Principles in the EU, COM (2008) 791 Final, 25 
November 2008, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0791:FIN:EN:PDF. 
Fifth World Parks Congress, Vth World Parks Congress, Durban, South Africa, 8–
17 September 2003, Recommendations, WPC Rec 5.04, available at 
www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/wpc2003/english/outputs/intro.htm#key. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Report and 
Documentation of the Expert Workshop on Marine Protected Areas and Fisheries 
Management: Review of Issues and Considerations, Rome, 12–14 June 2006, FAO 
Fisheries Report No. 825 (Rome: FAO, 2006). 
J. Guerreiro, A. Chircop, D. Dzidzornu, C. Grilo, R. Van Der Elst, and A. Viras, 
“The Role of International Environmental Instruments in Enhancing Transboundary 
Marine Protected Areas: An Approach in East Africa,” unpublished TRANSMAP report 
on file with authors, 2009. 
C. Harness III, “Creating a Better Process to Resolve Environmental Disputes: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution.” In Seeking Balance: Conflict Resolution and 
Partnership, Conference Proceedings of the 15th International Conference of the Coastal 
Society, Seattle, Washington, 14–17 July 1996 (Alexandria, VA:, The Coastal Society, 
1996), 692–698. 
L. P. Hildebrand, ed., “Community-Based Coastal Management,” Ocean and 
Coastal Management (special issue) 36 (1997). 
MPA Governance: A Comparison 
182 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature/World Commission on 
Protected Areas (IUCN/WCPA), Establishing Marine Protected Area Networks—Making 
It Happen (Washington, DC: IUCN/WCPA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and The Nature Conservancy, 2008). 
D. M. Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary-Making (Ottawa, 
Ontario, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988). 
G. Kelleher, Guidelines for Marine Protected Areas, IUCN Best Practice 
Protected Area Guidelines Series No. 3 (Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK: 
IUCN/WCPA, 1999). 
R. O.Keohane, AfterHegemony:Cooperation and Discord in theWorld Political 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team (LEAT), Environmental Law Alliance 
Worldwide, “Access to Environmental Information in Tanzania,” LEAT Policy Brief, 
prepared by D. W. Ringia and S. J. Porter, April 1999, available at 
www.leat.or.tz/publications/access.to.information/access.to.information.pdf. 
J.-P. Levy, “A National Ocean Policy: An Elusive Quest,” Marine Policy 17 
(1993): 75–80. 
E. Mann Borgese, A. Chircop, and M. Pereira, “The Costs of Ratification of Part 
XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Ocean Yearbook 8 (1990): 1–17. 
E. Miles, “Future Challenges in Ocean Management: Towards Integrated National 
Ocean Policy,” in Ocean Management in Global Change, ed. P. Fabbri (London: 
Elsevier, 1992), 595–620. 
R. S. Pomeroy, J. E. Parks, and L. M. Watson, How Is Your MPA Doing: A 
Guidebook of Natural and Social Indicators for Evaluating Marine Protected Area 
Management Effectiveness (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN/World Conservation Union, 
2004). 
Ramsar Secretariat, “The Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance,” 
2007, available at www.ramsar.org/index list.htm. 
R. V. Salm, J. R. Clark, and E. Siirla, Marine and Coastal Protected Areas: A 
Guide for Planners and Managers, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: IUCN/World Conservation 
Union, 2000). 
Chapter 5 
183 
J. Sanders, and K. L. Cochrane, 2006. The “Rise” of Marine Protected Areas as a 
Tool in an Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management Environment (Rome: FAO, 2006). 
South Africa, “South Africa’s 20th Marine Protected Area,” 14 October 2008, 
available at www.southafrica.info/about/sustainable/stilbaai-141008.htm. 
A. Underdal, “Integrated Marine Policy: What? Why? How?” 14 Marine Policy 
14 (1980): 159-169. 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization/World Heritage 
Centre (UNESCO/WHC), World Heritage List, 2007, available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/. 
United Nations Environment Programme/World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
(UNEP/WCMC), National and Regional Networks of Marine Protected Areas: A Review 
of Progress (Cambridge: UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, 2008), available 
at www.unepwcmc.org/oneocean/pdf/MPA%20report%20FINAL.pdf. 
S. M. Vallejo, “Integrated Marine Policies: Goals and Constraints,” in Ocean 
Management in Global Change, ed. P. Fabbri (London: Elsevier, 1992), 153–168. 
R. P. Van Der Elst, G. M. Branch, D. Butterworth, P. A.Wickens, and K. 
Cochrane, 1997. “How Can Fisheries Resources be Allocated. . .Who Owns the Fish?” In 
2nd World Fisheries Congress: Developing and Sustaining World Fisheries Resources: 
The State of Science and Management, Brisbane, Australia, 28 July-2 August 1996, ed. D. 
A. Hancock et al. (Collingwood, Australia: CSIRO Publishing, 1997), 307–314. 
J. A. Wall, and A. Lynn, “Mediation: A Current Review,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 37 (1993): 160–194. 
S. Wells, N. Burgess, and A. Ngusaru, “Towards the 2012 Marine Protected Area 
Targets in Eastern Africa,” Ocean and Coastal Management 50 (2007): 67–83. 
World Conservation Congress, Resolutions and Recommendations, World 
Conservation Congress, Barcelona, 5–14 October 2008, Resolutions 4.045 Accelerating 
Progress to Establish Marine Protected Areas and Creating Marine Protected Area 
Networks, 2008, available at http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/WCC-4th-005.pdf. 
World Resources Institute, Reefs at Risk in the Caribbean (Washington, DC: 
World Resources Institute, 2004). 
MPA Governance: A Comparison 
184 
World Summit on Sustainable Development, “Plan of Implementation of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development,” in Report of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August–4 September 2002, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002). 
World Wildlife Federation (WWF), “WWF Eastern African Marine Ecoregion,” 
in The Eastern African Marine Ecoregion Vision: A Large Scale Conservation Approach 
to the Management of Biodiversity (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: WWF, 2004). 
 
 
                                                 
NOTES 
i
 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 142. 
ii
 Convention on Biological Diversity, COP 7, Kuala Lumpur, 9–20 February 2004, 
Decision VII/28, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/results/?id=7742&kw=2012&l0= MAR&l3=COP-
07&t0=2012. 
iii
 An MPA network is understood as “a collection of individual MPAs or reserves 
operating cooperatively and synergistically, at various spatial scales, and with a range of 
protection levels that are designed to meet objectives that a single reserve cannot achieve” 
(IUCN/WCPA 2008, at 11). A Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) workshop on MPAs in fisheries management considered the concept of “network” 
at three levels: “at a minimum, more than one MPA; more usefully, a collection of MPAs 
either as representative networks and/or with some degree of connectivity which could be 
ecological or social, including sharing of governance resources; ideally, a synergistic 
system of MPAs with the ‘whole greater than the sum of the parts’ relative to objectives” 
(FAO 2006, at 5). 
iv
 Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African 
Region, 21 June 1985, available at sedac.ciesin.org/entri/texts/EastAfrPro.html. 
v
 A transboundary MPA is understood as an MPA that is jointly established by 
neighboring states and whose area straddles their common maritime boundary. In the 
absence of a delimited maritime boundary, the transboundary MPA may cover areas 
(whether in dispute or not) where a maritime boundary might be potentially delimited. 
vi
 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 2 
February 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245. 
vii
 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 
November 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151. 
Chapter 5 
185 
                                                                                                                                                  
viii
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
396. The conditions and procedure for the adoption of special mandatory measures are set 
out in art. 211(6). 
ix
 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 1. 
x
 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 23 June 1979, 
1651 U.N.T.S. 355. 
xi
 Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds, 16 June 
1995, U.K.T.S. 2003 No. 13. 
xii
 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2 November 2001, 
41 I.L.M. 40. This convention entered into force on 2 January 2009. 
xiii
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 
March 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. 
xiv
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified 
by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto, 17 February 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61. 
xv
 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 December 1946, 161 
U.N.T.S. 73. 
xvi
 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter, 29 December 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 137. 
xvii
 Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 21 
May 1997, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st sess., 99th mtg., UN Doc A/RES/51/229. 
xviii
 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 
30 November 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 77. 
xix
 Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and 
Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region (Nairobi Convention), [1986] O.J.C. 
253/10, 46 I.E.L.M.T. 985. 
xx
 Nairobi Wildlife Protocol, supra note 4. 
xxi
 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 33. 
xxii
 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, 3 June 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241. 
xxiii
 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 17 August 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116. 
xxiv
 Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement, 18 August 1999, available 
at http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page id=protocols wildlife. 
xxv
 Southern African Development Community Protocol on Fisheries, 14 August 2001, 
available at http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page id=protocols fisheries—0 
(21 August 2005). 
xxvi
 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 15 
September 1968, 1001 U.N.T.S. 3. 
xxvii
 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 11 July 
2003, available at http://www.africa-union.org/Official documents/Treaties Conventions 
Protocols/ nature and natural recesource.pdf. 
xxviii
 Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal 
Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, 8 September 1994, 1950 U.N.T.S. 35. 
xxix
 For example, in the two border regions considered candidates for transboundary 
MPAs in this article, there are well-established domestic MPAs: Tanzania, Mnazi Bay; 
Mozambique, Quirimbas and Inhaca Island; and South Africa, iSimangaliso. 
xxx
 Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe on the 
Establishment of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, 9 December 2002, available at 
MPA Governance: A Comparison 
186 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.tbpa.net/docs/treaties MOUs/GreatLimpopo 
InternationalTreatyFinalNov2002.pdf. 
xxxi
 General Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol Between the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Government of the Republic of 
Mozambique and the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland, 22 June 2000, available 
at http://www.scribd.com/doc/6805890/LTFCAGeneral-Protocol-Signed-on-22-June-
2000. 
xxxii
 Bilateral Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Botswana and the 
Republic of South Africa on the Recognition of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, 7 April 
1999, available at http://www.tbpa.net/docs/treaties MOUs/KgalagadiAgreement.pdf. 
xxxiii
 Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of Namibia and the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa on the Establishment of the [|Ai-|Ais/Richtersveld] 
Transfrontier Park, 1 August 2003, available at http://www.tbpa.net/docs/treaties 
MOUs/TFP AIAIS-RICHTERVELD.pdf. 
xxxiv
 Tripartite Interim Agreement Between the Republic of Mozambique and the 
Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland for Co-operation on the 
Protection and Sustainable Utilisation of the Water Resources of the Incomati and 
Maputo Watercourses, 29 August 2002, available at faolex.fao.org/cgi-bin/faolex.exe?rec 
id=029794&database=FAOLEX&search type= link&table=result&lang=eng&format 
name=@ERALL. 
xxxv
 South African Development Community Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses, 7 
August 2000, 40 I.L.M. 317. 
xxxvi
 World Heritage Convention, supra note 7. 
xxxvii
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, supra note 13. 
xxxviii
 Nairobi Convention, supra note 19. 
xxxix
 Two of these, although coastal, are cultural sites: Stone Town of Zanzibar, a historic 
Swahili coastal trading center; and the Ruins of Kilwa Kisiwani and Songo Mnara, 
consisting of remains of historic East African ports dating back to the thirteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. 
xl
 CBD COP7 Decision, supra note 2. 
xli
 UNCLOS, supra note 8. 
xlii
 Ibid., arts. 5–14. 
xliii
 Agreement Between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique Regarding the 
Tanzania/Mozambique Boundary, 28 December 1988, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/T
ZA-MOZ1988TM.PDF. 
xliv
 UNCLOS, supra note 8, Art. 15. 
xlv
 Writing on ocean policy analysis, Underdal and Miles proposed four key questions; 
namely, What do we want? What should we want given our biophysical conditions? 
Why? How do we get there and what are we prepared to pay to get there? (Underdal 
1980; Miles 1992). This analytical approach is also applicable to analysis of MPA 
policies. 
xlvi
 At the end of 2008, none of the three states ranked in the “high human development” 
category of the Human Development Index. South Africa (125) and Tanzania (152) are in 
the medium rank, and Mozambique (175) is in the low development rank, out of 179. 
UNDP, Human Development Reports (2008), available at hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
Chapter 5 
187 
                                                                                                                                                  
xlvii
 A distinction is maintained between marine parks and marine reserves. A marine 
reserve is an area where some resource use is permitted, but subject to restrictions. A 
marine park is a type of reserve where community use and habitation are permitted on the 
basis of a strict zonation scheme and participatory management. Marine Parks and 
Reserves, Tanzania, available at www.marineparktz.com/faq.htm. 
xlviii
 Tsistikamma National Park in South Africa was proclaimed as an MPA (marine 
national park) in 1964. It is a no-take zone and extends seaward by 5 kilometers to 
include intertidal life, reefs, and deep sea fish. South Africa National Parks, available at 
http://www.sanparks.org/parks/tsitsikamma/tourism/history.php. 
xlix
 As reported by Ministério para a Coordenação da Acção Ambiental, Centro de 
Desenvolvimento Sustentável para as Zonas Costeiras, available at 
http://www.zonascosteiras.gov.mz/article.php3?id article=5. 
 
  
Chapter 6 
189 
6. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS 
Guerreiro, J., Chircop, A., Dzidzornu, D., GRILO, C., Ribeiro, R., van der Elst, R. and 
Viras, A. (2011). "The Role of International Environmental Instruments in Enhancing 
Transboundary Marine Protected Areas: An Approach in East Africa", Marine Policy 
35(2):95-104. 
 
Abstract: The increasing degradation of marine ecosystems has led to multiple calls for 
greater protection through the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs). If created 
at the ecosystem or ecoregion level, MPAs will likely straddle maritime boundaries and 
therefore necessitate international cooperation. International environmental law and 
international law of the sea may facilitate cooperation between States in creating 
transboundary MPAs. The extent to which this body of law is actually or potentially 
useful for the establishment of transboundary MPAs is examined in the context of the 
East African Marine Ecoregion, focusing on Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania. A 
general survey and assessment of the applicable global, regional, and bilateral instruments 
in relation to the three States is conducted. Although some global instruments are relevant 
in the East African context, regional and bilateral instruments are more conducive to the 
establishment of transboundary MPAs. The article concludes that although a trilateral 
agreement between Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania would be an ideal vehicle 
for the establishment of a transboundary network of MPAs addressing both national and 
ecoregional conservation interests, a separate solution at each border will be the first step 
towards this goal. 
Keywords: transboundary marine protected areas, International environmental 
instruments, East African marine ecoregion. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Global nature conservation met a turning point with the adoption of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 1992 (CBD) [1], which calls for in situ protection. CBD goals 
include the range conservation of at least 10% of the world’s ecological regions by 2010, 
while the target date for marine protected areas (MPAs) is 2012 [2]. Adopted under the 
CBD, the Jakarta Mandate [3] further commits State Parties to the conservation of marine 
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and coastal biodiversity. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
called for a global representative system of MPAs at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) [4], reinforcing the Jakarta Mandate [5]. Nonetheless, the spatial 
extent of marine conservation efforts amounts to less than 1% of the total marine surface 
[6].  
These figures suggest that greater efforts at national and international levels are 
needed for MPA targets to be met. In marine ecoregions and large marine ecosystems 
(LMEs)21 straddling inter-state terrestrial and maritime boundaries, the lack of a shared 
common approach and strategy concerning marine biodiversity conservation is partly 
responsible for the poor record to date. International organizations recognize that the road 
towards a “global representative system” depends on international cooperation, at least at 
the level of the ecoregion.22 Transboundary conservation23 mechanisms such as 
transboundary MPAs,24 particularly transboundary networks of MPAs,25 have the 
potential to assist States in meeting these international marine conservation targets.26 
International environmental law and the international law of the sea can be expected to 
facilitate cooperation between States in establishing transboundary MPAs.  
This article examines these marine conservation issues in the context of the East 
African marine ecoregion (EAME), involving Mozambique, South Africa, and 
                                                 
21
 Sherman [7] defines LMEs as “relatively large regions on the order of 200,000 km2 or larger, 
characterized by distinct bathymetry, hydrography, productivity, and trophically dependent populations”. 
22
 The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) defines an ecoregion as “a geographic area that contains a distinct 
assemblage of natural communities sharing a large majority of species, dynamics, and environmental 
conditions, and which functions effectively as a conservation unit” [8]. 
23
 The first transboundary protected area was established in 1932, the Waterton-Glacier International Peace 
Park, between the United States and Canada, and comprises previously established national parks in each 
State. 
24
 Hereinafter, references to transboundary MPAs include transboundary networks of MPAs unless 
otherwise specified. 
25
 A network of MPAs is “a collection of individual MPAs or reserves operating cooperatively and 
synergistically, at various spatial scales, and with a range of protection levels that are designed to meet 
objectives that a single reserve cannot achieve” [9]. A transboundary network of MPAs straddles 
international maritime boundaries; however, the individual MPAs within the network may lie entirely on 
either side of the maritime boundary. 
26
 Sandwith et al. [10] define a transboundary protected area as “An area of land/or sea that straddles one or 
more boundaries between states, sub-national units such as provinces and regions, autonomous areas and/or 
areas beyond the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, whose constituting parts are especially 
dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological biodiversity, and of natural and associated 
cultural resources, and managed cooperatively through legal and other effective means”. 
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Tanzania.27 Currently, there are initiatives to establish transboundary networks of MPAs 
involving Mozambique and Tanzania, and Mozambique and South Africa (hereinafter 
referred to as the transboundary sites). Three main questions are considered: (i) What 
elements of global, regional, and bilateral legal instruments potentially support the 
implementation of transboundary networks of MPAs in the transboundary sites?; (ii) To 
what extent do these instruments apply to the three States?; and (iii) How can applicable 
instruments support the establishment and management of transboundary networks of 
MPAs? The usefulness of these instruments and the East African record in their regard 
are assessed from the perspective of their relevance for the establishment of 
transboundary MPAs in the EAME. 
2. THE CONTEXT 
2.1. The Eastern African marine ecoregion 
The EAME includes areas considered to be in near-pristine condition. It extends for over 
4.600 km and covers an estimated 540.900 km2, including the 200 nautical mile (nm) 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South 
Africa. The ecoregion directly supports 21.5 million people who depend on goods and 
benefits from the coastal zone [6]. However, several habitats and species are under heavy 
pressure, including mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass beds, dugongs, turtles, and sharks.28 
Protection of these habitats and species has become the focus of international attention 
and cooperation, making EAME a priority area for transboundary networks of MPAs. The 
region has a long history of marine environmental protection initiatives at the national 
level, e.g., Inhaca and the Portuguese Islands MPAs (Mozambique, 1965); Tsitsikamma 
National Park (South Africa, 1968); Watamu Marine National Park and Malindi-Watamu 
Marine National Reserve (Kenya, 1968); and Dar es Salaam Reserves (Tanzania, 1975) 
[12].  
It appears that Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique are well on the road to meeting 
the CBD target, with Kenya having designated 8.7% of its continental shelf as a MPA, 
                                                 
27
 This study was carried out under the EU Project “Transboundary networks of marine protected areas for 
integrated conservation and sustainable development: biophysical, socio-economic and governance 
assessment in East Africa” (TRANS- MAP), INCO-CT2004-510862. 
28
 Sharks and other fished species (mackerel, small pelagic fish, lobsters, and shrimps) are likely to be 
transboundary [11]. 
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Tanzania 7.7%, and Mozambique 4% [13]. In 2003, Tanzania committed to expanding its 
marine protected areas to 10% by 2010 [13]. Mozambique has also declared its intention 
to implement transboundary reserves with South Africa (which is the present situation) 
and Tanzania. South Africa recently claimed that 15% of its coast is covered by MPAs as 
a result of the declaration of four MPAs in 2004 [14].  
2.2. The border areas  
Transboundary site-specific features, such as geography, ecological concerns, socio-
economic dynamics, and jurisdictional matters, collectively define the conditions for 
transboundary MPA-making efforts.29 As the “middle State”, Mozambique is key to the 
creation of a regional transboundary MPA network. The challenge remains to develop 
cooperative transboundary conservation mechanisms, as well as to ensure connectivity 
and effective management. 
The Ruvuma River defines the border between Mozambique and Tanzania (Fig.1). 
A natural frontier, local communities freely cross the river and families have cross-border 
ethnic and kinship ties. In Tanzania, the Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park 
(MBREMP) is located across from the border with Mozambique, while the Quirimbas 
National Park (QNP) in Mozambique is 175 km distant from the border. Essentially an 
archipelagic configuration, this area is well-known for its high tropical biodiversity as 
well as the presence of vulnerable biota including coral reefs, sea turtles, humpback 
whales, dolphins (bottlenose, humpback, spinner, and spotted), and dugongs. Tourism, a 
growing economic force on the islands, threatens to exclude fishermen from traditional 
productive sites. Fishing is often a transboundary activity.  
The Mozambique and South Africa border area, characterised by some of the 
world’s highest coastal sand dunes and sandy beaches, stretches from Maputo Bay to 
Ponta do Ouro and further down to the iSimangaliso Wetland Park (IWP, formerly 
Greater St. Lucia Wetland Park) (Fig. 2).30 Wetlands, including Lake St. Lucia, arguably 
comprise the largest estuarine system in Africa. Coral reefs here are amongst the most 
southerly in the world. Coelacanth populations in the IWP alone justify the existence of 
an MPA as the area provides ideal habitats. Sea turtles, mainly loggerhead and 
                                                 
29
 The TRANSMAP Project analyzed and published reports on each of these aspects. 
30
 Kosi Bay and the GSLWP are less than 20 and 150 km, respectively, from the border with Mozambique. 
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leatherback, nest on the sandy beaches between Mabibi and Kosi in South Africa, and 
from Ponta do Ouro to Inhaca Island in Mozambique.  
Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve, with an area of 678 km2, was declared by 
Decree no. 42/2009, for the “preservation and protection of marine and coastal species 
and their habitats” [15]. Stretching 3 nm into the Indian Ocean, its long sandy beaches 
and coral reefs provide an important feeding area for turtles, dugongs, and migratory 
birds. It is considered one of the eight key biodiversity sites (seascapes) of global 
importance within EAME [16].  
Cetaceans are either seasonal migrants, e.g., humpback whales, or semi-resident 
populations, e.g., humpback and bottlenose dolphins. Whale sharks also live in this 
transboundary area. Saw fish, once common, are now considered critically endangered 
[17], and recent studies treat this species as extinct in South African waters. As in the 
north border area, tourism is an economic driver with the Lubombo Tourism Route, 
proposed under the Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative, expected to attract 1.4 
million tourists to the transboundary area by 2010 [18]. 
2.3. Maritime zones and boundaries 
Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania have established maritime zones and 
boundaries in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
1982 (UNCLOS) [19]. Mozambique and South Africa have delineated straight baselines 
(in addition to the normal baseline based on the low watermark); Tanzania has only 
adopted the normal baseline. All three States have declared 12 nm territorial seas. Both 
Mozambique and South Africa claim a 24 nm contiguous zone, which South Africa also 
considers as a maritime cultural zone for the protection of objects of an archaeological or 
historical nature. For no clear reason, Tanzania has not exercised its right to declare a 
contiguous zone. Each State has declared a 200 nm EEZ. Both Mozambique and South 
Africa have enacted continental shelf legislation consistent with UNCLOS. Tanzanian 
legislation only refers to the EEZ.  
The maritime boundary between Mozambique and Tanzania has been long settled 
by treaty [20]. The potential boundary between Mozambique and South Africa remains 
undelimited. 
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Figure 1 - Border area between Mozambique and Tanzania (Source: adapted from Transmap Internet 
MapServer (http://internal.bio3.pt/transmap/default.asp, as of 21 April 2009)). Description: Fig.1 shows the 
northern border area, with the terrestrial boundary between the two countries defined by the Ruvuma river. 
Existing MPAs are also shown, namely the MBREMP in Tanzania, located immediately across from the 
border with Mozambique, and the QNP in Mozambique, which is 175 km distant from the border. Legend: 
MBREMP—Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park. QNP—Quirimbas National Park. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Border area between Mozambique and South Africa (Source: adapted from Transmap Internet 
MapServer (http://internal.bio3.pt/transmap/default.asp, as of 21 April 2009)). Description: Fig.2 shows the 
southern border area, between Mozambique and South Africa. Existing MPAs are also shown, namely the 
IINR and the POPMR, in Mozambique and the IWP in South Africa. Legend: IINR—Inhaca Island Natural 
Reserve. IWP—iSimangaliso Wetland Park (formerly Greater St. Lucia Wetland Park, GSLWP). 
POPMR—Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve. 
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2.4. Existing MPAs 
There are no “real” transboundary networks of MPAs, or transboundary MPAs (with joint 
administration) between the three States.31 However, each State has taken steps at a 
national level to further a “transboundary approach”.  
In 2000, Tanzania established the MBREMP, and its general management plan 
was approved in 2005. In 2003, Mozambique established Quirimbas National Park 
(QNP), with 20% of its 750.639 ha comprised of marine and island habitats. This effort 
was complemented by the expansion of an old MPA (Bazaruto National Park), which 
became one of the largest in the region. Mozambique and Tanzania have identified 
establishment of transboundary MPAs as a priority activity of Tanzania’s Marine and 
Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP) [22]. Mozambique is also 
sponsoring studies on the framework and action plan for a transfrontier conservation area 
between Mozambique and Tanzania (Mtwara-Quirimbas Complex).32  
On the southern border, South Africa has long-established IWP. Mozambique’s 
Inhaca Island Natural Reserve is one of Africa’s oldest MPAs. In 2000, the two countries 
concluded a protocol to establish the Lubombo Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Marine and 
Coastal Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area (TFCRA) [24].33 The most recent 
MPA, established in August 2009, the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve, includes the 
Inhaca and Portuguese islands and the Maputo Special Reserve. In October 2009, a 
transboundary MPA was declared under the Lubombo Protocol. This transboundary area 
extends 300 km, from Maputo Bay in Mozambique, to Cape St. Lucia in South Africa 
(the southern boundary of the IWP), linking the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve to 
IWP. Thus, national protected areas at their respective borders form this transboundary 
                                                 
31
 Effective transboundary MPAs or networks of MPAs would provide: (i) a joint management team or 
commission from the States involved; (ii) a common/ single management plan with common goals; and (iii) 
a commitment to pursue similar regulations on each side of the border(s). A joint declaration supporting a 
transboundary MPA, together with the creation of MPAs on each side of the border and transfrontier task 
teams, are usually the first steps in establishing a transboundary MPA network. These aspects are analyzed 
in another article [21]. 
32
 This includes Mnazi Bay, the Ruvuma Delta, Mocimboa da Praia, Pemba Bay, and Quirimbas 
Archipelago as well as economic development initiatives (e.g., the Mtwara Corridor Development Project) 
[23]. 
33
 This is one of five protocols under the 2000 General Trans-Frontier Conservation and Resource Area 
Protocol between Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland. This general protocol defines a TFCRA as a 
“geographical area divided by one or more international political borders, which is identified by two or 
more of the Parties (...) to be subject to TFCRA management”. 
International Environmental Instruments 
196 
MPA. Finally, the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, established by a 2002 trilateral 
treaty with Zimbabwe, also contributes to transboundary conservation in this region [25]. 
3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MARINE PROTECTED AREAS 
Global, regional, and bilateral legal instruments can facilitate the establishment of MPAs 
in East Africa at three levels:  
(1) providing for the establishment of PAs (and by inference, MPAs);  
(2) providing measures and tools that facilitate the establishment and/or management of 
MPAs; and  
(3) setting out a framework conducive to the establishment and management of MPAs, 
e.g., environmental protection. 
3.1. Global instruments 
3.1.1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
All three States are Parties to UNCLOS. UNCLOS includes general provisions such as 
unity of the oceans, an integrated approach to marine conservation and management, as 
well as provisions for international cooperation.  
Although Part XII on the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
emphasizes global and regional cooperation, it does not specifically address MPAs. 
Article 194(5) [26], however, calls on States to adopt measures that form the basis for 
MPAs, namely “to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of 
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life.”  
Other UNCLOS provisions, e.g., Article 21(1), allow a coastal State to establish 
standards for international shipping in the vicinity of or within MPAs in conformity with 
UNCLOS and the international standards adopted through the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) [27]. For exceptionally sensitive marine areas, Article 211(6) further 
provides that States can ask IMO to adopt special mandatory measures for the prevention 
of pollution from international shipping within an area of their EEZ.  
Within the EEZ, coastal States have rights over, inter alia, living marine resources 
(Article56(1)). Articles 63 and 64 facilitate the conservation and management of 
straddling stocks and highly migratory species through appropriate regional organisations.  
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The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries further promotes sustainable 
fishing practices in marine waters [28].  
3.1.2. Convention on biological diversity (CBD) 
The CBD [1] and the Jakarta Mandate framework for a systemic approach to the 
establishment and management of marine PAs is consistent with the provisions 
UNCLOS. As States Parties to the CBD, the three States are obliged, “as far as possible 
and as appropriate, [to] establish a system of protected areas or areas where special 
measures need to be undertaken to conserve biological diversity” (Article8(a)), including 
the transboundary areas discussed here. The 2004 Principles and Guidelines for the 
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity (the Addis Ababa Principles) [29], call on States sharing 
transboundary resources to engage in joint ecosystem management and decision-making 
arrangements (Practical Principle 7) and to adopt cooperative bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements where habitats and/or resources straddle two or more States (Practical 
Principle 8). 
3.1.3. Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat 
(Ramsar Convention) 
The Ramsar Convention [30] supports the establishment of MPAs in coastal wetlands 
with mangroves, coral reefs, and seagrass beds. Of the 25 Ramsar sites in these three 
State Parties, four are located in the border area of South Africa.34  
Ramsar calls on State Parties to cooperate in managing transboundary wetlands 
and to coordinate policies where watercourses exist [31]. Resolution VIII.32 elaborates 
on State Parties’ plans for conservation, integrated management, and sustainable use of 
mangrove ecosystems and their resources [32]. Ramsar also promotes regional strategies 
for mangrove conservation, supporting the three States’ efforts to coordinate habitat 
conservation. Finally, Ramsar Resolution VIII.44 addresses the integration of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)35 and Ramsar in Africa [35], particularly 
in the transboundary context. 
                                                 
34
 The four Ramsar sites are St. Lucia System, Kosi Bay, Lake Sibaya, and Turtle Beaches/Coral Reefs of 
Tongaland. 
35
 The African Union adopted the NEPAD programme for social and economic development in Africa in 
2002 [33]. Ramsar Resolution VIII.44 calls on African Contracting Parties to use NEPAD to implement the 
Ramsar Strategic Plan [34], in particular, transboundary initiatives 
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3.1.4. Convention on the conservation of migratory species of wild Animals (CMS)  
The CMS provides for international cooperation in the protection of particular migratory 
species and their habitat, especially those listed in its two appendices [36]. Appendix 1 
marine species found in the two transboundary sites include humpback and blue whales, 
and green, hawksbill, olive ridley, loggerhead, and leatherback turtles. Under the CMS, 
the duties of “range States” for these species include conservation, restoration and 
protection of habitat and migratory routes, as well as limitations on exploitation with 
exceptions accommodating traditional subsistence users. State Parties are to “endeavour 
to conclude” conservation and management agreements for Appendix II species, which 
include dugongs, humpback dolphins, and whale sharks (Article 2(3)(c)). Mozambique, 
Tanzania, and South Africa are range States for one or more of the listed species, and all 
three are Parties to the CMS.  
Three species-specific CMS agreements are relevant for the two transboundary 
sites. A transboundary MPA network could contribute to the conservation and habitat 
protection goals of the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory 
Waterbirds, 1995 (AEWA) [37,38] for listed species such as the African open bill 
(Anastomus lamelligerus) and African spoon bill (Platalea alba). Only Mozambique is 
not a Party to the AEWA.  
All three States are signatories to a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
concerning conservation and management of marine turtles and their habitats (IOSEA 
MoU) [39], which calls for regional and international cooperation “in the establishment of 
transboundary marine protected areas using ecological rather than political boundaries” 
for listed species. A similar MoU concerning dugongs [40] integrates the CMS and 
CITES lists and emphasises “ecosystem-based management (e.g., networks of marine 
protected areas)” (Objective 3). Like the IOSEA MoU, transboundary MPAs that 
prioritise ecological boundaries are encouraged (Objective 6). Of the three countries, only 
Tanzania is a signatory. 
3.1.5. Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora 
(CITES) 
A transboundary network of MPAs in the East Africa region would meet CITES calls for 
State Parties to cooperate in combating the illegal trade in endangered species, a problem 
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experienced by each of the States considered here. The three States are Parties to CITES 
[41]. 
3.1.6. International convention for the regulation of whaling (ICRW) 
ICRW [42] was one of the earliest international agreements to call for the establishment 
of MPAs by providing for the adoption of “regulations with respect to the conservation 
and utilisation of whale resources, fixing open and closed waters, including the 
designation of sanctuary areas” (Article V,1) [43]. The EAME region has at least 39 
species of cetaceans, including the highly vulnerable blue whale [44] and vulnerable 
species such as humpback, Bryde’s, and southern right whales. In addition, several 
cetaceans are threatened through interactions with commercial fisheries. However, only 
South Africa is a Party to the ICRW. Mozambique and Tanzania would need to make a 
political commitment to cooperate with each other and South Africa and designate 
sanctuaries in the two transboundary sites for ICRW to support transboundary 
conservation in this region. 
3.1.7. Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage 
(WHC) 
The WHC [45] could provide another level of protection to cultural and natural heritage 
sites in the transboundary area as all three States are Parties. Where natural heritage sites 
are already established, future MPAs in those areas would benefit from the heritage 
protection. Prior to the declaration of the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve, 
Mozambique made a submission to the World Heritage Committee for its inclusion on the 
World Heritage List.36 Mozambique has also submitted the Quirimbas Archipelago for 
inclusion on the World Heritage List.37 The IWP, a designated South African natural 
heritage site since 1999, is a candidate for inclusion in a transboundary network of MPAs 
between Mozambique and South Africa. If the Ponta do Ouro Reserve is designated, 
together with IWP, it would form Africa’s first transboundary marine World Heritage Site 
[47]. 
                                                 
36
 Submitted on 28th August, 2008, under the Criteria (vii) and (x) and Category “Natural” (Ref.:5382) by 
the Mozambique National Directorate for Culture, Ministry of Education and Culture [16]. 
37
 Submitted on 28th August, 2008, under the Criteria (ii), (iv) and (x) and Category “Mixed” (Ref.:5380) 
[46]. 
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3.1.8. International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships (MARPOL) 
MARPOL [48] Annexes I, II, and V provide for the designation of “special areas” by 
IMO for the prevention of sea pollution [49]. MARPOL includes provisions that would 
constitute an important tool for the protection of the marine environment within an MPA 
and give international status to those areas [50]. All three East African States are Parties 
to MARPOL, but not to all five of its annexes. Mozambique and Tanzania are Parties to 
Annexes I–V inclusive; South Africa is Party to all except Annex IV. Currently, there are 
no special areas in the two transboundary sites; the nearest, designated under Annex 1, is 
further south in South Africa [51].  
Separately from MARPOL, but also through the IMO, MPAs in a transboundary 
network could be designated as a particularly sensitive sea area (PSSA) where further 
shipping control measures might apply, such as navigation routing and certain areas to be 
avoided [52,53]. Additional measures concerning the safety of navigation may be 
permissible under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
(SOLAS) [54]. Although there are no PSSAs in African waters, a PSSA layered over an 
existing MPA would assist East African States with the management of transboundary 
MPAs, as has been demonstrated in the Wadden Sea. 
3.1.9. Other instruments 
Other international instruments could play a complementary role to MPA-making and 
management in one of two ways. First, there are instruments that can appropriately be 
described as contextual. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[55], together with the Kyoto Protocol [56], is one example to which all three States are 
Parties. Actions taken to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions 
indirectly benefit an MPA. At the same time, an MPA builds resilience in ecosystems so 
they can adapt to climate and related physical change [57]. The Convention on the Law of 
the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses [58], addresses non-navigational 
uses of rivers based on the principle of equitable utilisation [59], including protection of 
the downstream marine environment and estuaries, nevertheless only South Africa is a 
Party.  
The global programme of action for the protection of the marine environment 
from land-based activities (GPA) [60] combats this significant problem through 
integrated coastal management (ICM) [61]. The programme includes marine pollution 
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and legal framework assessments and an initiative to develop a new land-based marine 
pollution protocol under the Nairobi Convention of the East African Regional Seas 
Programme [62].  
A second category of international instruments are those controlling vessel source 
pollution. Reference has already been made to SOLAS and MARPOL. The International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) [63] 
provides a framework for joint oil spill contingency planning and response in combating 
accidental pollution. Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa are Parties to OPRC. 
Similarly a transboundary MPA network could benefit from the cooperative regulation of 
dumping of wastes in or in the vicinity of protected areas under the London Convention 
[64]. Tanzania and South Africa are Parties; however, only South Africa is a Party to its 
1996 Protocol [65].  
3.2. Regional instruments 
3.2.1. African convention for the conservation of nature and natural resources 
This convention [66] was adopted to preserve the unique biodiversity of Africa and to 
enhance human well-being. However, it has little to say about transboundary cooperation 
and simply provides a brief reference to bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Article 
XVI). Tanzania and Mozambique are Parties, but South Africa has not yet ratified it. The 
Convention was revised following the WSSD to provide for cooperative management of 
transboundary resources or ecosystems through the establishment of inter-State 
commissions [67]. Although not yet in force, and none of the three States have ratified it, 
Tanzania and Mozambique signed the revised Convention which sets the ground for more 
localized approaches to marine conservation. 
3.2.2. Eastern African regional programme (EARP)  
Since 1980, the EARP [68] has worked with relevant United Nations agencies and 
governments in the management and conservation of the resources of the region [69]. 
Four legal instruments shape marine conservation initiatives in the region: (i) the Action 
Plan for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the Eastern African Region (Eastern African Action Plan); (ii) the 
Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal 
Environment of the Eastern African Region,1985 (Nairobi Convention); (iii) the Protocol 
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Concerning Cooperation in Combating Marine Pollution in Cases of Emergency in the 
Eastern African Region, 1985 (Marine Pollution Protocol); and (iv) the Protocol 
Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African Region, 
1985 (Protected Areas Protocol). A new protocol concerning pollution from land-based 
activities is under development.  
EARP has been criticized for not setting outcomes or standards to be met by State 
Parties. Nevertheless, elements of the Action Plan support the establishment of 
transboundary MPAs, particularly those strengthening the ability of governments to adopt 
environmental management policies through cooperation in establishing protected areas, 
training, and mapping (Article 9).  
The Nairobi Convention [70], together with its two protocols, is the only regional 
legal instrument to specifically address marine conservation issues. The Convention sets 
out measures for the establishment of protected areas in marine and coastal habitats and 
for the reduction and avoidance of marine pollution. The stipulation for the individual or 
joint establishment of “specially protected areas” opens the way for transboundary 
conservation initiatives. All three States have ratified the Convention and both of the 
Protocols.  
The Marine Pollution Protocol [71] addresses marine pollution and recommends 
the adoption of bilateral or multilateral sub-regional agreements to give effect to its 
provisions (Article 8). Such actions include contingency plans within MPAs or an MPA 
network, or communication mechanisms between MPA authorities and the responsible 
national authority.  
The Protected Areas Protocol [72] is the keystone of the Nairobi instruments 
insofar as MPAs are concerned. It calls for measures to “maintain essential ecological 
processes and life support systems” (Article 2), including the development of national 
conservation strategies and management plans (Article 5). Article 10 obliges State Parties 
to take individual or joint measures to preserve rare and fragile ecosystems and species. 
The Protocol lists flora (Annex I), fauna (Annex II), harvestable species of wild fauna 
(Annex III), and migratory species (Annex IV) that require a level of special protection, 
including dugongs, humpback and blue whales, and several marine turtle species. More 
importantly, it provides a potential legal basis for the creation of transboundary PAs in 
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East Africa.38 In particular, Article 13 on Frontier Protected Areas establishes a duty for 
State Parties wishing to establish a PA in an area contiguous to the frontier of another 
State to engage in consultation with that State and, inter alia, “examine the possibility of 
establishment by the other Party of a corresponding protected area or buffer area.” 
3.2.3. Treaty establishing the African economic community and related sub-regional 
agreements (AEC) 
The AEC (1991) [73] includes general provisions for harmonisation of natural resource 
and environmental protection policies between State Parties (Article 4(2)). All three 
States are Parties.  
Established under AEC, the recently revived East African Community (EAC) [74] 
provides for the adoption of common wildlife conservation policies and the development 
of “common management plans for transborder protected areas” (Article 116). 
Nevertheless, only Tanzania is a member of the EAC. 
3.2.4. Treaty of the Southern African development community (SADC) 
One of SADC’s (1992) main environmental objectives is achieving “sustainable 
utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment” (Article 5) 
[75]. The high-level integration and policy coordination functions accorded to the 
Integrated Committee of Ministers in, inter alia, natural resource management, could 
facilitate the establishment of transboundary MPAs. All three States are members of 
SADC and have ratified its Treaty and respective protocols.  
The SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement, 1999 
(SADC Wildlife Protocol) [76] inextricably links conservation and development efforts 
and calls for cooperation between State Parties to manage shared wildlife resources and 
the “transfrontier effects of activities within their jurisdiction or control.” It provides the 
first definition of a “transboundary conservation area” for East Africa39 with requirements 
for harmonized legislation on wildlife use and conservation (Article 4).  
                                                 
38
 Establishment of protected areas is based on: (i) natural habitats; (ii) migration routes; (iii) areas 
necessary for economically important marine species; (iv) reserves of genetic resources; (v) rare or fragile 
ecosystems; and/or (vi) areas of interest for scientific research and monitoring. 
39
 Transfrontier conservation area is defined as the “area or the component of a large ecological region that 
straddles the boundaries of two or more countries, encompassing one or more protected areas, as well as 
multiple resources use areas” (Article 1). 
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The SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses, 2000 seeks “to foster closer 
cooperation for judicious, sustainable and coordinated management, protection and 
utilization of shared watercourses” [77]. Cooperative management of the Ruvuma River 
and its estuary at the south border, and the several rivers crossing the north border, would 
have a beneficial impact on the water quality of any transboundary MPA.  
The SADC Protocol on Fisheries, 2001 calls on State Parties to promote 
sustainable use of living aquatic resources and ecosystems [78] and to coordinate the 
establishment of MPAs, particularly with reference to critical habitats and endangered 
species, and migratory species in transboundary areas (Article 14). It calls for joint 
research programmes on shared resources and common scientific problems (Article 17). 
The Protocol implicitly recognises the need to protect endangered species in 
transboundary areas. 
3.2.5. Other instruments 
INFOPÊCHE40 [79], the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [80], and the Lusaka 
Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in Wild 
Fauna and Flora, 1994 are considered to play a complementary role. Of the three States, 
only Tanzania is not a member of INFOPÊCHE. The Western Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission’s main objective is the conservation and management of tuna stocks of the 
Indian Ocean. Currently, only Tanzania is a Party; South Africa is a cooperating non-
contracting Party. The Lusaka Agreement [81] establishes a permanent Task Force and 
provides for the creation of National Bureaus responsible for the implementation of the 
Agreement at the national level. The Agreement’s management area includes “marine and 
coastal areas within the limits of national jurisdiction of the Parties” (Article 1), however, 
the Task Force’s activities seem to have only targeted terrestrial species. 
3.3. Bilateral cooperation 
One of the main sub-regional initiatives facilitating the establishment of transboundary 
protected areas is the General Trans-Frontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol, 
2000 [82] between Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland. The Protocol defines 
Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Areas (TFCRAs) and calls for “the 
                                                 
40
 INFOPÊCHE refers to the Agreement for the Establishment of the Intergovernmental Organization for 
Marketing Information and Cooperation Services for Fishery Products inAfrica. 
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development of joint strategies… for trans-frontier ecological planning and resources 
management...” A TFCRA Commission, with members designated by the ministers of the 
Parties, reports to the Ministers’ Committee, and recommends measures and policies 
necessary to achieve the Protocol’s goals.  
To date, four bilateral and one trilateral protocols have been signed under the 
general TFCRA Protocol. The Lubombo-Kosi Bay TFCRA [24] establishes a 
transboundary MPA that stretches from Maputo Bay, linking the Ponta do Ouro Marine 
Partial Reserve (which includes the Inhaca Island Natural Reserve and the marine 
component of the Maputo Elephant Reserve), in Mozambique, to the IWP in South 
Africa, as well as intervening MPAs in South Africa. A transfrontier task team, 
integrating relevant agencies from both countries coordinates oversight of shared 
resources [83].  
At the northern border, the Mtwara Development Corridor (MtDC), a 
transboundary initiative of Tanzania with Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia, promotes 
investment in infrastructure. Projects to enhance transboundary collaboration in natural 
resource management and World Heritage Sites are being studied, although joint resource 
management remains a concern [84]. 
4. DISCUSSION 
Each of the global, regional, and bilateral instruments to which Mozambique, South 
Africa, and Tanzania are Parties, despite their shortcomings, offers opportunities for 
furthering transboundary marine cooperation and MPA-making. UNCLOS and the CBD 
provide the necessary legal foundation for the establishment of MPAs and a framework 
for transboundary networks of MPAs. UNCLOS sets out the coastal State jurisdictional 
framework in the territorial sea and EEZ, and for marine environmental protection and 
preservation rights and responsibilities. CBD establishes the basic principles and 
approaches to marine conservation at the genetic, species, and ecosystem levels. The 
three States are able to pursue CBD objectives by exercising the authority and control 
they enjoy in their maritime zones through UNCLOS. Although Tanzania has not fully 
maximized its benefits from UNCLOS, this shortcoming is not an impediment to MPA-
making and transboundary marine cooperation. However, coastal States are subject to 
some limitations under UNCLOS, especially with respect to international shipping, which 
is subject to additional international standards and rules. The weak protection accorded 
International Environmental Instruments 
206 
marine biological diversity under UNCLOS is offset by the measures provided under the 
CBD.  
In relation to MPA establishment, several global instruments overlap to some 
extent. The duty to undertake in situ conservation in the CBD, including the Jakarta 
Mandate commitments for coastal and marine conservation, is a clear mandate for the 
establishment of MPAs. The call for cooperation accommodates transboundary MPAs 
and transboundary networks of MPAs. Although concluded decades apart, Ramsar and 
the World Heritage Conventions also provide for site-specific conservation measures, 
raising questions as to the efficiency of conservation efforts at the same site. It is not 
uncommon for a conservation site to be a national MPA, as well as a Ramsar and/or 
WHC site. There is, perhaps, a need for convergence among international regimes to 
minimize potential inefficiencies. This overlap can be rationalised by considering the 
particular function that each instrument serves. As a framework instrument, the CBD sets 
out general principles. The Ramsar Convention focuses on particular conservation sites, 
namely, wetlands of international importance. With their international status, Ramsar 
sites are prestigious and elicit international recognition, attracting technical and financial 
support, thereby providing an incentive to governments to establish or reinforce MPAs in 
wetlands. To some extent, the WHC can be rationalized as giving protection to sites that 
also deserve international recognition and technical and funding assistance. However, 
where a WHC site is a wetland of international importance, the duplicity cannot be easily 
explained. Even so, the three East African States might still find political (if not 
economic) value in multiple conservation designations for the same site. For example, 
South Africa’s GSLWP, as well as Tanzania’s Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park 
and Mozambique’s Quirimbas National Park in the north and the recently designated 
Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve in the south, possess natural and cultural values 
that may well qualify them for WHC designation, in addition to the protection offered 
under the CBD. 
The international protected areas regime is reinforced by regional level 
conventions to which the three States are Parties. The African Convention for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources could serve as a regional legal umbrella 
for implementing transboundary MPAs, particularly considering its post-WSSD 
amendments concerning cooperative management of ecosystems and establishment of 
inter-State commissions. However, the revised convention is not yet in force, and South 
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Africa has not signed it yet. The Nairobi Convention and its protocols translate global 
commitments into regional marine conservation measures and initiatives for the 
establishment of marine and coastal protected areas. In particular, the Protected Areas 
Protocol highlights the need for protection of natural habitats and genetic resources and 
includes provisions for Frontier Protected Areas at international border areas. Thus, in 
addition to establishing national MPAs, the East African States are also promoting the 
establishment of transboundary MPAs on a bilateral basis in this regional instrument 
[85].41  
There is also some measure of duplication at the regional level, this time between 
the Nairobi Convention Protected Areas Protocol and the SADC Wildlife Protocol. The 
SADC Protocol also provides for regional transboundary conservation areas and a 
harmonised wildlife use and conservation legal regime. However, the Protocol’s 
institutional structure, including the Committee of Ministers for Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources that is responsible for adopting regional wildlife policies and the 
Protocol’s Wildlife Conservation Fund, provide both a political mandate and funding 
mechanism for regional transboundary nature conservation policy.  
Other global and regional instruments provide useful tools for MPA management. 
MARPOL special area designation (regarding oil pollution, noxious substances, and 
garbage); SOLAS routing and reporting measures, PSSA designation, and appropriate 
protective measures; and OPRC contingency planning and response are of note, 
especially because the three States, with the exception of South Africa, have made little, 
if any, use of the opportunities afforded by these measures. This is unfortunate given the 
evidence of illegal discharges related to international shipping, including oily ballast 
water, in coastal areas of the region. If a transboundary MPA or a transboundary network 
of MPAs were designated between Tanzania and Mozambique, following the example of 
the transboundary marine protected area established between Mozambique and South 
Africa, or if a transboundary network of MPAs was designated between Tanzania and 
Mozambique and Mozambique and South Africa, the three States would be able to 
approach the IMO with a joint proposal for PSSA designation or special area designation 
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 E.g., the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve in Mozambique forming a TBMPA with the IWP in 
South Africa. 
International Environmental Instruments 
208 
under MARPOL Annexes I, II, and V. Such additional measures would be useful, 
particularly in sensitive habitats. 
Perhaps even more than shipping, fishing is a major issue that must be addressed 
when establishing an MPA. Unfortunately, there are few suitable tools available, 
especially in areas where poverty alleviation and alternative sources of livelihood are 
fundamental local concerns [86]. At the global level, apart from UNCLOS and the CBD, 
sustainable fisheries management principles, rules, and processes with mandatory 
application in national maritime zones are limited. The FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries has achieved widespread recognition because of the importance it 
attaches to ecosystem-based management, precaution, and co-management, among other 
principles. All of these principles are relevant for MPAs in the transboundary sites 
contemplated here. Globally, CITES, and regionally, the Lusaka Agreement, also offer 
useful tools to combat the harvesting and illegal trade in marine endangered species in the 
region, e.g., marine turtles. Likewise, the Lusaka Agreement, together with CITES, could 
extend enforcement and protection to living marine and coastal species. INFOPÊCHE, 
particularly its SADC office (INFOSA), could be used to reduce conflict with industrial 
fishing interests.  
An obvious weakness of international law is that a treaty is not binding on a State 
unless it becomes a Party to that instrument. This rule of classical international law 
continues to defer to national sovereignty, irrespective of the merits of a treaty or the 
urgency of the problems that the instrument tries to address. These three East African 
States are not Parties to all the relevant instruments. For example, Mozambique has not 
signed the London Convention, and Tanzania and Mozambique’s distance from the 
Whaling Convention is noteworthy considering that this region is habitat for several 
whale species. Thus, there is a need for political commitment to pursuing regional 
outcomes that are consistent with international conservation prerogatives. Transboundary 
MPAs and transboundary networks of MPAs could incorporate global and regional 
principles, rules, and practices into bilateral or sub-regional agreements to help achieve 
stated marine conservation outcomes, as is the case with the Lubombo-Kosi Bay TFCRA 
between Mozambique and South Africa. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This article set out to examine the extent to which instruments of international 
environmental law and the law of the sea are of actual or potential assistance to current 
initiatives to establish a transboundary network of MPAs between Mozambique and 
Tanzania and Mozambique and South Africa. Although there is a trend towards 
transboundary conservation cooperation, its application to MPAs has barely begun. In 
East Africa, although global instruments are helpful, it is clear that regional and bilateral 
instruments are more conducive to the establishment of transboundary MPAs or 
transboundary networks of MPAs. Clearly and demonstrably, bilateral level cooperation 
is the most effective political and legal approach. However, bilateral initiatives for the 
creation of a transboundary network of MPAs should also be guided by the interests of 
conservation at the ecoregion level, as distinct from the achievement of solely national 
conservation objectives.  
Global and regional instruments can play an important role in national and 
ecoregional conservation interests. Harmonisation of these two sets of interests through a 
multilateral agreement supporting a network of integrated MPAs (national and 
transboundary) would address conservation objectives at the EAME level. In the two 
transboundary sites, a model to follow for such an instrument could be the treaty between 
Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe establishing the Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Park. Such an agreement would need to address a host of difficult issues, including 
desired conservation outcomes at the ecoregion level, the appropriate institutional 
framework, the type and degree of inclusive participation as a matter of good governance, 
and the applicable law for enforcement purposes in transboundary areas. A first step 
would be a bilateral approach, as in the present situation (supported by national 
declarations of MPAs and transfrontier task teams). Mozambique and South Africa, 
through the Lubombo-Kosi Bay TFCRA, together with the declaration of the Ponta do 
Ouro Partial Marine Reserve, created a transboundary MPA. This could serve as a 
starting point for the development of a trilateral agreement between Tanzania, 
Mozambique, and South Africa (among other diplomatic and management options) [21] 
to create a regional transboundary network of MPAs and transboundary MPAs that 
protect the EAME.  
A regional network of MPAs would be an innovative mechanism for protecting 
the marine environment and achieving ecoregion targets in East Africa. Although 
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Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania are registering considerably more progress than 
many other States in meeting their 2012 CBD targets, a regional network of MPAs has 
the potential of not only enhancing the prospect of meeting those targets, but also of 
providing a leadership role in African marine conservation.  
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GLOSSARY 
Marine protected area: Any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its 
overlying water and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has 
been reserved by law or other effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed 
environment. 
Transboundary marine protected area: An area of land/or sea that straddles one or more 
boundaries between states, sub-national units such as provinces and regions, autonomous 
areas and/or areas beyond the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, whose 
constituting parts are especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological 
biodiversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed co-operatively 
through legal and other effective means.  
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Marine protected areas network: A collection of individual MPAs or reserves operating 
cooperatively and synergistically, at various spatial scales, and with a range of protection 
levels that are designated to meet objectives that a single reserve cannot achieve. 
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7. PROSPECTS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY MPAs 
GRILO, C., Chircop, A. and Guerreiro, J. (Submitted). "Prospects for Transboundary 
Marine Protected Areas in East Africa". Ocean Development & International Law. 
 
Abstract: Transboundary marine protected areas (MPAs) have been proposed in East 
Africa to tackle threats to marine biodiversity, meet international MPA targets, promote 
tourism and contribute to poverty reduction. This article examines what may drive, 
facilitate or constrain states to create a regime for transboundary MPAs. A regime 
between Mozambique and Tanzania is not yet formed and may be indefinitely delayed 
due to oil prospecting and exploration. There is a well developed regime between 
Mozambique and South Africa that resulted in the two adjoining MPAs being declared 
the first transboundary MPA in the continent. 
Keywords: transboundary conservation; marine protected areas; regime theory; East 
Africa. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The transboundary nature of many habitats and species, as well as of the threats posed to 
them, necessitates management approaches that are not confined to the areas under the 
jurisdiction of a single state. Transboundary protected areas constitute one tool at the 
disposal of neighboring states to jointly promote the conservation of their shared natural 
environment. In the case of states sharing marine habitats and species, transboundary 
marine protected areas (MPAs) can be particularly useful for their protection and for the 
promotion of cooperation.1 However, their creation necessitates the establishment of a 
cooperative arrangement to facilitate collaboration in their management.  
Regimes are “set[s] of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.”2 States that join a given regime expect it (i) to provide a 
framework for liability; (ii) to reduce transaction costs associated with reaching 
agreements among its members, facilitating future cooperation; and (iii) to improve the 
quality and quantity of information available on the behavior of states, reducing 
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uncertainty.3 Thus, regimes can facilitate the coordination of multiple states’ actions on 
issues of common interest, such as the creation and management of transboundary MPAs. 
Regimes are distinct from governance frameworks. Governance frameworks are 
“specific, purposive governance interventions that are developed and delivered by 
multiple actors at multiple scales in pursuit of a broad goal”, while regimes “encompass 
the whole range of customs, norms and rules that shape a particular object.”4 Put more 
simply, governance is the way in which a regime is implemented. Governance is critical 
to the consideration of cooperation in the creation and management of transboundary 
MPAs, because the lack of participation from relevant stakeholders at appropriate scales 
can hinder cooperation in the creation of such a regime, and may affect the success of its 
implementation. 
We investigated what drives, facilitates and constrains states in creating a regime 
for transboundary MPAs in East Africa. In this region, two transboundary MPAs have 
been proposed for the borders between Mozambique and Tanzania and between 
Mozambique and South Africa, to protect marine biodiversity, promote tourism and 
contribute to poverty reduction.5 The domestic governance frameworks of these states for 
MPA-making have been examined,6 and diplomatic and management options proposed as 
paths for coordinated action.7 However, it remains to be seen whether Mozambique, 
South Africa and Tanzania are willing to move forward with the creation and 
management of transboundary MPAs. 
In the following section, we present the theoretical framework that makes this 
paper one of few applications of regime theory to the study of transboundary 
conservation.8 Its novelty lies not only in the geographical focus of the paper, but also in 
its prospective character. Regime theory will guide the discussion of the Mozambique-
Tanzania case in section 3 and the Mozambique-South Africa case in section 4. In these 
two sections, we use information collected through interviews with key actors in the three 
states, and extracted from relevant plans, policies and reports to identify states’ 
motivations to create transboundary MPAs, discuss issues of relevance for MPA-making 
in each region, and elaborate on the expectations regarding the ability of the proposed 
transboundary MPAs to address these specific issues. We finalize by presenting the 
lessons learned in these two cases, which we hope can assist the involved states in setting 
up tailor-made regimes.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Regime theory attempts to explain how states claiming sovereignty but competing for 
power and influence can cooperate in an international arena that does not have a central 
government to make and enforce rules of behavior.9 Regimes operate as “intervening 
variables standing between basic causal variables (most prominently, power and interests) 
and outcomes and behavior”, thus facilitating coordination between actors in the 
international sphere in relation to a given issue-area.10 In other words, regimes provide a 
framework of predictability for states to interact regarding particular issues. The elements 
of regimes mentioned above are defined as follows: “principles are beliefs of fact, 
causation, and rectitude; norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations; rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action; decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”.11 
In negotiating regimes and cooperating in a regime, states embody different and 
often contradictory interests resulting from their particular domestic dynamics.12 They 
can also be influenced by non-state actors, such as international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).13 Regime theory has also been used to explain cooperation 
between states in environmental and natural resource issues, such as marine pollution in 
the Mediterranean,14 the regulation of whaling and the conservation of Antarctica’s 
environment.15 While the existence of a regime does not ensure that participating states 
will cooperate, they do provide a useful framework to investigate how and why 
cooperation may occur.  
Regime formation can be explained in terms of the power and capabilities of 
states regarding the issue-area at hand, their specific interests, their knowledge and 
perception of the issues at stake, and context.  
Power resources include (i) enough control over a resource allowing a state to 
dominate collective decision-making affecting it; (ii) sufficient capacity to change the 
quality of the shared resource; (iii) enough trade control allowing environmental 
restrictions to seriously affect trading partners; and (iv) a reputation for diplomatic 
behavior and scientific knowledge.16 Power and capability considerations are significant 
for the two case studies here described because they attest to the ability of the states 
involved to create and manage transboundary MPAs. 
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The existence of a regime can enable states to realize their common interests,17 
and hence promote cooperation in that regard. When considering their interests, states 
take into account both the benefits and costs of maintaining the status quo and of joining 
a regime. Consideration of the motivations of states in creating and managing a 
transboundary MPA can provide an indication of how committed they may be to 
overcome obstacles to cooperation. 
The interests of a state regarding its membership in a given regime are defined not 
only by its capabilities but also by its knowledge, values and perception of the importance 
and consequences of the issues at stake, as well as the options available to solve them.18 
These aspects are significant to assess the potential for cooperation in the creation and 
management of transboundary MPAs. This is because they are an indication of how 
appropriate states perceive transboundary MPAs to be instruments or means to address 
the problems that motivated them to consider their creation. 
In addition to power, interests and knowledge, there is a range of other factors that 
are merely circumstantial and unrelated to the issue at hand but that are able to determine 
if and when cooperation will occur and to shape resulting regimes.19 These contextual 
factors may include shifts in values and ideas, new political trends, or simply specific 
events such as changes in political appointees. For example, transboundary marine 
conservation currently represents a paradigm shift, which has been motivated by the 
physical continuity of the marine environment, the global impact of human activities, and 
the recognition that borderless ecosystems require borderless protection.20 
While regime formation results from interactions between power, interests, 
knowledge, and context, it is possible that all these factors are conducive to regime 
formation and yet none may be formed. This is because regime formation is often 
propelled by specific triggers, that is, specific circumstances that create in relevant actors 
an urgent need to cooperate through an enabling regime. Such circumstances can consist 
in the perception of likely benefits that may accrue from creating a regime. An eminent 
threat posed to resources, species or people would also impel actors to agree on a regime. 
In other situations, international pressure may be sufficiently encouraging for regimes to 
be formed or altered. This international pressure may result from states not complying 
with international conventional obligations. Of course, states may also decide 
independently to abide by the obligations they voluntarily committed to, only out a sense 
of moral commitment. 
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In the following sections, we examine how these factors interact and may affect 
cooperation in the creation and management of transboundary MPAs between 
Mozambique and Tanzania and between Mozambique and South Africa.  
3. THE BORDER REGION BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND TANZANIA 
3.1 Status of existing proposals 
Mozambique and Tanzania have in recent years engaged in bilateral discussions 
regarding the creation of a new MPA on the Mozambican side as the first step to establish 
a transboundary MPA between the two countries. The Palma National Reserve (PNR) 
was proposed by the Mozambican Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Affairs 
(MICOA) to partially fill the gap in marine protection that exists between the Mnazi Bay-
Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP) in Tanzania and the marine component of the 
Quirimbas National Park (QNP) in Mozambique.21  
Bilateral discussions between the two countries have occurred under the umbrella 
of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2007 between the regional 
governments of Ruvuma and Mtwara in southern Tanzania, and the provincial 
governments of Cabo Delgado and Niassa in northern Mozambique.22 These initial 
conversations resulted in MICOA commissioning, on behalf of Mozambique and 
Tanzania, a proposal for a transboundary MPA to be proclaimed once PNR is created, in 
order to promote biodiversity conservation, tourism development and poverty reduction 
in the region.23 This potential transboundary MPA would also meet the World Wildlife 
Fund’s (WWF) goal of protecting the Mtwara-Quirimbas complex.24 
The MoU determines the creation of, among others,25 the Environment and 
Conservation Working Group (E&C WG) “to oversee tourism and conservation issues”.26 
This working group was set up in Tanzania and met two times with the participation of a 
MBREMP representative. In these two meetings, a transboundary MPA was discussed. 
Mozambique had not assigned focal points to the E&C WG, and so Tanzanian 
participants were tasked with identifying their counterparts. A third meeting was held in 
January 2011 in Mozambique, where matters of common interest were discussed but did 
not involve the proposed transboundary MPA.27 
3.2 Motivations for the proposals 
Prospects for Transboundary MPAs 
226 
Mozambique’s motivation to create a new MPA, and eventually a transboundary MPA 
with Tanzania, is rooted in the recognition of overexploitation of marine resources in its 
northern coast driven by population growth and by Tanzanian migrant fishers.28 At the 
2003 World Parks Congress, Mozambique made public its commitment to create 
transboundary MPAs with both its neighbors as part of its efforts to meet international 
MPA targets.29 
Tanzania’s main motivations for the creation of the PNR are the weak law 
enforcement on the Mozambican side, and the uncontrolled cross-border movement of 
people. For Tanzania, the advantage of creating PNR is that state presence (i.e., law 
enforcement) would increase in that area. Currently, the Mozambican side of the border, a 
remote part of the country, is a “safe haven” for those wanting to engage in illegal 
activities such as extensive mangrove cutting in the Ruvuma River and surroundings. 
This is a natural resource-rich area that is adjacent to MBREMP but out of the reach of its 
officers.30 Tanzania does not envision the proclamation of the transboundary area without 
Mozambique first creating PNR: “it is like engagement: you don’t get married before 
engagement”.31 
Though these and other interests have propelled authorities of the two countries to 
meet, the dropping of the proposed transboundary MPA from their agendas signals that 
they will likely not be translated into any meaningful political action in the near future.  
3.3 Reasons for lack of progress 
Current lack of progress in the creation of a new MPA adjoining MBREMP as the first 
step to a transboundary MPA between Mozambique and Tanzania can be attributed to 
several factors. 
First, there are differences in how the two states envision the preparation of a joint 
proposal for a transboundary MPA. Mozambique prefers to have technical meetings to 
compile relevant information, followed by political approval of the proposal, and then 
later submit it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convey it to high-level meetings 
between the two countries.32 Consequently, a proposal would reach national decision-
makers already in an advanced stage. In contrast, Tanzania would like to expand the 
political scope of bilateral discussions to include ministries from both countries. In this 
way, a joint proposal could be elaborated in close connection with higher levels of 
decision-making. 
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Second, meetings promoted by the E&C WG under the MoU have involved 
distinct governmental levels. Tanzania’s participants have included staff members of the 
Marine Parks and Reserves Unit,33 while contacts with Mozambique have only involved 
provincial representatives. Naturally, decisions made in these meetings need to be 
sanctioned centrally in Mozambique before implementation can proceed.34 Also, while 
MBREMP’s representatives participated in those meetings, QNP staff members were not 
contacted.  
Third, the lack of involvement of relevant national decision-makers at an initial 
stage, and the consequent need for approval by the central government in Mozambique 
may have influenced the fate of the PNR proposal. This proposal, commissioned by 
MICOA to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) office in 
Mozambique, was submitted to a multi-ministerial group. The outcome of this collective 
evaluation remains unknown, and no further steps have been taken to create this MPA. 
This group of ministerial representatives did not include the Ministry of Energy, a rather 
surprising move as this region is rich in hydrocarbons and has the potential to 
significantly reduce Tanzania’s and Mozambique’s dependence on external sources of 
energy.35 MBREMP has a natural gas field operating since 2006 within its boundaries that 
is used to produce electricity for the entire region. Hydrocarbons have also been found on 
the Mozambican side of the border, and though their commercial viability is yet to be 
determined, their development appears promising.36 It is unlikely that an MPA would be 
created in this region by Mozambique before the prospects for oil and natural gas 
production are fully understood.  
Forth, there are differences in the language skills37 of the officials of the two 
countries that appear to hinder cross-border institutional communication.38 Though this 
may be a minor issue,39 it is important when contrasted with the generalized perception 
that transboundary conservation is facilitated in Africa by the porous nature of political 
borders delimited during colonial occupation. Indeed, it is a paradox that local 
communities sharing family ties, language, culture and religion, can easily communicate 
across the border, but decision-makers from both countries find it difficult to 
communicate across the same border in their respective official languages.    
3.4 Existing capacity 
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Communication difficulties resulting from different language skills speak directly to the 
capabilities of each state. Mozambique and Tanzania are among the poorest countries in 
the world, though Tanzania is better positioned than Mozambique in terms of their 
Human Development Index.40 Part of this developmental differential is attributed to the 
economic and social disruptions Mozambique experienced as a result of independence 
and civil wars. These troubled times in Mozambique’s history were important in 
cementing its friendship with Tanzania: Mozambique’s liberation movement was based in 
Dar es Salaam, and attacks against the Portuguese colonial regime were often launched 
from Tanzania. However, and though this friendship continues to be recognized at various 
political levels, it has also been accompanied to some extent by a condescending attitude 
of Tanzanian officials toward Mozambique. Nevertheless, most governmental officials 
and NGO staff members interviewed in Mozambique perceived Tanzanian governmental 
officials to be better organized, and also highlighted their better knowledge of the issues 
affecting their natural environment.41 
An additional indicator of each state’s ability to cooperate in transboundary MPA 
creation and management is how they both dealt with the challenges of MPA 
management in this transboundary region. In Mozambique, the Quirimbas National Park 
was created in 2002 with financial support from donors and has greatly benefited from the 
direct involvement of WWF-Mozambique. The involvement of this NGO has been crucial 
in such a remote area of the country. It is recognized that the park faces important 
challenges, such as its extent (7.500 km2 of which 1.500 km2 are marine), large human 
population (±130.000 people), and insufficient number of wardens for law enforcement. 
Specifically, the marine component of the QNP faces the problem of overexploitation of 
marine resources which is exacerbated by migrant fishers from Tanzania. 
Overexploitation has its roots in population growth and declining reliability of farming 
due to drought, while fishers’ migration results from overexploited marine resources in 
Tanzania and probably also from the creation of the MBREMP. To protect biodiversity 
and enhance local fish stocks, several no-take areas were created inside the QNP. The 
QNP also partnered with fishing authorities to promote the organization of local fishers 
into fisheries co-management organizations.42 This power-sharing approach to marine 
resource management inside QNP is not atypical or surprising, given QNP’s clear efforts 
in regularly consulting local communities regarding numerous aspects of its 
management43 and its inability to enforce regulations in such a large area.  
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In Tanzania, the Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park was created in 2000 
with the initial financial support of donors. Though IUCN played an important role in 
implementation, WWF-Tanzania is currently the only international NGO with a 
permanent office near the park,44 from where it promotes community development 
activities inside the MPA. The park has a population of 30.000 people, and covers an area 
of 650 km2 (one third of which is terrestrial). Though smaller than QNP, MBREMP also 
faces its own challenges, most visibly its high population density.45 Many fishers still 
oppose MPA regulations quite strongly, particularly in the more resource-dependent 
villages. Population growth and prolonged drought have contributed to overfishing, and 
because local fish stocks are almost depleted, there has been an increase in highly 
profitable, but very damaging, dynamite fishing. Unlike in Mozambique, fisheries co-
management institutions are only promoted outside MPAs in Tanzania. MPA staffs are 
committed to solve these challenges, but their capacity was recently reduced as top 
officers took leaves of absence to carry out their studies.46    
3.5 Oil and natural gas exploration in MPAs 
Hydrocarbon exploration is of critical importance to the future of MPA-making in this 
transboundary region. It is very unlikely that either country would forgo the tremendous 
impact on their national economies that an important discovery could have in order to 
create an MPA. Hence, the need to assess how each country stands on this issue. 
The MBREMP is viewed in Tanzania as a good example of how hydrocarbon 
exploration is not incompatible with marine environmental protection through MPA 
creation. Natural gas exploration was subjected to an Environmental Impact Assessment 
and had to observe stricter rules because of its location. For this, and in the face of the 
ongoing hydrocarbon exploration in Mozambique, it is seen as an example that 
Mozambique could follow.47 Because of the importance that hydrocarbons have for 
national development, WWF-Tanzania, a leading NGO in the country, has adopted a 
strategy of not opposing hydrocarbon exploration. Instead, it advocates adherence to 
international environmental standards by the oil industry operating in the country.48 
Therefore, the interplay between marine environmental protection and oil 
exploration in Mozambique is crucial for the future of the proposed transboundary MPA. 
Hydrocarbon exploration is a national priority because of its potential to decrease the 
country’s dependence on external sources of energy and, eventually, also to increase 
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exports. This issue is even more pressing given Mozambique’s developing context. Thus, 
it is not surprising that hydrocarbon exploration appears to be a national priority that 
supersedes MPA creation. But what can be expected if commercially viable hydrocarbons 
are found in northern Mozambique? The infrastructure for hydrocarbons exploration, 
production and processing is inexistent in northern Mozambique, and the country would 
then be faced with two options if the identified oil reserves are commercially viable.49 On 
the one hand, Mozambique’s first oil refinery could be built, along with a pipeline from 
sea areas where commercially viable hydrocarbons are found. On the other hand, 
hydrocarbons could be transshipped for vessels to transport where there is a refinery. In 
either case, the creation of the PNR and, consequently, of the transboundary MPA, will 
likely depend on when the location of commercially exploitable reserves is confirmed and 
what type of hydrocarbons are there. 
3.6 Expectations regarding tourism, fisheries, and poverty reduction in MPAs 
As in the case of the existing MPAs in the region, the proposals for these new MPAs are 
based on general expectations regarding their ability to promote tourism, support fisheries 
and reduce poverty. This paper considers the realism of those expectations against a 
review of the performance of existing MPAs in these fields. 
In the two countries, MPAs are relied on to foster tourism and to provide direct 
benefits through tourism operator fees. The current ministries under which MPA creation 
and management are placed reflect this expectation.  
In Mozambique, MPAs are created through the Ministry of Tourism, which has 
the mandate to create and manage protected areas in the country. This institutional 
connection between protected areas and tourism was established in 2000 because 
“tourism was seen as one way of financing protected areas management.”50 Indeed, the 
establishment of the Quirimbas National Park rested on, among others, the premise that 
“underdevelopment represents an opportunity for the tourist industry.”51 QNP’s Tourism 
Development Plan aims at intertwining tourism development with conservation and at 
producing “tangible benefits for local communities through tourism.”52 Tourism operators 
and visitors already contribute to the parks’ budget through operator and entrance fees. 
However, it is unlikely that this makes up a significant part of the park’s budget, which is 
still largely supported by donor funding.53 
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In Tanzania, the MPRU has been under the umbrella of the Ministry of Livestock 
Development and Fisheries since 2008. Before then, it was under the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism.54 The MPRU clearly supports the view that “marine parks and 
reserves are a new tourism product”,55 and coral reefs in particular are an important 
tourism attraction.56 Similar to the QNP, the establishment of the MBREMP was also 
premised on its ability to stimulate tourism and derive benefits from it.57 However, these 
have been unfulfilled expectations. The only tourism operator inside this MPA was forced 
to shut down after a sudden increase in tourism operator fees determined nationally. Any 
further tourism activity in the MPA is unlikely to emerge, not only because of the fees but 
also because this is a location that can hardly compete58 with the popularity of Zanzibar 
or Mafia Island.59 Donor funding for MBREMP has ended and this MPA is currently 
funded by the Tanzanian government. The initial dependence of the MBREMP on 
international donors60 is common to other marine conservation initiatives in Tanzania,61 
and reflects a national pattern in donor-driven nature conservation.62  
There are widely held beliefs regarding the role of MPAs in promoting fisheries, 
and thus obtain support from fishers.63 These have been based on the abundant evidence 
of increased catches inside and near MPA boundaries, particularly in coral reefs where 
the mobility of fish species is generally low.64 Indeed, overfishing and the use of 
destructive fishing gear were the main motivations to create the marine component of the 
QNP65 and the MBREMP.66 
In QNP, several sanctuaries (i.e., no-take areas) were created in consultation with 
communities. These temporary closures are open to fishing a few days every year, and the 
large catches obtained have contributed to generate support from fishers. However, the 
creation of sanctuaries was often at odds with local communities’ preferences.67 Also, 
fishers often complained that sanctions for lack of compliance with sanctuaries were 
disproportionate.68 Consequently, the relationship between fisheries authorities and park 
authorities was tense. This has eased since the QNP concluded a Memorandum of 
Understanding with fisheries authorities that detailed how the several institutions with a 
fisheries-related mandate inside QNP were to coordinate their activities and cooperate.69 
The most prominent of these activities is to support fishers in establishing Community 
Fisheries Councils. These fisheries co-management organizations, known locally as 
CCP70 (or Conselhos Comunitários de Pesca), are starting to address the problems of 
migrant fishers, overfishing and the use of destructive fishing gear.  
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Destructive fishing practices in particular dynamite fishing in coral reefs, were the 
main motivation for the creation of the MBREMP.71 This MPA has had a positive impact 
on coral reef condition, and there is anecdotal evidence of improved catches. However, 
dynamite fishing is resurging. Its comeback is explained by its high profitability.72 In face 
of depletion of local fish stocks, it is a very attractive activity for dispossessed youth by 
which they can quickly improve their economic situations.73 The resurgence of dynamite 
fishing is further compounded by the tense relationship between fishers and park 
authorities which has its roots in MPA implementation. A gear exchange program offered 
new fishing gears and motorized boats to fishers who owned gear banned by the new 
MPA regulations. The program did not reach all fishers, and it was perceived as unfair by 
fishers who did not own banned gear and were thus not eligible for new gear.74 Currently, 
the park is assisting local communities, through other institutions, in improving school 
infra-structure and developing their community-based organizations,75 as well as in 
accessing training for alternative income-generating activities (AIGAs).76 However, its 
performance is not more than “satisfactory” in all evaluated management outcomes.77 
Lastly, MPAs are often promoted and created in the two countries with 
assumptions regarding their ability to contribute to poverty reduction. The rationale for 
this lies in the potential for employment opportunities for locals in tourism, and with the 
expectations of improved fish catches resulting from increased marine protection. Clear 
linkages between tourism and poverty reduction are usually not easy to find, mostly 
because they often go unreported.78 Yet, in Tanzania, tourism has been found to reduce 
poverty through, for example, the building of new infrastructure for improved access 
between tourism attractions, which allows more visitors and facilitates new local business 
opportunities.79 In the MBREMP, tourism is almost inexistent, with the only scuba diving 
operator in the region rarely taking divers to the MPA.80 In Mozambique, tourism 
development in the QNP has had some impact in terms of employment and trickle down 
effects in local economies during the construction phase.81 Employment in ecotourism in 
particular generates some economic substitution (in relation to marine resource use) but 
how long this effect may last may depend on the availability of AIGAs to where 
household resources (labor, savings) can be directed.82 Additionally, tourism operators 
pay park fees that, in part, are channeled to local communities to use for collective 
purposes. However, there are also negative consequences of tourism in the QNP: high-
end tourism ventures in some of the islands have displaced fishers,83 and the presence of 
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tourists has raised concerns among elders regarding changes in local culture.84 In contrast 
to tourism, the role of improved artisanal fisheries in poverty reduction has not been 
adequately recognized in the policies of the two countries.85 Yet, improved fisheries can 
assist with poverty reduction as long as AIGAs are available while fishing effort is 
reduced. In Tanzanian MPAs, households that participate in AIGAs are less likely to use 
destructive fishing gear.86 This can be particularly significant for marine conservation as 
those using destructive fishing gear are generally poorer.87 AIGAs can reduce human 
pressure on resources as long as they are adapted to local contexts,88 and are an important 
step in bringing people out of socio-ecological poverty traps.89 In the MBREMP, AIGAs 
are being promoted by local and international NGOs and not by the park itself, reflecting 
the current capacity difficulties in this MPA. Indeed, MBREMP officers’ work currently 
consists of law enforcement, and the way this task has been carried out since the MPA 
was created has been described as “it’s like the carrot and the stick, but there’s no carrot 
and the stick is a really big stick”.90 However, it should be noted that within MPRU, 
MPA creation and management is perceived as biodiversity conservation, and hence 
“working with communities inside MPAs is [considered] work for the NGOs”.91 In the 
QNP, fisheries have been enhanced through small no-take areas, but better coordination is 
required to ensure local markets can absorb above-average catches during the few days 
these no-take areas are open to fishing every year.92 
3.7 Are the proposed MPAs an adequate and desirable response? 
In considering the creation of the proposed Palma National Reserve as a first step toward 
a transboundary MPA, Mozambique and Tanzania need to assess their options to pursue 
conservation in their shared marine environment. This transboundary region is threatened 
by overexploitation of marine resources, which is partly driven by migrant fishers. 
Overexploitation of fisheries resources necessitates fisheries management and 
conservation measures, such as temporary closures to enable stocks to recover,93 
provision of AIGAs, and better law enforcement. 
These could be provided within the framework of an MPA or through existing 
fisheries management institutions. Creating an MPA would match Mozambique’s goal of 
increasing marine protection and Tanzania’s goal of increasing enforcement capacity on 
the Mozambican side of the border. However, the problems that the MBREMP and the 
QNP face, and the existence of fisheries management institutions, bring into question the 
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need to create a new layer of governance through a new MPA. Additionally, the creation 
of a new MPA may be opposed by fisheries officers who believe that MPAs are being 
pursued “to meet goals that are not connected to the survival of the communities or to the 
resolution of their problems”. One of these officers suggests instead that “MPAs are a 
means to resource conservation, not an end; [and that] there are other measures, such as 
temporary closures and closed seasons that can be considered temporary MPAs”.94 
Indeed, existing fisheries management institutions can be strengthened to deal adequately 
with existing threats, particularly through co-management. 
If, despite these difficulties, Mozambique decides do establish the PNR and, with 
Tanzania, declare this MPA and the MBREMP to be a transboundary MPA, there are 
other considerations that both states need to take into account when firming a general 
political agreement to cement their increased political commitment.95 First, the two states 
need to give careful consideration to community participation. Though communities were 
consulted on the creation of the PNR, management of this MPA would need substantial 
outreach effort to ensure cooperation from communities, to provide AIGAs that reduce 
the impacts of reductions in fishing areas, and to avoid the mistakes committed in other 
MPAs. An agreement between the two states on the transboundary MPA should include 
specific provisions for community participation. These provisions should specify the 
conditions under which community involvement in MPA-related decision-making should 
take place.96 This point is particularly important not only in itself, but because the 
creation of the PNR would place almost the entire coast of Cabo Delgado province in 
Mozambique inside MPAs, and will likely be resisted by stakeholders such as fisheries 
institutions.97  
Second, this agreement should specify whether it aims at promoting an integrated 
approach through the harmonization of management measures between the MBREMP 
and the PNR (preferred by MPRU officers and WWF-Mozambique), or if it is to have 
each country deal separately with their own people and natural resource share, and to 
facilitate communication between both sides of the border for law enforcement 
purposes.98  
Third, Mozambique and Tanzania should assess their institutional, human 
resource and financial capacities to ensure the adequate management of the new MPA 
and of the ensuing transboundary MPA, including donor options and how initial 
capacities can be maintained after external support terminates. 
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4. THE BORDER REGION BETWEEN MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
4.1 Status of existing proposals 
In 2000, Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland signed the General Transfrontier 
Conservation and Resource Area Protocol99 whereby the three countries agreed to 
establish five transboundary protected areas between them. One of these transboundary 
protected areas is the Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier 
Conservation and Resource Area,100 between Mozambique and South Africa.101 This 
transboundary protected area is formed by the new Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve 
(POPMR) in Mozambique and the iSimangaliso Wetland Park (IWP)102 in South Africa. 
The two MPAs are contiguous although the maritime boundary between the two countries 
is not delimited to date.103. 
POPMR was created in 2009, during our fieldwork, by extending seawards the 
limits of the terrestrial Maputo Special Reserve up to 3 nautical miles, covering a total 
area of 678 km2. This MPA was established and is currently managed by DNAC – the 
National Directorate for Conservation Areas under the Ministry of Tourism in 
Mozambique – with direct technical support from the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), a 
non-profit organization that promotes transboundary conservation in Southern Africa.104 
POPMR’s main goal is to “protect marine and coastal species and their habitats”.105 
POPMR is contiguous with IWP’s marine section. 
IWP is formed by various terrestrial and marine protected areas, many of which of 
longstanding existence (decades in some cases) and totaling 3.585 km2. These were 
consolidated into IWP upon its listing as South Africa’s first World Heritage Site. Its 
main goal is “the protection, conservation and presentation of World Heritage values, 
with a strong emphasis on locally beneficial economic development.”106 
Soon after POPMR was established by law, the Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Marine 
and Coastal Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area was proclaimed the first – and 
until now the only – transboundary MPA in Africa.107 
4.2 Motivations for the proposals 
In 1998, Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland officially launched the Lubombo108 
Spatial Development Initiative (SDI). SDIs are state programs targeting specific regions 
with “unrealized economic potential” that may be unlocked by facilitating private 
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investment and thus promote wealth generation and employment.109 Lubombo SDI’s 
implementation has consisted in removing barriers to make this region a worldwide 
tourism destination, and end “the paradox of poverty amidst natural plenty”.110 SDI’s 
principal activities consist of actions to remove such barriers to regional economic 
development, including a malaria control program, asphalting the main road from 
Hluhluwe in South Africa to Maputo in Mozambique to facilitate cross-border access and 
the creation of transboundary protected areas to promote tourism.  
For South Africa, the proclamation of the new transboundary MPA with 
Mozambique will contribute to stimulate the region’s economy, as Mozambique is 
expected to finally improve road infrastructures near the new MPA. The IWP is South 
Africa’s tourism anchor project for the Lubombo SDI. Its management is premised on the 
“development for conservation”, or the idea that “economic empowerment and job 
creation, through appropriate tourism development, is necessary to achieve conservation 
goals.”111 Coral reefs play a particularly important role in this regard: they are in very 
good condition112 and are targeted by an important scuba diving industry.113 IWP’s World 
Heritage Status contributes to the promotion of nature-based tourism as the vehicle for 
economic development. The area covered by the POPMR is not yet a World Heritage Site 
but has been in the tentative World Heritage list since August 2008.114 For South Africa, 
the designation of IWP as part of a transboundary marine World Heritage Site would 
enhance the attractiveness of the park for tourists. 
For Mozambique, the creation of the POPMR was a natural step in protecting the 
region’s biodiversity by extending the limits of the Maputo Special Reserve. Importantly, 
the establishment of the POPMR was necessary to demonstrate that this region is actively 
managed and protected, a requirement to obtain World Heritage Site status.115 The 
POPMR’s management also has a strong focus on coral reefs because of the local 
burgeoning scuba diving industry. There are also expectations that the POPMR will assist 
in regulating tourism development in the region, as this is growing quickly and 
uncontrolled. 
4.3 Existing capacity and achievements 
The POPMR’s short existence evokes the need to consider each country’s MPA and 
overall management capacity. Though Mozambique and South Africa are neighboring 
countries, there are striking differences between the two regarding their developmental 
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ranking in the Human Development Index.116 As mentioned before, Mozambique’s recent 
history has significantly hampered its development. In contrast, South Africa, already an 
economically strong country before the end of apartheid, is viewed as one of the new 
emerging economies at the global level. After Mozambique’s independence, South 
Africa’s apartheid regime supported destabilization in the country. Bilateral relations 
were officially reestablished in 1994, with the advent of the new democratic regime in 
South Africa and the end of civil war in Mozambique. Despite their distinct histories, the 
IWP and the POPMR face relatively similar challenges. 
In Mozambique, there are 12.000 people living in the terrestrial area bordering the 
POPMR.117 Still in its initial years of existence, POPMR is benefiting from PPF’s 
involvement. Like in other transboundary protected areas in southern Africa, PPF’s role 
consists in providing the technical means to facilitate implementation of transboundary 
protected areas.118 For example, POPMR’s program manager is paid by PPF, and liaises 
with DNAC and with the staff of the adjacent Maputo Special Reserve.119 The main 
challenges that the POPMR currently faces are related to tourism activities. There are 
several tourism resorts being built along the coast and away from the border with South 
Africa by requesting land concessions120 from Mozambican authorities. These 
concessions often conflict with biodiversity conservation and reduce the area available for 
local communities to use for their subsistence. In particular, conflicts have emerged 
between local communities, on one side, and district authorities and tourism developers 
on the other side, with the former complaining of not being consulted nor compensated 
for the private use of their land. At some places along the coast, tourism development is 
also threatening the dunes that are cleared of vegetation to make room for infrastructures. 
This negative impact is further aggravated by tourists that drive quad bikes on the dunes 
and 4x4 vehicles on the beach. Most tourists visiting the region are aware that such 
activities are not allowed, but take advantage of the weak enforcement capacity of 
Mozambican authorities. The new POPMR is contributing to improve this situation, 
through enforcement of the management plan, increased visible presence in various points 
along the coast, and liaising with different local and district authorities.121 POPMR’s team 
is exercising a stricter control of beach activities, including enforcing a ban on beach 
driving inside the POPMR (similar to the nation-wide beach driving ban in force in South 
Africa since 2004), and on the non-fishing use of jet skis.122 It is not clear the role that the 
POPMR has played, if any, in controlling tourism development in the dunes, nor is it 
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clear if it will be able to face the enormous challenges posed by a deep-water harbor 
proposed to be built in the most important section of this MPA.123 The harbor will be 
located near the southern limit of POPMR’s no-take area, and will be supplied with goods 
from Botswana and Zimbabwe through a new 1.100 km-long railroad that will cross the 
Maputo Special Reserve.124 Though similar announcements have been made in the 
past,125 the recent signing of a Memorandum of Understanding by the three countries 
suggests that this time construction may actually begin. 
The IWP has a different setting from that of the POPMR’s. Although there are 
only 2.000 inhabitants inside the IWP, over 600.000 people live adjacent to its 
boundaries.126 Despite its World Heritage Status, IWP has not met one of the World 
Heritage Convention requirements: an approved Integrated Management Plan.127 Since 
2000, IWP’s management has been based on “interim planning measures.”128 The 
absence of a management plan implies that there is no “prime document from which other 
plans flow, and [that takes] precedence if there is doubt or conflict.”129 In addition to the 
lack of a management plan, there appear to be overlapping mandates between the IWPA 
and Ezemvelo KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife (EKZNW), the provincial nature conservation 
services. Unlike other protected areas in KwaZulu-Natal, the IWP is managed by a public 
entity other than EKZNW, the iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority (IWPA), which 
reports directly to the Minister and not to the provincial government.130 Hence, the tense 
relationship between the IWPA and EKZNW is not surprising, nor is the fact that they 
have contrasting interpretations of their individual mandates inside the IWP. On the one 
hand, the IWPA argues that it “contracted EKZNW to undertake nature conservation”, 
and therefore EKZNW are “service providers... but we look at them as partners.”131 On 
the other hand, EKZNW views its mandate and IWP’s as non-hierarchical and 
complementary: EKZNW has an agreement at the central level with the Marine and 
Coastal Management (MCM) division of the Department of Environment to undertake on 
its behalf law enforcement, awareness and research activities within MPAs in KwaZulu-
Natal; and it conceives IWPA’s mandate as being confined to tourism and social aspects 
(e.g., solving land claims).132 In addition to unclear mandates, EKZNW and the wider 
research community face difficulties in obtaining permission from the IWPA to conduct 
research inside the IWP. This requires enduring a lengthy bureaucratic process, which is 
further compounded by IWPA’s narrow understanding of the research that is to be 
conducted inside the IWP.133 
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In addition to these protected area governance issues, the IWP faces two particular 
management challenges: unauthorized tourism developments, particularly close to the 
border with Mozambique; and disputes with local communities.134 Unauthorized tourism 
facilities have been erected inside the park by clearing vegetation. The IWPA has 
accompanied this closely, and some illegal tourism operators have thus been evicted and 
forced to rehabilitate the degraded areas. However, IWPA’s relationship with local 
communities is tense. Though several land claims have been resolved successfully, there 
are other indicators of the benefits IWP may provide to people living in its vicinity to 
compensate for restrictions to resource use. Indeed, solved land claims do not necessarily 
involve resettlement by previously excluded communities, and can instead provide for 
some form of power-sharing for conservation-oriented resource management.135  
The day-to-day management of the two MPAs is coordinated through direct cross-
border contacts between their staff, while overarching political decisions are made by the 
TFCA Commission established by Article 4 of the General Trans-Frontier Conservation 
and Resource Area Protocol.136 The creation of the POPMR and the proclamation of the 
Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay transboundary MPA have not added much to what the IWP was 
already achieving on the South African side of the border. There have been some efforts 
to coordinate law enforcement with Mozambican authorities. However, there remain 
doubts, including among those working directly in transboundary conservation, regarding 
its benefits for local communities: “I am not sure that transboundary protected areas 
benefit local communities”.137 
4.5 Expectations regarding tourism and poverty reduction in transboundary 
conservation 
The Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay transboundary MPA, like the IWP, has been created from 
the premise that nature as a tourism attraction can promote economic development that 
benefits poor communities. We briefly assess the extent to which this expectation is being 
realized. 
The potential of biodiversity as a tourism attraction and driver of economic 
development presupposes the existence of basic infrastructure. Under the Lubombo SDI, 
paving the road from Hluhluwe in South Africa to Maputo in Mozambique was required 
to stimulate tourism investment. Though South Africa’s section of this road was paved 
before the POPMR was established, Mozambique’s section has not been paved yet and a 
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4x4 vehicle is needed to travel between the border near Ponta do Ouro and the country’s 
capital. Though it could be argued that an undeveloped road favours biodiversity 
conservation by restraining human presence, it seems that Mozambique’s delay has not 
been purposeful in this regard, but instead has resulted from lack of funding. This, 
however, has not stopped Mozambique’s southern coastal area from expanding its 
tourism offer in the past 10 years. In South Africa, tourism development is growing and 
appears to be associated with improved accessibility. 
Tourism development can benefit local communities under certain conditions. 
First, their skills should match those needed by the sector. In impoverished, 
undereducated communities, this can be particularly challenging, except perhaps during 
the construction phase. For example, most Mozambicans working in tourism development 
near the POPMR are not from the region. In the IWP, many locals do seasonal house 
work (i.e., cleaning, cooking, washing) for tourist families. Even if there are local 
inhabitants with the necessary skills, tourism is often not able to absorb all the available 
skilled labor force. This means that local expectations regarding job opportunities in 
tourism inside protected areas138 may never be met. Second, tourism investments should 
preferably be owned by locals, as this will more easily contribute to local retention of 
wealth.139 In the POPMR, almost all the tourism investments are owned by South African 
nationals. In the IWP, they are also owned by South Africans, many of them are not from 
the region, and a few have their business head offices elsewhere. Third, preference should 
be given to tourism investments that benefit communities. This is the Peace Park 
Foundation’s approach to the POPMR.140 Yet, there are doubts that benefits to local 
communities resulting from tourism development can offset the reduction in areas 
available for resource use near the POPM.141 Even if these conditions are met, there are 
still problems with tourism-led economic growth. By promoting a single sector to drive 
economic development, strong dependence on that sector can be expected to occur, 
reduced income from which will be felt in the off-season.142 Also, tourism development 
often leads to local inflation of prices for basic goods and services, making these less 
accessible to the underprivileged local inhabitants.143  
4.6 Current bottlenecks to bilateral cooperation 
Although each MPA is making progress in addressing the respective challenges, there 
remain specific bottlenecks to effective bilateral cooperation in the protection of marine 
biodiversity and tourism promotion. 
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First, and as recognized by an interviewee working directly in transboundary 
conservation, “the political side of the game is easy; it is making it happen that is 
hard.”144 In particular, on-the-ground implementation is at times complicated by technical 
representatives of South Africa, “the less cooperative partner.”145 Indeed, difficulties in 
cross-border operational communication have been attributed to South Africans wanting 
to solve problems on their own. Law enforcement coordination in particular can 
complicate cooperation because different regulations are applied on each side of the 
border. Indeed, in October 2009, two Mozambican fishing vessels were apprehended by 
South African authorities for allegedly fishing inside South Africa’s side of the 
transboundary MPA.146 After being pursued into Mozambican waters, the two vessels 
were found with endangered bottom fish species protected by South African law but 
apparently not by Mozambican law.147 Though this disparity  suggests that the catch was 
obtained in Mozambican  rather than in South African waters, the crews of the two 
vessels were placed under arrest and eventually deported, causing some tension among 
MPA officers in the POPMR and the IWP.148 As found elsewhere, the absence of a 
delimited maritime boundary between the two countries does not appear, per se, to deter 
cross-border cooperation for law enforcement.149 Because no other reasons were found to 
explain  the less collaborative stand of South African officers, it is concluded that  the 
until recently-strained relations between the two countries still affect cross-border 
cooperation.150 
Second, there are substantial differences between South Africa’s and 
Mozambique’s technical and financial capacities. Funding limitations appear to be the 
reason Mozambique has not yet asphalted the road that runs from the border to Maputo. It 
is not clear if South Africa is negatively affected by this; it is more likely however that 
Mozambique would benefit from improving the road connection between its capital and 
its largest trading partner. In terms of technical capacity for protected area management, 
South African staff has a larger experience because of the country’s history in protected 
area creation and management. Indeed, and because of IWPA’s experience with the 
World Heritage Convention, its staff assisted Mozambique in preparing a proposal for 
POPMR’s area designation as a World Heritage Site.151 In Mozambique, protected area 
staff were substantially reduced during the civil war, but the number of people and the 
level of their training is increasing fast.152 
The assessment of these bottlenecks is preliminary. The Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay 
transboundary MPA is less than 2 years old and so is the POPMR. As management 
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experience accumulates, it is expected that cooperation between the POPMR and the IWP 
will be stronger and spearheaded by activities of common interest. 
4.6 Overcoming bottlenecks to cooperation 
Though cooperation between Mozambique and South Africa faces some bottlenecks that 
may complicate the management of this transboundary MPA, they are not critical. They 
will eventually and likely be overcome in two ways. First, “it will take at least 10 years 
before [the transboundary MPA] is fully functional.”153 In other words, at least a decade is 
needed to strengthen institutional and personal relationships upon which a functional 
transboundary MPA relies. Second, differences in capacity on both sides cannot be 
expected to be overcome in the short term. Indeed, and though this difference is 
recognized on both sides of the border, it has not deterred the creation of the 
transboundary MPA nor its inclusion in the World Heritage Convention tentative list. 
5. DISCUSSION 
In the two previous sections, we explored factors that can facilitate or hamper the regime-
building for transboundary MPAs between Mozambique and Tanzania and between 
Mozambique and South Africa. 
Concerning power and capabilities, a visible difference regarding the creation and 
management of their MPAs was found between Mozambique and South Africa. In 
contrast, Mozambique and Tanzania do not appear to be substantially different in their 
ability to manage their MPAs. Hence, in our two cases, uneven capabilities are associated 
with cooperation in the creation and management of transboundary MPAs. In this sense, 
South Africa can be considered a “benign hegemon”, that is, a state that does not act 
altruistically but exercises positive leadership.154 
In terms of their interests, the three states show opposing inclinations. On the one 
hand, there are some that support cooperation in the creation and management of a 
transboundary MPA; on the other hand, there are others that inhibit cooperation in that 
same regard. This is clearly the case of the proposed transboundary MPA between 
Mozambique and Tanzania, where the potential existence of commercially exploitable oil 
and natural gas appear to be deterring any efforts by Tanzania to involve Mozambican 
officers of the central government, and have likely halted further appreciations of the 
proposal to create the Palma National Reserve. In the Mozambique and South Africa 
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case, where national interests in environmental tourism-led economic development are 
generally aligned, the transboundary MPA is already a reality. 
Knowledge and perception of the role of MPAs in tourism development, fisheries 
management, and poverty reduction were found to shape each state’s interests. Common 
to the three states is the understanding that protected areas reduce poverty, a perceived 
benefit that is undoubtedly in the interest of all, although it is not necessarily a valid one. 
Furthermore, they all share similar views regarding how tourism can be coupled with 
biodiversity conservation, though slightly nuanced in each case. In the Mozambique-
Tanzania case, tourism is seen primarily as a source of revenue to financially support 
MPA management, while in the Mozambique-South Africa case tourism is promoted as a 
driver of economic development. 
Mozambique’s nuanced views of the role of tourism in MPA management can be 
attributed to contextual factors. Its coastal northern region near the border with Tanzania 
is one of the poorest and remotest in the country (2.500 km away from the country’s 
capital). Promoting biodiversity conservation there through MPA creation is more costly 
than creating an MPA closer to the country’s capital, as is the case of the POPMR. Hence, 
tourism is relied on to finance MPA management in this region, a position that is shared 
by Tanzania. 
By considering the role of these factors in regime formation in an integrated 
manner, and by recalling the definition of regime initially presented, we now elaborate on 
whether a regime for transboundary-MPA making exists in each of the two study areas.  
In the case of Mozambique and Tanzania, the two countries share the principle 
that their shared marine environment needs to be protected from negative impacts of 
human activities. They further believe in the norm that coordinated actions need to be 
taken to better protect their shared marine environment. However, Mozambique seems to 
believe that this principle is incompatible with the principle that economic development is 
needed to reduce poverty, which is expressed in the norm that the country needs to 
explore its potential as a hydrocarbon producer. Because principles and norms constitute 
the defining core of regimes,155 we argue that a regime does not exist between 
Mozambique and Tanzania for cooperation to protect their shared marine environment, 
though the two countries share that principle. 
In relation to the Mozambique and South Africa case, the two countries share the 
same belief as Mozambique and Tanzania, with the particularity that protection of the 
marine environment serves, essentially, to support tourism-driven economic development. 
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This is translated into the norm espoused by the two countries that they need to 
coordinate actions to better protect their shared marine environment. The essential 
ingredient for creating this regime is thus defined. The regime is made operational 
through the application of rules and the adoption of decision-making procedures. In other 
words, even if it had not been made operational through the creation of the transboundary 
MPA, it would still be possible to affirm that a regime exists between the two countries 
for transboundary marine conservation. The chief rule in this case is exactly that of the 
creation and active management of the transboundary MPA. Decision-making procedures 
were not identified, though they are most likely to be consensus-oriented. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigated what drives, facilitates and constrains Mozambique, South Africa 
and Tanzania in building bilateral regimes for the establishment and management of 
transboundary MPAs. In particular, we explored how each state’s MPA management 
capabilities, interests in creating (or not) MPAs, the knowledge and perceptions that 
shape these interests, and context, can affect regime formation. We conclude that a 
regime between Mozambique and Tanzania for transboundary marine conservation has 
not yet emerged, whereas there is a well developed one between Mozambique and South 
Africa. The former’s potential for cooperation may never be reached, while the latter’s is 
already being enjoyed, though with some difficulties that will likely wear off with time. 
Simultaneously considering a range of factors that can affect cooperation allowed us to 
enrich our analysis and, hopefully, afford it greater predictability.156 Although the two 
cases addressed in this article are restricted to East Africa, we believe that similar 
prospective analyses can assist decision-makers at various levels in different geographical 
locations to anticipate issues that have the potential to constrain effective transboundary 
marine cooperation. 
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8. DIPLOMATIC AND MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 
Guerreiro, J., Chircop, A., GRILO, C., Viras, A., Ribeiro, R., and van der Elst, R. (2010) 
"Establishing a Transboundary Network of Marine Protected Areas: Diplomatic and 
Management Options for the East African Context", Marine Policy 34(5):896-910. 
Abstract: International conservation efforts and cooperation are increasingly necessary, 
particularly at an ecoregion level, for the achievement of international targets for 
protecting biodiversity and degradation of ecosystems. Whereas more than 11 percent of 
land is protected, less than 1 percent of marine space is similarly protected. 
Transboundary networks of marine protected areas and transboundary marine protected 
areas (TBMPAs) are an essential form of cooperation for meeting these international 
targets. This paper explores the diplomatic and political options for regional and sub-
regional cooperation between Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa, for the 
establishment of transboundary conservation mechanisms in the Eastern African Marine 
Ecoregion (EAME). Five options for the establishment and management of these 
mechanisms are presented, together with actions to be taken to facilitate cooperation. The 
paper deal with a proposed strategy for the implementation of transboundary conservation 
mechanisms, focusing on TBMPAs, between the three countries at a biogeographical/sub- 
regional level, supported by lessons learnt in other transboundary marine conservation 
experiences. The paper concludes that although political will may exist among States 
sharing borders to establish TBMPAs, the complexity of dealing with sub-regional 
realities is a difficult obstacle to overcome in a single step. The situation at each border 
must be taken into account in order that different multi-scale and multivariate solutions, 
supported by a common baseline will ultimately converge in a common trilateral 
framework. Finally, a two-step approach seems to be in course with the declaration 
(October 2009) of a TBMPA linking Ponta do Ouro in Mozambique to iSimangaliso 
Wetland Park in South Africa, following one of the options formerly presented. 
Keywords: Marine protected areas, Transboundary networks, Political options, Eastern 
African marine ecoregion. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Following the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, it became 
widely accepted that protected areas (PAs) were a key mechanism to combat the loss of 
Diplomatic and Management Options 
254 
biodiversity and degradation of ecosystems worldwide. Although several PAs were 
created and became well known prior to the 1972 Conference, it was only then that a 
global approach was consolidated in to the World Conservation Strategy [1]. The Strategy 
in turn lead to the adoption of the World Charter for Nature by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1982 [2]. The process of strengthening the global conservation 
framework reached its peak with the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) in 1992 [3]. The CBD sets the following specific and successive targets for PAs: 
“at least 10 percent of the world’s ecological regions effectively conserved”; 
establishment of a representative protected area systems by 2010; and, in the case of 
marine protected areas (MPAs), the 10 percent target is to be accomplished by 2012 [4]. 
Furthermore, the CBD adopted the Jakarta Mandate (CBD Decision, 1995) [5] which is 
aimed at the conservation of marine and coastal biodiversity and includes a programme of 
action. This trend was reinforced at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) [6] in 2002 by the call of the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) for a global representative system of MPAs [7]. Subsequently, the 5th World 
Parks Congress in 2003 recommended that 20–30 percent of each marine habitat be 
closed to exploitation activities.  
Intuitively, these international commitments are promising; the reality is that 
whereas more than 11 percent of land was protected in some way by 2008, less than 1 
percent of marine space was similarly protected [8,9]. This suggests that initiatives at 
both national and international levels are not sufficient to match expectations and that 
greater efforts at MPA-making are needed. 
Marine conservation typically employs three major mechanisms: the creation of 
MPAs, regulations to protect habitats and endangered species, and fisheries regulation. 
Since these initiatives are mainly implemented at a national scale, they fail to address the 
goal of protection at the level of a biogeographic region. This weakness underlines the 
need to establish representative networks covering the full suite of biological diversity 
(habitats, species and genetic resources) in an ecoregion.  
Frequently, the distribution of species, habitats and ecosystems do not match 
jurisdictional or political boundaries. Thus countries need to establish cooperative 
mechanisms to protect and maintain biodiversity [10]. International organizations 
recognize that, at a minimum, the road to a “global representative system” of PAs 
depends on international cooperation at the level of the ecoregion. As a form of 
international cooperation, transboundary conservation mechanisms such as transboundary 
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networks of MPAs and transboundary MPAs (TBMPAs)1 are an essential tool to reach 
this goal.  
According to Sandwith et al. [12], the establishment of TBMPAs potentially 
enhances transboundary cooperation between countries once the TBMPA is jointly 
managed by the countries involved. Benefits arising from the use of TBMPAs instead of 
single and separate MPAs include the promotion of international cooperation at different 
levels and fora, improved environmental protection across ecosystems, and the assurance 
of better and more efficient resolution of problems (frequently transboundary) such as 
marine pollution.  
The concept of MPA networks is also appealing. Networks represent a large-scale 
approach to conservation planning, which can contribute to the above-mentioned targets 
being met at the global scale and enhanced resilience, which is urgently needed in the 
face of climate change. The establishment of MPA networks potentially assures the 
protection of species and ecosystems, maintenance of genetic connectivity of populations, 
protection of ecological processes fundamental to ecosystem functioning, establishment 
of social and economic networks among stakeholders, and cost sharing, among other 
benefits. In the literature, there is a recognized need for networks of protected areas to be 
created, particularly in the marine environment because species and ecosystems (and even 
coastal communities) are more interconnected than on land, due to, for instance, oceanic 
and tidal currents, biological processes, and human activities [13].  
Following the “transboundary” concept, there can be additional gains if MPA 
networks are also transboundary, i.e., if a national network can be linked to a regional 
network. Enhanced protection of species and ecosystems that cannot be adequately 
protected by only one country, e.g., migratory species or shared ecosystems; improved 
management of transboundary MPAs; enhanced information sharing and exchange of 
technologies and experiences between countries (capacity improvement); and definition 
of common objectives for shared areas, among others, are potential benefits from such 
networks [13].  
While the protected area in a transboundary MPA is jointly managed by the 
countries involved, in a transboundary network of MPAs the protected areas can be 
                                                 
1
 The first transboundary protected area was established in 1932. The Waterton-Glacier International Peace 
Park between the United States and Canada was preceded by the establishment of national parks on each 
side of the border some years earlier [11]. 
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established nationally and each country involved in the network maintains responsibility 
for the management of the area under its jurisdiction. However, all the involved countries 
must share a common understanding of the conservation or sustainable use goals to be 
pursued in these protected areas.  
Recently, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania have begun to explore the 
possibility of the establishment of transboundary marine conservation mechanisms in 
their common border regions and in the Eastern African Marine Ecoregion (EAME). In 
this paper, transboundary marine conservation mechanisms may entail the establishment 
of one or more TBMPAs or a transboundary network of MPAs (which may also include 
one or more TBMPAs).  
This paper explores the diplomatic and political options for regional and sub-
regional cooperation between the three countries for the purpose of transboundary marine 
conservation.2 This type of cooperation has the potential to assist the three countries in 
meeting their CBD marine conservation targets. The paper starts by setting out the 
geographical and ecological context of the sub-region and the countries concerned, 
including the state of transboundary marine conservation initiatives. The paper then sets 
out options for cooperation on transboundary marine conservation, depending on the 
scope and intensity of cooperation based at the starting point back in 2006. The paper 
further identifies actions that would need to be undertaken to strengthen the framework 
for MPA cooperation and a potential strategy leading to the establishment of 
transboundary conservation mechanisms in the sub-region. Finally, the paper ends by 
analysing one of the options effectively chosen by states in October 2009.  
In this paper, a marine protected area is, as proposed by IUCN, “any area of 
intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its overlying water and associated flora, fauna, 
historical and cultural features, which has been reserved by law or other effective means 
to protect part or all of the enclosed environment” [14]. The term transboundary marine 
protected area is used as proposed by Sandwith et al. [12] to mean: “[A]n area of land or 
sea that straddles one or more boundaries between States, sub-national units such as 
provinces and regions, autonomous areas and/or areas beyond the limits of national 
sovereignty or jurisdiction, whose constituting parts are especially dedicated to the 
                                                 
2
 This study was carried out under the EU Project ‘‘Transboundary networks of marine protected areas for 
integrated conservation and sustainable development: biophysical, socio-economic and governance 
assessment in East Africa’’ (TRANSMAP), EU Contract no. INCO-CT2004-510862. 
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protection and maintenance of biological biodiversity, and of natural and associated 
cultural resources, and managed co-operatively through legal and other effective means”. 
According to the IUCN [10], a MPA network can be defined as a “collection of individual 
MPAs or reserves operating cooperatively and synergistically, at various spatial scales, 
and with a range of protection levels that are designated to meet objectives that a single 
reserve cannot achieve”. The terms “border” and “maritime boundary” are used in the 
following manner: border refers in a generic sense to border regions between two 
neighbouring States; boundary is used where a maritime boundary has been delimited 
between those neighbouring States. The term “transboundary” refers to an area covering 
both sides of a border, whether or not a maritime boundary has been delimited. 
2. THE CONTEXT  
2.1. The Eastern African Marine Ecoregion 
The EAME extends from Somalia to South Africa across Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Mozambique for more than 4600 km, covering an area of about 540900 km2, including 
the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Twenty-two million people are 
estimated to depend on the goods and services of that coastal area [15]. The EAME has 
several biodiversity-rich areas, such as mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass beds, beaches, 
and coastal mudflats, some of which are considered to be in a near-pristine condition. It is 
considered one of the top marine ecoregions for biodiversity, supporting ca. 1000 
different seaweed species, several hundred sponge species, over 200 coral species, more 
than 3000 species of mollusks (oysters, cockles, mussels and clams), over 300 species of 
crabs, at least 50 species of starfishes, over 100 species of sea cucumbers, and more than 
1500 species of fish [16]. Key species are well known and include dugongs, turtles, 
whale, sharks, and dolphins, not to mention the coelacanth. All of these species are under 
heavy pressure from exploitation. Thus, they have become the focus of international 
attention and cooperation, such as initiatives led by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
[17]. Due both to the migratory character of several endangered species and the 
interdependence of the several component ecosystems, EAME has become a priority area 
for transboundary marine conservation.  
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The current trend3 in the region is to reinforce the networks of MPAs in order to 
meet the 2012 targets in Eastern Africa. Wells et al. [9] showed that Kenya, Mozambique, 
and Tanzania appear to be on the road to meet the CBD target, with Kenya having 
designated 8.7 percent of its continental shelf as a MPA, as have Tanzania and 
Mozambique at 7.7 and 4 percent, respectively. South Africa recently claimed that 15 
percent of its coast is covered by MPAs as a result of the declaration of four new MPAs 
in 2004 [19].  
At the World Parks Congress in 2003, Tanzania committed to expanding the 
marine area under its protection to 10 percent by 2010, and Mozambique declared its 
intention to implement cross-border reserves with Tanzania and South Africa. Obviously 
the contemporary challenge is to develop cooperative transboundary conservation 
mechanisms to reach the CBD’s 2012 ecoregion protection goal and to achieve not only 
ecological representativeness, but also a transboundary network of MPAs that ensures 
connectivity and effective management. Transboundary conservation mechanisms will 
provide for a more effective management of shared resources and transboundary activities 
(e.g., fishing) between these countries.  
Geographically located between Tanzania and South Africa, Mozambique shares 
with these States sensitive coastal ecosystems like mangroves, coral reefs, estuaries, 
wetlands, sandy and rocky beaches, and seagrass beds.4  
The establishment of MPAs cannot hope to be successful without consideration of 
the site-specific issues in the two border regions considered in this paper such as 
geography, ecological concerns, socio-economic dynamics, and jurisdictional matters, 
which collectively define the conditions for MPA-making efforts. These matters need to 
be addressed as they are conditions that can be expected to affect the effectiveness of 
domestic as well as TBMPAs [20]. Further, the two border regions are so far apart that 
                                                 
3
 Early conservation experiences date back to the 1960s: Inhaca and the Portuguese Islands MPAs 
(Mozambique, 1965); Tsitsikamma National Park (South Africa, 1968); Watamu Marine National Park and 
Malindi-Watamu Marine National Reserve (Kenya, 1968); and Dar es Salaam Reserves (Tanzania, 1975). 
Francis et al. [18] reviewed the historical process of creating and managing MPAs in the area. 
4
 The EU project TRANSMAP has created a GIS platform (Transmap GIS) that allowed the mapping of 
both border areas (Tanzania–Mozambique and Mozambique–South Africa). The platform includes mapping 
of habitats, coastal land and sea uses, physical data, bathymetry, and the maritime zones of the three 
countries. Mapping of habitats in both areas was based on the most recent satellite imagery with appropriate 
resolution and treated to facilitate discrimination of cover by image analysis. Data for baseline mapping was 
sourced from responsible partners and the GIS layers from the data providers and all other GIS data were 
accessioned on the Transmap Meta-database, which was created to include metadata descriptions of 
datasets. 
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they have distinct ecological, socio-economic, and political features. Therefore, a 
contextualized approach is required. 
2.2. The Tanzania–Mozambique border area 
The terrestrial border between Tanzania and Mozambique is defined by the Ruvuma 
River (see Fig. 1a). The two States have also delimited the maritime boundary, including 
the territorial sea and EEZ [21]. Essentially, the border’s coastal geography has an 
archipelagic configuration. Biodiversity in the area is extremely high, and several 
charismatic species have been recorded. These include sea turtles (Caretta caretta (EN),5 
Dermochelys coriacea (CR), Chelonia mydas (EN), Eretmochelys imbricata (CR) and 
Lepidochelys olivacea (VU)), humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae (LC)), minke 
whales (Balaenoptera acutorostrata (LC)), and various dolphins species (Tursiops 
aduncus (DD), Sousa plumbea,6 Stenella longirostris (DD), and Stenella attenuata (LC)) 
[23–28]. Although the region presents suitable habitat conditions to dugongs and 
coelacanth, their status in the region has not been confirmed. As for corals, although an 
accurate inventory is lacking, a study coordinated by the Mozambican Ministry for 
Environmental Coordination (MICOA) in 2006 [29] recorded 125 species of hard corals 
(Scleractina) in the area.  
Local communities on both sides of the border are poor and depend mainly on 
agriculture and artisanal fishing. Fishing mainly occurs in coastal and inshore waters 
using several types of gears. There is also intense cross-border trading. Many families 
have cross-border ethnic and kinship ties (e.g., the Makonde) and share their languages, 
traditions, and lifestyle.  
On the Tanzanian side of the border, extending along the 125 km coastline, the 
Mtwara region has 1.128.523 inhabitants (according to the 2002 census results) [30] with 
the two coastal districts (Mtwara Urban and Mtwara Rural) accounting for 26 percent of 
the region’s total population. The Mtwara region is one of the poorest in the country and 
has some of the least developed infrastructure in Tanzania. Agriculture accounts for 87 
percent of the economy, while artisanal fishing accounts for 5 and 3 percent of economic 
                                                 
5
 According to 2009 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 2009.1 [22]: EN—endangered; CR—
critically endangered; VU—vulnerable; LC—least concern; DD—data deficient; and NT—near threatened. 
6
 Not included on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. 
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activity in Mtwara Rural and Mtwara Urban, respectively [31].7 In recent years, the 
Tanzanian government has launched a series of initiatives to alleviate poverty, namely the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper [32] and the Development Vision 2025 [33]. These 
initiatives have had a direct impact on the Mtwara Region where several projects are 
being developed. In particular, three projects should be highlighted:  
(i) The Mtwara Development Corridor: A spatial development initiative aimed at 
creating an economic growth zone consisting of transborder trade and investment, 
linking Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. This initiative also includes 
the building (and rebuilding) of infrastructure, particularly roads (both in Tanzania 
and Mozambique), as the existing ones are impassable during the rainy season or do 
not exist at all.  
(ii) Tourism is a main vector for development. The 125 km coastline has very attractive 
sandy beaches and several resorts are being planned.  
(iii) Marine compressed natural gas (CNG) exploitation8 is one of the most significant 
industrial developments, with the Mnazi Bay exploration and production concession 
covering a 756 km2 area in southeastern Tanzania in the Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma 
Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP). Illegal fishing, coral mining, large-scale 
mangrove cutting, an increasing number of marine resource users and consequent 
overharvesting have added to the panoply of threats facing this coastal area. 
In 2000, the Tanzanian government responded to increasing environmental threats 
in this area by creating the MBREMP as a multi-purpose MPA. Located across from the 
border with Mozambique, the park covers a total land and sea area of 650 km2 (of which 
200 km2 is marine), with 30000 inhabitants spread over 11 villages. The centerpiece of 
the current management strategy is a general management plan that was approved in 2005 
[34] and is based on a “multiple use” philosophy. The Mtwara Development Corridor also 
enhances and promotes transboundary collaboration in natural resource management.9  
 
                                                 
7
 Nevertheless, as most of fishing is for local and self-consumption, these percentages might be 
underestimated in official statistics. 
8
 This project was submitted to an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and mitigation measures are 
being implemented in coordination with the Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park and Tanzanian 
Marine Parks and Reserves Unit. 
9
 The Tanzanian government is also promoting management of shared resources, notably through its 
negotiations for the management of resources in Lake Nyasa, Lake Tanganyika, and Lake Victoria. 
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Figure 1 – (a) Border area between Tanzania and Mozambique (Source: adapted from Transmap Internet MapServer, 
http://internal.bio3.pt/transmap/default.asp, as of 21 April 2009). Description: (a) shows the northern border area with 
the terrestrial boundary between the two countries defined by the Ruvuma River. Existing MPAs are also shown, 
namely the MBREMP in Tanzania, located immediately across from the border with Mozambique, and the QNP in 
Mozambique, which is about 175 km distant from the border. Legend: MBREMP—Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary 
Marine Park, QNP—Quirimbas National Park. (b) Shows the Border area between Mozambique and South Africa 
(Source: adapted from Transmap Internet MapServer http://internal.bio3.pt/transmap/default.asp, as of 21 April 2009). 
Description: (b) shows the southern border area between Mozambique and South Africa. Existing MPAs are also 
shown, namely the IINR in Mozambique and the IWP in South Africa. Legend: IINR—Inhaca Island Natural Reserve, 
IWP—iSimangaliso Wetland Park (formerly Greater St. Lucia Wetland Park, GSLWP). 
 
The Province of Cabo Delgado on the Mozambique side of the border has an 
extensive coastline (380 km) and includes the Quirimbas Archipelago, which is 
comprised of 28 islands. Its population size is similar to Mtwara (1.287.815 inhabitants, 
according to the 1997 National Census). Eighty-three percent of the population lives in 
rural areas. Like Mtwara in Tanzania, Cabo Delgado is one of the poorest provinces of 
Mozambique. Agriculture, fisheries, and forestry employ 92 percent of population. With 
26.386 people involved in fishing activities, this is one of the key commercial and trading 
sectors [35]. Logging is both a dynamic activity and a major threat to the coastal 
environment as there is evidence of illegal logging and timber exports as a consequence 
of increasing economic pressures and weak law enforcement [36]. The Cabo Delgado 
Province Strategic Development Plan addresses the poverty issue and identifies the three 
key sectors for enhanced production of goods and services: (i) oil and gas development, 
(ii) tourism and (iii) artisanal fisheries.  
The nearest coastal protected area to Mozambique’s border is the Quirimbas National 
Park (QNP), which is 175 km from the border with Tanzania. The QNP was created in 
Diplomatic and Management Options 
262 
2002 with a total area of 7506 km2, of which 1522 km2 are marine. The park encompasses 
6 districts, 40 villages and has a population approximately 95.000 [37]. The park’s 
management plan contains provisions for local communities’ participation. The 
Mozambican government plans to create a protected area adjacent to MBREMP that 
covers both land and marine areas on their side of the border. The future Ruvuma-Palma 
National Reserve (RPNR) will constitute a decisive step in the development of 
transboundary conservation mechanisms and is evidence of the common political 
commitment to conservation between Tanzania and Mozambique. The Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) and the World Bank (WB) are funding two major projects in 
the MBREMP (Tanzania) and QNP (Mozambique).10 Further, the establishment of 
TBMPAs between Tanzania and Mozambique is one of the priority activities of the 
Tanzania Marine and Coastal Environmental Management Project (MACEMP),11 
supported by the World Bank [40].   
2.3. The Mozambique–South Africa border area 
Mozambique and South Africa have not yet delimited their adjacent territorial sea and 
EEZ boundaries. The area considered in this study (see Fig. 1b) stretches from Maputo 
Bay (including Inhaca Island) to Ponta do Ouro and into South Africa down to the 
southern limit of the iSimangaliso Wetland Park (IWP,12 formerly Greater St. Lucia 
Wetland Park (GSLWP)). The IWP includes a marine reserve component that is 5 km 
wide and extends for 155 km along the South African coast. Mozambique’s coastal areas 
are mainly dominated by sandy beaches. These ecosystems, together with coral reefs, link 
Ponta do Ouro and Kosi Bay. These coral reefs are considered to be the most southern in 
the world.  
Crossing the border area, 32 marine mammal species have been recorded at IWP 
that are both internationally threatened and listed in CITES appendices. Populations of 
bottlenose Tursiops truncatus (LC) and T. aduncus (DD), humpback S. plumbea and S. 
chinensis (NT), and spinner S. longirostris (DD) dolphins live in the waters of the park. 
                                                 
10
 The development of the MBREMP is being financed, since 2002, by GEF and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). Other institutions, such as IUCN and the Fonds Français pour 
l’Environnement Mondial (FFEM) are also supporters. The project’s target is the protection and sustainable 
use of the marine biodiversity and resources of the MPA [38]. Biodiversity conservation and training 
activities in the QNP are funded by FFEM and the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) [39]. 
11
 The MBREMP and QNP management plans resulted from this process. 
12
 The IWP resulted from the aggregation of 13 formerly protected areas and has been a World Heritage 
Site since 1999 [41]. 
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Winter migrations of the humpback whale, M. novaeangliae (LC), and the southern right 
whale, Eubalaena australis (LC) have also been recorded [42]. Leatherback turtles, D. 
coriacea (CR), have an estimated population of 2500, of which 750 are female. Non-
breeding green turtles, C. mydas (EN), are also resident, while hawksbill, E. imbricata 
(CR), and olive ridley, L. olivacea (VU), turtles visit the coast. Most of these species 
move across the border and up to Maputo Bay. Coral species (129) are particularly 
important for their conservation and scientific value. Regarding ichthyofauna,13 nearly 85 
percent of the reef fish species endemic to the West Indian Ocean are present in this area. 
Notably, the coelacanth Latimeria chalumnae (CR) is found here as the area has ideal 
habitat for this species in its canyons [43]. The ragged-tooth shark Odontaspis ferox (DD) 
and the whale shark Rhincodon typus (VU) have also been recorded here.  
The movement of people in this area is mainly related to tourism, principally from 
South Africa to southern Mozambique and from Maputo to Ponta do Ouro. The high 
concentration of people resulting from tourism has a negative impact on the sand dunes 
and beaches. Sport fishing, often illegal, together with scuba diving,14 constitutes a major 
threat to coral reef conservation in the area. Over the next few years both the South 
African and Mozambican governments foresee strong development in tourism in this 
area. They hope to develop the “Lubombo Tourism Route,” as proposed under the 
Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative, in to one of the most desirable international 
destinations in the region. Their intention is to double the number of bed nights to four 
million by 2010 [45, 46]. At the same time, the Government of Mozambique has 
expanded the long existing Bazaruto National Park, which is now one of the largest 
MPAs in the region.15 Traditional activities in the MPA are linked to artisanal fisheries. 
The National Small Scale Fisheries Institute (IDPPE) [47] estimates 2171 fishers using 
boats and 3007 collectors of marine invertebrates’ resources operate in Maputo province, 
particularly in Maputo Bay. 
On the other side of the border, in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), 19 communities have 
been identified as subsistence (or small-scale commercial) fishing communities and 43 
                                                 
13
 Sawfish are a species that is considered critically endangered [22], and recent studies treat this species as 
extinct in South African waters. Thus, there is an urgent need to protect the population of southern 
Mozambique and to put a stock recovery plan in place. 
14
 Pereira [44] estimates that there are approximately 7000 dives per year along this stretch of Mozambican 
coast. 
15
 Studies, including TRANSMAP, are currently under way to identify other areas of potential interest for 
biodiversity conservation and to facilitate the establishment of a transboundary network of MPAs in this 
part of the EAME region. 
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Local Subsistence Co- Management Communities have been established [48–50]. There 
are many traditional and historic ties between families in northern South Africa and 
southern Mozambique, particularly those of Tembe/Thonga tribal heritage, which have 
encouraged the development of cross-border trade in fish, meat, and other goods [51]. 
According to Lemm and Atwood [52], there is also cross-border fisheries poaching from 
Mozambique, both from South African recreational vessels launched at Ponta do Ouro 
and by Mozambican semi-industrial fishing vessels.  
In the border region, both governments have initiated conservation measures. In 
2000, Mozambique signed a protocol with South Africa establishing the Lubombo Ponta 
do Ouro–Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area 
[53]. The protocol falls under the General Trans-Frontier Conservation and Resource 
Area Protocol [54] between Mozambique, South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland. 
Article 2 of the General TransFrontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol sets out 
the goals and mechanisms for the creation of a transboundary PA (referred to as 
transfrontier protected area, TFCA). It draws upon the terms of several international 
agreements to which the three States are Parties, in particular the CBD. The Protocol 
defines the TFCA as “a specific geographical area divided by one or more political 
borders, which is identified by two or more of the parties to be the subject of TFCA 
management” and calls for “the development of joint strategies for trans frontier 
ecological planning and resources management”. The Protocol established a TFCA 
Commission with powers and means “for the successful achievement of TFCA 
objectives”. 
3. EXPLORING THE RANGE OF DIPLOMATIC AND MANAGEMENT 
OPTIONS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY MARINE CONSERVATION IN EAST 
AFRICA  
3.1. Precursors 
Transboundary environmental conservation cooperation is a growing trend 
internationally. A global survey of such cooperation indicates the existence of 188 
transboundary cooperative arrangements, involving 818 PAs (both terrestrial and marine) 
in 112 States [11]. To broaden this assessment and to identify as much information and as 
many experiences as possible, several examples of transboundary cooperation for nature 
conservation were analysed. These examples were not restricted to formal MPAs or to 
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tropical regions, but also included examples of international cooperation and temperate 
regions which might contribute to further analysis of the options presented in this case 
study. A short resume of the features of these examples is presented in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
Table 1 - Examples of international cooperation for nature conservation surveyed in this case study. 
Name 
Establishment 
(agreements 
signed or 
established) 
Total 
area 
(km2) 
Area per 
country (km2) Motivation 
Process 
initiation 
Implementing 
and 
management 
instruments 
Great 
Limpopo 
Transfrontier 
Park 
2002 34.778,84 
 
LNPa 10.812,11 
KNPb 19.031,22 
GNPc 4935,51 
Conservation of 
transboundary 
ecosystems 
Direct tri-
national 
negotiations 
and 
arrangements 
with 
international 
support 
International 
Treaty 
Joint 
Management Plan 
Strategic 
Integrated 
Management Plan 
for the GLTPd 
Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef 
System 
1997 - - 
Protect the largest 
coral reef system 
in the Western 
Hemisphere from 
multiple threats 
Joint 
declaration 
(the Tulum 
Declaration) 
that joins four 
countries in 
conserving the 
MBRSe 
Tulum 
Declaration 
Sustainable 
Development 
Policy for 
Fisheries, Tourism 
and Marine 
Protected Areas in 
the MBRS 
Chetumal 
Declaration 
(fisheries) 
Agreement on 
Common 
enforcement in the 
MBRS 
Geographical Area 
Rennovation 
Agreement 
North 
America 
Marine 
Protected 
Areas 
Network 
1999 - - 
Facilitate strategic 
design and 
establishment of a 
system of MPAsf 
throughout North 
America 
Tri-national 
workshop 
 (North American 
Agreement on 
Environmental 
Cooperation, 
1993) 
Turtle Islands 
Heritage 
Protected 
Area 
1996 2447,31 My
g
 17,64 
Phh 2429,67 
Protection of 
Marine Turtles 
Joint work 
groups 
Memorandum of 
Agreement 
Wadden Sea 1982 9191,04 
Dni 2465,14 
Gej 4038,67 
Ntk 2687,23 
Protection of an 
important tidal 
wetland with a 
great incidence of  
human uses 
Cooperation in 
Trilateral 
Conferences 
since 1978 
Joint Declaration 
on the Protection 
of the Wadden Sea 
Trilateral Wadden 
Sea Plan 
Description: This table summarises the characteristics of the examples of transboundary cooperation for nature 
conservation analysed in this paper. The description includes geographical aspects, such as the total area set aside for 
nature conservation by country, as well as details on the establishment, implementation and management of these areas. 
aLimpopo National Park. bKruger National Park. cGonarezhou National Park. dGreat Limpopo Transfrontier Park. 
eMesoamerican Barrier Reef System. fMarine Protected Areas. gMalaysia. hPhilippines. iDenmark. jGermany. 
kNetherlands. 
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Table 2 - Relevant institutions established under the GLTP, MBRS, NAMPAN, TIHPA and Wadden Sea. 
Name 
Type of 
conservation 
mechanism 
Administration Management/ implementation Technical Other  institutions 
Great 
Limpopo 
Transfrontier 
Park 
Transboundary 
Terrestrial 
Protected Area 
Tri-national 
Ministerial 
Committee 
Joint Management 
Board (Equal 
representatives from 
the three countries) 
GLTP Management 
 
International 
technical 
committee (main 
State conservation 
agencies of the 
three countries) 
The three governments 
Donor institutions 
(Financial support) 
Mesoamerican 
Barrier Reef 
System 
Transboundary 
Network of 
Marine 
Protected 
Areas 
Governments of 
the four countries 
Governments of the 
four countries 
through: 
SICAa 
CCADb 
Project Coordination 
Unit 
BEMAMCCORc 
TRIGOHd 
n. a. 
GEF 
World Bank 
(Financial support) 
North America 
Marine 
Protected 
Areas Network 
Transboundary 
Network of 
Marine 
Protected 
Areas 
CECe 
CEC’s Council 
(Cabinet-level 
environment 
officials from the 
three countries or 
their designates 
CEC 
CEC’s Council 
Joint Public 
Advisory (group of 
five citizens from 
each country) 
Secretariat 
(environmental 
experts from the 
three countries) 
n. a. n. a. 
Turtle Islands 
Heritage 
Protected Area 
Transboundary 
Marine 
Protected Area 
Sabah Parks of 
Malaysia 
Department of 
Environmental and 
Natural Resources 
of Philippines 
Project Management 
Teams 
Joint management 
ASEANf Marine 
Turtle Specialist 
Group 
 
University 
Malaysia Sarawak 
Institute of 
Biodiversity and 
Environmental 
Conservation of 
Malaysia 
Institute of 
Biodiversity and 
Environmental 
Conservation of 
Malaysia and 
Philippines (Literature 
survey carried out by 
Malaysia) 
Wadden Sea 
Transboundary 
Network of 
Marine 
Protected 
Areas 
Trilateral 
Governmental 
Conference 
Senior Officials 
Trilateral Working 
Group 
Trilateral 
Monitoring and 
Assessment Group 
Trilateral Data-
handling Group 
Monitoring Expert 
Groups 
 Trilateral Seal 
Expert Groupg 
n. a. n. a. 
Description: The table shows the most relevant institutions involved in the administration and 
management/implementation of the examples of international cooperation for nature conservation analysed in this 
paper. Technical and other institutions (namely funders) are also identified, as applicable. aSystem for Central American 
Integration. bCentral American Commissionon Environment and Development. cBelize-Mexico Alliance for the 
Management of Common Coastal Resources. dTri-National Alliance for the Gulf of Honduras. eCommission for 
Environmental Cooperation. fASEAN—Association of South East Asian Nations. gResponsible for the implementation 
of the Seal Management Plan. The Seal Management Plan encompasses a trilateral monitoring of the populations of 
harbor seal (Phoca vitulina) that occur in the Wadden Sea. In the past years a virus emerged, the 
phocinedistempervirus, which has affected these populations. Therefore, the management plan aims, among other 
things, to eradicate or low the incidence of the epidemic virus. 
 
In contrast with terrestrial experiences, there are relatively few examples of 
TBMPAs. The Turtles Islands Heritage Protected Area (TIHPA) in the Sulu Sea between 
Malaysia and the Philippines was possibly the first TBMPA. It was established in 1996 to 
protect the nesting grounds of sea turtles. It is comprised of nine islands, of which six are 
in the Philippines and three are in Malaysia. TIHPA represents the first effort to take 
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conservation across international boundaries in an entirely marine context and represents 
a formal TBMPA that is administrated and managed jointly by two States. TIHPA is also 
notable for being created despite the conflict over the delimitation of a maritime border 
between Malaysia and Philippines.  
The Wadden Sea16 and the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System (MBRS) Project 
are examples of areas where strong cooperation exists between the States involved, and 
where separate protected areas in the marine environment already exist. The Wadden Sea 
is jointly protected through political agreements involving Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands. It consists of an extensive area of nature reserves and natural parks,17 
together with a major part of the particularly sensitive sea area (PSSA) established in the 
region by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2001. The complexity of the 
ecological interdependencies and uses of the Wadden Sea area showed that it was not 
enough to protect only those areas with the highest ecological value. Therefore, the 
protected areas already referenced have been integrated into a legally binding 
conservation area (representing almost two-thirds of the Wadden Sea).18 A larger area, the 
Wadden Sea Cooperation and Management Area, was established to enable the three 
countries to address all issues pertaining the Wadden Sea. Cooperation started in 1978, 
and trilateral governmental conferences have taken place every 3 or 4 years to set out 
cooperative trilateral initiatives in the Wadden Sea. 
The Project for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of the MBRS is specifically 
devoted to transboundary networks of MPAs, and involves Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, 
and Honduras. The main motivation for protecting the region is the existence of the 
largest coral reef system in the Western Hemisphere (second longest in the world), which 
faces multiple threats from overfishing, industrial shipping, agriculture, uncontrolled 
mass tourism, coastal and watershed development with improper urban sewage, garbage 
disposal, and climate change. There are 15 priority MPAs within the MBRS 
transboundary zones. In fact, the MBRS region includes over 60 gazetted MPAs, 
                                                 
16
 The Wadden Sea is an important tidal wetland, extending along the North Sea coast of Denmark, 
Germany and Netherlands. It is surrounded by densely populated and industrialized areas that support 
human activities such as gas and oil exploitation, tourism and fisheries. 
17
 The Wadden Sea nature reserves and national parks could be considered as MPAs since the areas covered 
are largely marine areas. However, none of the littoral countries include MPA designation in their 
conservation laws. 
18
 This trilateral conservation area consists of the National Planning Decree area in the Netherlands, three 
national parks in Germany, and the Wildlife and Nature Reserve in Denmark [55]. 
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although many of these only exist on paper and lack an effective management regime 
[11]. Fifteen representative MPAs of importance to multinational stakeholders were 
chosen to be the focus of MBRS in or near transboundary sites.  
The North America Marine Protected Areas Network (NAM- PAN) is a 
trinational project—United States, Canada and Mexico—involving a vast group of 
individual and institutional stakeholders and areas along the Pacific coast. These three 
States, with the United States as the “middle State”, as is the case for Mozambique, were 
partners on trade and environmental issues before the NAMPAN project commenced. 
This established pattern of cooperation facilitated the establishment of NAMPAN, which 
was suggested during a trinational workshop in1999. Canada, Mexico and the United 
States worked to establish NAMPAN with the support of the Biodiversity Programme of 
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a trinational intergovernmental 
organization.19 Although the level of commitment to such initiatives fluctuates, there are 
never the less ongoing transboundary arrangements and further reinforcement of 
cooperation is expected.  
In Africa, the idea of transboundary cooperation was first articulated by the 
Belgian colonial authorities in 1929 between Rwanda and Congo. Early in 1925, Africa’s 
first national park was established by Belgium, covering the western half of the Virunga 
Mountains. In 1929, the Belgian authorities expanded Albert National Park to include all 
of the Virunga Mountains, which covered the two colonies of the Belgian Congo and 
Ruanda-Urundi. This initiative constituted the first incipient transboundary park. When 
the colonies gained independence in the 1960s, the park was split into the Virunga 
National Park of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Volcanos National Park 
of Rwanda [56]. However, Africa’s first formally declared transboundary PA, the 
Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, was established between South Africa and Botswana only 
in 2000. It is also in Africa, specifically in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) area, that one can find the only organization dedicated to promoting 
transboundary conservation programs—the Peace Parks Foundation.  
                                                 
19
 The CEC is an intergovernmental organization established by the three governments under the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. It was created to address regional environmental 
concerns, to help prevent potential trade and environmental conflicts, and to promote the effective 
enforcement of environmental law. 
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Transboundary nature conservation has a long record in the EAME sub-region, 
having been formalized through following treaties:  
(1) Treaty between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique, the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe on the Establishment of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) 
established in 200220 [58];  
(2) Bilateral Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Botswana 
and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the Recognition of the Kgalagadi 
Transfrontier Park signed in 1999 [59];  
(3) Treaty between the Government of the Republic of Namibia and the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa on the Establishment of the 
[Ai|Ais/Richtersveld] Transfrontier Park established in 2003 [60]; and  
(4) Lubombo Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier 
Conservation and Resource Area Protocol signed in 2000 [53]. The GLTP and the 
General Trans-Frontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol offered the best 
prospects for providing a working legal and political basis for a TBMPA between 
Mozambique and South Africa.  
The GLTP21 served as one of the models for the implementation of the strategy 
presented in this article, once similar steps have been followed. First, the process has 
involved three countries, such as the case presented here. Second, after the signing of the 
MoU between the three countries, reflecting the political support, working groups were 
created under a technical committee, which was operational under the ministerial 
committee. To facilitate the process, an international coordinator was appointed, being 
                                                 
20
 The GLTP is a terrestrial protected area that became a reality in 2002, when the heads of State of 
Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe signed an international treaty to establish this transboundary 
protected area. Its objectives are to foster international collaboration, enhance ecosystem integrity and 
natural ecological processes, generate revenue for local peoples, maintain a sub-regional economic base, 
and develop transborder ecotourism as a means for fostering regional socio-economic development [57]. 
The GLTP links protected areas already established (Kruger National Park in South Africa—19 031 km2; 
Limpopo National Park in Mozambique—10 812 km2; Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe—4935 
km2), comprising a total area of about 35000 km2. Kruger National Park was established in 1898; 
Gonarezhou National Park was established in 1934; and Limpopo National Park was proclaimed in 2001, 
replacing the Coutada 16 area. Despite the international treaty, the GLTP is yet to be officially opened. 
21
 The process formally started in 1996 when the first negotiations occurred and a development plan was 
conceived for what would eventually be the GLTP. The memorandum of understanding for the GLTP was 
finally signed in November 2000 and the establishment treaty was formalized in December 2002. Both the 
GLTP and TIHPA represent formal transboundary protected areas with joint administration. 
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this position rotary every 2 years between the three countries. Finally, the process 
culminated on a high level meeting, where the trilateral treaty for the establishment of the 
GLTP was signed by countries involved. The technical committee was transformed in to a 
joint management board and working groups into management committees, which will 
deal with several issues, including conservation, legislation, resources and tourism [57]. 
In the case of the General Trans-Frontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol, 
signed by Mozambique, South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland, it provides a legal 
and political basis, once it calls for the development of transfrontier conservation areas, 
and also for joint strategies for transfrontier planning and management and the 
establishment of mechanisms for joint supervision and decision-making between the three 
countries [54]. Although this general protocol does not refer explicitly to marine and 
coastal areas, it includes five protocols, one of which being the Lubombo Ponta do Ouro-
Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol, 
referred above. This protocol refers to a TFCA between Mozambique and South Africa, 
focusing on marine and coastal environments, and thus constituted a main anchor for the 
steps to follow in the creation of the TBMPA at the Mozambique/South Africa border.  
Although these models of transboundary protected areas provide useful lessons for 
decision-makers, any arrangements for a new transboundary conservation mechanism 
must be placed in the context of the EAME region. In particular, decision makers will 
need to take into consideration the unique features of the three States establishing 
transboundary mechanisms in the two border regions, with one State (i.e., Mozambique) 
having both of its borders covered. This almost unprecedented situation requires unique 
political, institutional and management arrangements from other marine conservation 
cooperation initiatives in the region. 
3.2. Potential options  
Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania, once took the political decision to cooperate in 
the establishment of transboundary conservation mechanisms to contribute to achieving 
their marine ecoregion conservation goals, had a range of diplomatic and management 
options to consider. These options are presented and discussed in turn below. One end of 
the range pointed to the least amount of cooperation, while the other end indicated the 
highest degree of cooperation. These options were considered at two levels: the first level 
hypothesized a trilateral approach, whereby Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania 
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agree to act in concert on a subregional basis; the second level considered the two 
transboundary sites separately in the event that the sites were not evenly prepared for 
transboundary conservation mechanisms. It was conceivable at the starting point that an 
option considered realistic for one transboundary site might not be desirable for the other 
site. Furthermore, even as both Tanzania and South Africa had moved to create MPA sat 
their borders with Mozambique, they were faced with the situation that Mozambique was 
still in the process of establishing MPAs at its borders with each of these countries. 
Neither the Mtwara Development Corridor to the north, nor the more specific General 
Trans-Frontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol to the south, specifically 
address the TBMPA approach. 
3.2.1. Option 1: independently established and managed MPAs on both sides of the 
border 
Under this option, the neighbouring States could simply proceed with the establishment 
of MPAs within the irrespective maritime zones, guided by common ecosystem 
objectives. The three States could establish these independently, ideally in coordination, 
but not necessarily contemporaneously. The resulting MPAs on either side of the 
maritime boundary would be established in accordance with national laws and would 
only, therefore, be subject to the national planning and management regime. This 
approach partly reflects the starting situation as South Africa and Tanzania had already 
established MPAs in their border regions with Mozambique. Mozambique had yet to 
implement MPAs near either border. However, this situation was to change with the 
implementation of the Ruvuma-Palma National Reserve in the northern Mozambique and, 
particularly, the Lubombo Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier 
Conservation and Resource Area Protocol in the south border (between Mozambique and 
South Africa). Several precursors of TBMPAs in other regions (see Tables 1 and 2) 
started the process with a simple memorandum of understanding and independently 
established MPAs. For example, TIHPA took 20 years from the idea of a TBMPA to 
conclusion of the actual agreement between the governments of the two States. A similar 
approach could be followed at both borders with Mozambique, even as these autonomous 
processes continue. The three countries have already produced statements and agreements 
at a bilateral level that provide adequate ground for a step towards adoption of 
transboundary conservation mechanisms. 
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3.2.2. Option 2: independently established and managed MPAs, but including a regime of 
management cooperation through information-sharing 
The second option is really just an extension of the first. Independently established MPAs 
in either or both of the border regions, which would be subject to a national planning and 
management regime, would be accompanied by the concurrent establishment of a 
management cooperation regime through information sharing. States on each side of the 
border would level the playing field in terms of scientific, technical and other information 
needs to encourage achievement of stated common ecosystem objectives. The three States 
could also embark on a coordinated monitoring programme. For example, the 
implementation of the TIHPA was fostered by the establishment of working groups, 
support from regional and international institutions, and guidelines development.22 
However, the ultimate decision-making authority within each MPA (e.g., whether there 
should be resource access, by whom, total allowable catch, seasons, etc.), would remain 
within each State. This seemed a viable option because of the existence of the Mtwara 
Corridor initiative in the northern border area and the Lubombo Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay 
Marine and Coastal Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol in the 
southern border area. Although it would constitute a relatively low level of commitment, 
this would serve as an intermediate stage to achieving a TBMPA. Again, a memorandum 
of agreement, similar to that creating the TIHPA, or simply a joint declaration, such as the 
Tulum Declaration that initiated the MBRS,23 would reinforce the political statements 
already produced at either a bilateral or trilateral level. Actually, this ended to be the way 
chosen by Mozambique government with the declaration, on the past 21 August, 2009 
[61], of the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve with an area of 678 km2 stretching 
                                                 
22
 The goal of this TBMPA plan is the sustainable use of natural resources, which calls for a gap analysis in 
management and training needs, forward looking management plans, and training programmes. Both 
governments have also identified development of an ecotourism programme as a priority. Today, TIHPA 
serves as a model for future transboundary marine parks around the world. 
23
 The process of establishing the MBRS project started with the Tulum Declaration in 1997, a joint 
declaration that called on the four littoral States of the MBRS and its partners in the region to join in 
developing an action plan for its conservation and sustainable use. The four countries were already 
signatories of the main international conventions on the environment, as well as of several regional 
conventions (e.g., 1991 the Tuxtla Mechanism, a presidential agreement between Central America and 
Mexico concerning projects supported by international cooperation; the 1992 Convention for the 
Conservation of Biodiversity and the Protection of Priority Wild Areas in Central America, concerning 
protected boundary areas; and the 1995 Mesoamerican biological corridor). The MBRS Project had its 
official launch in Belize in June 2001 in the presence of the Prime Minister of Belize and Ministers of the 
Environment from the Mesoamerican States. This represented the first phase of a 15-year conceptualized 
programme. 
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three nautical miles out to the sea and aiming the “protection of coastal marine species 
and their habitats”. Thus a process initiated 5 years before gave birth to 300 km of MPAs 
extending from Maputo Bay in Mozambique, to Cape St. Lucia in South Africa, the 
Southern boundary of the iSimangaliso Wetland Park. Furthermore, a transfrontier task 
team, consisting of relevant agencies24 from both countries is foreseen, in order to 
coordinate oversight of shared resources. 
3.2.3. Option 3: coordinated establishment and management of MPAs 
This option would see the establishment of national MPAs on both sides of the border, 
with a higher degree of cooperation in the planning, designation and management of the 
MPAs than in the first two options. Option 3 entails significant bilateral technical 
cooperation, extending beyond a regime of information sharing to include common 
consideration of issues such as ecosystem objectives, no-take zones, and resource access. 
This option requires higher degrees of political and bilateral commitments by the 
respective bureaucracies of the three States. Leading agencies should be identified (as in 
TIHPA) and bilateral or trilateral consultation committees created as fora for consultation 
and coordination in the management of resources and for the development of efficient 
management guidelines and measures. Again, the MBRS project offers a model to 
consider as it involves two border commissions at the north and the south of a central 
State.25  
3.2.4. Option 4: joint establishment of two transboundary MPAs 
                                                 
24
 Particularly the Transfrontier Conservation Areas Unit of Mozambique and the iSimangaliso Wetland 
Park. 
25
 The MBRS Project established two transboundary park commissions for the management of shared 
marine and coastal resources: the Transboundary Park Commission of the Northern Zone 
(BEMAMCCOR—Belize-Mexico Alliance for the Management of Common Coastal Resources), 
comprised of Mexico and Belize, and the Transboundary Park Commission of the Southern Zone 
(TRIGOH—Tri-National Alliance for the Gulf of Honduras), comprised of Belize, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. These commissions serve as a forum for consultation, coordination, convergence and mutual 
effort in the management of resources, and they have provided a series of guidelines and measures for the 
efficient management of the MBRS. More specifically, features addressed in the MBRS project include the: 
(i) establishment of new protected areas and strengthening of existing ones; (ii) strengthening of 
regulations; (iii) evaluation of community-based alternative livelihoods to reduce the impacts of fisheries; 
(iv) assessment of limiting factors; (v) analysis of load capacity of TBMPAs; (vi) expansion of a 
conservation investment matrix/map that identifies key conservation partners, their levels of investment, 
main strategies, expected impacts and stressors of the Mesoamerican Reef System; (vii) identification of 
areas of overlap and potential collaboration; and (viii )ecotourism planning. 
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Option 4 requires a high degree of political commitment between the three States, for 
either or both sites. Unlike the first three options, this option would have the neighbouring 
States jointly designating the TBMPA independent of the steps already taken at the 
national level by Tanzania and South Africa. Further, the TBMPA would not be managed 
as two separate areas at the national level, but rather through a joint commission 
composed of administrative, scientific and technical personnel. This option would require 
a complex agreement setting out the mandate of the authority, delegation of powers and 
functions, establishment of working relationships between the national enforcement 
authorities on both sides of the border at the two sites, arrangements that would enable the 
implementation of commission-directed measures, development of an appropriate legal 
framework at both the bilateral and national levels, provisions for funding, and a dispute 
settlement mechanism. Some of the foundations for this option result of the Mtwara 
agreement and the Lubombo Ponta do Ouro-Kosi Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier 
Conservation and Resource Area Protocol and could be developed under a roadmap 
model similar to the NAMPAN Project,26 which was formally initiated with a trinational 
workshop in1999. Further, the three countries share strong bilateral and trilateral 
commercial and political relationships under SADC, which could serve as an umbrella 
agreement similar to that of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).27 The 
model of the Wadden Sea is also relevant as it includes a trilateral government conference 
and strong mechanisms for trilateral management, which are supported by expert groups 
and a common management plan. 
3.2.5. Option 5: trilateral sub-regional diplomatic and management agreement 
                                                 
26
 US President George W. Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and Mexican President Felipe 
Calderón identified work under the NAMPAN as a “key accomplishment” in a joint statement issued on 
August 21, 2007, at their meeting in Montebello, Quebec: “To improve the ecological health of our shared 
marine resources, our governments continued to expand the North American Marine Protected Areas 
(MPA) Network. The Network will use our countries’ marine protected areas in the development of a tri-
national MPA-based monitoring programme stretching from Baja to the Bering Strait” [62]. 
27
 The NAMPAN project complements the environmental provisions of NAFTA. The goal of NAMPAN is 
to work with a tri-national, multi-sectoral group of stakeholders to establish an effective system of North 
American MPA networks to enhance and strengthen protection of marine biodiversity. Currently, the 
project addresses targets from the 2003 Strategic Plan for North American Cooperation in the Conservation 
of Biodiversity [63], coordinated by the CEC. The first goal (out of six) of the Strategic Plan is to promote 
cooperation for the conservation and maintenance of North American regions of ecological significance. To 
be included in NAMPAN, the MPAs need to contain biodiversity that is shared by the three States and is 
threatened and already subject to join efforts. Further, the MPAs also need to be able to share information, 
institutional capacity, and infrastructure, and demonstrate a high chance of success, visibility and public 
support. 
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This fifth and final option could be considered an extension of option 4, but with added 
value at the sub-regional level. In pursuit of common marine ecoregion conservation 
objectives, the three States could consider a sub-regional agreement under the Nairobi 
Protocol Concerning Protected Areas and Wild Fauna and Flora in the Eastern African 
Region, 1985 [64]. The added value of this approach is a higher degree of integration of 
cooperative conservation efforts pursuant to the United Nation Environmental 
Programme’s Regional Seas Programme regime commitments of the three States. A 
formal trilateral treaty model could be based on the experience of GLTP with its 
international technical committees, joint management board, and Tri-National Ministerial 
Committee. Although in the EAME case the two areas are separated, if we consider the 
MBRS lessons regarding anchoring MPA management in both international and regional 
conventions, the region could adopt a similar system for the protection of a marine 
ecoregion. Again, lessons learned from the Wadden Sea experience, particularly those 
concerning trilateral cooperative arrangements, could be supportive of this approach. The 
Wadden Sea initiative also has benefited from the inclusion of measures from various 
international and regional instruments (e.g., PSSAs established by IMO, the Convention 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, the Convention 
on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, the Natura 2000 
Network, and the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy). This initiative offers a 
good example of a multinational marine protection approach based on international 
instruments and national protected areas that is anchored by trilateral cooperation.  
3.3. Strategic relationship between options 
The above options can be considered as either alternative courses of action, or as a 
stepped approach to reaching the highest degree of transboundary marine conservation 
cooperation at the sub-regional level. There can be various reasons why three States 
might not be willing to proceed immediately with the highest degree of cooperation in a 
marine setting, or to cooperate as intensively as they do for transboundary terrestrial 
protected areas. First, they might not be ready politically, possibly because of an 
outstanding bilateral issue such as the undelimited territorial sea and EEZ boundaries 
between Mozambique and South Africa, or the perception that a TBMPA might affect 
either State’s position in delimiting these boundaries. Nevertheless, this was precisely the 
situation faced by Malaysia and the Philippines in establishing TIHPA and it did not 
impinge on the creation of the TBMPA. Second, the three States might be concerned over 
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their lack of understanding of the shared marine environment and the commitments they 
would assume under a TBMPA. This suggests that they might want to take a more 
cautious, incremental approach and increase their cooperation and commitments as their 
knowledge base grows, which seems to be the present situation. Third, the three States 
might not be ready to commit substantial resources to establishing a TBMPA due to other 
socio-economic and ecological priorities, and thus would prefer to proceed with the 
“least-cost” cooperative option as an initial step. However, the three States might have 
access to international donor or NGO resources for an inception period, which could lead 
to a higher degree of cooperation as more joint activities could be funded. At the same 
time, they might be concerned over the sustainability of externally funded initiatives after 
that funding terminates, and therefore would prefer a low-intensity, and conceivably more 
sustainable, type of cooperation.  
The decision to proceed with anyone of these options, or to use them sequentially, 
is most likely to be influenced by the reasons appointed above in this sub-section. The 
decision(s) to establish transboundary marine conservation mechanisms and the 
cooperative options explored will also be influenced by the perception from the three 
States that such a network will assist them in reaching their 2012 MPA targets, the 
benefits to be derived from transboundary (in comparison to national) conservation 
mechanisms,28 and their ability to commit resources (e.g., personnel, assets, and funding).  
4. ACTIONS TO FACILITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
OF TRANSBOUNDARY MARINE CONSERVATION 
4.1. Aligning international commitments  
In addition to any domestic and bilateral actions the three States might take to cooperate 
on transboundary marine conservation, they would benefit from the alignment of their 
commitments to international marine and environmental legal instruments. Mozambique, 
South Africa, and Tanzania are parties to some of the most relevant international 
instruments concerning nature conservation and marine environmental protection. 
                                                 
28
 A transboundary approach to conservation reflects a stronger political commitment of the States involved, 
responding to the international call which states that global targets could only be achieved through 
international cooperation and cooperative conservation, at least at the level of the ecoregion. Further, the 
image of the three States will be reinforced through this common position, showing a common will and 
efforts to achieve international targets. 
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Nevertheless, there are important instruments in relation to which their practices diverge. 
For example, under MARPOL73/78 [65], it would be possible to secure, through IMO, 
the designation of special areas under Annexes I (oil), II (noxious liquid substances) and 
V (garbage), for the TBMPAs. The value of such designation is that higher standards 
could be applied for pollution control measures from international shipping operations. 
This has recently been accomplished for a large area of South Africa’s EEZ for Annex I 
purposes. Discharges (frequently illegal) of a variety of ship-generated wastes area 
problem on the major international navigation route along the east coast of Africa. At this 
time, all of three States are Parties to MARPOL, significantly enhancing the possibility of 
obtaining special area status for both border regions.  
Mozambique and Tanzania are parties to the International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation [66], which offers an opportunity for 
joint spill contingency planning and response. Both Tanzania and South Africa are parties 
to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter [67]. The creation of TBMPAs, for instance, could benefit from the 
cooperative regulation of waste discharge in the area if Mozambique becomes a Party to 
the Convention.29  
Insofar as South Africa has ratified the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling [69], but neither Tanzania nor Mozambique have ratified it, the 
designation of sanctuary areas for whales might be impeded. Since the transboundary 
areas of these three States are considered to be highly important for several whale species 
(see Section 2), it appear that both Mozambique and Tanzania will need to undertake 
special measures in order to achieve a higher level of protection for these species, namely 
to accede to the Whaling Convention.  
Although the three countries are parties to the World Heritage Convention [70] 
and the Ramsar Convention [71], nevertheless both instruments have been barely used by 
both Tanzania and Mozambique.  However, in the study areas, several sites have the 
necessary characteristics to be considered under these conventions, thus reinforcing the 
international status of the protected areas. This was precisely the option taken by the 
                                                 
29
 In 1996, the London Convention was overhauled by the Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter [68] and resolutions adopted by the special 
meeting, but of the three States, only South Africa is a Party. 
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Mozambican government regarding the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve as its 
creation was previously accompanied by the submission of the area to UNESCO World 
Heritage List.30  
As the central State geographically, and considering the creation of MPAs in both 
Tanzania and South Africa, it seemed clear that it was up to Mozambique to proclaim 
MPAs within its borders, if it was to give substance to the international commitments it 
has assumed together with Tanzania and South Africa. Nevertheless, and whatever option 
is followed, for the three States to move forward with the transboundary marine 
conservation, several issues remain to be addressed, including: (1) harmonisation of the 
management options and development models at the borders, i.e., as are already pointed 
out for both the Mtwara corridor initiative and the Lubombo Spatial Development 
Initiative (namely the General Trans-Frontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol 
and the “Lubombo Tourism Route”); (2) harmonisation of fisheries management 
measures, particularly regarding offences and penalties, taking into consideration the 
provisions of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries [72], the SADC 
Protocol on Fisheries [73], and the INFOPÊCHE agreement [74] (providing that Tanzania 
and South Africa adopt the latter agreement); and (3) implementation of the mechanisms 
set out in both the Mtwara initiative and the General Trans- Frontier  Conservation and 
Resource Area Protocol (as well as in the Nairobi Convention) concerning the sharing of 
scientific information. 
4.2. Settling an outstanding maritime boundary 
The lack of a delimited maritime boundary between Mozambique and South Africa 
seemed to be a constrain to the creation of a southern TBMPA. At this time, the full 
extent of application of each State’s laws and enforcement jurisdiction is unclear in the 
disputed area. The delimitation of the maritime boundary (consisting of the territorial sea, 
the EEZ, and the continental shelf) would clarify jurisdictional issues between the two 
countries and facilitate marine conservation cooperation, including enforcement. 
Nevertheless, this should not be an impediment to progress towards a TBMPA, as was 
shown by the TIHPA where a similar problem existed. Also in the present case, it became 
it was not an unsurpassable obstacle, although based on a “lighter” level of commitment. 
                                                 
30
 Submitted on 20/8/08 Criteria (VII) (X), Ref.:5382. 
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4.3. National MPA policies 
At the national level, all three countries enjoy consistent legal frameworks for the 
establishment of MPAs.31 None of the countries seems to have adopted stand-alone MPA 
policies. Instead, the policy framework for MPA establishment is found in broader policy 
documents relating to the environment, biodiversity, fisheries, or coastal zone 
management. If the three countries are to establish transboundary/regional conservation 
mechanisms, they might consider clarification of the role this approach (i.e., 
transboundary) is to play in marine conservation at the national level. Furthermore, in the 
establishment of TBMPAs, the countries will have to agree on common procedures for 
MPA review and implementation. 
4.4. From idea to realization 
An important first step towards the establishment of transboundary conservation 
mechanisms in the EAME region was the general political commitment that has been 
expressed by Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa at the 5th World Parks Congress 
in 2003. Against this political backdrop, the designation and operationalization of 
TBMPAs are conceivable through a strategy based on a series of consecutive, and 
possibly parallel, steps.  
A danger with MPA designation that is hurried and involves only the bureaucratic 
and intellectual elite is a lack of stakeholder support and sustainability. It is fundamental 
that participatory rights and processes relate to the expectations of communities and 
stakeholders in the decision-making process for establishing TBMPAs. According to 
Pomeroy et al. [76], if there is inclusive participation of stakeholders, they are more likely 
to develop a sense of ownership and be compliant with management measures. Generally, 
without local support, MPAs will probably fail [14]. Local communities and stakeholders 
living and working in or near the sites to be preserved need to have their rights identified 
and, where appropriate, safeguarded. Although States involved seemed to have chosen a 
bilateral approach based on national declarations of MPAs together with the constitution 
of transfrontier task teams, instead of following a trilateral common way, it may be 
considered a theoretical roadmap if such an option was to be taken. It must be also kept in 
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 The national legal and institutional frameworks for MPAs are analysed in another paper [75]. 
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mind that the state of the art at the field still allows that evolution, if States agree with a 
progressive level of commitment, as stated before. 
4.4.1. An alternative or evolutionary approach to the designation of TBMPAs 
The stepped approach to the designation of TBMPAs proposed below encourages 
meaningful involvement of stakeholders and convergence of efforts among key actors, 
both of which are important issues in MPA making. The strategy proposed (see Fig. 2) is 
equally applicable to any of the cooperative options identified. 
Figure 2 - Proposed strategy for the development of TBMPAs in the two border areas. Description: Figure shows the 
stepped approach of the strategy proposed (in the large boxes). The small boxes reflect the correspondence between the 
steps of the strategy and the diplomatic and management options described in the paper. Legend: TBMPAs—
transboundary marine protected areas, MPAs—marine protected areas, PAs—protected areas. 
 
First, and as a catalytic activity, a sub-regional international workshop would be 
convened, involving senior officials from national institutions tasked with MPA-making 
responsibilities, MPA managers, scientists, academics, community representatives and 
NGOs from the three States, including participants from their border regions.32 
Preparatory work for this workshop would need to map out key institutions, stakeholders 
and actors, as well as secure funding for the TBMPA implementation process until the 
three States are in a position to assume full funding responsibility for the TBMPA. The 
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 The workshop could be, as an example, convened and facilitated by an amicus curiae (i.e., someone that 
is not an involved Party). This could be a highly respected international NGO active in the region. 
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workshop would be an important first step at networking between the respective MPA 
constituencies in each border area and to ensuring an inclusive and participative approach 
from inception of the MPA-making process. Participants would exchange views on the 
utility of MPAs and how MPAs could serve as tools to achieving socio-economic and 
conservation objectives. The state of knowledge for the two areas and capacity- building 
needs would need to be identified. The workshop report would provide a preliminary 
assessment of the interest in, state of the art and general feasibility of TBMPAs in the 
sub-region. The report would serve as a working document and would be followed by a 
series of scientific and feasibility studies, ideally facilitated by the amicus curiae. The 
report and related studies would be communicated to key government institutions in the 
three States.  
Second, given that there is already a general political commitment to the 
establishment of TBMPAs and steps taken by each country, each national institution that 
has the mandate to lead the MPA-making process would continue the step one workshop 
process within their respective country. At the national level, there will be an opportunity 
to engage a broader range of governmental actors than in the preceding step. Ideally, the 
national workshops in the two border areas would be coordinated and aim to secure 
further political and bureaucratic support. At the local level, the stakeholder constituency 
would also be broadened to involve coastal communities, local governments, and the 
commercial sector. These actions will be vital to securing support for, and eventual 
compliance with, the TBMPAs. Coastal communities along the two border areas would 
be sensitized to the need for cross-border support to achieve transboundary objectives. 
Third, political and bureaucratic support at the national level would need to 
converge into a trilateral technical process. With the support of ministries of foreign 
affairs, this could consist on the establishment of a trilateral scientific and technical 
committee (Trilateral Committee) and the convening of a trilateral planning workshop at 
which goals, frameworks, roles, and next steps are identified. The members of the 
Trilateral Committee would be technical, not political, personnel. From this point 
onwards, the Trilateral Committee would play a steering role to the process, ideally with 
the continued assistance and support of the amicus curiae. The Trilateral Committee 
would consider the processes through which TBMPAs are (were) designed and how to 
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coordinate the process in one country with the parallel process in the adjacent country.33 
Commitment to a “bottom-up” process should be agreed upon for the eventual national 
designation and management of MPAs, or portions thereof, on either side of the border. 
This approach would be consistent with the emerging trend identified in the region by 
Francis et al. [18].  
Fourth, the Trilateral Committee would convene a series of trilateral, national and 
local workshops addressing relevant conservation (scientific) and developmental (socio-
economic) issues. These workshops would facilitate information and knowledge sharing 
and further build constituencies in the border regions. The workshops would also play an 
important role as a constituency-building tool and provide structured inputs into the 
Trilateral Committee. The workshops consider ways on how existing MPAs and PAs in 
the two border regions (namely, MBREMP, QNP, and IWP) could be integrated into 
TBMPAs. A needs assessment for each of those areas would be required to determine 
how the TBMPA initiative would strengthen and coordinate with broader conservation 
and socio-economic objectives. 
Fifth, a major trilateral workshop would be convened at which the Trilateral 
Committee proposes options for the establishment of TBMPAs.34 The proposal would 
draw on the inputs from the earlier workshop and information gathering processes and set 
out advantages and disadvantages for each option.  
Sixth, possibly following internal consultations and further diplomatic and 
bureaucratic exchanges, each of the three States would make the formal political decision 
to proceed with the formal designation of TBMPAs in their respective border areas. This 
decision would be followed by a high level meeting between the three States. The 
Trilateral Committee, in cooperation with the respective ministries of foreign affairs and 
national MPA lead institutions, would draft (1) the trilateral agreement, which would 
serve as framework for TBMPA cooperation between the three States, and (2) technical 
annexes spelling out the designation, structures, processes and financing of the two 
TBMPAs.  
                                                 
33
 In present situation, how to coordinate the different processes going on at different stages, in the three 
different countries. 
34
 In the present situation, how to move on to real TBMPA situation starting on the national declared MPAs, 
although under the umbrella of regional agreements and the declared intention to constitute TBMPAs. 
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Seventh, a high-level meeting between the three States would be convened during 
which an agreement on cooperation in the establishment of TBMPAs would be signed. 
The Contracting Parties would resolve to reconfirm the membership of the Trilateral 
Committee to authorize the formal commencement of its work.  
Eight, the Trilateral Committee establishes and manages the two TBMPAs in the 
region. 
5. CONCLUSION 
As the international community struggles to meet the 2012 targets for marine 
conservation, marine transboundary conservation is increasingly being seen as an 
effective mechanism for addressing the ultimate goal of protection at the level of 
biogeographic region and establishment of a “global representative system” of MPAs.  
Notwithstanding difficulties of implementation, TBMPAs are seen as a key 
mechanism for protection of marine ecoregions. Despite the pioneering initiative of 
TIHPA in 1996, there is still a long way to go before the creation of networks of 
TBMPAs is a commonly used tool worldwide. Although political will may exist among 
States sharing borders, the complexity of moving beyond a bilateral approach (such as in 
TIHPA) to a multinational/sub- regional level often seems to be a too big obstacle to 
overcome. Even in the EU, the issue of transborder cooperation regarding marine 
conservation is only now really kicking off in the context of the European MPA network 
(Nature 2000) and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive [77]. A multi-scale 
approach, such as the one proposed by Fanning et al. [78] for a large marine ecosystem 
(LME) governance framework, with vertical linkages between the global, regional, 
national, and local policy cycles, will be crucial to the success of any TBMPA initiative. 
Further, the multiplicity and diversity of stakeholders involved in the policy cycle will 
affect each stage of the TBMPA decision-making process.  
With regard to political arrangements, within a multilateral agreement, States tend 
to follow different degrees of commitment ranging from the lower level of a 
memorandum of understanding that is based on a nationally declared and managed MPA 
(which can be bilateral), to the higher level of a sub-regional treaty among States with a 
real TBMPA and joint administration. This article intended to demonstrate that among 
these two extremes there can be a solution phased in a step-by-step level of options to 
facilitate accommodation of site-specific issues and unique approaches to bilateral 
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issues.35 Furthermore, a clear roadmap encouraging meaningful involvement of 
stakeholders and convergence of efforts among multiple key actors is considered to be a 
decisive approach to a real designation of TBMPA and not simply two MPAs on each 
side of the border.  
In the present case study, the political decision to create TBMPAs between 
Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa is anchored, at the global level, in the CBD and 
UNCLOS [79], and at a regional level in the Nairobi Convention and the SADC Protocol, 
as well as sustained by bilateral agreements such as the Lubombo Ponta do Ouro–Kosi 
Bay Marine and Coastal Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area Protocol.36 
However, at the national and, in particular, the local levels, moving forward on MPA 
development depends (and depended) on the readiness of each State, its institutional and 
legal frameworks, and involvement of all of the stakeholders. A common pattern emerges 
from the case studies analysed here in terms of the process to be followed: a “starting 
meeting” or sub-regional workshop to prepare for the necessary political decisions and 
the procedural measures to implement a TBMPA following the declaration of a “common 
will” among States to develop a TBMPA.  
This case study involving Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa in the EAME 
and analysis of existing models suggests a possible approach to the development of 
TBMPAs at the biogeographic or subregional level. When more than two States share a 
common political will to move forward with a TBMPA but simultaneously face national 
and site constraints, a single “top-down” solution might not be possible. The status quo 
hypothesis (H0) suggests that for those States, TBMPA development will remain a 
theoretical political and social abstraction. The challenge is to develop a range of 
solutions that can simultaneously accommodate bilateral realities and coexist under the 
multilateral umbrella. Ultimately, such an approach can lead the different “streams” in to 
the “bigger river” of a treaty without demanding too much of each Party at the beginning 
(and thus putting at risk the final aim, i.e., transboundary marine conservation). Different 
border realities most surely demand different solutions that are not only multi-scale but 
also multivariate in nature, and are supported by a common baseline. Eventually, these 
                                                 
35
 For example, in the present case study, the undelimited maritime boundary between Mozambique and 
South Africa. 
36
 See this on Guerreiro et al. [80]. 
Chapter 8 
285 
approaches will converge into a homogeneous political reality, within a commonly 
accepted framework.  
Reality showed in the present case that TBMPA between countries not sharing the 
same borders seems to follow, at least in its early stages, bilateral approaches instead of a 
concrete multilateral commitment. Nevertheless, this starting point can be faced and 
managed as a first step for a formal transboundary multiple commitment regarding marine 
conservation. 
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GLOSSARY  
Marine Protected Area: Any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with its 
overlying water and associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has 
been reserved by law or other effective means to protect part or all of the enclosed 
environment. 
Transboundary Marine Protected Area: [A]n area of land/or sea that straddles one or 
more boundaries between states, sub-national units such as provinces and regions, 
autonomous areas and/or areas beyond the limits of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, 
whose constituting parts are especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of 
biological biodiversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed co-
operatively through legal and other effective means. 
Marine Protected Areas Network: Collection of individual MPAs or reserves operating 
cooperatively and synergistically, at various spatial scales, and with a range of protection 
levels that are designated to meet objectives that a single reserve cannot achieve. 
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9. INSTITUTIONAL INTERPLAY IN MPA NETWORKS 
GRILO, C., (In Press). “Institutional Interplay in Networks of Marine Protected Areas 
with Community-Based Management”, Coastal Management 39(4):XX-XX. 
 
Abstract: Institutional interplay, or the ability of one institution to affect another, is a key 
feature of multi-level environmental governance that can influence the performance of 
institutions, such as marine protected areas (MPAs). In the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), 
MPA networks are being created to meet top-down, internationally defined MPA targets, 
while simultaneously there is a strong regional focus on bottom-up, community-based 
marine management. These apparently contradictory trends can be bridged through MPA 
networks that include community-based MPAs. To explore whether institutional interplay 
affects the success of such MPA networks, and to provide guidance for MPA-making in 
the WIO, the literature on ten geographically diverse MPA networks with community-
based MPAs was reviewed. Because this is a first exploration into the topic, not all causal 
links between institutional interplay and MPA effectiveness could be confirmed, neither 
was any indication of interplay-related costs found. However, the analysis suggests that 
institutional interplay is generally concerned with information exchanges and issues of 
control and authority and seemed to have positive effects on MPA success. As MPA 
networks expand in the WIO, MPA practitioners and managers in the region may 
consider different forms of institutional interplay to be tailored to their specific 
management and financial contexts. 
Keywords: MPA networks, community-based MPAs, institutional interplay  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental governance systems consisting of multiple institutions at various 
levels of organization are important for managing global commons because they can 
address threats at the international, national and local levels (Berkes, 2006, 2007; Dietz et 
al., 2003). This is also the case of many marine resources. Multi-level institutions 
governing them can independently meet conservation targets, but because such 
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institutions do not exist in isolation from each other, the interactions between them may 
influence each others’ performance.  
Institutional interactions, or institutional interplay, are “situations where the contents, 
operation or consequences of one institution …are significantly affected by another” 
(Stokke, 2001). Institutional interplay is an important feature of international 
environmental governance (Young, 1996). It is also important for environmental 
conservation at lower levels (Cash et al., 2006; Ostrom et al., 1999; Young, 2002). For 
example, institutional interplay has simultaneously advanced and complicated the 
implementation of the Habitats Directive in the European Union, through the ability of 
environmental NGOs to influence EU policy-making and through a mismatch between 
EU and national priorities, respectively (Paavola et al., 2009). In the marine realm, 
insufficient interaction between biodiversity conservation regimes and fisheries 
management regimes has precluded biodiversity concerns from being reflected in 
fisheries management decision-making at regional and national levels (Hoel, 2003). There 
are also insufficient interactions between global and local levels of decision-making 
pertaining to marine protected area (MPA) creation and management (Pajaro et al., 2010). 
One way of overcoming this is to integrate top-down approaches to MPA-making with 
bottom-up ones, for example through the establishment of MPA networks that integrate 
community-based MPAs. These MPA networks go a step beyond community-based 
design of MPAs (e.g., Ban et al., 2009). They are a viable option in the Western Indian 
Ocean where MPA-making is essentially driven by international commitments (Wells et 
al., 2007) but cannot ignore local approaches to marine management (Francis et al., 
2002). 
The overall goal of this exploratory paper is to provide insights into how institutional 
interplay can contribute to the integration of top-down and bottom-up marine 
conservation approaches. Specifically, it sets out to determine whether institutional 
interplay affects MPA success, by focusing on the particular case of MPA networks with 
community-based MPAs. The paper contributes to the growing MPA literature, and 
extends the application of the institutional interplay concept to the MPA field by 
examining ten MPA networks with community-based MPAs created in different 
geographical contexts. Most of these MPA networks are still in the planning and 
implementation phases. Consequently, the results of this research are rather preliminary, 
but they are also important at this point in time when so many countries are setting up 
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nation-wide MPA networks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: first, the 
emergence of MPA networks with community-based MPAs in the Western Indian Ocean 
and their importance are explored; this is followed by an explanation of the theoretical 
underpinnings of institutional interplay. Then a brief description of each of the ten MPA 
networks, providing evidence of institutional interplay and its consequences; and finally a 
discussion of these institutional interactions and policy implications for the Western 
Indian Ocean. 
2. MPA NETWORKS WITH COMMUNITY-BASED MPAS 
The differences between global and local levels of decision-making pertaining to 
MPAs are visible in the approaches adopted for MPA-making and management. Globally, 
the creation of MPAs is a priority for many inter-governmental organizations, States and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and is supported by targets set internationally. 
These targets are to be achieved preferentially through the establishment of representative 
networks of MPAs (IUCN-WCPA, 2008; Laffoley, 2008). MPA networks generally 
require a top-down approach to creation and, more limitedly, to management. They can 
be more efficient than single MPAs at protecting marine biodiversity if they are designed 
according to scientific criteria, instead of being opportunistically created (Roberts et al., 
2003). In contrast, and at the local level, community-based management has gained 
popularity for providing wide participation and empowerment of local communities and 
integrating conservation and development concerns from the bottom-up (Berkes, 2004, 
2007; Christie & White, 1997). While community-based management is not a panacea, 
community-based MPAs have been reasonably more successful in simultaneously 
achieving conservation and development goals than other types of MPAs, particularly in 
developing countries (Christie & White 2007; Cinner et al. 2005). 
In the Western Indian Ocean, several MPA networks are being designed at the 
regional (i.e., Western Indian Ocean and East Africa Marine Ecoregions), national (i.e., 
Tanzania, Madagascar, and Seychelles) and sub-national (Rodrigues Island, in Mauritius) 
levels (UNEP-WCMC 2008). In this region, the trend toward top-down, science-based 
MPA networks also contrasts with the emergence of community-based MPAs (Francis et 
al. 2002), and the greater attention paid to community-based marine management in 
general (Wagner, 2004, Cinner et al. 2009).  
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Top-down and bottom-up trends in marine management in general, and in MPA-
making in the Western Indian Ocean in particular, can be reconciled (Hildebrand, 1997; 
Qiu et al., 2009), and may converge as MPA networks1 with community-based MPAs.2 
Such MPA networks are attractive because they combine science-based MPA network 
design aimed at meeting international conservation targets, with the more participatory 
management that is often achieved with community-based MPAs. MPA networks with 
community-based MPAs are also desirable for “restraining” top-down and bottom-up 
trends (Hind et al., 2010). This “middle ground” can distribute and balance some power 
and responsibility between multiple levels of management (Jones, 2002), and connect 
global MPA initiatives to the local realities where MPA implementation occurs (Pajaro et 
al., 2010). MPA networks with community-based MPAs may be desirable for combining 
different levels of organization, and for enabling coordination among them, which is an 
essential condition for MPA network success (Christie et al., 2009; Pollnac et al., 2001; 
White et al., 2002). In such MPA networks, a centralized management body may be 
necessary to coordinate activities in the several MPAs, as these may have distinct 
objectives. In addition, community-based MPAs are more susceptible to failure if no 
linkages are established with higher-level institutions (Folke et al., 2007). Also, 
management authorities of an MPA network with community-based MPAs will probably 
refrain from dictating rules without consulting local constituencies, and consequently less 
likely to be seen as outside interference (Ostrom et al., 1999). In turn, community-based 
MPAs may expect to have their authority and decision-making capacity recognized, so 
that their members may establish enforceable rules more easily (Ostrom et al., 1999). 
MPA networks with community-based MPAs can be considered an example of 
polycentric governance of the marine environment that aims at its protection from 
damaging activities, by connecting governmental management with community-based 
management. Hence, they present an important opportunity to investigate institutional 
interplay in the governance of marine commons. This is significant because neither MPA 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this paper, an MPA network is defined as “a collection of individual MPAs or reserves 
operating cooperatively and synergistically, at various spatial scales, and with a range of protection levels 
that are designed to meet objectives that a single reserve cannot achieve” (IUCN-WCPA, 2008). 
Consequently, MPA networks that were not designed to a significant extent according to scientific criteria 
were not analyzed. Supra-national MPA networks were also excluded because the involvement of two or 
more national jurisdictions would further complicate the analysis. 
2
 MPA networks with community-based MPAs are considered to be those with at least one MPA “where the 
management authority and responsibility rest[s] with indigenous peoples and/or local communities through 
various forms of customary or legal, formal or informal, institutions and rules” (Dudley, 2008). 
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networks with community-based MPAs, nor institutional interplay in MPA networks in 
general, have received much attention. In fact, most literature on MPA networks deals 
almost exclusively with their ecological dimension (e.g., Murray et al., 1999; Roberts et 
al., 2003). In the few cases where processes of implementation of MPA networks with 
community-based MPAs are explicitly addressed (Green et al., 2009; IUCN-WCPA, 
2008; UNEP-WCMC, 2008; World Bank, 2006), a discussion of institutional interplay is 
usually lacking. The rare exceptions (e.g., Armada et al., 2009; Eisma-Osorio et al., 2009; 
Lowry et al., 2009) are geographically restricted, and can only provide limited insights 
into institutional interplay within such MPA networks and its impact on their 
effectiveness. 
3. INSTITUTIONAL INTERPLAY 
Institutional interplay is one of the main factors affecting the performance of 
institutional arrangements (Young, 2005). Specifically, it is considered an important 
determinant of environmental regimes’ ability to identify and solve environmental 
problems (Cash et al., 2006), to meet multiple objectives (Berkes, 2007), and to be 
resilient (Ebbin, 2009). In essence, institutional interplay’s relevance stems from the 
recognition that one environmental problem may be governed by various institutions at 
the same time, and that institutions do not act in isolation from each other. Institutional 
interplay has been mostly studied at the international level (e.g., Gehring & Oberthür, 
2009; Stokke, 2001), and proposed conceptual frameworks are still expanding in scope to 
also include domestic regimes and actors (Stokke, 2001). Nevertheless, five distinctions 
are generally accepted regarding the identification of institutional interplay, its drivers, 
and levels of organization involved, direction, and effects.  
The first distinction concerns the criteria for the identification of institutional 
interplay. Influence must originate from a source institution (independent variable); then, 
a target institution (dependent variable) must be susceptible to that influence; and finally, 
there is an effect that is explained and accounted by a causal relationship between the 
two (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009). For example, a network of shorebird reserves (i.e., 
source and target institutions) was developed and, among other things, created a 
successful research and monitoring program that identifies the main threats to shorebirds 
and how their populations oscillate (i.e., causal relationship) (Wilson, 2008).  
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Secondly, institutional interactions may either be driven by the inherent condition of 
the environmental problem at stake, or by the intention of intervening actors. Unintended, 
functional linkages occur “when the substantive problems or activities that two or more 
institutions address are linked in biogeophysical or socioeconomic terms”, while 
purposeful, strategic linkages exist “when actors seek to forge connections between or 
among institutions intentionally in the interests of pursuing individual or collective goals” 
(Young, 2002). The biodiversity and climate change international regimes are 
functionally linked because the success of the latter will affect the former’s (Kim, 2004). 
In contrast, the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea resulted from strategic 
linkages between different issue-areas - such as navigation and marine scientific research 
- that are functionally unrelated but, along with many others, share the same geographical 
space.  
Thirdly, institutional interactions may involve institutions at different levels of 
organization (vertical interplay), or institutions at similar levels of organization 
(horizontal interplay) along the jurisdictional scale (Young, 2006; Young, 2002). 
Horizontal interplay has received more attention from scholars than vertical interplay 
(e.g., Gehring & Oberthür, 2008; Kim, 2004) because of the former’s prevalence in the 
international arena. The interplay between international trade regimes and environmental 
regimes is a case in point because of the ability of the former to preclude the effectiveness 
of the latter (McLaughlin, 1994). However, interest in vertical interplay is on the rise in 
connection with issues of scale in the management of global commons, in particular, 
concerning how international and national institutions impact the effectiveness of, 
respectively, national and local ones (Berkes, 2006; Cash et al., 2006; Heikkila et al., 
2011; Paavola et al., 2009; Young, 2002; Young, 2006).  
Fourth, institutional interplay can be reciprocal if it impacts the target institution 
while being attentive to its arrangements, or unilateral if it ignores them completely 
(Young, 2002). The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources and the whaling regime exhibit institutional linkages that result in mutual 
impacts (Young, 1996). In contrast, the lack of recognition of fisher associations’ role in 
fisheries management in India undermines their performance locally, in part because they 
have not been able to successfully influence centralized fisheries decision-makers 
(Berkes, 2006).  
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Lastly, institutional interplay can generate positive, negative (e.g., Young, 2002) or 
neutral effects in the target institution. The character of these effects depends on whether 
the interaction supports, contradicts or does not affect the target institution’s objectives 
(Gehring & Oberthür, 2009). For example, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement has 
improved and supported compliance control in fisheries by bringing into the international 
arena important features of some more advanced regional fisheries regimes (Stokke, 
2000), while the Kyoto Protocol’s promotion of monocultures as carbon sinks contradicts 
the Convention on Biological Diversity’s goal to protect biodiversity (Pontecorvo, 1999). 
These forms of institutional interplay have been found mostly in international 
institutions. While there are yet no reasons to believe that such typologies are not 
applicable to interactions involving lower levels of social organization (Gehring & 
Oberthür, 2009), it is worth looking at interplay from the perspective of those same 
levels. Such interactions are less studied, and are essentially concerned with the effects 
that higher level institutions (national, sub-national, municipal) have on local ones 
through centralization of decision-making, nationalization of natural resources, or 
increased participation in markets (Berkes, 2002). These interactions tend to have 
negative effects on local institutions (Baticados & Agbayani, 2000), but other purposeful 
interactions can actually strengthen them (Berkes, 2002). Often, local institutions will 
seek recognition from the state (Marschke & Berkes, 2005), so that their legitimacy 
cannot be challenged. This recognition can be codified in a legal instrument, adding an 
extra layer of assurance by enabling the operation of community-based organizations 
(Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). However, crystallizing norms and rules can backfire by 
reducing institutional capacity to adapt to changing conditions (Baines, 1989). Besides 
state recognition and enabling legislation, other cross-scale linkages that can be fostered 
to support local institutions include capacity building (Jones & Burgess, 2005) and 
institution building (Menezes et al., 2009). 
4. INSTITUTIONAL INTERPLAY IN MPA NETWORKS WITH COMMUNITY-
BASED MPAs 
 MPA networks were identified through searches in grey (e.g., UNEP-WCMC 2008; 
World Bank 2006) and peer-reviewed literature (e.g., Game et al., 2011). Additional 
searches for textual cues indicating that the MPA networks include community-based 
MPAs were conducted, leading to the identification of ten MPA networks formed at least 
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in part by community-based MPAs (Table 1). The literature search was then expanded to 
gather further evidence of institutional interplay, which is detailed in the following 
descriptions of the ten MPA networks.  
Table 1 - MPA networks with community-based MPAs 
Region Location 
Pacific 
Islands 
 
New Zeeland 
Palau 
Kimbe Bay, Papua-New Guinea 
Choiseul Province, Solomon Islands 
Western Province, Solomon Islands 
Southeast 
Asia 
Danajon Bank, Philippines 
Southeast Cebu, Philippines 
South 
America  
 
Brazil 
Chile 
Ecuador 
New Zealand currently has 33 no-take areas in its seas. They do not adequately 
represent the various ecosystems, and a national no-take MPA network is being planned. 
New Zealand’s current MPA policy addresses the role of customary management tools 
(taiäpure and mätaitai reserves) in MPA networks (Bess & Rallapudi, 2007). These 
reserves cannot be proposed primarily for biodiversity conservation, though they can 
make a contribution to it and are seen as being compatible with the sustainable use of 
fisheries resources (Department of Conservation & Ministry of Fisheries, 2005). There is 
no clarification of the relation between customary fisheries management tools and overall 
MPA network management. However, the MPA Policy states clearly that customary 
reserves do not have veto power over proposed no-take MPAs. Nevertheless, its 
Implementation Guidelines suggest a prominent role for indigenous people in public 
consultation (Ministry of Fisheries & Department of Conservation, 2008). This and other 
inconsistencies, which may negatively affect customary reserves and the proposed MPA 
network, are to be streamlined through, among others, the implementation of the MPA 
network (Bess & Rallapudi, 2007). 
The Palau MPA network is being created to implement the 2003 Protected Areas 
Network Act. The Act determines that Palau’s national and 16 state governments are to 
collaborate in the creation of a national network of marine and terrestrial protected areas. 
A marine ecological gap assessment at the national level allowed planners to understand 
how existing MPAs are protecting the country’s marine biodiversity, and what areas are 
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under protected (Corrigan et al., 2007). Palau currently has twenty seven MPAs, and five 
Locally Managed Marine Areas (LMMA) that were established and legally recognized in 
the late 1990s (LMMA, 2010). An LMMA is “an area of nearshore waters and coastal 
resources that is largely or wholly managed at a local level” by local communities, often 
in collaboration with local government and other organizations (Govan et al., 2008). 
Existing traditionally managed areas were limitedly accounted for in the protected area 
network scenarios produced with the software MARXAN (Hinchley et al., 2007). As the 
analysis is scaled down to the state level, and state-specific targets and threats integrated, 
existing traditional managed areas will be mapped and taken into account (Hinchley et 
al., 2007). 
The MPA network planned for Kimbe Bay, Papua-New Guinea was designed to be 
resilient to climate change. In a first phase, broad Areas of Interest (AOI) were selected 
using the software MARXAN (Green et al., 2009). In the future, local communities 
within each AOI are going to be involved to decide on the delimitation of individual 
MPAs in their AOI (Lipsett-Moore et al., 2006). Though other governance types are 
planned for, inshore MPAs are to be established and managed as legally binding LMMAs 
(Green et al., 2009). Individuals and organizations involved in LMMA management will 
join the LMMA network, a forum for sharing experiences and information that has played 
a prominent role in socio-economic monitoring in the Indo-Pacific region (Loper et al., 
2008). They have also seen their compliance and enforcement legitimacy strengthened by 
the approval by local governments of legislation that reinforces traditional authority 
(Green et al., 2007). This legislation has already been used in several LMMAs. 
In the Choiseul Province of the Solomon Islands, the provincial government was 
supported by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) in a province-wide conservation planning 
process targeting terrestrial and marine environments. A stakeholder workshop was held 
in May 2009, and community leaders engaged in participatory mapping resulting in the 
identification of 25 conservation features (Lipsett-Moore et al., 2010). MARXAN was 
then used to systematically identify priority areas for conservation based on those 
community inputs as well as expert input, and on information on existing protected areas, 
LMMAs and marine managed areas (Lipsett-Moore et al., 2010). All twelve wards of the 
province agreed to create one terrestrial protected area and one MPA within the next two 
years. MPA-making in Choiseul Province is likely to follow a strategy similar to past 
LMMA creation (LMMA, 2009). Previously, TNC had par
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influential ecumenical NGO to provide assistance to communities in setting up a LMMA, 
assess community conditions, conduct a baseline survey, and provide advice to the 
community that then decided on how to proceed (Lipsett-Moore et al., 2010). The MPA 
network is still being developed (Game et al., 2011), and it is not clear if and how, in 
addition to participation in the LMMA network, community-based MPAs will articulate 
and coordinate MPA management with other institutions. 
Also in the Solomon Islands, but this time in its Western Province, an MPA 
network was implemented in two lagoons for biodiversity conservation and fisheries 
enhancement (Aswani & Hamilton, 2004). Assisted by researchers, local communities 
have been able to use customary sea tenure (CST) regimes to create 23 MPAs where 
members have actively secured their entitlements (Aswani et al., 2007). Each community-
based MPA is governed by a Resource Management Committee (RMC) that is mandated 
to (i) ensure the MPA is secure and dispute-free; (ii) ensure enforcement and compliance; 
(iii) raise awareness; (iv) organize inter-MPA workshops for discussion of MPA-related 
issues; and (v) promote collaboration with outside institutions for exchange and 
educational programs (Aswani & Hamilton, 2004). RMCs and customary law are not 
always effective in dealing with poaching from outsiders and overfishing from locals 
(Cudney-Bueno & Basurto, 2009). RMCs are thus in the process of seeking legal support 
to protect marine resources under customary property (Aswani et al., 2005). This will, 
hopefully, lead to legal recognition of RMCs and clarification of governmental and 
customary/RMC mandates. As well, it will allow RMCs to use a management order in 
provincial legislation for increased protection of marine resources in areas under 
customary management, and in this way, implement provincial legislation. 
In the Philippines, the two MPA networks planned for Danajon Bank and Southeast 
Cebu are to be based on existing community-based MPAs that were not originally located 
to ensure connectivity. For this reason, new MPAs are to be created (Lowry et al., 2009). 
In Danajon Bank, the MPA network is being developed as part of a project aimed at 
improving fisheries sustainability. Municipalities have formed a cluster linking them for 
planning and decision-making purposes, including the identification of appropriate sites 
for new MPAs (Armada et al., 2009). Each MPA in the region is currently managed by an 
organization of local communities, and these organizations have formed an alliance to 
exchange experiences (Armada et al., 2009). The alliance is being formalized so it can 
apply for external funding and technical support (Christie et al., 2009). Part of their MPA 
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monitoring activities has been conducted with the participation of local resource users 
(Pietri et al., 2009). In Southeast Cebu, the MPA network is based on existing municipal 
MPAs, new MPA planning, and collaboration between municipalities. Municipalities 
were primarily concerned with improving coastal law enforcement to stop commercial 
fishing in municipal waters, and signed a Memorandum of Agreement to create an inter-
municipal, multi-stakeholder management council mandated to deal with marine affairs in 
their waters (Eisma-Osorio et al., 2009). The council works as a marine issues 
information and decision-making hub for the municipalities, and has facilitated the 
formation of social networks among MPA managers (Eisma-Osorio et al., 2009). The two 
MPA networks being created at Danajon Bank and Southeast Cebu are benefiting from 
cross-visits, a common practice in the Philippines whereby MPA managers visit another 
MPA to learn about their experiences and to empower host communities (Pietri et al., 
2009). Joint enforcement operations across municipal borders are also common, and have 
been facilitated by agreements and inter-municipal communication (Christie et al., 2009). 
Community-based MPA management bodies are expected to improve their individual 
management and to be linked to other MPAs within the networks (Lowry et al., 2009), 
though it is not clear how the latter will happen.  
Brazil committed to have a national MPA network in place by 2012 for biodiversity 
conservation and fish stock recovery (Chatwin, 2007). The new network will include new 
and existing MPAs. By 2007, there were sixteen Marine Extractive Reserves (MERs) in 
the country – a type of community-based MPAs where the sustainable use of marine 
resources is allowed – and another 68 were awaiting approval (Diegues, 2008; Prates & 
Blanc, 2007). MERs are legally established after a request by local communities. They 
are managed by legally recognized user organizations (Diegues, 2008). MERs have 
brought important benefits to local populations: increased catches of target species have 
been reported (Prates & Blanc, 2007), and greater MER community pride follows 
requests from adjacent non-MER communities to be taught artisanal aquaculture 
techniques (Diegues, 2008). However, MERs also face problems, such as competition 
with other users for space; difficulties in excluding other users; reduced enforcement 
capacity; and, in some cases, difficulties in reaching the reserve due to privatization of 
access and use of the coastal strip (Di Ciommo, 2007; Diegues, 2008). In addition, MER-
making efforts can easily be overridden by state agency permits for competing and 
environmental damaging activities (World Bank, 2006). It is not clear yet how the 
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management of current and future MERs will be integrated into MPA network 
management. However, it is very likely that IBAMA (Portuguese acronym for the 
Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources) will have an 
important role in this, as it is responsible for supervising MERs, and is actively involved 
in the creation of the national MPA network. 
Chile has committed to protect at least 10% of its territory through the creation of 
protected areas (CONAMA, 2005). Fifty-five (55) marine conservation priority sites have 
been identified, but existing MPAs were not taken into account (Chatwin, 2007). There 
are 22 MPAs in Chilean waters, and a system of 547 Management and Exploitation Areas 
for Benthic Resources (MEABRs) (World Bank, 2006). In these seabed areas, registered 
artisanal fishing groups have exclusive diving rights for shellfish collection, and exploit 
them according to a benthic resource management and exploitation plan (CONAMA, 
2005). Following plan approval, MEABRs’ activities are periodically reviewed by 
external consultants. This guarantees accountability but also imposes financial stress on 
MEABRs’ users, who pay for the external review. Several MEABRs have had positive 
conservation effects, sometimes similar to those of no-take areas (Gelcich et al., 2008a), 
and have improved environmental awareness among fishermen (Gelcich et al., 2008b). 
MEABRs do not always exist as stand-alone marine management tools. Three recent 
government-run multiple use MPAs utilize MEABRs as part of their zoning scheme 
(World Bank, 2006). Chile’s National Biodiversity Action Plan 2004-2015 endorsement 
of MEABRs as part of the “relevant public efforts developed in relation to biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use” is supportive of the integration of MEABRs into a 
future MPA network (CONAMA, 2005; Fernandez & Castilla, 2005). However, it is not 
clear how MEABRs will be articulated with the wider MPA network. 
Ecuador has a rather small MPA coverage: only 8 protected areas have a coastal or 
marine component, and these do not adequately protect the country’s marine biodiversity 
(Chatwin, 2007; Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador, 2007). Ecuador’s MPA network 
planning, which is part of the wider National System of Protected Areas (SNAP; Spanish 
acronym), included a marine gap assessment on about 80% of the mainland coast 
(Chatwin, 2007). Community-based protected areas are legally not part of SNAP, but this 
will change in the future (Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador, 2007). Protected areas 
governed by communities, indigenous people and afro-Ecuadorians will be one of 
SNAP’s components (Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador, 2007). These protected areas 
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include mangrove areas that, since 1999 and independently of their property regime, can 
be used by communities through an “agreement of mangrove sustainable use and 
custody” (Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador, 2009). In these mangrove areas, all 
located outside protected areas, communities implement a management plan with 
enforcement entrusted to local authorities. Until August 2009, 29 such agreements had 
been produced by the Ministry of Environment (USAID, 2009). Mangrove areas under 
community management have had positive results, namely recovery of fish resources, 
increased income for local communities, ensured mangrove conservation, and allowed 
communities to consolidate the protection of their territory (Ministerio del Ambiente del 
Ecuador, 2009; USAID, 2009). 
5. DISCUSSION 
The previous section uncovered nine different forms of institutional interplay in MPA 
networks with community-based MPAs (Table 2). Most interactions are driven by 
strategic considerations, involve institutions at the same level (i.e., horizontal interplay), 
are reciprocated, and have (or are expected to have) a positive impact on MPA 
effectiveness. The impact of institutional interplay on MPA effectiveness was discerned 
by evaluating the contribution of institutional interplay to the stated goals of community-
based MPAs and MPA networks, as described below. This general overview sets the 
stage for a more detailed discussion of the five distinctions regarding institutional 
interplay set out in section 3. 
First, identification of the elements that define institutional interplay was limited by 
the fact that the MPA networks are still very recent, and consequently by the literature 
itself. The latter was thoroughly reviewed to identify all credible and non-conflicting 
evidence. Despite this, the confirmation of causal links between institutional interplay and 
MPA effectiveness was greatly restricted. To overcome such limitations, two degrees of 
influence were defined to reflect the strength of the relationship between institutional 
interplay and MPA effectiveness, i.e. potential and effective effects. For example, the 
LMMA network and inter-MPA workshops provide opportunities for MPA managers to 
share information and experiences. While this can easily be perceived as a positive 
experience for participants, it is not possible to know whether information acquired in this 
way was put into practice and actually led to positive changes in MPA effectiveness, that 
is, to the attainment of the goals of the MPAs. Consequently, inter-MPA workshops and 
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the LMMA network are considered to have only a potential effect on MPA effectiveness. 
In contrast, the fact that customary reserves and the future MPA network in New Zealand 
have overlapping jurisdictions with conflicting goals strongly suggests that the interplay 
between them, if not solved, will have negative consequences for both, as the resource 
exploitation goals of customary reserves can be overridden by the biodiversity 
conservation goals of the MPA network, and vice versa. This inference was derived from 
the available literature, and has also been hinted at by others (Bess & Rallapudi, 2007). 
Hence, the causal relationship between institutional interplay and MPA effectiveness was 
considered to have a negative impact on the goals of the customary reserves and the MPA 
network, that is, not just potential negative impact. Finally, there were also cases where 
institutional interplay was not identified in the literature (i.e., Palau; Choiseul Province, 
Solomon Islands; Chile) because there was no clear action on the part of the community-
based MPAs (or of the MPA network) that contributed or conflicted with the goals of the 
MPA network (or of the community-based MPAs).  
Second, functional linkages were mostly associated with vertical interactions. This is 
not surprising, as institutions at different levels on the jurisdictional scale will be 
functionally linked. Strategic linkages were all registered across the same level of social 
organization, and generally involved the sharing of information. 
Third, vertical linkages identified were essentially concerned with issues of control 
and authority and driven by functional linkages. There were less occurrences of vertical 
interplay than of horizontal interplay. This could be due to the literature’s greater focus 
on local dynamics than on cross-level interactions. Another explanation is that horizontal 
is more prevalent than vertical interplay: there are, indeed, more possibilities for 
interactions between multiple community-based MPAs than between community-based 
MPAs and a single MPA network management authority; in most cases such MPA 
network authorities appear to be absent. This lack of a centralized MPA network 
management authority may be explained by the fact that some MPA networks are 
building on existing linkages between community-based MPAs and other institutions 
associated with marine conservation and management, which may increase their 
likelihood of success (Waylen et al., 2010). Thus, institutional interactions involving 
MPA networks with community-based MPAs are not limited to “internal” linkages (i.e., 
among community-based MPAs and between these and MPA network management), and 
can involve other institutions. For example, in northern Tanzania, district authorities were 
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directly involved in creating and managing collaborative management areas (Verheij et 
al., 2004). However, relying on existing official institutions has its setbacks too, as 
collaboration with community-based marine conservation initiatives can be seen as being 
separate from their general duties (Wells et al., 2010). Horizontal interplay, though 
assuming a multitude of forms, was not as varied as it initially seemed. Community-based 
MPAs are engaged in various activities with other community-based MPAs and other 
institutions at a similar level of organization. Yet, linkages between them are formed 
essentially by the sharing of information for mutual learning (e.g., cross-site visits), and 
by the pooling and coordination of individual resources for enforcement purposes. 
Information-dominated horizontal interplay reinforces the importance of social networks 
for MPA management. Such social networks facilitate the sharing of experiences that can 
lead to mutual learning, increasing the likelihood of MPA success, and are supportive of a 
socio-ecological conceptualization of MPA networks (Christie et al., 2009; Lowry et al., 
2009). Cross-site visits, for example, while not having a direct positive impact on MPA 
success, have been found to be a good predictor of MPA compliance and enforcement if 
taken into consideration along with other educational activities (Pietri et al., 2009). Cross-
site visits are usually restricted to MPA managers. Extending cross-site visit participation 
to local communities could improve MPA performance in the long-term. Local 
communities that participate in cross-site visits have been found to increase their 
understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing MPA management, learn new 
MPA monitoring techniques, and refresh data analysis skills (LMMA, 2010). While the 
scope of horizontal interplay may be narrow, the variety of linkages registered reflects the 
various ways in which community-based MPAs may interact for their own benefit and for 
the benefit of their counterparts.  
Fourth, most linkages were reciprocal, except for two horizontal interactions that were 
unidirectional. Though the distinction in terms of direction of institutional interplay is 
useful for a first exploration, it is not very informative. A more informed analysis of the 
nuances of reciprocal interplay (i.e., strength of interaction) would probably elicit its 
significance and mechanisms (King, 1997). 
Fifth, the effects of institutional interplay were assessed in terms of its impact on 
MPA effectiveness, namely on its biophysical, socio-economic and governance aspects, 
and to the extent possible afforded by the available literature; hence, the classification of 
some effects as “potential” in Table 2. For example, inter-MPA workshops offer an 
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opportunity for MPA managers to share information and experiences, which can then be 
used to improve management of their MPA. The lack of strong evidence suggesting that 
this indeed happens has rendered the effect of inter-MPA workshops the classification of 
“potentially positive”. In the case of legal recognition afforded to community-based 
MPAs, the effect of this institutional interplay was considered positive, given its obvious 
positive consequences for MPA effectiveness (i.e., legitimacy to enforce their own rules) 
even in the absence of reports after legal recognition was obtained. The effects of 
institutional interplay, though appearing overwhelmingly to be positive, only provide 
limited insights into the institutional dynamics of MPA networks with community-based 
MPAs. On the one hand, not all MPA networks have been implemented; as such, reported 
consequences of institutional interplay are only speculative. On the other hand, it is 
possible that negative and neutral consequences of interplay are not reported at all, 
especially as the latter can be easily dismissed as unimportant.  
This examination of institutional interplay in MPA networks with community-based 
MPAs provides useful insights for the MPA literature and for the growing literature on 
the dynamics of environmental institutions. In particular, it has investigated two types of 
institutional interplay (i.e., vertical and horizontal) that are often addressed separately 
(Gehring & Oberthür, 2008), and that speak directly to the “middle ground” between top-
down and bottom-up approaches suggested initially. This inquiry is limited in, at least, 
two aspects. First, a snapshot view of institutional interplay does not allow adequate 
understanding of institutional dynamics. For example, it is not possible to elaborate on 
how institutional linkages may change over time and through which mechanisms, and 
how this has affected MPA effectiveness. Second, while a broad analysis of a relatively 
large number of cases can be useful to gain a general view of institutional interplay in 
MPA networks with community-based MPAs, it misses important details that a more in-
depth analysis would make clear. This last limitation is further compounded by the 
literature-based methodological approach. However, the ten cases of MPA networks with 
community-based MPAs that have been analysed offer fair material for more in-depth 
studies in the future. 
Despite these limitations, the identification of different forms of institutional interplay 
has its value for MPA-making in the Western Indian Ocean. The fostering of positive 
institutional interplay complements the Western Indian Ocean MPA Toolkit (IUCN, 
2004), which is silent on horizontal interplay, though it is supported by the opportunity 
Chapter 9 
311 
offered by the Western Indian Ocean Certification of MPA Professionals program to 
establish a social network of MPA professionals in the region. Others have also provided 
evidence of institutional interplay in fisheries co-management in Kenya and Madagascar 
(Cinner et al., 2009) that could inspire similar MPA-related initiatives. The precise 
conditions under which any form of institutional interplay may be more easily 
implemented, or facilitate MPA success, were not investigated. However, MPA 
professionals in the Western Indian Ocean are better positioned to determine their 
applicability to their professional contexts, and to make any adjustments they may find 
appropriate. Even so, MPA professionals in the Western Indian Ocean and elsewhere are 
cautioned on the transaction costs associated with institutional interplay: interacting 
institutions need to spend time and money to foster linkages between them, exchange 
information, coordinate actions, and enforce compliance upon each other (McGinnis, 
2005). These transaction costs may be particularly burdensome in developing contexts.   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper set out to inform MPA-making in the Western Indian Ocean by examining 
the role institutional interplay may have in bridging top-down and bottom-up approaches 
to marine conservation, focusing on the particular case of MPA networks with 
community-based MPAs. Institutional interplay generally concerned information 
exchanges (e.g., through LMMA network, cross-visits) and issues of control and authority 
(e.g., overlapping jurisdictions, enforcement). Some forms of institutional interplay may 
have influence on MPA effectiveness, and can be an important tool for future MPA 
networks with community-based MPAs. However, fostering interactions among MPAs, 
and between them and other institutions, can be costly, and consequently purposeful 
interventions should be carefully considered. 
The ten MPA networks with community-based MPAs identified here present an 
excellent opportunity for future in-depth research on the dynamics of institutional 
interplay and its influence on marine conservation success at the local and network level. 
As MPA coverage expands worldwide, we should expect more detailed accounts of the 
institutional dynamics involved in MPA-making processes. 
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Table 2 - Forms of institutional interplay in MPA networks with community-based MPAs 
 MPA networks Identification criteria* Drivers Levels involved Direction Effects 
Overlapping 
jurisdictions  New Zealand 
MPA network affects customary 
reserves: conservation objectives may 
override customary fishing reserves 
Functional 
linkage Vertical Reciprocal Negative  
LMMA network/inter-
MPA workshops  
Kimbe Bay, Papua-
New Guinea; Western 
Prov., Solomon Islands 
CB-MPAs affect other CB-MPAs: new 
information and lessons are used for CB-
MPA management 
Strategic 
linkage Horizontal Reciprocal 
Potentially 
positive 
Legal recognition  
Kimbe Bay, Papua-
New Guinea; Western 
Prov., Solomon Islands 
Local/state authorities affect CB-MPAs: 
local/provincial legislation recognizes 
traditional/ customary authority 
Functional 
linkage Vertical Reciprocal Positive  
Inter-MPA alliance  Danajon Bank, The Philippines 
CB-MPAs affect other CB-MPAs: 
experiences are shared  
Strategic 
linkage Horizontal Reciprocal 
Potentially 
positive  
Memorandum of 
Agreement & multi-
municipal/stakeholder 
management council  
Southeast Cebu, The 
Philippines 
Municipalities and stakeholders affect 
others: coordination of enforcement 
efforts is facilitated 
Strategic 
linkage Horizontal Reciprocal 
Potentially 
positive 
Cross-site visits 
Danajon Bank and 
Southeast Cebu, The 
Philippines 
CB-MPAs affect other CB-MPAs’ 
biological and social success 
Strategic 
linkage Horizontal Reciprocal Positive 
Joint enforcement 
operations  
Danajon Bank and 
Southeast Cebu, The 
Philippines 
CB-MPAs affect their and other CB-
MPAs’ enforcement effectiveness 
Strategic 
linkage Horizontal Reciprocal Positive 
Sharing information  Brazil MERs affect adjacent communities: transfer of traditional knowledge 
Strategic 
linkage Horizontal Unilateral 
Potentially 
positive  
Enforcement by local 
authorities  Ecuador 
Local authorities affect CB-MPAs: local 
authorities enforce CB-MPA’s rules  
Functional 
linkage Vertical Unilateral Positive 
*Source institution affects target institution: causal relationship. 
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10. MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND TRANSBOUNDARY MPAs 
GRILO, C. (2010). “The Impact of Maritime Boundaries on Cooperation in the Creation 
of Transboundary Marine Protected Areas: Insights from Three Cases”, Ocean Yearbook, 
Vol. 24:115-150. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Marine ecosystems are seriously threatened by human activities, such as coastal area 
development, waste discharge, and exploitation of marine resources.1 The consequences 
of these threats are often transboundary in nature. They are being observed beyond the 
coastal or inland waters where they originate and affect neighbouring and distant states, 
and the high seas. Conversely, conservation measures applied by a state can also benefit 
the marine environment of its neighbours, and, thus, provide an incentive for 
transboundary cooperation in marine conservation.  
The foregoing shows that there is an obvious interdependency among states in 
relation to their use of the seas and the impact this has on the marine environment. 
Cooperation between states is, therefore, a necessary condition for effective management 
of the marine environment and its resources. According to articles 192 and 197 of the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),2 states must 
cooperate in several areas, including for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment at the global and regional levels. The 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD),3 in articles 8 and 22, advances this commitment by specifying the duty 
of state parties to conserve biodiversity through, among others, in situ conservation in a 
manner consistent with the law of the sea. The CBD Decision II/10: Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity,4 also known as the Jakarta 
Mandate, reinforces the obligation of state parties to implement measures to conserve 
                                                 
1
 GESAMP, The State of the Marine Environment, Reports and Studies No. 39 (Nairobi: UNEP, 1990); 
GESAMP, A Sea of Troubles, Reports and Studies No. 70 (Nairobi: UNEP, 2001). 
2
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 16 
Nov. 1994). 
3
 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 142 (entered into force 29 Dec. 1993). 
4
 Dec. II/10—Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity, Doc. 
UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19 ( Jakarta: 2d Conference of the Parties, 1995). 
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marine biodiversity, particularly through the establishment of marine protected areas 
(MPAs). 
MPAs are one of the most promising marine conservation tools.5 By definition, 
they are areas of the marine environment that have been reserved for a conservation 
purpose.6 As area-based management tools, MPAs can serve different objectives within 
and beyond that of their overall conservation goal. Besides protecting certain habitats and 
species, especially those that are critical to endangered populations, MPAs may also help 
rebuild depleted fish stocks, provide opportunities for tourism and marine research, and 
protect cultural heritage.7 Unfortunately, the marine environment is far from being 
adequately protected by MPAs.8 
The transboundary nature of marine ecosystems and resources necessitates the 
establishment of transboundary MPAs (TB-MPAs), whereby conservation measures are 
implemented in multiple jurisdictions and so that common threats to marine biodiversity 
may be jointly addressed. Ecosystem-based management thus challenges political borders 
by using ecological boundaries as a management area, instead of depending on 
administrative jurisdictions for that purpose. Like transboundary protected areas in 
general, the overlay of TB-MPAs with multiple jurisdictions is based on the assumption 
that sovereignty is not an impediment to cooperation in biodiversity conservation.9 TB-
MPAs have the potential to facilitate cooperation,10 just as their establishment is itself a 
product of collaborative decision and action.  
MPAs, transboundary or not, exist within the limits of the jurisdiction of coastal 
states inside specific ocean areas claimable under UNCLOS. In each of its declared 
maritime zones, a coastal state enjoys distinct jurisdictional rights that are progressively 
                                                 
5
 S. Belfiore, B. Cicin-Sain and C.N. Ehler, eds., Incorporating Marine Protected Areas into Integrated 
Coastal and Ocean Management: Principles and Guidelines (Gland, Switzerland: IUCN, 2004); G. 
Kelleher, ed., Guidelines for Marine Protected Areas (Gland: World Commission on Protected Areas, 
1999). 
6
 Protection of the Coastal and Marine Environment, IUCN Res. 17.38 (Gland: IUCN, 1988):2(b). 
7
 Kelleher, see n. 5 above, at xvii. 
8
 Id. at xxii (noting that 9 percent of the land is protected); L.J. Wood, L. Fish, J. Laughren and D. Pauly, 
“Assessing Progress towards Global Marine Protection Targets: Shortfalls in Information and Action,” 
Oryx 42, no. 3 (2008): 340–351, at 340 (illustrating that only 0.65 percent of the marine environment is 
covered by MPAs). 
9
 M. van Amerom, “National Sovereignty and Transboundary Protected Areas in Southern Africa,” 
GeoJournal 58, No. 4 (2002): 265–273, at 269. 
10
 T. Sandwith, C. Shine, L. Hamilton and D. Sheppard, Transboundary Protected Areas for Peace and Co-
operation (Gland: IUCN, 2001): 7. 
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reduced from the maritime zone closer to land to the most seaward, that is, from internal 
waters, to the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and 
ending in the continental shelf. The geographical scope of these five maritime zones is a 
function of the creation of maritime boundaries that determine where they are measured 
from, their extension, and their width. Maritime boundaries are a key tool for coastal 
states to expand their sovereignty and jurisdiction over adjacent sea areas as permitted by 
UNCLOS.11 Because TB-MPAs are dependent on how coastal states may exercise their 
jurisdiction over sea areas, the capacity of transboundary MPAs to go beyond sovereignty 
in addressing threats to marine biodiversity is linked to the role of maritime boundaries in 
determining the maritime space within which each state may claim rights over sea areas. 
This article assesses the interaction between determination of sovereignty through 
maritime boundary-making and cooperation in marine conservation as materialized in 
transboundary MPAs. Its main goal is to analyze how maritime boundary-making has, or 
has not, affected cooperation between coastal states in creating TB-MPAs. In particular, it 
analyzes the boundary behaviour of coastal states and the functionality of potential or 
existing maritime boundaries associated with three transboundary marine protected areas 
established in different maritime boundary contexts: the Turtle Islands Heritage Protected 
Area in Malaysia and the Philippines; the Red Sea Marine Peace Park created by Israel 
and Jordan; and the Pelagos Sanctuary for Mediterranean Marine Mammals, promoted by 
France, Italy, and Monaco. This inquiry is timely because transboundary conservation is 
attracting growing attention12 and many of the potential maritime boundaries are yet to be 
established. 13 
                                                 
11
 The rules introduced by UNCLOS for boundary-making have allowed states to claim more sea space than 
permitted under pre-UNCLOS international law of the sea. 
12
 One of the goals of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity is “to establish and strengthen regional networks, transboundary protected areas (TBPAs) and 
collaboration between neighbouring protected areas across national boundaries,” including in the marine 
environment; Dec. VII/28—Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e), UNEP/CBD/COP/7/28 (Kuala Lumpur: 
7th Conference of the Parties, 2004). Also, Article 35 of the 2004 draft of an International Covenant on 
Environment and Development states that parties to the convention would “cooperate in the conservation, 
management and restoration of natural resources which occur in areas under the jurisdiction of more than 
one State, or fully or partly in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. To this end, (a) Parties 
sharing the same natural system shall make every effort to manage that system as a single ecological unit 
notwithstanding national boundaries”; IUCN Commission on Environmental Law, Draft International 
Covenant on Environment and Development—Third Edition: Revised Version (Gland: IUCN, 2004): 14. 
13
 Despite its potential for extended jurisdiction over the marine realm, more than half of the world’s 
maritime boundaries are yet to be settled; P. Hallwood, “An Economic Analysis of Drawing Lines in the 
Sea,” Ocean and Coastal Management 51, no. 5 (2008): 405–409, at 405. 
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The article first describes the process of maritime boundary-making in relation to 
the maritime zones it may generate, how their distinct jurisdictional regimes relate to 
MPAs, and the factors influencing the creation of maritime boundaries. After introducing 
the concept of transboundary marine protected areas, it examines the parallel history of 
the three transboundary MPAs in the context of existing maritime boundaries, or the 
potential they carry to influence the determination and delimitation of new boundaries in 
the areas under consideration. The interactions between maritime boundary-making and 
cooperation in creating and managing TB-MPAs are discussed with reference to the 
factors perceived to influence both processes. The article concludes with an argument on 
the assumed need for maritime boundary-making to precede the creation and management 
of transboundary marine protected areas. 
2. MARITIME BOUNDARIES, MARITIME ZONES, AND MARINE 
PROTECTED AREAS 
In general, boundaries allocate rights and duties over specific land or sea areas. In the 
particular case of maritime boundaries, this allocative purpose is complemented by zone-
making. According to Johnston, under UNCLOS, and in addition to delimiting 
jurisdictional zones, boundaries also serve an administrative purpose insofar as they 
provide the geographical scope to which specific regulatory arrangements apply.14 
This section sets out the three phases according to which the process of boundary-
making unfolds: first, the delineation of baselines from where the breadth of the maritime 
zones is measured; second, the determination of the seaward limits of those maritime 
zones; and third, the delimitation of the “lateral” boundaries, that is, boundaries between 
adjoining or opposite coastal states.15 The maritime zones generated in each of them are 
described and discussed in relation to MPA-making.16 The section ends with an 
examination of the factors at play in maritime boundary-making. 
2.1 Delineation of Baselines 
                                                 
14
 D.M. Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary-Making (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1988): 7. 
15
 Id. At 123, n. 1. 
16
 The maritime zones beyond national jurisdiction are discussed later in this section. 
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The process of maritime boundary-making, and therefore maritime zone-making, is 
initiated by the delineation of baselines. The landward portion of the sea defined by the 
baseline constitutes internal waters (UNCLOS, Article 8(1)). The coastal state exercises 
full sovereignty in its internal waters and only in very particular cases may foreign vessels 
exercise the right of innocent passage within that area (UNCLOS, Article 8 (2)). 
Consequently, the coastal state is free to create and manage MPAs in its internal waters 
without being limited by the rights of other states. In the case of archipelagic states, the 
baselines are delineated around the outward side of the outer islands (UNCLOS, Article 
47). In the waters on the inward side of the archipelagic baselines, the archipelagic state 
enjoys sovereignty over the water column, airspace, seabed, subsoil, and all marine 
resources (UNCLOS, Article 49).17 Paradoxically, foreign vessels and aircrafts enjoy 
more rights in these archipelagic waters than in the territorial sea of the archipelagic state, 
located on the outward side of the archipelagic baselines.18 
2.2 Determination of Seaward Limits 
After baseline delineation, and in addition to internal waters, four other maritime zones 
may be created through the determination of seaward limits in relation to the baselines. 
First, a coastal state may establish its territorial sea by claiming an area adjacent to 
land where it may enjoy sovereignty—in similar terms as that enjoyed in its land 
territory—up to 12 nautical miles (NM) from the baselines (UNCLOS, Articles 2 and 3). 
The coastal state’s sovereignty in the territorial sea is, however, limited by the right of 
innocent passage of foreign vessels (UNCLOS, Article 17). This implies that the 
establishment and management of MPAs in the territorial sea shall not, in any way, 
interfere with their right of innocent passage.19 
                                                 
17
 Archipelagic baselines, as opposed to baselines delineated by non-archipelagic states, do not generate 
internal waters on their inward side. Article 50 of UNCLOS determines that “[w]ithin its archipelagic 
waters, the archipelagic State may draw closing lines for the delimitation of internal waters.” 
18
 R.L. Bledsoe and B.A. Boczek, The International Law Dictionary (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1987), 
s.v. archipelagic waters. 
19
 Most MPAs are located within the territorial seas and appear not to conflict with the right to innocent 
passage. Some coastal states, like Belgium, have legislated in this regard. Article 20(2) of its 1999 Act on 
Protection of the Marine Environment and Ocean Space under Belgium jurisdiction reads as follows: 
“Establishment of marine protected areas in the territorial sea may not have the effect of preventing or 
restricting the exercise of the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels in the territorial sea.” Act of 19 
January 1999 on Protection of the Marine Environment and Ocean Space under Belgium Jurisdiction, 
reprinted in Law of the Sea Bulletin 45 (2001): 47–66. 
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Second, a coastal state may also claim a contiguous zone in the area immediately 
adjacent to the territorial sea. In this zone, which cannot extend more than 24 NM from 
the baselines, “the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent 
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its 
territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations 
committed within its territory or territorial sea” (Article 33 (1) of UNCLOS). In the case 
where an EEZ overlapping with the contiguous zone has not been claimed, the coastal 
state is very restricted in its legal capacity to both implement an MPA and enforce its 
regulations. The contiguous zone has seen its importance reduced since the adoption of 
UNCLOS and the introduction of the legal regime of the EEZ.20 Even though many 
coastal states still declare a contiguous zone and claim an EEZ, the EEZ regime is 
significantly more relevant to the creation of MPAs, as it will be shown next. 
Third, and within an extension of 200 NM from the baselines, a coastal state can 
claim its EEZ, beginning from the seaward limit of the territorial sea (UNCLOS, Article 
55). The particular legal regime of the EEZ, one of the major contributions of the Law of 
the Sea Convention to the governance of the oceans, attempts to balance the sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state with “the freedoms [of other states] referred to 
in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such 
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and 
pipelines” (UNCLOS, Article 58 (1)). For the purpose of MPA-making, a distinction is 
necessary. On the one hand, the coastal state has in its EEZ “sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed 
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and 
winds” (UNCLOS, Article 56 (1) (a)).21 On the other hand, it has jurisdiction for “(i) the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (ii) marine 
                                                 
20
 V. Prescott and C. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, 2d ed. (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2005): 19. For a recent discussion of the role of the contiguous zone in the protection of underwater 
cultural heritage, see P. Sioussiouras, “The Contiguous Zone as a Mechanism for Protecting the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage,” in Unresolved Issues and New Challenges to the Law of the Sea, Time Before and Time 
After (A. Strati, M. Gavouneli and N. Skourtos eds., Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005): 63. 
21
 Emphasis added. 
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scientific research; (iii) [and] the protection and preservation of the marine environment” 
(UNCLOS, Article 56(1)(b)).22 This implies that whether a coastal state may create and 
enforce the regulations of an MPA in the EEZ will depend on its main purpose. An MPA 
created to enhance fish stocks falls under the coastal state’s sovereign rights to conserve 
its marine resources in the EEZ, while an MPA established to protect particular habitats 
and species falls only under its jurisdiction. Where sovereignty is not applicable, MPAs 
for marine conservation are limited by the rights other states enjoy in the EEZ of the 
MPA-making coastal state. However, because most MPAs usually have a mix of 
objectives that most often include both biodiversity conservation and fisheries 
enhancement,23 the creation of MPAs in the EEZ will hardly contradict the purposes of 
the EEZ regime,24 and even less the general obligation of all states “to protect and 
preserve the marine environment” (UNCLOS, Article 192).25 
Finally, a coastal state has a juridical continental shelf “extend[ing] beyond its 
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of 
the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend up to that distance” (UNCLOS, Article 76).26 A 
coastal state has sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting its natural resources, namely “mineral and other non-living resources of 
the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species” 
(UNCLOS, Article 77(4)). The creation of benthic MPAs, that is, conservation areas 
                                                 
22
 For a discussion of the different implications of sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state over 
the EEZ for the purpose of creating MPAs, see F.H. Wegelein, “Marine Protected Areas in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone: The European Union between a Rock and Hard Place?” Georgian Law Review 5, no. 2–3 
(2002): 321–371, at 335–345. 
23
 D.P. Boersma and J.K. Parrish, “Limiting Abuse: Marine Protected Areas, A Limited Solution,” 
Ecological Economics 31, no. 2 (1999): 287–304, 287; P.J.S. Jones, “A Review and Analysis of the 
Objectives of Marine Nature Reserves,” Ocean and Coastal Management 24, no. 3 (1994): 149–178, at 
149. 
24
 In 1999, only 15 MPAs were known to have been created in the EEZ; Kelleher, see n. 5 above, at 8. 
Some coastal states, like Mexico and Australia, have already created MPAs in their EEZs, and others (e.g., 
US and South Africa) are planning to do the same; UNEP-WCMC, National and Regional Networks of 
Marine Protected Areas: A Review of Progress (Cambridge: UNEP-WCMC, 2008): 49–50, 62, 84. 
25
 Wegelein, see n. 22 above, at 347. 
26
 A coastal state does not need to declare its continental shelf up to 200 NM to enjoy its rights as provided 
in UNCLOS. If the coastal state intends to claim the continental shelf beyond the 200 NM, it is to submit a 
proposal of its limits to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, whose recommendations on 
the delineation are final (UNCLOS art. 76). 
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limited to the sea bottom, is therefore restricted to the regulation of their exploitation.27 
Though MPAs in the continental shelf may protect seamounts28 wherever they fall inside 
this maritime zone of any given coastal state, it is not yet clear the extent of the coastal 
state’s rights to MPA-making and management vis-à-vis the freedom of fishing enjoyed 
by other states in the overlaying waters.29 
2.3 Maritime Zones beyond National Jurisdiction 
Besides these five maritime zones—internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, 
exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf—two other maritime zones are found in 
the sea: the Area and the high seas. Unlike the former zones, they do not fall under the 
jurisdiction of coastal states, but instead, under that of the International Seabed Authority 
(ISA) and of flag states, respectively. However, the claims of coastal states to extended 
jurisdiction over their adjacent maritime space impact on the size and shape of both the 
Area and the high seas. 
The high seas are constituted by “all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the 
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State” (UNCLOS, Article 86). Sixty-four percent 
of the marine environment is estimated to be high seas.30 As in the EEZ, the potential 
creation of MPAs in the high seas needs to be examined against the freedom of the high 
seas. The latter comprises, among others, the freedom of navigation, overflight, fishing, 
the freedom to conduct scientific research, to construct artificial islands and other 
                                                 
27
 J. Gibson and L. Warren, “Legislative Requirements” in Marine Protected Areas: Principles and 
Techniques for Management, S. Gubbay (ed.), (London: Chapman and Hall, 1995): 37. 
28
 Seamounts are underwater mountains that do not reach the surface. They are areas of high biodiversity, 
hosting endemic communities not found elsewhere. Seamounts concentrate many fish assemblages, making 
them particularly attractive for fisheries activities. Because most of the sessile species found in seamounts 
grow extremely slowly, these ecosystems are vulnerable to bottom fishing activities; T. Morato and D. 
Pauly, eds., Seamounts: Biodiversity and Fisheries (Vancouver: Fisheries Centre Research, University of 
British Colombia, 2004), available online: 
<http://www.seaaroundus.org/report/seamounts/FCRR12(5).pdf>. 
29
 Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Management of Risks to the Biodiversity 
of Seamounts and Cold Water Coral Communities Beyond National Jurisdiction (2003) 
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/INF/25, Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, available 
online: <http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-07/information/cop-07-inf-25-en.doc>. 
30
 Executive Secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Scientific Information on Biodiversity in 
Marine Areas Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, UNEP/CBD/WG-PA/1/INF/1, Ad Hoc Open-
Ended Working Group on Protected Areas, (2005) available online: 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/pa/pawg-01/information/pawg-01-inf-01-en.pdf>. 
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installations, and to lay submarine cables and pipelines (UNCLOS, Article 87(1)).31 In 
exercising the freedom of the high seas, flag states are to comply with measures for the 
exploitation of marine resources (UNCLOS, Articles 116 to 119) and for the conservation 
of marine mammals (UNCLOS, Article 120). In regards to conservation of marine 
biodiversity, beyond these provisions, in the high seas flag states are only obliged by the 
general duty to protect the marine environment, as set out in article 192. Therefore, the 
potential for MPA establishment in the high seas is limited by the type of feature targeted 
for conservation. If the goal of a high seas MPA falls outside the limits imposed by 
UNCLOS, its success will depend on the willingness and capacity of flag states to 
regulate and enforce the actions of the vessels flying their flag.32  
The Area, declared the common heritage of mankind in 1970, comprises the 
seabed and its subsoil beyond national jurisdiction.33 Its size and shape is determined by 
the seaward limit of the continental shelf.34 Because the mandate of the ISA is limited to 
the regulation of the exploitation of the mineral resources of the Area, marine 
conservation measures would have to be considered by the ISA in light of the benefits 
they may afford to its mineral resources.35 
                                                 
31
 The freedom of the high seas is subject to the relevant provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, 
namely those pertaining to the Area and in regard to marine scientific research. 
32
 K.M. Gjerde and G. Kelleher, “High Seas Marine Protected Areas on the Horizon: Legal Framework and 
Recent Progress,” Parks 15, no. 3 (2005): 11–18, at 12. For recent developments on high seas MPAs, see J. 
Ardron, K. Gjerde, S. Pullen and V. Tilot, “Marine Spatial Planning in the High Seas,” Marine Policy 32, 
no. 5 (2008): 832–839; T. Scovazzi, “Marine Protected Areas on the High Seas: Some Legal and Policy 
Considerations,” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 19, no. 1 (2004): 1–17; IUCN, Ten-Year 
High Seas Marine Protected Area Strategy: A Ten-Year Strategy to Promote the Development of a Global 
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Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), c. 9. 
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In sum, when considering the creation of MPAs, coastal states need to consider 
their distinct rights and those of other states according to the type of maritime zone. 
MPAs can be established in the internal waters and the territorial sea of a coastal state 
without restrictions, except for the legitimate exercise of the right of innocent passage by 
foreign states. In the contiguous zone and the EEZ, the mix of objectives of an MPA will 
need to, at least partially, match the applicable sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal state, with due regard for the rights of third states. In the high seas and the Area, 
the establishment and management of any MPA is subjected, respectively, to the 
willingness of flag states to ensure their vessels’ compliance with regulatory measures, 
and the right of the ISA to implement measures regulating mineral exploitation. 
Against this background, the discussion now considers how the determination of 
“lateral” boundaries vis-à-vis these various ocean areas may affect the prospect for the 
establishment of TB-MPAs. The discussion focuses mainly on how the factors that 
influence the possibility of efforts to delimit these boundaries may result in their concrete 
settlement, or in agreement on a boundary arrangement, or on neither. 
2.4 Determination of “Lateral” Limits 
After delineation of baselines and determination of seaward limits, the final stage of 
maritime boundary-making consists in determining the “lateral” limits of maritime zones, 
to shape their width in relation to adjacent coastal states, and their extension in relation to 
opposite states with overlapping claims. A coastal state may delimit its lateral boundaries 
with adjoining or opposing coastal states in respect of the maritime zones both have 
claimed. 
In the case of the territorial sea, and where states fail to agree on such a boundary, 
a coastal state cannot “extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of 
which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of 
the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured” (UNCLOS, Article 15). 
UNCLOS does not set out the rules for the delimitation of the contiguous zone between 
two adjacent or opposing states.36 As for the EEZ, the guidance provided by UNCLOS 
has been appropriately termed as vague and empty.37 It ascertains that the boundary 
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agreement must be an “equitable solution” (Article 74 (1)), but it does not specify the 
rules through which such a solution is to be found. Importantly enough, UNCLOS 
imposes negotiation as the primary means to settle the EEZ bilateral boundary, suggesting 
in addition that states enter into provisional arrangements regarding the putative border 
region while an agreement on the maritime boundary is not reached (Article 74 (3)). If, 
within a reasonable period, the diplomatic option fails, states are then to resort to the 
dispute settlement mechanisms provided by UNCLOS (Article 74 (2)). These provisions 
are similar to those applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf between 
adjoining and opposing coastal states (UNCLOS, Article 83), but in sharp contrast with 
those on the territorial sea, which lack orientation on the process for delimiting a shared 
boundary between two coastal states. 
2.5 Implications of Maritime Boundary-Making for Transboundary MPAs 
The framework provided by UNCLOS for maritime boundary-making is far from being 
comprehensive. One of its weaknesses is its insufficient emphasis on the connection 
between a boundary settlement and cooperative transboundary arrangements for 
coordinated exploitation of the areas delimited.38 Boundary settlements and arrangements 
are distinguished by the certainty and clarity of the former, as opposed to the flexibility of 
the latter.39 Boundary settlements resolve a boundary issue permanently, while a 
transboundary arrangement serves the wider goal of facilitating cooperation or 
consultation in the development and management of sea areas around a maritime 
boundary. 
As far as the limits of the EEZ are concerned, transboundary arrangements may 
constitute a provisional step, pending the negotiation of the boundary (UNCLOS, Article 
74 (3)), or the resolution of a dispute associated with its delimitation, as provided by Part 
XV of UNCLOS. One of these arrangements is the establishment of a Joint Development 
Zone ( JDZ).40 A JDZ is “a provisional arrangement covering the whole or part of the 
overlapping claimed areas, with or without the settlement of a maritime boundary.”41 
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(London: Croom Helm, 1988): 7. 
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JDZs are apparently used exclusively for the joint exploitation of marine resources, 
easing divergences on often the most contentious issue in maritime boundary 
delimitation: the perceived economic benefits marine resources may offer.42 
JDZs are of particular importance in the context of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, where 
states should cooperate in, inter alia, the protection of the marine environment 
(UNCLOS, Article 123 (b)). 
In the context of existing maritime boundaries, the creation of TB-MPAs may be 
facilitated by the absence of disputes over the boundaries and the resources they divide. 
Maritime boundaries have the advantage of distributing sea areas and determining 
jurisdictions. The clarity and certainty provided allows states engaged in transboundary 
marine conservation to focus on deciding what measures to apply, and how to apply and 
enforce them within the framework afforded by the maritime zones and respective 
boundaries. Additionally, TB-MPAs may provide an entry point for transboundary 
arrangements of another nature than that of marine conservation.43 
States may not always be interested in negotiating or resolving disputes, however, 
over a maritime boundary, usually because the costs entailed supplant the benefits they 
may gain from resource exploitation. Here, then, TB-MPAs may have a role to play. 
Because maritime boundary disputes are often a result of divergences over the 
distribution of valuable marine resources, TB-MPAs may embody a provisional boundary 
arrangement until the boundary is definitely settled. Hypothetically, and to a limited 
extent, the success of a TB-MPA where a maritime boundary is absent may be measured 
by the common understanding among the coastal states that the TB-MPA suffices as a 
boundary arrangement. 
In extreme cases where the absence of maritime boundary settlements may impact 
seriously on the economic activities of one of the states in the border region,44 and even 
though marine conservation may be a peripheral issue between contending states, the 
prospect of a TB-MPA may not gather the necessary level of cooperation its 
materialization may require. 
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Whether a TB-MPA succeeds in any of the hypothesized situations is dependent 
on the interplay between the multiple factors associated with the making of the maritime 
boundary in issue. 
2.6 Factors Influencing Maritime Boundary-Making 
As mentioned before, maritime boundary-making is expected to offer certainty to the 
states involved in the development and management of sea areas by creating maritime 
zones and allocating marine resources.45 When ocean boundaries are delimited, 
competition between coastal states is reduced and the potential for conflict over border 
resources is minimized.46 Maritime boundary-making has, therefore, the potential to 
facilitate cooperation between states in, for example, environmental protection.47 
Though it is guided by law, maritime boundary-making is not a mere legal 
exercise. Besides legal principles, rules codified in UNCLOS, state practice, and court 
cases, other factors contribute to the process, particularly in a “lateral” context.48 
Physical characteristics of the coastline and seabed influence the determination of 
baselines and, therefore, the seaward limits of every claimable jurisdictional zone. One 
illustrative case is that of semi-enclosed seas, where more often than not, maritime 
boundary-making will be a bilateral exercise, given the likelihood of overlapping claims 
to the maritime zones. The geological and geomorphological characteristics of the seabed 
are also crucial in settling maritime boundaries dividing overlapping claims to the 
continental shelf.49 
An affable political relationship between coastal states with overlapping claims is 
also influential in determining how the maritime boundary-making process may unfold. 
States that have less than polite relationships may have more difficulty in solving a 
dispute over sea areas, even if the issue at stake is not closely related to maritime 
boundary-making. Where coastal states are in, at least, amicable terms, and if more 
pervasive factors do not come into play, the delimitation of a common maritime boundary 
may be less contentious. 
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Socio-cultural similarity between adjoining and opposing coastal states may also 
facilitate dialogue and cooperation in settling maritime boundaries. Confluent values and 
beliefs may lay the ground to advance common understanding on the boundary-related 
issues under consideration.50 
The same does not happen when economic interests clash. Economic benefits 
usually originate boundary disputes and drive territorial behavior regarding the sea areas 
where marine resources are perceived to be abundant.51 States are generally concerned 
about two particular economic aspects of maritime boundary-making: the rents they can 
derive from the resources that may be allocated and the costs of engaging in a dispute 
over a maritime boundary.52 The absence of resolution of so many maritime boundaries 
may be explained by the high rents the involved states expect from marine resources in 
comparison to relatively lower costs of staking positions in a dispute.53 
Disputes over a maritime boundary may, eventually, only be settled through the 
intervention of third parties. That was the case of the disagreement between Argentina 
and Chile over the Beagle Channel, where the Pope mediated the negotiations between 
the two states, resulting in the 1984 treaty establishing a maritime boundary between 
them.54 However, third party intervention may not always be successful in resolving a 
maritime boundary dispute. For example, Guyana and Venezuela have still not come to 
terms regarding their maritime boundary, despite the intervention of the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.55 
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Taking the foregoing factors into consideration, the three transboundary MPAs of 
this article are now assessed in terms of the boundary behavior56 of the coastal states 
involved, and the functionality57 of the maritime boundaries straddled by each TB-MPA. 
It is expected that boundary behavior and the functionality of the related maritime 
boundaries have an impact on how transboundary MPAs are created and managed. 
3. TRANSBOUNDARY MARINE PROTECTED AREAS 
Transboundary protected areas (TBPAs) have received much attention in recent years, 
creating expectations about the integration of conservation, development and peace-
building goals, and the scaling-up of conservation to wider management units. The main 
theme of the 2003 World Parks Congress—Benefits Beyond Boundaries—reflects this 
paradigm. It had its beginning in 1932 with the establishment of the Waterton-Glacier 
International Peace Park between the United States and Canada.58 Clearly, transboundary 
protected areas are not new. Still, it was not until 2001 that a definition was first proposed 
for this marine management and resources conservation concept. A transboundary 
protected area is: 
An area of land and/or sea that straddles one or more boundaries between 
states, sub-national units such as provinces and regions, autonomous 
areas and/or areas beyond the limits of national sovereignty or 
jurisdiction, whose constituent parts are especially dedicated to the 
protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and 
associated cultural resources, and managed co-operatively through legal 
or other effective means.59 
Transboundary cooperation in the marine environment is not as common as on 
land,60 just like the coverage of the sea by protected areas is less than that found in 
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terrestrial ecosystems.61 The scarcity of examples of TB-MPAs is further attested to in the 
lack of literature and recent experience on its existence and administration.62 
Like maritime boundary-making in a bilateral context, the establishment and 
management of TB-MPAs is dependent on the level of cooperation between concerned 
coastal states regarding marine conservation. It is likely that other transboundary issues 
may also affect the development of transboundary MPAs. 
It is appropriate at this point to clarify what cooperation in the protection of the 
marine environment is understood to be under the UNCLOS. Part XII on the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment provides that “States shall cooperate on a 
global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent 
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards 
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic 
regional features” (UNCLOS, Article 197). Three possible forms of cooperation between 
states in the protection of the marine environment are recognized: sharing of information, 
prevention of pollution, and adoption of regulations on prevention, reduction, and control 
of marine pollution.63 Information sharing is required in regard to imminent or actual 
damage (UNCLOS, Article 198) and of research programs on marine pollution 
(UNCLOS, Article 200). Cooperation in the prevention of pollution can be achieved by 
jointly developing contingency plans (UNCLOS, Article 199) and by establishing 
scientific criteria for the appropriate regulations to prevent, reduce, and control marine 
pollution (UNCLOS, Article 201). Finally, states are expected to participate in the 
activities of the competent international organizations in establishing the above 
mentioned regulations. 
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Cooperation will, therefore, be a distinctive descriptive element of the three 
transboundary MPAs chosen to elicit the interaction between transboundary MPAs and 
maritime boundaries in this article. The Turtle Islands Heritage Protected Area (TIHPA), 
the Red Sea Marine Peace Park (RSMPP), and the Pelagos Sanctuary for Mediterranean 
Marine Mammals (PSMMM), bring two elements of diversity to the analysis. First, the 
concurrent evolution of the TB-MPAs and of the maritime boundaries at issue between 
the states involved is distinct in each example. Second, the three TB-MPAs were 
established with different purposes, and, often, as the result of processes not always 
steered by the states themselves. In addition to the diversity of situations depicted by the 
three cases, the choice of these particular cases was also motivated by the fact that the 
number of states involved is limited. 
For each TB-MPA, background information is provided on the emergence of the 
marine conservation arrangements, including the motivation for engaging in cooperation. 
The maritime boundaries straddled by each TB-MPA are identified in relation to the 
maritime zones they generate. By eliciting the parallel evolution of marine conservation 
cooperation and maritime boundary delimitation (when applicable), the role of existing or 
potential maritime boundaries in the history of the TB-MPA is examined in the light of 
identified boundary behavior and perceived functionality. 
3.1 Turtle Islands Heritage Protected Area 
3.1.1 Origin and History 
Covering an area of 2,446 km2, the Turtle Islands Heritage Protected Area (TIHPA) is the 
first transboundary marine protected area in the world dedicated exclusively to the 
conservation of sea turtles,64 protecting 80 percent of the nesting grounds of green turtles 
(Chelonia mydas) found in Southeast Asia. The TB-MPA covers three islands in 
Malaysia, off the coast of Sabah, and six islands in the Philippines (see Figure 1).65 It is 
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 WWF-Philippines, Turtle Islands—Resources and Livelihoods under Threat (Quezon City, Philippines: 
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also part of the Sulu-Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion,66 contributing to the protection of some 
of its unique features, such as coral reefs.67 Initially proposed during a 1993 workshop 
organized by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in the region, the TIHPA was established 
through a memorandum of understanding between Malaysia and the Philippines on 31 
May, 1996.68 
Prior to its creation, some degree of protection had already been afforded by the 
two states to the areas in question. In the Philippines, only Baguan Island was already 
protected, having been proclaimed a marine sanctuary in 1982.69 Since 1977, the three 
islands in Malaysia constitute the Turtle Islands Park, where conservation activities 
started as early as 1932.70 The six islands of the Philippines are quite isolated, and more 
accessible from Malaysia than from its own capital, Manila. The size of the resident 
population in the Philippine islands is vulnerable to the attraction exerted by Malaysia’s 
economic development on local job seekers and to political unrest in the Philippines.71 
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Figure 1 – Turtle Islands Heritage Protected Area
 
 
The creation of the TB-MPA was an important milestone in MPA history. It 
affords protection to rare and emblematic biodiversity features—but it also takes a novel 
approach to marine conservation by overcoming the limits imposed by maritime 
boundaries between states for the sake of marine conservation.72 In recognition of this, 
the national agencies responsible for the implementation and management of the Turtle 
Islands Heritage Protected Area were awarded the J. Paul Getty Wildlife Conservation 
Prize in 1997.73 
In 2006, the six Philippine islands were included in the state’s tentative list of sites 
for designation as World Heritage sites under the 1972 Convention Concerning the 
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Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention).74 
The site was proposed under the designation of Turtle Islands Wildlife Sanctuary.75 
Malaysia has not yet tabled a similar proposal, neither is it clear whether it will in the near 
future. 
Both Malaysia and the Philippines are involved in other marine conservation 
initiatives in the region. They are both member states of the revised Action Plan for the 
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the East 
Asian Seas (1994), an initiative of the UNEP Regional Seas Programme.76 The plan 
provides a blueprint for international cooperation between the participating countries, 
including the conservation of marine and coastal habitats. Activities appear to be limited, 
however, to the conservation of coral reefs.77 
3.1.2 Maritime Boundary and Maritime Zones 
Cooperation is not without conflict. The TIHPA straddles the maritime boundary between 
the two states. The border was negotiated in 1930 by the United States and Great Britain 
(administrators, respectively, of the Philippines and Malaysia) and codified in a treaty 
between the occupying administrations.78 The Philippines are not very satisfied with the 
existing line and insist it is a national territorial boundary because of their claim to 
sovereignty over Sabah, currently part of Malaysia.79 No further boundary agreements 
have been reached by the two states on this particular boundary.80 
In terms of the relevance of the maritime zones to the TIHPA, it is important to 
observe that Malaysia claimed a territorial sea of only 3 NM on the coasts of Sabah 
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because of the conflicting claims of the Philippines to this territory.81 Because the 
baselines are unknown,82 it is not clear whether the waters of the three Malaysian islands 
fall under the territorial sea or under the EEZ beginning at the 3 NM limit. It seems 
reasonable to assume, however, that the islands would provide the geographical support 
for the baselines and the waters surrounding the islands would consequently fall inside 
the territorial sea.83 
The Philippines, on the other hand, has declared in its constitution that the waters 
on the inward side of its archipelagic baselines constitute internal waters,84 and not 
archipelagic waters as prescribed by UNCLOS. This irregular position vis-à-vis the 
relevant UNCLOS provisions has been deemed the most extreme in the South China 
Sea.85 The Philippines has adopted colonial treaty limits as the seaward limits of its 
territorial sea.86 
From this brief examination, it seems very likely that the maritime boundary 
straddled by the TIHPA divides the territorial seas of both Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Both states enjoy full sovereignty in their respective territorial seas, as limited by the right 
of innocent passage. Regarding the latent claim of the Philippines over Sabah, this coastal 
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of Malaysia’s baselines and territorial sea claim in the northern Malacca Strait,” Marine Policy 27, no. 5 
(2003): 367–373, at 372. On 1 May 2007, Malaysia enacted the Baselines of Maritime Zones Act 2006, 
where rules for baseline delineation are set but no geographical coordinates are provided; Baselines of 
Maritime Zones Act 2006, available online: 
http://www.parlimen.gov.my/billindexbi/pdf/DR%20152006E.pdf. 
83
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available online: 
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Article 1 reads as follows: “The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, 
irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.” 
85
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state is not likely to be more vocal over the international status of the maritime boundary, 
given the remoteness of its six TIHPA islands.87 Significant changes in boundary 
behavior are, therefore, not expected, and the functionality of the maritime boundary, as 
reflected in the cooperative behavior of both states for the purpose of sea turtle 
conservation, will likely not be jeopardized. The overlapping of the TIHPA with the 
territorial seas of both states, where they have sovereign rights to establish and manage 
MPAs, has probably been a facilitating factor in the creation of this TB-MPA. 
3.2 Red Sea Marine Peace Park 
3.2.1 Origin and History 
The Red Sea Marine Peace Park (RSMPP) between Israel and Jordan has as its primary 
conservation goal to provide protection to the coral reefs found in the waters of the 
northern part of the Gulf of Aqaba (see Figure 2).88 These northernmost reef-building 
corals are subjected to a restricted circulation regime, which limits the renewal of the 
waters through the Red Sea. This particular natural aspect of the gulf exacerbates the 
impacts of regional activities such as land-based pollution, fishing, aquaculture, port 
operations, tourism, coastal development, etc.89 The RSMPP encompasses the Eilat Coral 
Nature Reserve in Israel and the Aqaba Marine Park in Jordan,90 but it does not include 
the waters that separate them. 
The creation of the RSMPP was motivated by the nature of the threats affecting 
the coral reefs in the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as the joint realization that problems of a 
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“Development and Management of a Network of Marine Protected Areas in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden 
Region,” Ocean and Coastal Management 46, no. 8 (2003): 741–761. 
Chapter 10 
347 
regional nature required peaceful regional cooperation. The overarching purpose of the 
RSMPP is, however, to promote cooperation and peace between the two states.  
The peace park is a product of the US-mediated 1994 peace treaty between Israel 
and Jordan.91 During the peace negotiations, the two states agreed to the development of 
the RSMPP as a means to foster bilateral cooperation and to protect the marine 
environment shared by the two states.92 The particular peace-enhancing role of the 
RSMPP is associated with its designation as a peace park. They are defined by IUCN as 
“transboundary protected areas that are formally dedicated to the protection and 
maintenance of biological diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and 
to the promotion of peace and co-operation.”93 
Though the Gulf of Aqaba appears to be a marginal region for both states, the 
participation of Jordan in the TB-MPA is extremely significant in the context of the 
Middle East conflict. When the peace park was created, this state was seen as “a gateway 
for advancing peace between Israel and other Arab States.”94 Following the signing of the 
peace treaty, cooperation between the two states progressed into wider forums and into 
other areas of common interest, such as economic development and sharing of water 
resources.95 However, bilateral cooperation in marine conservation has not been expanded 
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into regional initiatives, such as the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Regional Sea 
Programme.96 
The role of the US in promoting the peace treaty and in further supporting the 
RSMPP cannot be understated. As a mediator of the 1994 peace treaty, the US supported 
the creation of the RSMPP by mobilizing both the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA)97 to provide financial and scientific assistance to the two states through the Red 
Sea Marine Peace Park Cooperative Research, Monitoring and Management 
Programme.98 This US-funded project was initiated in 1999 to gather information on the 
circulation regimes in the Gulf of Aqaba, the location and types of marine resources 
available, and their condition. This information constitutes a knowledge base for the 
elaboration of the RSMPP management plan.99 
3.2.2 Maritime Boundary and Maritime Zones 
Before the 1994 peace treaty, a maritime boundary between the two states had not 
been delimited. The treaty did stipulate, however, that Israel and Jordan were to agree on 
a maritime boundary in the Gulf of Aqaba in the following nine months (Article 3.7). 
Only in 1996 was such an agreement concluded and their territorial seas clearly 
divided.100 By that time, Jordan had ratified UNCLOS, while Israel is still not a party.101 
The creation of the RSMPP seems to have taken place concurrently with the 
settling of the maritime boundary dividing the territorial sea of both counties. Still, 
because the RSMPP program, apparently the main driver of the TB-MPA activities, 
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started only in 1999102 after the maritime boundary had been delimited, it is argued that 
the RSMPP necessitated the delimitation of the maritime boundary. This is supported by 
the lack of evidence of any joint activities taking place before the program was initiated. 
 
Figure 2 – Red Sea Marine Peace Park 
 
Currently, transboundary movements for the purpose of monitoring and 
researching the waters of the RSMPP are quite limited: scientists from both states have 
been reported to meet in their boats by the maritime boundary to calibrate their equipment 
and then proceed to survey their own waters.103 The maritime boundary appears to be 
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seen as a fence dividing the two states.104 Given the political tensions that had existed 
between the two states, and that still exist in the region, this perspective of the maritime 
boundary, though not enhancing its functionality, has in fact facilitated the creation of the 
RSMPP.  
On its own, the maritime boundary holds a strong symbolic and political power 
despite the cooperative environment that enabled its delimitation. Despite the likelihood 
of further collaboration across the maritime boundary, increasing its rather limited 
functionality, boundary behavior is, nevertheless, highly unpredictable in light of the 
volatility of regional political relations in this region. 
3.3 Pelagos Sanctuary for Mediterranean Marine Mammals 
3.3.1 Origin and History 
The Pelagos Sanctuary for Mediterranean Marine Mammals (PSMMM)—established by 
France, Italy, and the Principality of Monaco—aims at protecting the cetaceans that 
aggregate in this area of the Mediterranean.105 It covers internal waters (15 percent) and 
the territorial sea (32 percent) of the three states, as well as the high seas (53 percent).106 
It is an MPA of great regional importance (see Figure 3). With an area of more than 
87,500 km2, it is the largest MPA in the Mediterranean. It represents 90 percent of the 
marine area of the Mediterranean Sea under protection, and it is the only MPA in this 
region to include the high seas.107 
The sanctuary was formally anticipated in a trilateral declaration of 22 March 
1993,108 following a proposal by the Tethys Research Institute and the European 
Association Rotary for the Environment. Through a joint project, these two organizations 
offered a novel rationale for the protection of marine mammals that feed in a multi-
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jurisdictional area of the north-western Mediterranean. Their initiative was fuelled, inter 
alia, by concerns mounting during previous decades about the impact of drift-net fishing 
on marine mammal populations.109 Prior to the creation of the PSMMM, each state had 
already established in their waters protected areas with a marine component.110 Additional 
conservation measures were also in place.111 
The PSMMM came into being on 21 February, 2002, following entry into force of 
the international agreement signed on 25 November, 1999, among the three coastal 
states.112 This was the first treaty specifically designed to proclaim a sanctuary for marine 
mammals.113 Within the overall goal of ensuring a “favourable conservation status to 
marine mammals” (Article 4), the agreement addresses four main threats to marine 
mammals arising from human activities: pollution (Article 6), drift-net fishing (Article 7 
(b)), unregulated whale watching (Article 8), and speedboat racing (Article 9). According 
to article 3, “[t]he sanctuary is composed of maritime areas situated within the internal 
waters and territorial seas of the French Republic, the Italian Republic and the 
Principality of Monaco, as well as portions of adjacent high seas.” Article 14 specifies the 
jurisdiction of the three states: 
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1. In the part of the Sanctuary located within the waters subject to its sovereignty 
or jurisdiction, each of the State Parties to the present Agreement is responsible 
for the application of the relevant provisions. 2. In the other parts of the 
sanctuary, each of the State Parties is responsible for the application of the 
provisions of the present Agreement with respect to ships flying its flag as well as, 
within the limits provided for by the rules of international law, with respect to 
ships flying the flag of third States.114 
This allocation of responsibilities reflects both the sovereignty of each state over 
its territorial waters, and the necessary cooperation to ensure the effectiveness of the TB-
MPA beyond the national waters of the three states. 
3.3.2 Maritime Boundaries and Maritime Zones 
The inclusion of the high seas in the sanctuary directly addresses the peculiar situation of 
the western section of the Mediterranean Sea where most coastal states have refrained 
from claiming their EEZs,115 placing the high seas just 12 NM from the coast. 
That is the case of the three coastal states. France claimed its EEZ on the Atlantic 
coast but not on the Mediterranean. Here, and at the time of the creation of the sanctuary, 
it had claimed the territorial sea and legislated its continental shelf.116 In 2003, it claimed 
an Ecological Protection Zone (EPZ) that extends for 60 NM beyond the territorial sea.117 
Like France, Italy had only claimed the territorial sea and legislated its continental 
shelf.118 In 2006, it also extended its jurisdiction to an EPZ where ecological zones may 
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be created for the protection of, inter alia, marine mammals.119 Monaco claimed a 12 NM 
territorial sea, and reached an agreement with France on the boundary dividing their 
territorial seas.120 In addition, Monaco approved its Code of the Sea, whereby it claims a 
territorial sea of 12 NM and sovereign rights over sea areas beyond this zone.121 None of 
the three states has claimed the contiguous zone or the continental shelf beyond the 200 
NM limit.122 France and Italy have not yet negotiated a boundary dividing their territorial 
seas from the mainland, but have delimited a similar boundary in the Strait of 
Bonifacio.123  
Other coastal states have also claimed EPZs in the Mediterranean. These maritime 
zones, which are not provided by UNCLOS, are, in practice, a more limited version of the 
EEZ regime.124 Their emergence is, to a certain extent, an attempt to afford to the 
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Mediterranean the rights and duties of the coastal states in regard to conservation and 
management of marine resources, and of the protection of the marine environment under 
national jurisdiction.  
Any possible claims to the full extent of the EEZ would overlap with those of 
opposite coastal states, and would place this sea entirely under national jurisdiction, a 
situation similar to that found in Southeast Asia, particularly in the Sea of Japan125 and 
the South China Sea.126 Two reasons have been advanced to explain reluctance in 
claiming the EEZ in the Mediterranean Sea. First, coastal states are apprehensive 
regarding the impact of the EEZ regime on the freedom of navigation in the main 
navigation routes of the Mediterranean, including the navigation of warships.127 Second, 
if EEZs were to be claimed and the high seas eliminated from the Mediterranean Sea, the 
fishing fleets of the coastal states would have to restrict their activities to the maritime 
zones under the jurisdiction of their flag state.128 As it is, the Mediterranean allows them 
to enjoy the freedom of fishing provided by the high seas regime. 
While uncertainty about the consequences of replacing the high seas with EEZs 
has precluded the extension of national jurisdiction, it is clear that the status quo is itself a 
cause of uncertainty, as this delicate balance may shift at any time.129 Concerns about the 
conservation of the marine environment and management of marine resources of the 
Mediterranean are not expected to motivate EEZ claims in this sea, given the proliferation 
of multilateral instruments and initiatives dealing with these issues. 
Faced with this situation and as parties130 to UNCLOS, the three states, in creating 
the Pelagos Sanctuary, exercised their duty to cooperate in the protection of the marine 
environment (UNCLOS, Article 197) and in the conservation and management of marine 
mammals in the high seas (UNCLOS, Article 120). The three states have, therefore, 
overcome the lack of EEZ and the management and conservation tools it provides for the 
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conservation of the marine environment.131 They have also done so in full respect for the 
UNCLOS, as the primary objective of the sanctuary is the conservation of marine 
mammals. The fact that the high seas included in the PSMMM would fall under the 
national jurisdiction of the three states if they were to claim their EEZs only strengthens 
the legitimacy of their entitlement to enforce the sanctuary’s regulations in the high seas. 
The absence of national jurisdiction over most of the sanctuary, and the 
incomplete delimitation of lateral boundaries of the territorial sea between France and 
Italy, were not deterrents to advancing cooperation in transboundary marine conservation. 
In 2001, the sanctuary was listed as a Special Protected Area of Mediterranean 
Importance (SPAMI) under the 1995 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and 
Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean,132 created within the framework of the 
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the 
Mediterranean, 1995 (Barcelona Convention).133 This designation extends the sanctuary’s 
regulations to all parties to the Barcelona Convention.134  
In that same year, regulatory measures were put in place banning high-speed boat 
races within Italian territorial waters.135 In 2004, the sanctuary’s management plan was 
approved,136 and, in 2006, the entire TB-MPA was nominated by Italy to enter into 
UNESCO’s tentative list for World Heritage Sites, as provided by the World Heritage 
Convention.137 
Analyzing now the functionality of the existing maritime boundaries, it must be 
noted that their permeability and capacity to not oppose cooperation is explicit. Neither 
the maritime boundaries dividing the territorial seas of France and Monaco, and of France 
and Italy in the Strait of Bonifacio, nor those delimiting the seaward extension of the 
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territorial sea of the three countries, have precluded cooperation in this joint initiative. It 
is clear that the political will of the three states was important to determine the 
functionality of the existing maritime boundaries. 
Figure 3 – Pelagos Sanctuary for Mediterranean Marine Mammals 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The preceding cases illustrate three particular contexts of interaction between maritime 
boundaries and transboundary marine protected areas in terms of the exercise of coastal 
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state sovereignty and jurisdiction in ocean areas. They also demonstrate that 
transboundary MPAs, like “national” MPAs, are motivated by and target different 
biological interests and concerns.138 
TB-MPAs and maritime boundaries seem to be mutually influential in how coastal 
states exercise their sovereignty and jurisdiction, though to different degrees. In addition 
to the five contextual factors previously identified to influence maritime boundary-
making (i.e., physical characteristics of the coastline, political relationships between 
coastal states, socio-cultural similarities, economic interests, and third party intervention), 
a sixth factor (i.e., similar maritime zones) was identified that may contribute to explain 
cooperation in transboundary MPA-making despite the state of the maritime boundaries. 
This emerges from the descriptive account of history and boundary issues of the three 
cases. 
Those three TB-MPAs cover similar maritime zones on both sides of the pertinent 
maritime boundaries. All the TB-MPAs, with the exception of the Pelagos Sanctuary, 
overlap exclusively with the territorial seas of the states involved.139 Consequently, all of 
the three TB-MPAs straddle the maritime boundary dividing the territorial sea of each 
state. Regarding the Pelagos Sanctuary, the inclusion of high seas areas and the 
consequent overlapping with the seaward limit of the territorial seas of the three countries 
is an atypical situation. The homogeneity of maritime zones covered by each TB-MPA 
has probably facilitated the implementation of TB-MPAs and the enforcement of 
regulations on both sides of the border by all the coastal states involved. In the case of the 
Pelagos Sanctuary, and though the inclusion of high seas areas introduces a contrasting 
level of jurisdiction in relation to that of the territorial sea, all of the three states are 
equally affected by the responsibilities imposed by the two different regimes. In other 
words, each state is responsible for the application of the sanctuary’s regulations in their 
territorial sea, and the three share that same responsibility in the high seas.140 
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The physical layout of the coastline has also influenced the boundary behaviour of 
the coastal states of the three TB-MPAs. In the TIHPA, the isolation of the islands in the 
Philippines have, to a certain extent, precluded this state from being more vocal regarding 
the status of the maritime boundary it shares with Malaysia.141 The location of the two 
other TB-MPAs in semi-enclosed seas would be expected to produce comparable 
boundary behavior on the part of all the coastal states involved. However, that is hardly 
the case. In the RSMPP, maritime boundary delimitation preceded the creation of the TB-
MPA, while in the PSMMM, the absence of a particular maritime boundary was not a 
deterrent to the creation of the TB-MPA. The examination of three additional factors can 
explain this discrepancy. 
France, Italy, and Monaco have strong political affinities and socio-cultural 
similarities. The three countries are located on the more uniform northwest quadrant of 
the politically and culturally heterogeneous Mediterranean coast. Though Monaco, unlike 
France and Italy, is not a member of the European Union, and consequently not directly 
affected by its regional integration policy, the similarities in language and wealth with 
these two states, as well as Monaco’s economic reliance on France, have probably 
provided a basis for cooperation in the implementation of the TB-MPA and in enforcing 
its regulations in the high seas. From this point of view, the Pelagos Sanctuary could not 
be more contrasting with the Red Sea Marine Peace Park, where both states are 
notoriously differentiated by their language, religion, and political system.142 
The third factor distinguishing the boundary context of these two TB-MPAs was 
the intervention of a third party. The active and facilitative role of the US was 
unequivocally relevant in settling the maritime boundary between Israel and Jordan, and 
in engaging scientists and managers from both countries in the TB-MPA activities. This 
factor alone explains by itself the delimitation of the maritime boundary and the creation 
and management of the RSMPP. In the Pelagos Sanctuary, the initial intervention of two 
non-governmental organizations was quickly overtaken by the political will of the three 
states. The Turtle Islands Heritage Protected Area was also not indifferent to the influence 
of third parties. Though it is not completely clear what might have been the significance 
                                                 
141
 The involvement of the Philippines in the implementation and management of the TB-MPA should not 
be interpreted as this country’s relinquishing its claim over Sabah. 
142
 Israel is a republic where the official language is Hebrew and the dominant religion is Judaism. In a 
striking contrast, Jordan is a kingdom where Arabic is the official language and Islam the dominant 
religion. 
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of WWF organizing the workshop from where the TB-MPA emerged, its continued 
support of the TIHPA activities in cooperation with the respective state agencies has 
contributed, to a certain extent, to its longevity. 
Lastly, economic interests do not appear to have been influential in the making of 
the three TB-MPAs. This is probably because the exploitation of marine resources in the 
sea areas covered by the three TB-MPAs is not significantly affected by TB-MPA 
regulations. The situation is not so linear when one considers the absence of claims to the 
EEZ by the three states that created the Pelagos Sanctuary. Economic considerations are 
most likely at the root of concerns regarding the freedoms of navigation and fishing, on 
the basis of which coastal states appear to be refraining from claiming their EEZs. 
As regards to the functionality of the maritime boundaries, it is argued that, 
despite variation in the functional status of the maritime boundaries in the three cases, 
they all facilitate cooperation between the relevant coastal states, though to different 
degrees. The RSMPP maritime boundary is the most functionally limited, which is 
exemplified by the restricted circulation of peace park researchers and managers. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the maritime boundary has facilitated cooperation in 
other areas besides coral reef conservation. This case clearly demonstrates the 
conceptualization of a maritime boundary as a fence facilitating neighborliness,143 and 
exemplifies one of the forms of cooperation predicted by UNCLOS (i.e., sharing of 
information).  
In the TIHPA case, despite the Philippines’ contesting of the international aspect 
of the maritime boundary, its functionality is not overshadowed: management activities 
are ensured and the movement of people across the boundary is not as restricted as in the 
RSMPP. This case also illustrates that even when a maritime boundary is the subject of a 
latent dispute, a transboundary MPA can still be created and managed effectively. The 
TIHPA goes beyond the forms of cooperation provided by UNCLOS for the protection of 
the marine environment by not only Malaysia and the Philippines sharing information, 
but also by their implementing conservation measures that are not restricted to the 
prevention of marine pollution.  
                                                 
143
 Springer, see n. 47 above. 
Maritime Boundaries and Transboundary MPAs 
360 
The maritime boundaries in the PSMMM are especially functional when 
compared with those of the other two TB-MPAs. Each state has the duty to apply the TB-
MPA regulations in its territorial sea and this responsibility is exercised by the three states 
in the high seas. What is most impressive in the Pelagos Sanctuary is, therefore, not only 
the functionality of the existing maritime boundaries between France and Monaco, and of 
the seaward limits of the territorial seas of the three states, but also the fact that neither 
the absence of a maritime boundary between France and Italy, nor the limited jurisdiction 
of the three coastal states over the high seas for the purpose of conserving marine 
mammals, were sufficient to prevent the creation of the TB-MPA. The PSMMM is, 
therefore, exemplary in demonstrating that transboundary MPAs do not always require 
the existence of maritime boundaries between the interested coastal states. The sanctuary 
is also a pioneer in the application of the concept of high seas marine protected areas. For 
these reasons, the three states have significantly expanded the scope of cooperation in the 
protection of the marine environment as defined by UNCLOS. 
In summary, the Turtle Islands Heritage Protected Area and the Pelagos Sanctuary 
for Mediterranean Marine Mammals have, to a certain extent, overcome unresolved or 
potential disagreements over maritime boundaries and marine space by promoting 
transboundary cooperation in regard to the specific issue of marine conservation.144 This 
is not to infer that the proclamation of TB-MPAs may be recommended to resolve 
maritime boundary disputes. However, focusing cooperation efforts on marine 
conservation has the potential to avoid confrontation between states145 and to provide a 
basis for advancing collaboration in other issue areas.  
5. CONCLUSION 
This article set out to provide insights into the interactions between the existence or 
creation of maritime boundaries and the prospect for the emergence of transboundary 
marine protected areas in the context of coastal state sovereign rights and jurisdiction. 
The three examples analyzed have demonstrated that, at least, six factors affecting this 
relationship need to be considered in the creation of transboundary marine protected 
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areas. Most importantly, it was shown that cooperation in marine conservation does not 
necessarily require the delimitation of maritime boundaries. However, generalizations on 
this point require caution, as the contexts in which these transboundary MPAs have been 
established seem to point to the value of this form of transboundary cooperation in the 
absence of valuable economic resources or other salient issues with the potential to fuel 
boundary disputes. Still, transboundary MPAs have the potential to overcome boundary 
divergences that are purely territorial, and thus constitute a boundary arrangement that 
may provisionally or permanently replace an actual maritime boundary. 
As cooperation between coastal states in marine conservation advances, more 
transboundary MPAs are expected to be created as a tool to advance marine ecosystem-
based management. Overcoming the political borders that bind our conservation efforts 
may be less difficult than was once foreseen. 
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11. CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 Summary of Findings 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the possibility of bilateral, and potentially 
trilateral, cooperation for the creation and management of transboundary networks of 
marine protected areas, and the governance requirements of such forms of cooperation. A 
case study and interdisciplinary approach was applied to two study areas – the 
transboundary coastal regions between Mozambique and Tanzania and between 
Mozambique and South Africa – and two marine resources – coral reefs and Indo-Pacific 
humpback dolphins (Sousa chinensis). This resulted in the production of seven 
autonomous, non-sequentially produced but inter-related research papers that contributed 
to answering the main research question (see page 14) and related research subquestions 
(see page 96).  
In Chapter 4, common pool resource theory formed the analytical basis for the 
examination of the ecological characteristics, threats and institutional arrangements 
associated with coral reefs and Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins in each of the study 
areas. This chapter answered research subquestions #1 and #2. It was found that 
transboundary MPAs can be effective in the protection of coral reefs in the border 
between Mozambique and South Africa, and in the protection of humpback dolphins in 
the border between Mozambique and Tanzania. In contrast, transboundary MPAs may not 
be the best tools to protect coral reefs in the border region between Mozambique and 
Tanzania, and to protect humpback dolphins in the border region between Mozambique 
and South Africa. This interdisciplinary analysis suggests that similar assessments of the 
ecological characteristics of species and habitats, their particular threats, and the specific 
institutional arrangements that govern them, are essential to assess the adequacy of MPAs 
to protect them. Furthermore, it is argued that, when considering creating MPAs, states 
should not only assess the adequacy of MPAs to protect particular biodiversity features, 
but also how do MPAs perform in comparison to other tools such as co-management. 
This is particularly relevant in developing contexts where fisheries are an important 
source of animal protein to coastal communities. 
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In Chapter 5, the domestic governance frameworks of Mozambique, South Africa 
and Tanzania in respect of MPAs were compared to identify commonalities and 
differences in institutional procedures, principles and values, as well as the impact these 
may have on the creation and management of transboundary MPAs. This chapter 
answered research subquestion #3. Criteria drawn from the MPA and integrated coastal 
and ocean management literature, and from the regime theory literature were used to 
compare states’ performance, and led to the conclusion that, despite the modernity of the 
policy and legal frameworks of Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania, there are 
important differences and insufficiencies in the three countries that need to be taken 
account in considering the creation of transboundary MPAs between them. These 
insufficiencies include, among others: the lack of a clear mandate for MPA-making in 
Tanzania and Mozambique; the lack of a clear legal definition of MPA in Tanzania; lack 
of capacity, most visibly in Mozambique; weak system for MPA governance review in 
the three countries; etc. It is suggested that a better definition of domestic lead roles for 
negotiating transboundary MPA-making, and even leading to the joint management of 
transboundary MPAs, would facilitate such processes. 
In Chapter 6, the extent to which international environmental law can assist in the 
creation and management of transboundary MPAs in the East African region was 
examined. This chapter answered research subquestion #7. Globally, UNCLOS and CBD 
are the key instruments for the establishment of transboundary MPAs and networks of 
MPAs. Regionally, the Nairobi Convention, and more specifically its Protected Areas 
Protocol, and the SADC Wildlife Protocol provide the legal foundation to create and 
manage transboundary networks of MPAs. The chapter concluded that it is at the 
regional, and most likely bilateral and trilateral levels, that a political and legal approach 
will be most effective. 
In Chapter 7, the prospects for the creation of transboundary MPAs in East Africa 
are examined through the lenses of regime theory. This chapter answered research 
subquestions #3 to #6. A fully developed regime between Mozambique and South Africa 
was identified, which is independent of the fact that these two countries have already 
declared a joint transboundary MPA. In other words, the core of a regime – i.e., principles 
and norms – was already in place before the two countries declared their joint 
transboundary MPA. The proclamation of the transboundary MPA materialized the rules 
and decision-making procedures that also define this regime, and consequently made it 
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operational. In contrast, there is not yet a regime for transboundary MPA-making between 
Mozambique and Tanzania due to divergent principles. It is concluded that analysing 
what may drive, facilitate or constrain states in creating regimes for cooperation in 
transboundary marine conservation can assist decision-makers in anticipating issues that 
have the potential to constrain the creation and management of transboundary MPAs.  
In Chapter 8, the diplomatic and management options that states may consider in 
the creation of transboundary MPAs were discussed. This chapter answered research 
subquestion #8. These options are intended to assist Mozambique, South Africa and 
Tanzania in cooperating in the protection of their shared marine environment, if the 
obstacles to cooperation identified in  Chapter 7 are overcome. Five options for the 
establishment and management of transboundary MPAs are suggested, along with the 
necessary actions to be taken, thus depicting increasing political commitment between the 
three countries: i) independently established and managed MPAs on both sides of the 
border; ii) independently established and managed MPAs, with cross-border information-
sharing mechanisms; iii) coordinated establishment and management of MPAs; iv) joint 
establishment of two transboundary MPAs; and v) trilateral sub-regional diplomatic and 
management agreements. These options can be considered as alternative goals, or as steps 
in achieving the highest degree of political cooperation. 
In Chapter 9, networks of MPAs are brought back to center of the discussion. 
Though this thesis purported initially to address the establishment of transboundary 
networks of MPAs, the preceding chapters generally concern the establishment of 
transboundary MPAs. Indeed, though the TRANSMAP project prepared proposals for the 
creation of transboundary networks of MPAs between Mozambique and Tanzania and 
between Mozambique and South Africa, fieldwork revealed that establishing TBNMPAs 
was seen as a subsequent step, and more precisely a technical option for the zoning of 
transboundary MPAs. This chapter revisits the topic of networks of MPAs by focusing on 
the case of MPA networks that include community-based MPAs. It contributes to answer 
research subquestion #8 by exploring how institutional interplay within MPA networks 
with community-based MPAs can assist in their management. By analyzing ten such 
MPA networks, it is concluded that institutional interplay generally concerned exchange 
of information and issues of control and authority, which may have influence on MPA 
effectiveness. However, institutional interplay can involve high transaction costs, and 
consequently its promotion should be carefully considered. 
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Finally, Chapter 10 examined how maritime-boundary-making can affect 
cooperation between states in the creation of transboundary MPAs. This inquiry is 
important for the Mozambique-South Africa case, as these two countries have not 
delimited maritime boundaries between them. It also responds in part to research 
subquestions #6 and #8. Three already established transboundary MPAs and the maritime 
boundaries they straddle were examined to assess how the two interacted and affected 
cooperation between the states involved. It is concluded that, and contrary to common 
belief, the creation and management of a transboundary MPA does not necessitate the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries between the involved states if there are not any 
salient issues that could prevent such cooperation. This conclusion was confirmed in 
August 2009 when Mozambique and South Africa proclaimed their joint transboundary 
MPA, shortly after this chapter was accepted for publication in the Ocean Yearbook. 
11.2 Interdisciplinary Approach 
The previous summary of the conclusions of this thesis reflects the importance of having 
adopted an interdisciplinary approach. These show that the problem at hand could not be 
solely addressed through the lenses of a single discipline or field of knowledge.  
A perspective based solely on natural sciences would have shadowed the socio-
economic importance of marine resources in each transboundary region, and would have 
not allowed a clear understanding of the interplay of specific political and legal issues in 
each transboundary region. For example, focusing simply on marine biology or ecology 
would restrict this research to scientific proposals to designate MPAs, including their 
placement in regards of the ecological characteristics of coral reefs and Indo-Pacific 
humpback dolphins. Advancing such proposals only on the basis of ecological and 
conservationist considerations would ignore the social, economic, legal and political 
contexts in which they would be implemented. 
A merely sociological and ethnographic view of cooperation for the creation and 
management of transboundary networks of MPAs would only study the societies to be 
affected and involved in such tasks. Consequently, though acknowledging local socio-
economic settings, it would ignore the ecological characteristics of resources 
necessitating conservation measures, the legal obligations of states, and the international 
relations setting in which cooperation could take place. If this narrow view had been 
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adopted, the relationships between marine resources and society would not have been 
comprehended. 
A purely legal view of the problem of transboundary MPA-making could stress 
the need for maritime boundary delimitation prior to the creation of a transboundary 
MPA, which it was found not to be always necessary. Also a purely legal approach would 
probably focus only the principles and rules of states codified in their domestic legal 
frameworks, and those codified in international legal instruments to which they subscribe, 
which would ignore the political issues that shape how states act in spite of their legal 
frameworks. An exclusively international relations approach would ignore local realities 
of each transboundary site, by examining cooperation between states only as an issue 
influenced by the behavior of states in the international arena. 
Finally, a purely legal-political approach would likely ignore the ecological 
characteristics of the marine environment that countries would be protecting through 
transboundary MPAs, and hence could be promoting a technical solution – i.e., 
transboundary MPA – that may not necessarily be the most adequate to a particular 
context, as it was shown in the examination of the adequacy of transboundary MPAs to 
protect coral reefs and Indo-Pacific humpback dolphins in the two study areas.In sum, the 
interdisciplinary approach used in this thesis made use of different but highly 
complementary disciplines that were crucial to the multidimensional problem-oriented 
research reported in this thesis. 
11.3 Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis adopted a novel approach to the study of marine protected areas, thus making 
important contributions to current knowledge of marine protected areas and regime 
building for transboundary marine conservation. 
 The novel approach consisted in the combined use of common pool resource 
theory and regime theory to examine the governance requirements of cooperation in the 
creation and management of transboundary MPAs. Though there have been some 
theoretical explorations of the combined use of those two theories, this thesis is, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, the first time that CPR theory and regime theory are 
applied in an integrated manner to the study of MPAs and, more specifically, to the study 
of transboundary MPAs, and even more specifically in an African context.  
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 This theoretical and interdisciplinary approach has elicited the following 
conclusions and key contributions to knowledge. First, coral reefs can be protected 
through a transboundary MPA in the border region between Mozambique and South 
Africa, but humpback dolphins likely cannot; also, coral reefs may not be adequately 
protected through a transboundary MPA in the border region between Mozambique and 
Tanzania, but humpback dolphins may be. Second, there is not a regime between 
Mozambique and Tanzania for the joint protection of their marine environment, because 
Mozambique’s priority is to explore the potential hydrocarbon reserves in its waters; there 
is a regime between Mozambique and South Africa for that same purpose, which has 
already materialized in the proclamation of a joint transboundary MPA. Third, and until 
Mozambique and Tanzania take appropriate actions regarding the conservation of their 
shared marine environment, a trilateral/sub-regional approach to transboundary marine 
conservation is unlikely to emerge. Finally, states considering the creation of 
transboundary networks of MPAs to assist in meeting international MPA coverage targets 
can consider the creation of a transboundary MPA as a first step toward TBNMPAs. An 
example to consider in this regard is the case of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in 
Australia that recently established a network of no-take areas within its boundaries 
(Fernandes et al. 2005). 
11.4 Policy Implications 
The findings of this thesis can have implications for MPA-related policy-making in the 
East African region, particularly in the three countries examined, and elsewhere in the 
globe. These policy implications are of particular importance to marine biologists and 
ecologists, marine managers and to professionals involved in regime building in the 
region. 
 The first policy implication of the findings is that the creation of MPAs should be 
preceded by an examination of the particular species and habitats a given MPA would be 
protecting, as well as of the threats posed to them. Most importantly, though, MPAs 
should be established when they are the appropriate institutional arrangements to deal 
with existing threats and the particular ecological characteristics of the marine species and 
habitats. Creating a new MPA where there are already institutional arrangements in place, 
though weak, can add an unnecessary layer of institutional and managerial complexity. It 
is furthermore recommended that proposals for the creation of MPAs at particular sites 
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should be compared with the status quo, and other management tools, in the same fashion 
that a given project is assessed in Environmental Impact Assessments. This can be 
particularly critical in developing countries where coastal communities often depend 
directly on coastal and marine resources for their livelihoods, but also where mistakes in 
marine management can come at a higher cost. Although it is recognized that many 
MPAs are often created opportunistically, that is an unlikely situation for transboundary 
MPAs, given the sovereignty issues at stake. 
 The second policy implication concerns the prospects for regime building in the 
East African region. The lead taken by Mozambique and South Africa could set an 
encouraging example for other countries in the region to establish transboundary MPAs 
where these are needed and appropriate. However, policy-makers in other countries of the 
region are reminded of the particular context in which this transboundary MPA was 
created, as well as of the time elapsed since a political agreement was signed to create 
that transboundary MPA until it was actually proclaimed. 
A final word of caution concerns the implications of these findings to the East African 
region, developing countries in other regions of the world, and even developed countries. 
The research reported in this thesis is rooted in two very particular geographical, 
ecological, political and economic contexts, even though they are found within the same 
country (i.e., Mozambique). This in particular should be taken by policy-makers 
elsewhere as a warning concerning the limitations of applying these findings to elsewhere 
without sufficient regard to context, even within the East African region. Nevertheless, 
the diplomatic and management options proposed in Chapter 8 can inform transboundary 
marine conservation initiatives elsewhere. These were proposed following an examination 
of transboundary conservation initiatives in very distinct contexts, and are sufficiently 
general to be adapted to other contexts. 
11.5 Future Research 
The findings of this thesis are not final, and though they purport to be comprehensive, 
they are not exhaustive. There are always gaps in knowledge that could not be filled 
during the research. One of the reasons for this is that the particular contexts in which this 
research was carried out will certainly change. Another is that some issues identified 
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during the elaboration of this thesis were not completely clarified because they were out 
of its scope. Some of these constitute interesting lines of inquiry for future research. 
First, the differences between the performance of MPAs and that of co-
management institutions in promoting the sustainable use of marine resources in 
particularly impoverished areas of developing countries (e.g., BMUs in Tanzania and 
CCPs in Mozambique) remain unclear.  
Second, there are several local NGOs active in MBREMP and QNP, which are 
active in either promoting co-management institutions or alternative income-generating 
activities. It is not clear, however, if this focus of their work resulted from community 
needs identified prior to the creation of these MPAs, or if they resulted in part of the poor 
performance of MPAs in those regards. 
Third, an in-depth historical account of the actions that led to the formation of the 
regime between Mozambique and South Africa could elicit nuances in its creation that 
were not captured in this research. 
Finally, the transboundary MPA between Mozambique and South Africa and 
other transboundary MPAs elsewhere in the world (e.g., Pelagos Sanctuary for 
Mediterranean Marine Mammals, Turtle Islands Heritage Protected Area) offer an 
interesting opportunity to study the assumptions of transboundary marine conservation 
and how these compare to those behind the creation of many transboundary protected 
areas on land. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE – coral reefs and humpback dolphins 
IMPORTANT: Explain that the questions we will ask are for us to know more about how 
people here use coral reefs, and a particular type of dolphin. 
I – PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Village/Community:__________________     Date:___/___/2009       Interviewer: _____________________ 
A. Respondent___________________________ B. Age:____ C. Sex: M__; F__ 
D. Main activity: _________________________________ 
E. Place of birth: __________________________ F. Place of living: ___________________________ 
G. Lives here since:________ H. If living here for more than 5 years, why here?__________________________ 
I. Persons in family/household: Men______; Women______; Children______________________ 
J. Attended school: Yes__; No__. If yes, up to grade:__________________________________________ 
 
II – INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES 
1. Which activities does your family do to have food and money? Rank them according to importance. (Indicate: ++ - 
mainly for money/food; + - also for money/food; x – not for money/food) 
 
Rank                                  Activity                                    Money           Food 
    
   ______       _________________________________     _______      _______ 
    
   ______       _________________________________     _______      _______ 
    
   ______       _________________________________     _______      _______ 
    
   ______       _________________________________     _______      _______ 
    
   ______       _________________________________     _______      _______ 
 
 
2. Which of these activities are done in the coral reefs or with coral reefs? (write down rank number)  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(NOTE: if there is at least one activity in or with coral reefs, do section III) 
 
 
3. When you (or your family) do any of those activities, do you see dolphins? If yes, which kind? 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
(NOTE: show the THREE main dolphin species in the field guide; if humpback dolphins are selected, do section IV). 
 
 
III – CORAL REEFS  
Fill the table below for the activities done ONLY in or with coral reefs.  
 
4 
Marine activity / 
marine or coastal 
resource exploited 
    
5 
Method/equipment 
used (mention type of 
net, mesh, length, 
number of hooks, 
number of lines, type 
of tool, knife, spoon, 
etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
6 
To whom does the 
equipment belong to? 
(if to respondent, to 
boss, to a group, etc.)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
7 
How did you get the 
equipment? (bought, 
made it, received it, 
etc) How much did 
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you pay for it?  
 
8 
How do you get to the 
places where you fish / 
collect, etc.? (if by 
boat, type of boat: 
rowing, sailing, 
engine) 
    
9 
How long does it take 
to get to the places 
where you fish / 
collect? 
    
10 
How often do you do 
this activity? (per day, 
per week, per month) 
    
11 
When do you do this 
activity? (day/night, 
high/low tide, all year 
round or just in 
specific times, etc.)   
    
12 
What is the best 
season? (time of 
year/tide, etc., where 
catch is greatest) 
    
13 
How much time do 
you spend in this 
activity? (n. of hours 
per day/out) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
14 
Do youwork alone or 
with more people? 
(indicate how many 
people and how catch 
is divided) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
15 
Catch/quantity caught 
or collected per day or 
out? (kgs, buckets, 
bunches, baskets, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
16 How much of what you catch is sold? 
 
 
 
 
   
17 Where do you sell it? To whom? 
 
 
 
 
   
18 
How much do you 
make a day/per 
month? 
 
 
 
 
 
   
19 
What price do you sell 
for? (per kilo, bucket, 
unit, bunch, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
20 
If you sell to a seller, 
do you know where 
(s)he takes what (s)he 
bought from you? 
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21 
Mention main species 
and rank them 
accordig to 
importance. 
 
1.______________ 
 
2.______________ 
 
3.______________ 
 
4.______________ 
 
1.______________ 
 
2.______________ 
 
3.______________ 
 
4.______________ 
 
1.______________ 
 
2.______________ 
 
3.______________ 
 
4.______________ 
 
1.______________ 
 
2.______________ 
 
3.______________ 
 
4.______________ 
22 
Can anyone do this 
activity? If not, who 
can? How do you get 
permission? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
23 
Can you catch how 
much you like? If not, 
who decides what to 
catch? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
24 
If someone takes more 
than it should, what 
happens? 
(sanction/punishment, 
monitorint) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
25 
Do you always have to 
catch the same 
quantity, or does it 
change over time? 
 
 
 
 
 
   
26 
Do you know if the 
law allows this 
activity? 
    
 
 
27. Do you think that coral reefs are better or worse than five years ago? ________________________________  
Why? 
 
#1 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
 
#2 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
 
#3 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
 
#4 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
 
28. Which activities do you think are bad for corals? Why? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. Which one is worse? Why? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IV – HUMPBACK-DOLPHIN 
 
30. How do you call this animal? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Questionnaires 
398 
31. How can you tell the difference between this animal and other animals that look alike? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
32. Where have you seen this animal? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
33. Can you explain in which situation did you see this animal? (what were you doing; what was the animal doing, was it 
dead or alive) 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
34. Do you usually see it in some particular time of the year? Which? What do you see the animal doing then? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
35. Have you ever used this animal for anything? When? What for? (if not, why not? For food, for example) 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
36. Do you know if other people use this animal for anything? What for? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
37. Where do you see those people using this animal? 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank respondent for her/his time and patience in answering our questions. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE – tourism operators 
IMPORTANT: Explain that the questions we will ask are for us to know more about tourism 
activities associated with the coral reefs and with marine mammals. 
I – PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Village/Community:__________________     Date:___/___/2009       Interviewer: _____________________ 
A. Respondent___________________________ B. Age:____ C. Sex: M__; F__ 
D. Main activity: _________________________________ 
E. Place of birth: __________________________ F. Place of living: ___________________________ 
G. Lives here since:________ H. If living here for more than 5 years, why here?__________________________ 
 
II – SCUBA DIVING 
4. For how long have you been running your scuba diving business here?______________________________ 
 
5. How many people work here? 
a. Peak season:from __________ to _____________; # people_________ 
from __________ to _____________; # people_________ 
b. Low season: from __________ to _____________; # people_________ 
from __________ to _____________; # people_________ 
6. Where do you usually take people to? (location; type of habitat: coral reef, rocky bottom, 
etc.)_____________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. How many boats do you have to get there?_____________________________________________________ 
 
8. How many people can each boat take?________________________________________________________ 
 
9. On average, how full is the boat per trip? 
a. Peak season: # people______________ 
b. Low season: # people_______________ 
 
10. How many boat trips do you do in one day: 
a. Peak season: # trips______________ 
b. Low season: # trips ______________ 
11. How long does each diving trip last?____________________ 
 
12. Where do your clients come from? 
____% This region ____% Other places in the country ____% Other African countries 
____% Europe ____% America ____% Asia 
 
13. Do you give any instructions to divers about diving in coral reefs? If yes, what are 
these?____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. During a diving trip, do you do any other activities with the divers? (e.g., lunch by the beach, etc.) If yes, what are 
these?______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Have you noticed any changes in the state of the coral reefs in the last 5 years?________ If yes, what changes are those 
and what do you think causes them? 
#1 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
#2 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
#3 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
#4 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
 
16. Which activities do you think are bad for corals? Why? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Which one is worse? Why? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Are you aware of any regulations and/or legislation regarding scuba diving in general and in coral reefs in 
particular?______ If yes, which? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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III – WHALE & DOLPHIN WATCHING  
 
19. For how long have you been running your whale & dolphin watching business here?____________________ 
20. How many people work here? 
a. Peak season:from __________ to _____________; # people_________ 
from __________ to _____________; # people_________ 
b. Low season: from __________ to _____________; # people_________ 
from __________ to _____________; # people_________ 
 
21. Where do you usually take people to? (location; type of habitat) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
22. How many boats do you have to get there?_____________________________________________________ 
23. How many people can each boat take?________________________________________________________ 
24. On average, how full is the boat per trip? 
a. Peak season: # people______________ 
b. Low season: # people_______________ 
25. How many boat trips do you do in one day: 
a. Peak season: # trips______________ 
b. Low season: # trips ______________ 
26. How long does each whale watching trip last?____________________ 
27. Where do your clients come from? 
____% This region ____% Other places in the country ____% Other African countries 
____% Europe ____% America ____% Asia 
 
28. Do you give your clients any explanations about what they see? If yes, what are these? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. What species of dolphins can you see in a trip? (show three main dolphin species in the field guide) 
If humpback dolphins are indicated, fill this table for humpback dolphins ONLY: 
a. Where do you usually see 
these dolphins? (distance to 
shore, bottom type, depths) 
b. In which time of the year 
do you see them more? 
c. What are these dolphins 
doing when you see them? 
(w/ calves? feeding?) 
d. Do you know where else 
the dolphins you see can be 
found? 
 
 
 
 
 
   
e. Do you see more or less 
of these dolphins than 5 
years ago? 
f. Do you know of any 
activities that may hurt these 
dolphins? 
g. Which of these activities 
do you think is worse for 
them? 
h. Do you know if people 
here make any other use of 
these dolphins besides 
dolphin watching? 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
30. During a whale watching trip, how do you approach dolphins and whales? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. During a whale watching trip, do you do any other activities with your clients? (e.g., checking the coral reefs, etc.) If yes, 
what are these? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. Have you noticed any changes in the numbers of marine mammals in the last 5 years?________ If yes, what changes are 
those and what do you think causes them? 
#1 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
#2 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
#3 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
#4 Cause______________________________  Effect______________________________ 
 
Thank respondent for her/his time and patience in answering our questions.
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INTERVIEW SCRIPT FOR TYPE A ACTORS1 
Date: _____/______/______                                                Country: Mz…; SA…; 
Tz… 
Name of interviewee: ________________________________________________________ 
Name of organization: _______________________________________________________  
Role in organization: ________________________________________________________ 
Duration of interview: initiated at ___h ___m; finished at ___h ___m. (Total = ____h ____m) 
Consent form: provided...; signed…; collected…. 
 
Introductory briefing 
• This interview is part of the research work I am doing to obtain my doctoral degree. The 
purpose of my research is to examine the potential for cooperation between Tanzania and 
Mozambique and between Mozambique and South Africa in the joint conservation of 
shared marine natural resources. 
• Through this interview I would like to understand your country’s potential for 
cooperation in this type of initiatives. 
• Your participation and any opinions you may share will be considered purely personal, 
even though I may query you on your organization’s positions. 
• I will not use a tape recorder to register your answers, and instead will take written notes. 
• These and other aspects are explained in greater detail in this consent form. [Allow the 
interviewee to read through the consent form] 
• Ask if the interviewee has any questions before starting the interview. 
 
I – GENERAL QUESTIONS 
1. Characterization of the organization (mandate, goals, resources, activities related to 
marine conservation and/or transboundary conservation, involvement with other 
organizations) 
 
2. Has your organization ever participated in transboundary conservation initiatives? 
 
3. If yes to 2, use interview script for type B actors before proceeding with the remaining of 
this interview. 
 
I would like now to introduce another topic, concerning the position of your 
department/organization/institution in relation to the hypothetical cooperation of your country 
and a neighboring state in the conservation of shared marine resources. I ask you to consider 
that such cooperation would target in particular coral reefs and humpback dolphins. I will 
then first start by asking you some questions about coral reefs and humpback dolphins in 
particular.  
                                                 
1
 Institutions in each country that would be involved in leading a transboundary marine conservation initiative. 
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II – KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESOURCES AND ASSOCIATED 
INTERDEPENDENCIES 
4. Coral reefs 
a. Is there any knowledge of the health of the coral reefs in your country being 
dependent on the health of coral reefs in the neighboring country, and vice-versa? 
b. What are the main threats to coral reefs in the region? 
c. Are you aware of any activity in the other country impacting on the coral reefs in 
your country? And vice versa? 
d. Are you aware of any activities of nationals of the other country in the coral reefs 
of your country? And vice versa? 
5. Humpback dolphins 
a. Are there any records of humpback dolphins migrating between your country and 
the neighboring country? 
b. What are the main threats to humpback dolphins in the region? 
c. Are you aware of any activity in the other country impacting on the humpback 
dolphins in your country? And vice versa? 
d. Are you aware of any activities of nationals of the other country related to the 
humpback dolphins in your country? And vice versa? 
 
I would like now focus on another issue. I will ask you now questions regarding the opinion 
of your department/organization/institution in relation to the hypothetical cooperation of your 
country and a neighboring state in the conservation of these shared marine resources. 
 
III – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACTOR 
6. What is the significance of coral reefs conservation for your department? (ask about 
general or specific actions that target coral reefs) 
7. What is the significance of humpback dolphin conservation for your department? (ask 
about general or specific actions that target humpback dolphins) 
8. What do you think the main goals of joint conservation of these resources in the 
concerned study area(s) should be? Can you elaborate? 
9. In your opinion, what could be the effects of joint cooperation for the conservation of 
these resources on the goals of your department? 
10. How do you think your department could contribute to that initiative? (ask about 
experience, material means, etc.) 
11. In your opinion, would there be other governmental departments with a stake in this type 
of initiative? (If yes: What could their role/contribution be?) 
12. Besides governmental departments, would there be any other organizations with a stake 
in the joint conservation of these shared marine resources? Can you elaborate on their 
potential roles and contributions? 
13. Are there any other implications for your country of cooperating in joint conservation 
initiatives in that region? 
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In this final part of the interview, I would like to ask you to consider how the hypothetical 
cooperation in the conservation of coral reefs and humpback dolphins may be implemented.  
 
IV – SCENARIOS FOR MARINE JOINT CONSERVATION  
14. Consider that, among other measures, the two countries decide to create marine protected 
areas for the conservation of coral reefs and humpback dolphins. Which of these three 
scenarios seems more feasible to you (show figures in the next page)? 
a. Two marine protected areas on each side of the border, with each country 
responsible for all the management activities within its MPA; 
b. A single transboundary MPA, with each country responsible for all the 
management activities in its side of the MPAs; 
c. A single transboundary MPA, in which states share management responsibilities.  
(Give some time for the interviewee to analyze the three scenarios) 
 
15. Can you elaborate on your choice by explaining what you think are the limitations and 
advantages of each option? 
 
16. A new approach to marine conservation is the creation of networks of MPAs, that is, 
several MPAs in an area of the sea where there are important habitats and species. If a 
network of MPAs is shared between two countries, what implications do you foresee for 
the management of the network? 
 
17. Should a network of MPAs address other issues, or should it focus only on the 
conservation of these resources? Why? 
 
Closing debriefing 
• Mention some of the main points I have learned from interviewing this person. Allow the 
interviewee to give feedback on this. 
• I have no further questions. Is there anything else you would like to say or ask before we 
end the interview? 
• Conclude by thanking for the cooperation. 
Interview Scripts 
406 
SCENARIO A 
Two MPAs on each side of the border, with each 
country responsible for all the management 
activities within its MPA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO B 
A single transboundary MPA, with each 
country responsible for all the 
management activities in its side of the 
MPA.  
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO C 
A single transboundary MPA, with the countries 
sharing management responsibilities within the 
entire MPA. 
 
 
 
Country X 
Land 
 
Country Y 
Land 
Sea 
 
 
Sea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country X 
Land 
 
Country Y 
Land 
Sea 
 
 
 
 
Sea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country X 
Land 
 
Country Y 
Land 
Sea 
 
 
 
 
Sea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MPA 
 
MPA 
 
 
 
Transboundary 
MPA 
 
 
Transboundary 
MPA 
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INTERVIEW SCRIPT FOR TYPE B ACTORS1 
Date: _____/______/______                                                Country: Mz…; SA…; 
Tz… 
Name of interviewee: ________________________________________________________ 
Name of organization: _______________________________________________________  
Role in organization: ________________________________________________________ 
Duration of interview: initiated at ___h ___m; finished at ___h ___m. (Total = ____h ____m) 
Consent form: provided...; signed…; collected…. 
 
Introductory briefing 
• This interview is part of the research work I am doing to obtain my doctoral degree. The 
purpose of my research is to examine the potential for cooperation between Tanzania and 
Mozambique and between Mozambique and South Africa in the joint conservation of 
shared marine natural resources. 
• Through this interview I would like to understand the role your country may have in this 
type of initiatives. I will ask questions about the organization you are a part of, and then 
about the organization’s experience in transboundary conservation. 
• Your participation and any opinions you may share will be considered purely personal, 
even though I may query you on your organization’s positions. 
• I will not use a tape recorder to register your answers, and instead will take written notes. 
• These and other aspects are explained in greater detail in this consent form. [Allow the 
interviewee to read through the consent form] 
• Ask if the interviewee has any questions before starting the interview. 
 
I – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACTOR 
1. Mandate, goals, resources, activities, involvement with other organizations. (ask for 
descriptive materials) 
 
2. Before being involved in this transboundary conservation initiative (TCI), has your 
organization ever participated in other transboundary conservation initiatives? 
 
3. If yes to 2., when, where and how? Role played by the organization? 
 
II – EXPERIENCE IN THE TRANSBOUNDARY CONSERVATION INITIATIVE 
Select the transboundary conservation experience in which the actor was involved: 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier 
Park………………………………………………………………… 
Elephant corridor between Selous and Nyasa 
Reserves………………………………………. 
                                                 
1
 Institutions/organizations with experience in transboundary conservation. 
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(if the interviewee or his/her organization was involved in both, ask questions separately for 
each transboundary conservation initiative) 
 
4. What are the main goals of this TCI? (ask for descriptive materials; if goals convey more 
than ecological concerns, ask to elaborate on their need) 
 
5. How did your organization become involved in this TCI? 
 
6. What was your organization’s role in this TCI?  
 
7. How did your organization’s participation in the TCI contributed to your organization’s 
goals? 
 
8. What other organizations and governmental departments were involved in the TCI? 
 
9. How would you describe their role and functions in the TCI? 
 
10. What is your opinion about the general success of this TCI? (try to elicit the 
organization’s concept of success) 
 
11. In your opinion, what were the positive aspects of this TCI? (ask about centralization or 
decentralization of management, who has decision-making power, how management 
deals with unforeseen changes)  
 
12. Why do you think the TCI was successful in those aspects? 
 
13. Do you think that there were negative aspects in the TCI as well? (ask about 
centralization or decentralization of management, who has decision-making power, how 
management deals with unforeseen changes) 
 
14. Why do you think that happened? 
 
I would like to introduce a third topic, concerning the motivations of the involved countries to 
cooperate in this TCI. 
 
III – ACTOR’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE MOTIVATIONS TO COOPERATE 
15. What do you think were your country’s motivations to cooperate in this TCI? (try to elicit 
motivations concerning capacity, advantages, disadvantages, and values; specify 
interdependencies)  
 
16. And what do you think the other country’s motivations were? (try to elicit motivations 
concerning capacity, costs and benefits, and values; specify interdependencies) 
 
I would like you now to consider the possibility of your country cooperating with a 
neighboring country in the conservation of shared marine resources through the creation of 
marine protected areas.  
 
IV – ACTOR’S PERCEPTIONS OF MOTIVATIONS FOR FUTURE 
COOPERATION IN MARINE CONSERVATION 
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17. What advantages do you think your country would have in participating in such 
initiative? 
 
18. And disadvantages? 
 
19. What difficulties do you foresee in this type of initiative? (technical/financial/human 
means; differences between the two countries) 
 
20. Considering your experience with the TCI mentioned before, what do you think should be 
done differently if the two countries are to cooperate in marine conservation? Or done in 
addition to what was done in the TCI? 
 
21. And what should be done as in this TCI? 
 
V – SCENARIOS FOR JOINT MARINE CONSERVATION  
 
22. Consider that, among other measures, the two countries decide to create marine protected 
areas for the conservation of coral reefs and humpback dolphins. Which of these three 
scenarios seems more adequate to you (show figures in the next page)? 
1. Two marine protected areas on each side of the border, with each country responsible 
for all the management activities within its MPA; 
2. A single transboundary MPA, with each country responsible for all the management 
activities in its side of the MPAs; 
3. A single transboundary MPA, in which states share management responsibilities.  
Give some time for the interviewee to analyze the three scenarios) 
 
23. Can you elaborate on your choice by explaining what you think are the limitations and 
advantages of each option? 
 
Closing debriefing 
• Mention some of the main points I have learned from interviewing this person. Allow the 
interviewee to give feedback on this. 
• I have no further questions. Is there anything else you would like to say or ask before we 
end the interview?  
• Conclude by thanking for the cooperation. 
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SCENARIO A 
Two MPAs on each side of the border, with each 
country responsible for all the management 
activities within its MPA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO B 
A single transboundary MPA, with each 
country responsible for all the 
management activities in its side of the 
MPA.  
 
 
 
 
SCENARIO C 
A single transboundary MPA, with the countries 
sharing management responsibilities within the 
entire MPA. 
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INTERVIEW SCRIPT FOR TYPE C ACTORS227 
Date: _____/______/______                                                Country: Mz…; SA…; 
Tz… 
Name of interviewee: ________________________________________________________ 
Name of organization: _______________________________________________________  
Role in organization: ________________________________________________________ 
Duration of interview: initiated at ___h ___m; finished at ___h ___m. (Total = ____h ____m) 
Consent form: provided...; signed…; collected…. 
 
Introductory briefing 
• This interview is part of the research work I am doing to obtain my doctoral degree. The 
purpose of my research is to examine the potential for cooperation between Tanzania and 
Mozambique and between Mozambique and South Africa in the joint conservation of 
shared marine natural resources. 
• Through this interview I would like to understand the role your country may have in this 
type of initiatives. 
• Your participation and any opinions you may share will be considered purely personal, 
even though I may query you on your organization’s positions. 
• I will not use a tape recorder to register your answers, and instead will take written notes. 
• These and other aspects are explained in greater detail in this consent form. [Allow the 
interviewee to read through the consent form] 
• Ask if the interviewee has any questions before starting the interview. 
 
I – GENERAL QUESTIONS 
18. Characterization of the organization (mandate, goals, resources, activities related to 
marine conservation and/or transboundary conservation, involvement with other 
organizations) 
19. Has your organization ever participated in transboundary conservation initiatives? 
20. If yes to 2, use interview script for type B actors before proceeding with the remaining of 
this script. 
 
I would like now to introduce another topic, concerning the position of your 
department/organization/institution in relation to the potential cooperation of your country 
and a neighboring state in the conservation of shared marine resources. I ask you to consider 
that such cooperation would target in particular coral reefs and humpback dolphins. I will 
then first start by asking you some questions about coral reefs and humpback dolphins in 
particular. These questions are therefore of a scientific or technical nature. Please let me 
know if you are not comfortable answering these questions. 
                                                 
227
 Institutions/organizations that may influence a state’s motivation to cooperate in transboundary marine 
conservation. 
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II – KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESOURCES AND ASSOCIATED 
INTERDEPENDENCIES 
21. Coral reefs 
a. Is there any knowledge of the health of the coral reefs in your country being 
dependent on the health of coral reefs in the neighboring country, and vice-versa? 
b. What are the main threats to coral reefs in the region? 
c. Are you aware of any activity in the other country impacting on the coral reefs in 
your country? And vice versa? 
d. Are you aware of any activities of nationals of the other country in the coral reefs 
of your country? And vice versa? 
22. Humpback dolphins 
a. Are there any records of humpback dolphins migrating between your country and 
the neighboring country? 
b. What are the main threats to humpback dolphins in the region? 
c. Are you aware of any activity in the other country impacting on the humpback 
dolphins in your country? And vice versa? 
d. Are you aware of any activities of nationals of the other country related to the 
humpback dolphins in your country? And vice versa? 
 
I would like now to focus on another issue. I will now ask you questions regarding the 
potential cooperation of your country and a neighboring state in the conservation of these 
shared marine resources. 
 
III – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ACTOR 
23. What is the significance of coral reefs conservation for your organization? (ask about 
general or specific actions of the organization concerning coral reefs) 
24. How do you think your country has been doing concerning the conservation of coral 
reefs? (ask respondent for successes and failures) 
25. What do you think should be done differently or in addition to what has already been 
done? (ask about viability of proposed options) 
26. What is the significance of humpback dolphin conservation for your organization? (ask 
about general or specific actions of the organization concerning humpback dolphins) 
27. How do you think your country has been doing concerning the conservation of humpback 
dolphins? (ask respondent for successes and failures) 
28. What do you think should be done differently? Or done in addition to what has already 
been done? (ask about viability of proposed options) 
29. What do you think the main goals of joint conservation of these resources in the 
concerned study area(s) should be? Can you elaborate? 
30. In your opinion, what could be the effects of joint cooperation for the conservation of 
these resources on the goals of your organization? 
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31. How do you think your organization could contribute to cooperation in the conservation 
of these resources? (ask about experience, material means, etc.) 
32. Besides your organization, would there be any other organizations with a stake in the 
joint conservation of these shared marine resources? Can you elaborate on their potential 
roles and contributions? 
 
IV – INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL ACTOR OVER STATE’S POSITION 
33. Has your organization ever collaborated with any of these governmental departments 
before? In what? (ask respondent to give examples) 
34. What did this partnership achieve that you think could not be achieved without your 
organization? 
35. Has your organization ever advocated specific environmental policy directions to 
decision-makers? How? 
36. Was the outcome of that advocacy what your organization expected? Why? 
37. If your country was to cooperate in the conservation of shared marine resources, what 
would be your organization’s preoccupation when communicating with decision-makers 
in that regard? 
 
In this final part of the interview, I would like to ask you to consider how the hypothetical 
cooperation in the conservation of coral reefs and humpback dolphins may be implemented.  
 
IV – SCENARIOS FOR JOINT MARINE CONSERVATION  
38. Consider that, among other measures, the two countries decide to create marine protected 
areas for the conservation of coral reefs and humpback dolphins. Which of these three 
scenarios seems more adequate to you (show figures in the next page)? 
a. Two marine protected areas on each side of the border, with each country 
responsible for all the management activities within its MPA; 
b. A single transboundary MPA, with each country responsible for all the 
management activities in its side of the MPAs; 
c. A single transboundary MPA, in which states share management responsibilities.  
(Give some time for the interviewee to analyze the three scenarios) 
 
39. Can you elaborate on your choice by explaining what you think are the limitations and 
advantages of each option? 
 
40. A new approach to marine conservation is the creation of networks of MPAs, that is, 
several MPAs spread in an area of the sea where there are important habitats and species. 
If a network of MPAs is created to protect coral reefs and humpback dolphins, and is 
shared between the two countries, what implications do you foresee for the management 
of the network? 
 
41. Should a network of MPAs address other issues, or should it focus only on the 
conservation of these resources? Why? 
 
Closing debriefing 
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• Mention some of the main points I have learned from interviewing this person. Allow the 
interviewee to give feedback on this. 
• I have no further questions. Is there anything else you would like to say or ask before we 
end the interview? 
• Conclude by thanking for the cooperation. 
 
SCENARIO A: Two MPAs on each side of the border, with each country responsible for all 
the management activities within its MPA. 
 
SCENARIO B: A single transboundary MPA, with each country responsible for all the 
management activities in its side of the MPA. 
 
 
 
SCENARIO C: A single transboundary MPA, with the countries sharing management 
responsibilities within the entire MPA. 
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Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT: Transboundary Networks of Marine Protected Areas: 
Governance Requirements in East Africa 
 
RESEARCHER NAME: Catarina Grilo 
 
RESEARCH INSTITUTION: Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology - Faculty of 
Sciences of the University of Lisbon, Portugal (ICAT/FCUL) 
 
RESEARCHER CONTACTS:  
E-MAIL: ccgrilo@fc.ul.pt  
ADDRESS: Instituto de Ciência Aplicada e Tecnologia. Edifício ICAT, FCUL. 
Campus da FCUL, Campo Grande. 1749-016, Lisboa. PORTUGAL. 
MOBILE NUMBER: (+351) 960 101 668 
 
RESEARCHER SUPERVISOR: Prof. José Guerreiro (ICAT/FCUL)  
E-MAIL: jose.guerreiro@fc.ul.pt 
ADDRESS: Instituto de Ciência Aplicada e Tecnologia. Edifício ICAT, FCUL. Campus da FCUL, Campo Grande. 
1749-016, Lisboa. PORTUGAL. 
PHONE NUMBER: (+351) 217 500 006 
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THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED FOR YOU TO CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN THE 
PRESENT STUDY. 
We invite you to take part in a research study being conducted by Catarina Grilo as part of 
her doctoral thesis in Marine Sciences at the University of Lisbon. Your participation in this 
study is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time without affecting your 
relationship with the researcher, or with the University of Lisbon. The study is described 
below. This description tells you about the purpose and scope of the research. It also tells you 
of any risks, inconvenience, or discomfort you might experience by participating in the 
research. Participating in the study might not benefit you directly, but we might learn things 
that will benefit others. You should discuss any questions you have about this study with 
Catarina Grilo. 
The purpose of this study is to understand if there is a potential for cooperation between 
Tanzania and Mozambique and between Mozambique and South Africa in the creation of 
transboundary networks of marine protected areas. It will also seek to investigate whether this 
potential for cooperation can be realized, and how.  
The data to be collected concerns your personal knowledge about the transboundary region at 
stake and the potential for transboundary marine conservation. This information will be 
collected through an interview that will not be recorded. The researcher will take notes of 
your answers and insights. These notes will be used to create an interview report. If you do 
agree to participate in this study, you will be asked at a later point to collaborate in reviewing 
your interview report to ensure that the answers and insights you have given are appropriately 
stated.  
You may participate in this study if: (i) you are affiliated with a governmental department 
that has a decision-making mandate for the purpose of transboundary marine conservation; 
(ii) you are affiliated with a governmental department or a non-state institution that does not 
have decision-making mandate for the purpose of transboundary marine conservation, but 
that may somehow be affected by it; (iii) you are affiliated with an organization (state or non-
state) that has been previously involved in transboundary conservation initiatives in one of 
the three countries in question. 
This study will be conducted by Catarina Grilo, under the supervision of Prof. José Guerreiro 
(FCUL, Portugal) and Prof. Aldo Chircop (Dalhousie University, Canada). Catarina Grilo 
will be the only person with access to the data, and the sole keeper of participants’ anonymity 
and confidentiality. No risks and discomforts are expected from your participation in this 
research. You do not need to answer any question in regards to which you may feel 
discomfort. The potential risk of your statements being known to third parties will be 
minimized by ensuring that your name and affiliation is not associated to the files containing 
the information you will have provided, nor disclosed in any circumstance. This includes the 
interview report validated by you. Its content will most probably be used in the publication of 
several research articles, but your name or affiliation will not be mentioned (or any 
information that may lead to that) unless you provide written consent. All the information 
you may provide will be transcribed to electronic files, to be kept in a password-protected 
computer folder for at least five years. If the information you provided is critical to 
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substantiate my arguments, you will be asked whether your name can be mentioned. If you 
do not agree, your participation and contribution will remain anonymous, in accordance with 
this consent form. 
Your participation in this research will not bring direct personal benefits to you. Still, you 
will have a singular opportunity to participate in a research study. Additionally, your insights 
are expected to contribute to the general knowledge of the advantages and limitations of 
transboundary networks of marine protected areas, an emergent form of cooperation in 
marine conservation.  
Do not hesitate to ask any questions about the study either before participating or during the 
time that you are participating. I would be happy to share my findings with you after the 
research is completed.  
Please sign your consent with full knowledge of the nature and purpose of the procedures. A 
copy of this consent form will be given to you to keep. 
“I have read the explanation about this study. I have been given the opportunity to discuss it 
and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent to take part in this 
study. However I realize that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
from the study at any time.” 
_______________________________________                             ____________________ 
Signature of the Participant                                                               Date 
 
_______________________________________                             ____________________ 
Signature of the Researcher                                                              Date 
 
 
